Transcripts For CSPAN Hearing On U.S.-China Relations Post-C

CSPAN Hearing On U.S.-China Relations Post-Coronavirus July 12, 2024

Coronavirus pandemic continues. Spoken policy experts about chinas global influence and why continued engagement with china is in the best interest of the u. S. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time. Before we proceed to our topic the National Security implications of the u. S. And china relationship in a post covid world, housekeeping matters. The session will be conducted on an unclassified basis p all participants should refrain from discussing any class of either other information protected from public disclosure. The committee is conducting this virtual hearing with House Resolution 965 and the regulations for the conduct of Remote Committee proceedings. It is being broadcast on the committees website. Like many of you, i would have preferred to hold this hearing in person but because of the threat posed by covid19, it remained serious and widespread. We are proceeding in the best manner we can, remotely in todays case, in order to ensure the safety of our witnesses, members, staff, and the public. Todays conversation is essential to our oversight of how the nation should adapt to meet the challenge posed by an increasingly assertive china, especially as this shift occurs against the backdrop of a Global Pandemic with farreaching and unseen implications. I had hoped that this would be a bipartisan discussion. Unfortunately, without reason or justification, our republican colleagues once again have ided to i hope they will join us for future unclassified public closeds and unclassified roundtables. We will continue to have them as they are being used to frame the oversight issues and requests and inform our members of the myriad threats facing the country. The American People expect the congress will continue doing its job even in the pandemic and that means showing up, at a minimum whether we want to or not, whether conducted remotely or in person. These hearings and supplemental roundtables are essential business and integral it and our responsibilities in the classified round. Realm. The American People have a right to expect us to conduct business in a way that prioritizes the safety of witnesses and the public. That me remind members of the remote hearing procedures, consistent with regulations, the committee will keep microphones muted to limit background noise. Members are responsible for on muting themselves when they seek recognition. Because there are sometimes delays when muting or on muting unmuting, ensure the last member has stopped talking. Members and witnesses must have their cameras on at all times. If you need to step away, leave your camera on. If you encounter technical difficulties, please contact Technical Support through the channels established prior to this hearing. Our technical staff will work to get you back up and running as quickly as possible. Consistent with past practice, i will at appropriate times recognize members for their five minutes in order of seniority, starting with those present at the commencement of the hearing. Thank you for your patience as we proceed under these unusual circumstances. Todays hearing is convened at the height of a Global Pandemic, as evidenced by the virtual format of this hearing. Covid19 has daily and fundamentally shaped our lives. Unfortunately and undoubtedly, covid19 will have similar impacts on u. S. National Security Issues and must prompt the committee to reexamine its standing priorities. Several witnesses prepared payments for the record and referred to this unique moment in history as clarifying. For the United States, it is evident that the National Security and intelligence challenges that we face in coming decades will have considerably evolved from the post9 11 world. U. S. Allies and partners, the reliability, capability, and staying power of the United States appears at the moment far off and uncertain. China, in the midst of a strategic window of opportunity, the pandemic continues to offer a new has for beijing to assert longstanding sovereignty claims , bringing parity and emerging technology to shape the broader International Order in a manner conducive to its own interests. Just yesterday, china moved to implement sweeping new National Security legislation in hong kong, permanently fracturing hong kongs present judicial independence. China engaged in deadly clashes along the line of actual in the tragic death of a dozen indian soldiers and an unknown chinese death toll as well. Scientists that recently identified a new flu strain with pandemic attentional, demonstrating the Global Health events of International Concern will continue to emanate from china. Notwithstanding the implications of these events, the landscape of the international economy, and the united date and chinas respective roles in it, it will be more directly impacted by covid19. Growing calls for the u. S. To pursue a strategy of technological decoupling and increase the resilience of the u. S. Supply chain, present real choices for policymakers. In the face of chinas one built, one Road Strategic Initiative and washingtons ability to clearly communicate economic benefits of continued engagement with the u. S. Has proven limited. The Committee Takes these shifting dynamics seriously. We initiated the china deep dive and set out to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Intelligence Communitys ability address multifaceted challenges that china poses. Our findings remain with the Intelligence Community for comment and a declassification review and we have identified several areas requiring additional focus and oversight. Our annual intelligence authorization act will continue to champion the importance of collection and analysis on chinafocused issues. Competing with china cannot and