Transcripts For CSPAN Policy 20240703

The book was widely sold and is said to have highly influence the cause of abolition. A historian and author will be our guest to discuss the book. Watch books that shaped america, featuring narrative of the life of Frederick Douglass, life at nanticoke p. M. Eastern on cspan, cspan now, or online at cspan. Org. Also, be sure to scan the qr code to listen to our companion podcast, where you can learn more about the authors of the book featured. Books featured. Victor cha, former National Security Council Asian affairs director, and others, testified on security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, the recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and kim jongun, the nuclear is asian efforts, and chinas role in the region. From the Senate Foreign relations subcommittee, this is about an hour and 15 minutes. Welcome, everybody. This meeting of the Senate Foreign relations subcommittee on east asia, the civic, and International Cyber Security Policy will come to order. I would like to begin by thanking senator romney, Ranking Member romney, and members of the committee, for being here. Senator ricketts, as we discussed security and other challenges facing the Korean Peninsula, and u. S. Interests and the role in the region. We are grateful to be joined by three experts in this area dr. Victor cha, mr. Scott snyder , and ms. Jenny town. Im going to introduce each of them more fully in a minute. Despite the passage of 70 years since the end of the korean war, lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula remained elusive, and security concerns stemming from this conflict continue to echo far beyond the region. The alliance between the republic of korea and the United States, forged in mutual sacrifice seven decades ago, remains a key linchpin for peace and prosperity in east asia, and as we have reaffirmed in recent months, the u. S. Commitment to this alliance is ironclad. In april, President Biden welcome south korean president yoon for a visit in which the two leaders unveiled the washington declaration to reinforce extended deterrence and respond to north koreas growing nuclear threats. That same month, senator romney and i and our colleagues passed a Bipartisan Senate resolution to honor the 70th anniversary of our historic alliance, and president yoon also addressed a joint session of congress. In august, President Biden posted a historic summit, and deepened our trilateral cooperation to bring greater peace, prosperity, and security to the indo pacific region. I support the efforts of these leaders to heal old wounds, look for the future, and address shared challenges. This Trilateral Partnership will help to counter the trilateral threat in north korea, to share data on north Korean Missile launches the end of this year. I also commend the strong later language issued in response to the p. R. C. Aggression in the South China Sea. This is an historic moment in the u. S. Alliance, one we can build on to confront a range of security and economic challenges. None of those challenges is of course prudents war against one of those challenges is of course putins war against ukraine. Autocrats across the globe, including xi jinping in china and kim jongun in north korea, or paying close attention to the collective response of the United States and our allies, and will draw lessons based on that response. Kim jongun has been seeking to leverage russias need for a supply of basic munitions to gain access to russias advanced missile technology. At the u. N. Two weeks ago, president yoon vowed that south korea and its allies will not stand idly by, and we must not. I look forward to recommendations from our witnesses as to what we can do together. But among the steps we should take is to better enforce the existing u. S. And International Sanctions against the dprk, including the provision of the bipartisan Otto Warmbier act, which i authored a couple of years ago that took effect in 2019. That law put additional teeth into the sanctions regime, applying secondary sanctions against foreign banks and entities that violate them. The sanctions regime has been subject to a lot of leakage. In fact, the United Nations has identified a variety of schemes the dprk is using to evade those sanctions. And some of the firms that are aiding and abetting them in that effort. North koreas theft of cryptocurrency to fund illegal weapons programs is another area we must monitor and crackdown on. We must also do more to shine a light on the hermits human rights abuses taking place in north korea. The dprks increasing alignment with russia and china raises other concerns that we will discuss as we go forward. There are many other areas where we have to coordinate our efforts with south korea, including covering the p. R. C. s economic coercion, prohibiting export of cuttingedge technologies that can enhance chinas military technology, and the need for the United States and south korea to work with other countries in the region to support our goal of a free and open indo pacific. Have a lot of ground to cover today. For introduce our witnesses, let me turn it over to senator romney for his Opening Statement. Senator romney . Sen. Romney thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you to members of this panel for being here. I have met at least one of you before, but others of you, i have followed by virtue of your expertise, and appreciate your willingness to testify here today and provide your perspective and experience. I apologize in advance for having to leave at 3 20. I have another engagement that i unfortunately will have to run