Inspector general sopko, welcome to the Foreign Affairs committee. Forward to learning the lessons of afghanistan, but also getting some input to what we should do in the future. Afghanistanes in over the last six years have 10. Aged roughly we mourn those deaths and take them seriously. Compared to the other ,onflicts we are engaged in compared to the training deaths we suffer in our military, we cannot have the exhaustion of 10 years ago blind us to what is the operation now, and what is its cost. I know the chairman has an opening statement, but i will ,ecognize the Ranking Member then i will recognize our witness for his opening statement, and hopefully by then we will hear the chairmans statement. Thank you mr. Chairman pro tem, United States has been in afghanistan for almost 19 years, the longest war in the history of the United States. We sacrificed much on the battlefield, but we achieved a great deal. We decimated al qaeda and greatly weakened their global network. As a result, afghanistan has not been a staging ground for another successful attack against our homeland. After the 9 11 terror attacks, it is clear our approach to foreign threats needed to change. We cannot sit back and wait plot thousandses of miles away. We need to go on the offense, and we did. Our presence in the region thewed us to catch mastermind of 9 11, kill Osama Bin Laden, and more recently removed his son from the battlefield. I visited ambassador crocker many times and saw firsthand the challenges we faced and opportunities we had to succeed. We have led the charge on important issues as well, beyond those on the battlefield that includes supporting democracy and womens rights, countering the drug trade, developing the private sector, promoting economic growth, fighting corruption, and this type of work does not always make the news, but it is vital to our future and security. Unfortunately there have been costly missteps. We know about these missteps because the important work performed by the special Inspector General for. Fghanistan reconstruction since 2001, the United States has spent an estimated 132 billion on development 132 billion. Has found much of this money was wasted or stolen, or failed to address problems it was meant to fix. This is not the best use of american tax dollars. We spent 9 billion on counter narcotics programs, yet today afghanistan is the largest producer of opium which finances our enemies. How is it possible that after two decades, billions of dollars spent, thousands of lives lost, we still cannot slow drug production . Our efforts in counter narcotics have clearly failed. We have also learned our strategy to build an afghan army and police force has not made the security situation any better. The lack of coordination, misuse of funds, and insufficient training for afghans have failed to reduce violence across the country. This is completely unacceptable. The publication of the afghanistan papers, in the Washington Post last month serves as a sober reminder of our past mistakes, and underscores the importance of the Trump Administrations efforts to end this war. The American People have been very patient with our involvement. We have sacrificed greatly. Lost theirn soldiers lives in an attack this weekend. Well it to them and others to get this right. We owe it to them and others to get this right. In 2014 anditiated offers key insights into the complex challenges we face. These evaluations provide opportunities for congress and the executive branch prevent the from happening again in afghanistan or other operations around the world. I would like to thank mr. Sopko for his work on this important report, and appearing here today before this committee. With that, i yield back. We will now hear from john sopko, the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction for five minutes. Thank you very much mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and other members of the committee. Congress created sigar in 2008 to combat waste, fraud, and the reconstruction efforts in afghanistan. We have published over 600 audits, inspections, and other reports that have saved the american taxpayer over 3 billion while convicting over 130 individuals for misconduct related to that reconstruction effort. The 22nd time i have presented testimony to my appointment, today is the first time i have been asked to address sigars unique Lessons Learned program, and what we have learned from it. I think you for that opportunity. In light of the recent attention that our report has gotten, i am pleased to have the opportunity to clear up any misconceptions about what that program does or does not do. As with everything produced high , this produced by sigar programs mandate is limited to just reconstruction, not the war fighting. We do not assess u. S. Diplomatic and military strategies, nor our war fighting capabilities. Likewise, we are not producing an oral history of our involvement in afghanistan, nor opining on whether we should or should not be there. Rather, we are the only u. S. Onernment agency focused conducting research and analysis, which meets strict professional standards aimed at providing an independent and objective examination of u. S. Reconstruction efforts there, and to make practical recommendations to you the congress, and executive Branch Agencies for improving our efforts there and elsewhere. I would like to mention six overarching lessons that you can draw from these thousands of pages of reports we had issued. First, the successful reconstruction is incompatible with continuing insecurity. Secondly, unchecked corruption in afghanistan has undermined our goals there, and we helped foster that corruption. Third, after the talibans initial defeat, there was