should not be a slogan. It requires deliberate policy action and careful introspection about how we draw on our inherent strengths. Inone of our witnesses notes prepared testimony, we cannot underestimate the benefits associated with safeguarding and championing the promise of american opportunity. Navigatested states an increasingly fraught bilateral relationship with china, particularly in conjunction with a Global Recovery from covid19, its prudent to take stock and prepare. Today, we hope to do just that. I want to welcome our witnesses. We will proceed with fiveminute Opening Statements going in the following order. Ross, director, center of u. S. China relations, asia , asian, then dr. Evan studies, and distinguished fellow, school of foreign the seniord then fellow for Foreign Policy at the brookings institution, and finally, merit this meredith sumter. With that, why dont we begin with you . You are recognized for five minutes. You are all recognized for five minutes. Thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing. Unmute. Thanks to the community as well for holding this hearing. It comes at an extraordinary time. With the interNational Security law in hong kong, just sort of at the beach, it is more relevant than ever. Suggest for a moment why this is such a moment of inflection. I think it has become increasingly evident that china is not just a trade question, a question of how the global marketplace has itself but it is also a military question and now, it is more obvious than ever that it is also a question about competition. I think, between systems and values. Relationship in a different frame of reference. When i say that, what i mean is to manywere accustomed a long piece in the record is my testimony. The center of how we related to china. What were the presumptions of that . 1972 with in kissinger and nixon going to china. If we simply engaged across the board, that slowly, we would e a greater likelihood of out of the cold war. What is so extraordinary about the policy of engagement, and i am not one of the people who believes in the policy. I believe it is a failed policy. It is not erroneous precisely because for a administrations can eight administrations, the United States thought it was the height of leadership to china bend china, to help assist china to work out of its revolutionary period. Marketplace, International Order, etc. , etc. I think if you look at all these different administrations and go through them one by one in your record, it is so striking to see how one president , republican usually,rat, ultimately, they embraced the notion that we should try to engage china, so what happened . Just a cut to the chase, what happened was that we have a regime in china now thats very different in its set of pathway wes than the have laid out by deng xiaoping. Without reform, without the presumption that china will both reform economically and politically, to some degree, engagement has no basis because if you are not converging, then you are diverging, and if china actually is not trying to slowly old maoistof its form of government, it is deciding that that is what it is and that is what its model is and that is what it is going to be projecting around the world. That is indeed what i think we see in hong kong today so i think we are at a tremendously dangerous moment. We do not have a framework for dealing with china. We have a framework that failed. We dont know what is going to replace it. A very frayed alliance system. I think that is most one of the most critical elements that should be focused on. Last point. It is with great regret that a note republican colleagues this is an issue and normas interest in actually, of some agreement. The fact that we cannot get together with washington in a thertisan way to perfect framework, a new formulation, inasmuch agreement here as there is for any other issue. Let me stop here. Thanks. You are absolutely right. It is lamentable. It was not for a lack of our trying. I want to assure you of that. I should also mention that many of us find ourselves having a nice library, which is featured behind us, but none of us can hold a candle to you. Wonderfulfor that introduction to our hearing today. Lets go to dr. Medeiros. Thank you. Members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to discuss the u. S. China relationship and its impact on National Security and intelligence in a postcobit world. From a Historical Perspective and with an eye on the past 40 years of u. S. China relations, i am hardpressed to identify a time since normalization in 1979 when so much was in flux. A key time, perhaps the key time, to examine the forces driving the u. S. China relationship, especially from the perspective of the role that policymakers and the Intelligence Community can play. In my presentation, i want to focus on three issues. Number one, the current state of the relationship. The impact of covid and policy recommendation. First, regarding the current state of relationships, i would argue there is a unique and worrisome convergence in the short term cyclical drivers, things like the lack of communication, the president s personal ties to xi jinping, and how politicized relations have become, with the longterm structural drivers of the relationship such as the fact that there are now new and expanding sources of competition , security, economics, technology, and even ideology. And both of these cyclical or short term drivers and the longterm structural drivers are pushing the relationship in a more competitive and confrontational direction. This is occurring at the same time that many of the classic offers and stabilizers in the relationship against competition such as the role of top leaders, shared global challenges, the role of economic independence in the Business Community are diminishing in their importance and in some