to attend. But i am deeply interested in this topic. I would underscore the significance of the 70 years as an anniversary of the korean war. Dear friends of mine served in that war, in that conflict. And my heart is moved by the sacrifice made by many of the people of your nation excuse me, of the south korean nation as well as our nation, who have served together to provide for the security that now exists in south korea. I recognize, and we all do, that the korean war was at the outset of the cold war, and in some respects we are facing another cold war today. Not with the former soviet union so much as with an assertive china. At the outset of those things, our circumstances are different. One is that the rok has been an extraordinary technological leader and economic powerhouse. It is hard to imagine a place which is more technologically advanced than south korea, that provides more products to the world than south korea. And has fought well above its weight class in the world of Economic Affairs and in geopolitics, which is greatly appreciated here and by other nations around the world. At the same time, north korea has become, at least in my view, more belligerent and more malevolent in the last year or two. We are seeing that not only with aggressive actions with their missiles, but also with various flights and so forth that are threatening, and of course with north korea indicating a potential to provide weapons to russia in their invasion of ukraine. I am concerned about the fact that south korea has a Nuclear Neighbor to its north with a massive investment in conventional as well as nuclear arms, and at the same time does not have a Nuclear Capacity of its own. I would presume if i lived there i would be disturbed by that lack of balance, and would be wondering how that could be remediated. So i look forward to hearing your perspectives on these matters. I share the chairmans deep conviction that it is critical that our nations remain closely aligned, that we combine our support with the support of other nations in the region japan, obviously, in particular. And that association, i would like to get your perspective on as well. With that, mr. Chairman, we will turn to your questions, and we will be able to hear ultimately from our panelists. Sen. Van hollen thank you, senator romney, for those remarks. Now going to introduce more fully our three witnesses. Thank you all again for joining us. We have victor cha, Senior Vice President for asia and korean chair at the center for strategic and international studies, and also the distinguished professor of government at georgetown university. He was appointed in 2021 by the Biden Administration to serve on the defense policy board in as an advisory role to the secretary of defense. From 2004 two 2007, he served on the National Security council and respond from 20042007, he served on the National Security council. He was the delicate at Six Party Talks and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the nsc. The author of seven books, twotime fulbright scholar, and currently serves on an Editorial Board of academic journals, along with many other compliments and expertise. Thank you, dr. Cha, for being here. Scott snyder is a senior fellow for korea studies and director of the program of u. S. Korea policy at the council of Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the council on Foreign Relations, mr. Snyder was senior associate of the International Relations program of the asia foundation, where he founded and directed the center for u. S. Korea policy, and served as the asia foundations rep presented in korea from 2000 to 2004. He was also a senior associate at the forum center for strategic and international studies. He has worked as an asia specialist in the research and studies program of the u. S. Institute of peace, and as acting director of the Asia Societys contemporary affairs programs. He was a pantech visiting fellow at georgetown universitys Research Center in 2005 and 2006, and received a fellowship in 19981999 by the Social Security research council. Again, thank you, mr. Snyder, for being here to share expertise. Jenny count is a senior fellow at the stenson center and director of the 38 north program. Her expertise in north korea, u. S. Dprk relations, u. S. Rok alliance, and the northeast asia Regional Security is well known and established. She was named one of the groundbreakers of 2020, 50 women changing the world, and one of the most creative people in business in 2019 for her role in cofounding and managing the 38 north website, which provides policy and Technical Analysis on north korea. Ms. Town is also an expert reviewer for freedom houses freedom in the world index, where she previously worked on the human rights in north korea project. She served as the assistant director of the u. S. Korea institute at Johns Hopkins school of international studies. Ms. Town, welcome and thank you very much for being with us. Let me now turn it over to you, victor thank you, chairman van hollen, Ranking Member romney and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Im going to use my time to reflect on two recent and important developments with regard to security on the Korean Peninsula. From a us perspective. One of these is positive and one of these is negative, the positive developments relate to the vast improvement. As senator romney suggested in his comments in trilateral relations between the United States, japan and south korea. The scope of agreements reached at camp david really are impressive and unprecedented. And it leads me to ask sort of why did this happen . Why did these three allies