no clear reconstruction strategy, and no single military service, agency, or country in charge of afghanistan. N in fourth, politically driven timelines undermined our reconstruction efforts. Fifth, the constant turnover of u. S. Personnel, or what we have called the annual lobotomy negatively impacted all of our reconstruction efforts there. Sixth, to be effective, reconstruction efforts must be based on a better understanding of the historical, legal, and political traditions of the host nation. In addition to these key lessons, your staff has asked us to give you certain recommendations that you can focus on now. Here are six. First, in light of the ongoing peace negotiations, congress should ensure that the Current Administration has an actionable plan for what happens the day. Fter peace is declared second, to ensure that congress is made aware of problems in a timely manner it should require agencies to provide regular reports to congress disclosing risks to major reconstruction projects and programs as they occur. This would be analogous to the requirement we have imposed upon publicly traded corporations for the sec. Congress should condition future on budget assistance on a rigorous assessment of the afghan ministries and International Trust funds to ensure they have strong Accountability Measures in place. Fourth, oversight is still missioncritical in afghanistan. This must require administration continues to ensure adequate oversight monitoring and evaluation capabilities continue. Fifth, congress should require agencies to rack and stacked their programs and projects on at least an annual basis to identify their best and worst performing programs. , congress should required to submit for reconstruction efforts that june 2018,dated by and still has not been filed. That was mandated by the National Defense authorization act. In conclusion, our work at sigar is far from done. For all the lives and treasure the United States and its Coalition Partners have expended in afghanistan, the very least we can do is learn from our successes and failures there, to improve future operations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and i look forward to your questions. Good morning. Nation has been at war in afghanistan for more than 18 years. Sink in, and let that more than 2000 american lives lost, thousands more wounded. More than 60,000 afghan deaths, and more than 900 billion spent on a war that has dragged on for almost two decades, and is not include what it will take to take care of our veterans and years to come. After all that time, we are in a military stalemate. In 2001, the United States invaded afghanistan with a clear objective to defeat al qaeda and its taliban hosts, and prevent a repeat of 9 11. Our Coalition Partners and many were deadior leaders or fled into hiding. In 2002, president george w. Bush said, and i quote, the history of military conflict in afghanistan has been one of initial success followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure, we are not going to repeat that mistake. Yet here we are today 18 years later having made precisely that mistake. What happened . There is a lot to unpack when we look at what went wrong. Some things are clear. We got distracted by the war in , notby an administration an endgame in afghanistan. We entered into a questionable alliance with pakistan which continued to support and arm the telegram, provide them safe haven, and allow them to strengthen its hand in afghanistan. We changed missions, change priorities, and lost sight of what was considered a just war. Our role in afghanistan constantly evolved as we plodded along year after year to what now feels like a neverending war. In 2008, congress established the special general for reconstruction in afghanistan, which we call sigar, to conduct oversight in the war in afghanistan. In 2014, we called on sigar to do something that had not been done, conduct original research into the war, look at its failures, and Lessons Learned. Today we focus on those Lessons Learned. This past december, the Washington Post published hundreds of interviews and documents sigar collected, but the Lessons Learned program, m. These documents helped fill in significant gaps in our understanding of the u. S. War in afghanistan. They show a years Long Campaign of misrepresentation by our military officials. Youre after year we heard, we are making progress. Year after year we are turning a corner. Administrations of both parties promised we would avoid falling into a trap of nationbuilding in afghanistan. And military officials were painting a rosy picture, the reality was a deepening quagmire with no end in sight. It is a damming record. It underscores the lack of honest conversation between the American People and their leaders about what we are doing in afghanistan, and why we are doing it. Even in the light of this new information, the Trump Administration is not righting the ship on our afghanistan policy. Lessons learned reports have confirmed the longstanding view that there is no military solution to the conflict in afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration in 2017 announced it would send more troops to afghanistan and waited 18 months before naming an envoy to focus on afghanistan conciliation. That is a long time when we have troops in the field under fire. Just this past december, this Committee Held a hearing after President Trump derailed peace talks with the telegram over twitter, as we have come to expect from the president. The announcement came after a year of the administration blocking Key Information from congress and the American People about the status of the war. Secretary pompeo has still to this day refused to let the Top State Department negotiator in testify in an open hearing about the status of peace talks. There is so much more for us to understand about how we wound up here, and how we move forward in afghanistan. Inspector general sopko, i am pleased to discuss your findings and show your perspective. I recognize your opening. Tatement that you already gave i will call my friend the Ranking Member. Any further statements . No, ok. This morning, special inspector , i now, john sopko recognize you for five minutes. You have done that. Now it is time for questions. Despite sigars welldocumented account, the Trump Administration made no real change in strategy. 