cases, certain stabilizers and buffers are simply in operative. It is uncertain that a new u. S. President could or would fundamentally change this dynamic or perhaps less likely that xi jinping would change the course in the coming years, but i think we should accept that this convergence of short term and longterm structural will be with us for a long time. Given these dynamics, covid19 could not have come at a worse time for the relationship, given the fact that it is facing multiple stresses. I believe that the pandemic has had the following effects on this relationship. Number one, it has extension weighted the trusting polarization in both countries. In the United States, covid has highlighted the differences between our political system and increased pressure for economic decoupling from china. The pandemic has reinforced beliefs that the United States seeks to contain china and globally and delegitimize the communist party at home. This has produced a cycle of usual recrimination that is getting worse. The covid has politicized u. S. China relationship. Delete politics elite politics in china. They are criticizing china and the ccps role in spreading covid19 to elect the covid 19 campaign. For chinese politicians, being resolute has become a common theme promoted by the communist party. Number three, as covid has spread globally, china has used what many call its mask diplomacy, its offers of material assistance. But unfortunately, or fortunately, this diplomacy has consistently alienated many countries. Chinese diplomats have pushed other countries to praise chinas efforts and disparage those countries who criticize china. They have been using diplomacy but in a way that alienates a lot of countries. Lastly, it is the issue of whether or not we are facing chinese activism or opportunism. It has been the activism in advancing its territorial claims including within br, japan, vietnam, malaysia, and perhaps others. Understanding chinas precise motives is difficult. Nonetheless, it is generating a lot of instability in east asia. Policy close with four recommendations. Number one, the United States needs to rethink competition. American policymakers need to debate how to compete with china on what issues, in what theaters, and with what tools, and perhaps most importantly, at what cost. Need to rebuild communication. A central challenge for u. S. Policymaking policymakers Going Forward is going to be to reconceptualize and then rebuild bilateral communication in a manner that serves u. S. Interests. Keeping in mind that beijing has dialogue in the past to play for time and advantage, new channels will need to be both results driven, frequent balancing of quality and quantity. Number three, we need to reset our expectations about the future of the relationship and adjust our strategy and policy accordingly. In particular, resetting expectations about where givenss can be achieved the resistance to change in china, but also, we need to be mindful that we are going to have to reset our expectations about being comfortable with tolerating friction in the relationship but also adept at managing and using friction to serve american interests. Lastly, and i will conclude on this point, i think that the u. S. Government needs to reconstitute its open source analysis of china. Involve thegoing to Intelligence Community expanding what used to be a very substantial effort and is now shrunken. , cheneyse analysis intentions and policies, is an essential component to understanding the overall trajectory of china as well as u. S. China relations. To do it. The u. S. Government had a very extensive bureaucracy devoted to open source analysis, especially in collaboration with universities and think tanks. I dont think the u. S. China relationship is any less a consequential challenge and as a result, open source analysis needs to be rebuilt, expanded, and this will require new resources and leadership. I conclude my opening presentation and would like to submit my formal written statement for the record and welcome any and all questions. Thank you. Your written statement will be included in the record. To dr. Turn thank you for the invitation to speak at this hearing. Even as the u. S. And india have engaged with china, over the last two decades, their shared concerns for chinas behavior has been a key driver for the partnership. Over the last few months, there have been two Key Developments that have increased those concerns in new delhi. First, the Peoples Liberation army since early may to unilaterally change the status quote. The de facto boundary between the two countries which led to the first clash in 45 years between the two militaries. And second, the coronavirus pandemic. Both these developments have had and will continue to have an impact on indian news and approaches towards china, the United States, and the International Order. Andber 2019, xi Jinping Narendra modi sought to stressed sino indian corporation, however, the pandemic and boundary crisis have demonstrated that despite efforts to engage over the last few decades, chinaindia relationship remains a fundamentally and increasingly competitive relationship that can into conflict. Theboundary crisis and pandemic there continues to be debate about the motivations. Covid19 might have had an impact. At the strategic level, the boundary crisis is part of a battle of chinese assertiveness on a number of fronts. Ity are divided on whether stems from xi jinping wanting to show strength because of concerns about domestic and International Criticism against regimes handling of the beijings desire to take advantage of other countries including the United States being on the back foot or distracted due to the coronavirus. The pandemic seems to have had an impact at the operational level. They sought to

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