come together . And i think there are five reasons. The first is that the external security environment has compelled a much higher level of Cooperation Among the allies to put it bluntly, the war in europe really has changed everything, not just in europe, but also in asia, the unthinkable such as war in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula has now become possible and leaders are looking for ways to try to create more certainty and more stability. A second factor is chinas increasingly assertive behavior in the east china sea, in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits that has created much more uncertainty in the minds of leaders in asia. When you couple that with the war in europe, a third factor bringing the three allies together, of course, is north koreas unceasing icbm and weapons of mass destruction campaign. In the past months, north korea has tested its First Successful solid propellant nuclear icbm and this campaign shows no signs of abating any time soon. And the fourth factor contributing to the success of trilateral is south korean president yens efforts at improving relations with japan. The south korean president basically took what would be the hardest Foreign Policy issue domestically and pushed forward even when initially, it was not being reciprocated by tokyo. So the significance of this trilateral cooperation cannot be underestimated when the United States, japan and south korea are together, each is safer and each has a stronger ground upon which to deal with china. While camp david has been a positive development for security on the Korean Peninsula. The negative development relates to the budding relationship between north korea and russia. It is not new in the sense that there has always been cooperation between pyongyang and moscow. But there are a few elements that are new. First, the north Korean Leader arguably has leverage in the relationship for the first time. In recent memory, putin needs fresh supplies of ammunition and shells from north korea to prosecute this unjust war in ukraine. And that gives kim jong un a lot of leverage. Second, the kim putin summit reduces kims need to talk to the United States. It is noteworthy that the Biden Administration has stated its interest in re engaging in dialogue with north korea with no preconditions as to the results of those talks. This to me is a subtle but significant change that suggests greater flexibility in the us position. However, the prospects of such talks i think are even less likely because of the putin kim summit. Indeed, i believe that part of the reason for kims engagement with putin is because of the spectacular failure and the inability to recover from the era of summit diplomacy with the Previous Administration in the United States. The only way the north Korean Leader could save face with regard to that was to come out of the covid lockdown and seek a major summit with either xi jinping or putin. And he got his summit with putin. Im concerned that this summit meeting could result in substantial and significant Russian Support of north koreas weapons programs. To put it bluntly, the north Korean Leader would not have traveled all the way to russia simply for a food for munitions deal. Kim is looking for russian assistance with his Nuclear Weapons program, with his military satellite program, a Nuclear Powered submarine and his icbm program. The summit will likely lead to more dprk forced labor being sent to russia. Weve just done a report looking at russia and china who have been major perpetrators of north korean human rights abuses. There are several options for how the United States should respond to this and ill just highlight a few of the full list is in my written testimony. The first is to seek coordinated responses in form of sanctions through the g7 plus and the nato a p four venues. It is no longer possible to seek action on north korea through the un Security Council. Given russia and chinas opposition. Second consider a new declaratory policy to neutralize dprk icbm launches including the possibility of preemptive action. This is a risky policy but it would be aimed at deterring further testing by dprk. Third consider south korean lethal assistance to ukraine. South korean president yun has stated that north koreas provision of lethal assistance to russia is a direct threat to south koreas security. South korea thus far has provided humanitarian assistance and indirect lethal support through third parties like poland and the United States fourth consider enhance south korea cooperation with a should russia provide Nuclear Submarine technology to north korea . This might be considered a response south korea has world class port facilities that could be nuclear certified. And then finally, frame choices for china beijing remains ambivalent about this new cooperation between pyongyang and moscow. The United States should make clear to china that it cannot use north korea as a vehicle for indirectly supporting russias war. In conclusion, there are some who might argue that this new development in dprk russia cooperation is a response to the camp david summit. I dont believe that to be the case, russias need for ammunition alone would have made this cooperation inevitable, this concatenation of developments in the region, however, is precipitating an arms race in asia, but this is not at the initiative of the United States or its allies, chinas Massive Nuclear build up north koreas drive to become a Nuclear Weapons state, the size of france. And most of all russias war in europe have fundamentally changed the security environment in the region and on the peninsula