2017 south asia strategy suggested the war would battlefield and force the taliban to the negotiating table under favorable terms. He even dropped the mother of them tos to shock bending to our will, and it did not work. Did you make your reports available to the white house and other parts of the Trump Administration . When presented with evidence this war would not be won militarily, why do you think the president sent more troops to afghanistan . Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. It is not my jurisdiction to ,valuate strategic level policy so i cannot comment directly why the president did or did not do. We did brief senior staff. I spent over two hours briefing with my staff the chairman of the joint chief of staff on our Lessons Learned reports. We briefed senior officials of the state department as well as those at the nsc, and elsewhere. We advise them on what has worked or what has not worked on military policy, and our report has highlighted a number of things that have worked. I leave it up to them to make the decision as to how to proceed on that. I cannot not really think i can comment further on that. 2002, president thee w. Bush said, history of military conflict in afghanistan has been one of success followed by years of floundering and ultimate failure. We are not going to repeat that mistake. Looking back at that statement, president bush was right, and subsequent administrations did repeat that mistake after the initial military victory over the telegram, there were long years of floundering and failure. Officeere many your interviewed that felt we lost focus in afghanistan because of the bush administrations focus on iraq. Do you agree with that, and to what would you attribute this failure . I am sorry, mr. Chairman. I did not quite hear your full question. Do i agree with what president bush his statement . President bush said, the history of military conflict in afghanistan is one of success flounderingyears of and ultimate failure. We are not going to repeat that mistake. That is the end of the quote. Looking back at this statement, right,sident was president bush, except his administration and subsequent administrations did repeat that mistake. After the initial military victory over the taliban, there have been long years of floundering and failure, and there are many including those in your office interviewed that felt we lost focus in afghanistan because of the bush administrations focus on iraq. I am asking if you agree with any of those, and what you would attribute this failure. Reported ine have our Lessons Learned programs that we did lose focus on afghanistan. We allowed the telegram to basically come back, there was a resurgence of the taliban. We have noted that was a mistake. We have noted as a result, there was a surge under the Obama Administration of troops, as well as a surge on reconstruction and development aid. To nots in response focusing on afghanistan issues. Let me ask you a final question. I understand from your letter to the editor of the washington the that you feel newspaper mischaracterized your efforts. How would you respond to some of the observations of the interviewees . For example, this quote from bob crowley, an army colonel who served as a counterinsurgency adviser to u. S. Military commanders in 20132014 . This is a quote. Day it was altered to present the best picture possible. It totally unreliable but reinforced everything we were doing was right, and we became a self licking ice cream cone. Could you comment on that please. Mr. Sopko i am happy to do that. That quote is similar to what we have been reporting almost since i have become an Inspector General. I noticed, and it is not just on the military side, but on the develop inside and again, i do not focus on the war fighting. Ime Inspector General for reconstruction, not how well of inspector foran reconstruction. Whatrst trip over there, dod was saying was going on and what i saw in my staff was seeing on the ground is one of the reasons we performed or came about to do the Lessons Learned report. The problem is there is a disincentive to tell the truth. , and it is incentive for many reasons i know my time is up, but there are many reasons we can discuss that we have created an incentive to almost require people to live. Lie. Ople to i do not want to sound like fromhing from bul irl ives thaton a hot tin roof, there is an odor of audacity. Mendacity and hubris. You create from the bottom up an incentive because of short time frames, you are there for six months, nine months, or a year to show success. That gets reported up the chain, and before you know it the president is talking about a success that does not exist. At, is a good issue to look the does that tell us about way we do business, whether in afghanistan or maybe here in the United States. Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman, i remember visiting with the general who led our forces in tora bora. He said if i had a few more men, we could have taken them out. I think about that because had we taken out bin laden in the early days, who knows .