Transcripts For CSPAN Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates

Experience serving under president s George W Bush and barack obama. This is 45 minutes. My name is steve, on behalf of the crown family, its my pleasure to welcome to you the econd annual distinguished lecture or u. S. Foreign policy. We hosted lecture former defense secretary jim audience front of an of 900 people, a situation that unthinkable today. The pandemic has transformed ociety and international relations, along with protests, there are fundamental questions americas Global Leadership, image, and power. These questions have elevated work of tance of the the Lester Crown Center on u. S. Policy and the Chicago Council on which i and my founded. This is a forum for a discussion f perspectives on the big global questions. It can be policy makers, military leaders and journalists and analysts on the council same time to discuss their insights and others. Lic the center produces original research to deepen our proposed ing of the solutions to critical global challenges including their report, the annual Chicago Council survey of opinion on u. S. Foreign policy. The 2020 installment will be released later in the summer. As the council approaches its centenarian in 2020, the center enhance this to important work well into its century. Turning to this afternoons program, its my honor to welcome our distinguished speaker, by way of a recent introduction, he was the 22nd of defense under both president george w. Bush and president barack obama. An officer in the United States air force who orked in the c. I. A. Before being appointed directly with the agency. He was a member of the national in four staff administrations and served eight political of both parties. His nongovernmental leader roles including president of texas a m from 2002 to 2006. E is credibilitily chancellor of the college of william mary. E is the author of four books latest. Ng his r. Gates will be in a conversation today with the president of the Chicago Council Affairs Since 2013, served as a u. S. Permanent 2009sentative to nato from to 2013 and on the National Staff under cil president bill clinton. Coauthor. Adies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming former secretary of state and official of the c. I. A. Dr. Robert m gates and ambassador. Thank you, steve, and thanks to the crown family for the nvaluable support of the council which allows us to deliver the timely and critical a eign policy analysis to growing national and global audience. Elcome to all of you today for joining us. If this is your first event with us, please take a moment to website at r www. Thechicagocouncil. Org. We host over 100 programs, we do research on a whole variety of issues that may be important to you. The record, a n recording will be available on our website and on social media after we finish. Please share this with your family and your friends. Reminder, the council is an independent and nonpartisan expressednd the views by individuals we host are their own and do not represent the or viewsonal positions of the council. Ill start a conversation with and after about 30 minutes or so, well take your questions which you can typing ccga. Live into your browser. Submit the question you would to ask secretary gates. Lease also consider purchasing secretary gates latest book. A chance to t had purchase before todays event, in the chat t function here on zoom. Thank you for joining us here really ernoon, its reat to be back on the Chicago Council. Sec. Gates its great to be back here with you. Vo congrats on a terrific book, its a good and easy lead. Ou chronicled the exercise of power over the last 30 years by four different president s, well comment on the themes and commonalities in a moment. You were in the administration of George W Bush as the cold war winding down and as the gulf war was taking place. Of the c. I. A. Or in the final couple of years of that administration. In thatut yourself back situation at the end of the administration looking forward postcold war period, what did you think that world would look like and what did you think, what did you think at hat time americas role in it would be or should be . Sec. Gates most Intelligence Officers are pessimistic by nature. N fact, the Washington Post at one point called me the lightning and the darkest cloud. When i stood in my office at i was director in december of 1992, i was really about the future. We, the United States dominated world in a comprehensive way ilitarily, politically, econnormally, culturally, as i ay in the book, unparalleled since probably the roman empire. Some e actually making progress on middle east peace the demise after the iraq gulf war and we obviously have Good Relationship with russia at that point president eagan and bush had both worked with we had reached out to yeltsin, the president of russia and the leader of the union, if you will. I really thought the future was bright and we had a great team in the first bush baker was ion, jim ecretary of state, dick chaney was secretary of defense and sokov was national ecurity advisor, we worked together smoothly and it looked like the prospect was very bright. Ivo when you read your book, it doesnt look like the last 30 that every panned out in he way you were hoping in some ways. The big question is what went wrong . Sec. Gates that was the germ of n idea that really led to my writing the book was given where 1992 and t the end of fast forward 30 years and we are at every turn by challenges both internal and xternal, perceived as withdrawing from a Global Leadership role, in some respect we are. Were fighting three crises here inside the United States, a