in ways that have compelled countries who support the peaceful status quo to respond. Thank you very much. Thank you dr chow, mr snyder. Thank you mr chairman for the privilege of participating in this hearing on security on the peninsula and for spotlighting the impact of a new era of major power rivalry on the peninsula and indo pacific security situation. Thank you also for your strong voice of support for the Us South Korea Alliance, reflecting in your opening comments, which is our most valuable instrument for responding to interNational Security challenges, not only on the peninsula, but increasingly globally, the Us South Korea Alliance has become even more important in the context of a possible contagion of revisionist actions modeled on russias invasion of ukraine that china and north korea as challengers to internationally accepted borderlines might be tempted to repeat in asia and bipartisan congressional support for the alliance is also important against the backdrop of domestic Political Polarization and emerging forms of narrow nationalism in the us and south korea that could hamper Alliance Cooperation that has served us so well. For 70 years, i see three main impacts of the evolving Global Security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The first one you touched on in your Opening Statement and that is the paralysis of the un Security Council as a result of major power rivalry as the main instrument by which we impose penalties on north korea for its illegal Ballistic Missile launches and nuclear tests. China and russia have opened a back door of supply to north korea despite unsc resolutions intended to keep the front door closed and they are protecting north korea from punishment from further unsc violations. Given the paralysis at the un, the United States has no choice but to build a coalition of the willing among like minded countries in similar fashion to the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative in the mid 2000 s which supported efforts to discourage north korean illicit maritime transfers. Un paralysis requires a revamp of the array of sanctions designed to deny north koreas supply of technologies that have military uses. This effort should bypass chinese and russian non cooperation through the pursuit of secondary sanctions as a means by which to hold banking entities accountable. The Otto Warmbier brink act that you sponsored is a step in the right direction toward addressing these issues. And the us and south korea and japan need to grapple more actively with north koreas exploitation of cyber theft as an instrument for circumventing legal restraints in its ability to conduct international transactions. Theres also a need to supplement the public reporting on north korean illicit transfers that had been supplied by the un panel of experts as a means by which to hold north koreas actions in the light. Second, evolving by products of us china rivalry include an expanded focus on competition with china and the strengthening of like minded Cooperation Among the United States, japan and south korea. The deepening institutionalization of us japans south korea coordination as a result of the camp david summit has enhanced the effectiveness of that coalition to deal with the danger of chinese coercive behavior. But theres also the development of a for tat dynamic between the us japan and south korea. On the one hand and russia, china and north korea on the other. While strengthening our own coalition, the United States and south korea in my view should resist the urge to allow policy toward north korea to be subordinated to the us china rivalry which may serve to push china, north korea and russia closer to each other. Rather, the United States and south korea should pursue efforts to compartmentalize north korea as an area where china maintains a limited shared interest in denuclearization. Despite us, chinas strategic competition. Third, north koreas continued missile testing and the adjustment of its Nuclear Doctrine will continue to place pressure on the United States and south korea to reconcile the gap between the global view of extended deterrence through which the United States pledges to uphold global non proliferation norms while responding to north Korean Nuclear threats and the peninsula view, which focuses on the imbalance between a north korea that has Nuclear Weapons and a south korea that does not as senator romney referenced. In addition to enhancing the us south Korean Nuclear planning consultations through the Nuclear Consultative Group Announced last april. The United States should also provide training to dedicated south korean units in Nuclear Weapons response and containment in the event of nuclear use on the peninsula. This would equip south korean personnel to respond in real time to nuclear use scenarios rather than having to wait on us specialized units from off the peninsula in the event of use. Thank you. Again for the opportunity to join you today. And i look forward to the discussion. Well, thank you, mr chairman and Ranking Member romney, um and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Um its really a deep honor to be here today and to be able to appear before you. And im truly grateful for both the committees interest in this issue, but also this Incredible Opportunity to be part of this discussion with dr and mr snyder, the recent summit between putin and kim. And what seems to be a new level of military cooperation forming between the two comes as no surprise, deepening alignment between china, russia and north korea has been taking form for the past few years and especially between russia and