Tweets. Pentagon and state Department Officials reviewed u. S. Readiness for a biological attack. The response to the coronavirus and foreign adversaries using chemical agents. They appeared before two house subcommittees. Theill come to the hearing Armed Services subcommittee on capabilities. Rules andnce with regulations, the host will mute all participants. All participants are asked to while notelves muted engaged in the discussion, which should limit echoes or other disruptions. In instances in which members yield back, but do not remember to remute themselves, we will do so. Members and witnesses are responsible for a new think themselves. It may take unmuting themselves. A timekeeper will monitor the time for the hearing. If you are on the computer, you can view the timer by switching your personal view to grade or active speaker and thumbnail view. You can pin the timer by hovering your cursor over the timer. With that, we are ready to begin. Please count down from five so the system displays your video, for fivese pause additional seconds while the recording begins and start proceedings. This joint subcommittee hearing with the House Foreign Affairs committee on asia and nonproliferation and the house Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recess at any point and all members will have five days to submit statements, materials, and questions for the record subject to length limitation in the rules. To insert something into the record, halfstaff email. As reminder, please keep your video function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting themselves and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses when they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise. And will quorum recognize myself for opening remarks. I will be followed by the acting Ranking Member mr. Perry, the chairman, and Ranking Members to phonic. I will recognize members in sonority seniority. Before we get started and before i do my opening statement, it would be remiss for us not to mention the president and the first lady, and know they are in our thoughts and prayers and hope for a speedy recovery, and also the tens of thousands of americans who test positive everyday for this virus. Toy are in our thoughts, and underscore that does underscore this is a virus that orsnt know democrat republican, doesnt know what god we worship, what our country of origin is. It is a virus and it does underscore the importance of this topic we are talking about today. It does underscore this is a butrally occurring event, what bad actors may see as they see a threat like this that has brought the world to its knees and has wreaked economic havoc domestically and internationally. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Both having the department of defense and state department underscores the importance of this and my focus has subcommittee chairman, under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot of time talking about nuclear threats, but what we are seeing now is the real vulnerability to biological threats. Just to put that into context, weve not had an Aircraft Carrier brought to its knees by a kinetic missile, but we just saw in the past year, an Aircraft Carrier bratsk airport because of the virus brought to port because of the virus and that underscores what i worry about. I think about it in a couple different ways. Obtainery difficult to Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Technology. Hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iaea to reduce the nuclear threat. That is totally appropriate. We want to make sure Nuclear Technology and weaponry doesnt end up in the hands of bad actors, but if i put my doctorscientist hat on, the ability of technologies to alter viruses and do genetic editing, the knowhow and capabilities, are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. We know there are bad actors, certainly post 9 11, many of us prepared, saw anthrax and other threats and we worried about smallpox and so forth. That is something in a bipartisan way, congress, working with the administration, should really think about. What are the things we have to do to move ahead . I look forward to the witness testimony and there are several and imthink about, going to be curious about from the witnesses. Covid19 and spend the billions of dollars and build the infrastructure to defeat this virus, i also think we should strategically be thinking about how we use those resources to also prepare for bio surveillance, to be ready for the next naturally occurring buts or biological threat, also think about how we have dual use capabilities as we build that infrastructure, to do bio surveillance for manmade threats. As we move forward, also, as we move forward, weve got the bwc, but i think we need stronger, multilateral organizations with likeminded allies. I would be curious how doj and state are thinking about creating those institutions. When i think about the ethic of gene editing and or thats going on the technology, we woul really having created the standards and norms to say this , but this ise dangerous and you probably are not to be playing around with genes. I think that is an appropriate place where the scientific community, congress are to put those standards in place, not just for the United States, but the International Community. Again, our thoughts and prayers are with the president and first lady and those thousands of americans. I would be remiss if i didnt but my doctor hat on for a second and as we enter the following winter, lets do fall and winter, lets do what we can to keep people safe. Lets avoid large, indoor gatherings that we have seen really do act as super. Spreading events and the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter the fall, everyone go out there and get your flu shot, please get your flu shot. With that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, mr. Perry, for five minutes of opening statements. Rep. Perry thank you, chairman. Thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased biosecurity threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the sake of self prevention. The Strong International regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it work. We need to address the shortcomings of u. S. Multilateral engagements and determine where improvements need to be made. International Health Regulations went into force in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. By 2012, only about 20 of all countries were complaint and even today, most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. ThiS Administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning u. S. Engagement in institutions like the world Health Organization. Let me be clear about this, the World Health Organizations complicity in spreading the coronavirus should not be rewarded with United States indifference to its failures. Os strong affiliation with the Global Health security agenda raises concerns about the longterm efficacy. There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investment in bio security lends itself to a perfect permanent condition of moral hazard or select committees communities, like the United States, are compensating for the lack of investment by other states. There is only so much we can do alone. Key programs like the state departments bio security Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like china, cuba, iran, north korea, sudan, or syria, despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses. Countries like north korea have a clearly offensive biological weapons Weapons Program with no end in sight. How do we confront the fact