racial a es, an economic crisis, Public Health crisis and thayer ll linked together in one way or another and were paralyzed. The congress cant do anything consequence because of the partisan divide. Wanted to go we get look at how did in his place, particularly terms of the world. What were the things that went rong and where there successes that we could point to. Review 15 book to different Foreign Policy challenges that we experienced years, the ast 30 bvious ones, russia, china, iran, iraq, afghanistan, but the right thing and not getting into syria, did thing in the way so the about others, book is really, tries to address did uestion you asked, how we go from the pinnacle at the 1992 to where we are today. Ivo before i get to sort of answer which also lays out your where we need to go, as major national15 security issues, crises, pick one or two where we did it it right, wewe got did the right thing and it way. Ed out in the right sec. Gates the two biggest in esses that i write about he book is colombia on a bipartisan basis under three successive president s, we were its to help colombia pull of becoming brink a state controlled by criminal syndicates. President clinton and one of the lessons was we local partner ng in president uribe who was strengthen the institutions of colombia. He was anticorruption. He was dedicated to democratic and he ls and ideals wanted the colombians to do it themselves. Of then on the other side the coin, the Congress Actually limited the size of the presence the u. S. Could have in colombia. People, lly it was 400 u. S. People in uniform and it finally grew to 800 but that was and the same thing on civilians. So it forced an arrangement in support of e columbians going against them themselves. Provided the equipment and intelligence, but they carried the fight. The other aspect of it, this is instances in e which the sTate Department was there were many agencies that were involved, the or Ice Department over 10 12year period trained something columbian judges. The main point was we had a partner and we were in support of that partner rather than doing the job ourselves. The other success was president initiative to deal with africa. Aids in and, again, it had broad for tisan support considerable funding, tens of illions of dollars over an extended period of time that literally saved millions and lives in africa and one of the things that made it ork was that a number of different agencies in washington had a role in it, but the designated a Single Person to be in charge in the Tate Department who had authority over the budget and over the programs so there was a and an integration of all the government efforts in that was very, very are and the entire project ended up being really enormously successful. Were two important successes i think during the period and quite honestly, out examples that i cite, two are about the only successes. Ivo i was going to ask you about the other 13. Where you think we really got it wrong and the get to the well lessons that we learned from both of those about where we should go in the future. We go back those 30 years, where wrong . Really get it sec. Gates i think one of the main lessons of the book and it raws on our experience in somalia, haiti, iraq, and fghanistan is that in every case, our initial military and ement was successful the original military mission was accomplished quickly. The taliban and al qaeda were usted from afghanistan literally in about five weeks. Overthrown in time. Arly small period of our original humanitarian effort in somalia was very successful our troops. But the one characteric all four had in common that led to that we undertook to, we undertook nation building. To change the culture each of olitics of those countries, each with its own long history, some like a long history with in every instance those a failure. Gely were and weve spent many years in iraq and afghanistan and one of the points that i make in the book is that i we were in a position to have left afghanistan in january 2002. We had an internationally recognized government there, all f the different parties have come together and agreed on lead y to be an interim leader. The government had international recognition, a number of countries were prepared to afghan te money for reconstruction and construction nd that would have been a moment for us to leave. But in every case, it was the a success, sion was but only when we expanded our and became too ambitious in terms of what we were going to try and do in each these countries that we ended up getting into trouble. Factor in success and failure seems to be that if youre going to involve yourself a nation building exercise or helping a nation to solve the and y and economic political problems that may have led to the conflict, if you dont have a partner that on the leads that ground, youre not going to be able to success, you cant do it someone else. Sec. Gates you cannot impose country. On another one of my favorite quotes is from churchill where at the end 1944 was urged to overthrow a greece, ship in athens, who was actually a very strong impose a e allies and democratic government and churchills response was democracy is not a har lot to be picked up in the street at the point of a tommy gun. The point is you cant impose at the point of a gun. So if youre going to be nation building, i think what we didnt understand hope my is the lesson i book teaches, is it really is a and it sayndertaking predominantly civilian undertaking. What we can do is encourage them, give them help as we did colombia in Institution Building training judges and getting law, a to the rule of variety of civilian agencies nvolved such as