north korea since russias invasion of ukraine. However, since the failure to reach an agreement in 2019 to keep Us North Korea rapprochement alive, weve essentially been sidelined by pyongyang overtures have been made and to the north koreans to try and revive those negotiations and essentially repeat the conversations of the past. Despite as weve all talked about the drastic shifts in the geopolitical situation that work in north koreas favor now and certainly that hasnt worked. And instead north korea has spent the last few years even while in pandemic isolation, building up its wmd programs in ways that challenge us and allied forces and are on trend with the arms race in the region. Were not watching this move into a new phase. And pyongyang is cultivating actual Security Partners as well. And russia seems more than willing, given its precarious situation to what extent it is still unclear, but it seems enough to have kim excited. So the question this raises is how do we get back in the game . This is obviously a challenge we havent figured out and one that were seeing the consequences of play out in real time while the us has focused heavily on strengthening our alliances with south korea and japan to great success, as many have mentioned and bolstering our extended deterrence arrangements. These efforts are still just one piece of the security puzzle. They are not going to reduce tensions or mitigate the threat environment on their own. And in fact, they often strengthen the norths conviction that its choices are just north korea as the smaller country meets power with power to prove that it wont be intimidated. And the us and south korea are also good at meeting power with power for every negative action north korea takes, we are ready to increase pressure and demonstrate how much over match of capabilities we have remind them that we could annihilate them if they crossed the line. However, as the bigger country and the stronger forces in this equation, we really should assess when we use these kinds of responses to be more strategic and to avoid the kind of escalation spiral were caught in today. At the same time, what we arent good at is matching goodwill for goodwill. The trust deficit between our countries means that we assume north koreas negative choices to have the most sinister intent. And we tend to believe that about their positive actions as well. This also has been an obstacle to diplomacy. In the past. There have been times when north korea wanted to negotiate was willing to take or took unilateral actions to create windows of opportunity. But our own skepticism and reluctance to reciprocate led to missed opportunities. In fact, we posed, were actually posed with one of those moments today. The release of travis king was the best possible outcome for all parties involved and acknowledging that and finding a way to reciprocate that goodwill could potentially help create some small diplomatic opening. In my submitted remarks. Ive listed a few recommendations for how to think about rebuilding diplomacy with north korea. And ill highlight just two here. The first is we need a full time envoy, north koreas impact on regional and Global Security dynamics is serious and consequential and needs to be treated as such. Despite what else is happening around the world, we should upgrade the special representative position back to a full time position to strategize to coordinate interagency efforts and to be proactive and persistent in trying to reestablish channels of communication with the north koreans. And second, we need to recognize that north koreas loyalties and alignments are not forever and even the competition of influence between russia and china, that pyongyang shows that pyongyang cares most about the results, finding ways to instill some confidence that resuming talks with the United States on a range of issues, not just nuclear comes with some easy wins. While we work towards more difficult outcomes may help lower the perception of political or even personal risk for our north Korean Counterparts and may eventually be compelling. Certainly, there are no magic answers here that are going to guarantee success and changing course is undoubtedly going to come with criticism but waiting for north korea to come around as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes more dangerous, does not serve the collective interest of the us or our allies. Thank you, mr chairman. Thank you. Thank you, miss town. And now well begin the the question uh period here. And i think all of you uh know, well, that one of the big issues we are facing right now here in the United States senate and house is the question of maintaining our Security Assistance and commitment to the people of ukraine as they continue to battle putins aggression. The Senate Version of the continued resolution included at least a down payment on that assistance. The house version that ultimately passed did not, but President Biden has committed to making sure that we meet our commitments and there is bipartisan support in the United States senate and house to continue to provide that assistance. But as we watch, whats happening across the capital, obviously, there are concerns that have been raised. So my question to each of you beginning with you, dr cha is as south korea watches this week, we know that we know that, you know president xi is watching closely, we know that our adversaries are watching very closely what happens in ukraine. But of course, so are our allies . I believe so to each of you beginning with dr cha, what would be the impact on the psychology of our Security Alliance between the United States