that we have an unreliable International Biological weapons control regime . More importantly, in measuring success against the spread of bio threats, what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions . Providednds, china has a gift to nonstate actors that wish us harm. They have shown us on the world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the american economy, as well as our society. Threats to our way of life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus, and this time we hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today as they speak more about Synthetic Biology and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications that Synthetic Biology can posed to the United States, especially in light of the fact that several countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens correction, in subpart laboratory settings. I do also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, to hope hicks, and to anybody that has been affected by the virus, whether they have contracted it or whether it has occurred in their family members, loved ones, or community. We are all dealing with it one way or the other. I surely thanked the chairman for the time and i yield the balance. Thank you, mr. Perry. Let me now recognize the chairman of the intelligence and emerging threats subcommittee and Armed Services committee. You, chairman. I want to begin by acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady in the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. I know they are in all of our thoughts and prayers are now, and the people around the president S Administration who may also be experiencing the effects of the virus. We pray that they all have a quick and full recovery. Mr. Chairman, i want to thank my colleagues, the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific, and nonproliferation. Particularly, chairman and Ranking Member yo. I know mr. Perry is standing in for the Ranking Member right now. Thank you all for hosting this timely joint hearing on virus security. I recognize Ranking Member stefanik, as was my colleagues on the subcommittee. Which, as weic have seen of late, is vital to our nations security. I am very pleased that we are holding this very important joint hearing. Emerging biological techniques, sequencing, gene editing, and Synthetic Biology are rapidly changing the scope and scale of biological threats, and can lead to an increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge, biological threats are easy to greet easier to create than other weapons of mass distraction used in concert mass destruction. Toy enable a rogue actor inflict major damage on a military power. Just last month, the republic of Georgias Health ministry suffered a cyber attack from abroad. The database that stores medical documents from abroad on the database that stores Michael Douglas and national covid19 meant medical documents and national covid19 medical information. Including those in the u. S. , u. K. , and canada. So these attacks and the current Global Pandemic underscore the importance of collective scientific research, preparedness, and security across interagencies, and with our allies and for national and economic security. In a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a novel, highly infectious pathogen, we must ensure the interagency is working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen biological security across the range of threats. The defense Threat Reduction agency, through its execution of the department of defenses reduction biological Threat Reduction program and its text technical analysis, has been receiving popular requests for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety, bio security, and and bio surveillance support to a protection aid protection. There have been many good examples of the btrp training local professionals in countries like guinea, liberia, jordan, and thailand to diagnose and confirm the first cases of covid19 in their countries. Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats and the impact they could have on the National Security and economy, and as a pandemic that could arguably present the single grades threat to our country, was starting to spread across the globe. The president s budget address was delivered in february with a 36 cut to the cooperative Threat Reduction programs funding from last years enacted level at a time when the United States is struggling ot respond to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus. We are alarmed by the departments significant reduction in the budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. Thankfully, the house has acted. In fiscal year 2021, National Defense authorization act, hr6 395 added back 135 million to the program. 89 million of that was additional funding for the cooperative biological Engagement Program. The department of defenses chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop medical countermeasures, vaccines, therapeutics, and pretreatment. Its physical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection technologies, diagnosed diagnostics, ppe and decontamination systems. To prepare against potential unknown threats, cbdp bill expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens, making it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of Novel Coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in the National Response to the covid19 pandemic. So, these are obviously challenging times, and we need to double down on these programs. We need to make sure that we are in fact prepared for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country, and make sure that we have all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively, keep our country and perhaps the world safe. Hearing morerd to about the efforts of both departments today, what we can do to help ensure your organizations have the resources needed to prepare for the emerging threats of today and tomorrow, and how we can ensure that your department is ready and able to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis. I joined the host in thanking all of you, especially our witnesses, for joining us today. I yield back to the chairman. Thank you. Let me now recognize Ranking Member of the intelligence and emerging threats and capability subcommittee of the Armed Services committee, Ranking Members to phonic. Fanik. Phonic ste thank you, chairman. I would like to express my thanks to you and the ranking chairman. Thanks to the witnesses from the department of defense and state for being here today. The issue of bio security is one of national importance. As i have stated previously, while the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of the critically Important Mission of countering weapons of mass destruction, in particular, biological threats. The unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we continue to adapt our approach and every response iterate a response. We must learn from the Current Crisis and adjust our strategy to more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next event. This will surely not be the last biological creases this nation crisis this nation and world faces. I am interested in how your organizations and the federal government written large can more effectively use new data sets and Artificial Intelligence to truly modernize our buyers surveillance efforts. We must bio surveillance efforts. We must mature our capacity to measure when and where a biological event may occur and monitor where a pathogen is likely to spread. This must be a global effort. Partnerships we have developed will be critical Early W