Development Assistance with u. S. Agency for International Development and so n, so if were going to be involved in nation building and in some places i think we can be at very low cost, it has to be a civiliandominated understandwe have to that its a very long timeline. Had troops in south korea, weve had them for 70 years. South korea did not become a democracy until well into the 1980s. It was a long process. We had tens of thousands of troops in the country for that so this is not something that can be done with say, rt time line or, as i at the point perfect a gun. Ivo let me remind our audience, to ask a question of secretary gates, you can do so browser and o your ask a question there and well few minutes. N a the overarching lesson, i think, this set of issues point to that really is at the core of book is that the overmilitarization of our Foreign Policy, that the is not only just a very united ument that the states has, but has displaced other nonmilitary instruments engagement broad. Nd part of it is a very strong military, the other part of it weakening sTate Department and economic instruments and other instruments of power that we had. Why did that happen . Cold war after the with the peace dividend, the military actually gone down and means of our y poweren emphasized more than it turned out they were . Sec. Gates a lot of people one of the e that significant contributing factors o success in the cold war were the nonmilitary instruments of power. The cold war took place against backdrop of the biggest arms buildup, arms race in the world, but the because the soviet union and the nited states could not fight without both countries being destroyed, that competition took place using other means. For example, our decades long soviets deny the technology that would assist their military programs, but modernization of their economy. Trategic communications, the United States information agency, you know, its hay day in the Kennedy Administration under people like dward r. Murrow and in the Reagan Administration under people like charlie wick had reached to every corner of the world. 1990s, i think because of the hubris that came with war and our e cold standing alone atop the world, you will, i think that the ongress and president s essentially thought that these instruments could be dismantled. It was the congress in 1998 that eliminated the United States information agency, the congress wanted to time eliminate u. S. Agency for International Development and clinton refused to do that, but then tucked the agency under the sTate Department where had less independence and lower profile. All of these instruments that we either dismantled or saved of resources, even as the military, t had some budget cuts during the 1990s after the end of the cold war, but it remained strong. Ly so it was kind of it was a man bites dog story when at the first year of secretary in the fall of 2007, i called peech in which i for more resources for the sTate Department. Obody had ever heard of the secretary of defense calling for more resources for the state secretary of t as state condi rice would like to remind me, i had more people in than she had in the foreign service. With respect to vermilitarization, it kind of recalls the old principal, if the only tool you have is a hammer, than every problem looks like a nail. Nd so i think we began to look at International Problems through that lens and that was view the reasons in my hat we overmilitary advertise ourover military advertised Foreign Policy. It was a tool rather than a last resort. Ivo the muscle memory for these you point out in the book that President Trump tried to cut sTate Department assistance by 30 in 2017, again in 2018 and those numbers,ed but those numbers are still is necessary hat for the sTate Department to be the kind of effective rganization that you think it should be, the economic instruments could be stronger capable, the communication ability of the more robust. To be is eed more resources, how that going to happen . Sec. Gates one of the ironies f the last 20 years or so is that as congress has become more of more soured on the use military force, at the same time they have cut the resources for nonmilitary instruments of power, so kind of where are you going from there . Dont want to use the military, but youre not going the civilian sector of Foreign Policy, the instruments, then how do you sustain Global Leadership. My concern is that we are perceived and are ithdrawing from our global responsibilities. I think its because people dont understand and our leaders educate the o American People that engagement n the world is not about some objective, uistic for our Public Health and security is for us to be able to shape the International Environment and we through these instruments, through institutions we have helped and through our allies and friends. Make in the book is, if youre going to be able o sell the congress on providing more resources for these nonmilitary instruments, that so have to recognize many of them are outdated, that our National Security structures based on the 1947 law that was passed sort of in the of the cold war and the eed for a restructuring of the National Security apparatus, the Tate Department needs significant reform, both culturally, and other agencies i think need change as well. Nly if theyre willing to make these changes or if theyre willing to make these changes, then you have a stronger go to the congress and get more resources. I think part of the problem is them ss doesnt see operating very well and, therefore, just didnt want to more money into a structure that it doesnt think works or effective. Vo before we go to the questions which w