and south korea . What would be the psychological impact in south korea where the United States to discontinue its support to the people of ukraine . So its a great question. Ill offer some thoughts on it. I think. So the region, south korea, our allies, south korea, japan and australia are watching very closely what the United States is doing in ukraine and how were supporting ukraine if we were to discontinue funding, you know, i think politically they could rationalize it and say, well, you know, south korea and japan, were treaty allies. Ukraine is not a treaty ally, its not a member of nato. So i think publicly, politically they could rationalize it. But inside, behind closed doors, i think they would be very concerned that an attack of this nature against a country unprovoked and then the United States does not continue its support of ukraine would certainly have a major impact on the credibility of the us commitment, not just in europe, but also, but also in asia, i would say also asian allies, including allies like australia, japan, south korea have also stepped up. They want to work with the United States and help to support the United States and nato in terms of what theyre doing in ukraine, as you know. Well, you know, the japanese, the south koreans have been providing a lot of assistance and the south korean president has even hinted that he would provide more assistance, not just humanitbut lethal assistance. Nevertheless, if the United States were to stop funding the defense of ukraine, it would have a major impact on the way allies think about our credibility. Thank you, mr snyder. Well, i would agree as i suggested in my opening remarks that there is the risk of a revisionist contagion that i think our allies in asia are focused on. I think that is the reason why the russian invasion of ukraine had such a big impact on their own threat, perceptions in the region. And so i do think that that would be a setback as related to the idea of allies stepping up. I agree that the idea that most have is that they would go together with the United States. If theyre asked to fill a gap, i think in particular, in the context of south korea, there are a couple of obstacles one is domestic resistance. But the more important one is that with the putin kim summit, russia has established a kind of mutual deterrence dynamic with south korea as related to the possibility of lethal assistance to ukraine. And that is essentially the threat that if south korea provides lethal assistance to ukraine, then russia would up its assistance to north korea and vice versa. There is also a mutual deterrence dynamic with regards to the question of how much russia does with north korea as related to how south korea would respond in terms of providing greater assistance to ukraine. Thank you. I tend to agree with my colleagues in terms of that. This is very much seen as were going together that this is an allied response. I think there would be a certain sense of betrayal if there was, if the us did stop assisting ukraine, i think theres a lot of south koreans, especially the south korean public who does see a lot of themselves in the ukraine example of a country thats been attacked. At the same time. I think theres the same kind of debate inside south korea as there is here in the United States where theres certainly also another faction of the public who doesnt see any affinity towards ukraine and doesnt see it as their business either, especially when there are domestic issues that plague the administration. So, you know, the us leadership on ukraine is especially important when we are talking about allied relations and i do think it would cause our allies to also start to pull back and start to rethink their choices. Thank you, senator romney. Professor, i wanted to begin this by asking you to elaborate on one of your recommendations and i didnt quite understand. I think it was number two, which was, a preemptive action with regards to missile launch. What, what did you mean by that . And, and perhaps could be some logic or, or some pros and cons. Sure. So one of the problems we have, senator is since last year, north korea has done over 100 Ballistic Missile tests. Weve never seen anything like this before. All of us have been studying this issue for decades and weve never seen that level that tempo of activity before those tests are for demonstration purposes, but theyre also for advancing their capabilities. You need to test, to know whether it works and we really dont have a good way of deterring those tests when were negotiating with them. I think as jenny would agree, they dont test as much, but theyre not interested in talking right now. At the same time, the three allies have gotten much more integrated in terms of Missile Defense, tracking real time, early warning, these sorts of things. And my point is that given that this is not a, this is not, this is a moving target and its getting worse and worse, what else can we do to try to deter them from testing . So, one of the ideas there and its a risky one is declaratory policy to say that we reserve the right to actually take down a missile if its headed over japan or if its headed towards hawaii or the west coast of the United States and that could be a mid course intercept or it could be on the launch pad now theyre firing now mobile missiles. So its harder to take it out preemptively. But the idea is that we need to consider something to deter further missile testing and we dont have anything thats doing that right now. Its risky. I acknowledge its risky, but perhaps were at that point now. Thank you. As i think about the, the last couple of decades with our relationship with the p rdp rk. I, it seems to me that weve gone from pillar to post guard rail to guard rail from being aggressive and oppositional at one hand to writing love letters on the other to having a meeting. I mean, weve been all over the map. It strikes me that we have no consistent strategy or policy with regards to the d pr k. And, and i wonder if, if you draw any lessons from that or any suggestions about what we might do to, to develop a consistent policy approach with regards to the d pr k. Because what weve done so far from what i can tell hasnt worked. So i, i look to you are, are there Lessons Learned from the, the last decades that, that we ought to consider as we think about the next decades and we begin with you doctor. So having participated in the failure of that diplomacy, i would agree with you. I think, you know, we have been trying to deal with north korea since Ronald Reagan and have been unsuccessful. The deal that we put on the table effectively has been the same which is, you know, they, they freeze and dismantle their major programs in return for economic existence, food, political recognition and security guarantee, not security guarantee, a peace assurance on the peninsula and the region. Its come in different formats, bilaterally or multilaterally Six Party Talks. But, you know, i think we have to come to the realization that its not the deal that they want anymore. And frankly, were at a loss as to what to pursue next. I mean, as youve said, weve tried everything from expert working level talks to summit summitry leader to leader on at least three different occasions, right, in singapore, in hanoi and at pam and none of those have reached the conclusion. I mean, i dont want to sound skeptical, but i think that its very difficult to imagine a deal that would satisfy us that could be had with the current regime in north korea or the things that they would want to have a serious negotiation are things thats very difficult for us to give up. Like our Alliance Relationship with south korea, our troops on the Korean Peninsula, our forces in japan as well. So it is, it is, i guess the one of the main lessons that ive learned from this is that its not really the modalities of the negotiation or whats on offer. The problem right now is that the deal that makes the most sense from a us and allied perspective is not the one the north koreans want. Thank you mr schneider. As i think about the history and its a long history, i think less about a cycle than about a progression in which things are getting worse. We are learning things about each other. And i think that what we are learning with each iteration is actually making it even more difficult to bridge the gap. And so i think that we did learn something, for instance, from engaging directly in summitry with kim jong un. But the main thing i think we learned is that kim jong un does not want to give up his Nuclear Weapons. And i think the main thing that he learned is that even though he thought he was entering into negotiations from a position of strength, he wasnt nearly powerful enough to coerce us into accepting him as a nuclear state. And so that dynamic is problematic, but i think that where the real challenge comes is that we have spent so much time focusing on denial that we have not necessarily looked as closely as we needed to about how we can stimulate the pace of change inside an authoritarian, near totalitregime in such a way is that it can evolve in order to make different choices. And its an exceedingly difficult challenge that im putting on the table. I think thats the reason why weve not been able to do it is that our perspective on trying to counter their action has kind of inhibited us. And even in policy terms, inhibits us from trying to reach in to north korea and generate the level of debate and even dissent that would actually be necessary for north korea to change direction. Thank you. Thank you, senator. It is an important question and, and one that, yeah, theres no easy answers to. I think, you know, part of this process is we have to understand that north korea is also growing stronger every year. The where we started in negotiations with north korea is not the north korea, it is today and north korea has Nuclear Weapons. This isnt a non proliferation challenge. You know, when we started negotiating in the, in the 19 90s we were trying to prevent north korea from building Nuclear Weapons and we tend to still have that same proposition when we go into negotiations. Now, despite the fact that north korea tested their First Nuclear weapon in 2006 and has since then conducted five other tests. So, you know, i think we, we need to understand that what were dealing with now, the nature of the denuclearization challenge right now is not non proliferation, it is disarmament. And i think that really takes a very different approach in order to solve of how do you convince an insecure country to disarm and to trust that we have their best interests at heart, especially when there are examples out there that would prove otherwise. And so i think, you know, thats the fundamental problem with our approach today is that we still continue to hold on to this notion that we can, that we have time that we can keep north korea at the train station. And instead theyre already racing down the track. And what were trying to do is stop a moving train. So in, in doing so i think we need to be more agile. I think one of the lessons were learning is we need to be more agile right now. We tend to always approach this issue in a denuclearization centric approach where if north korea is not willing to talk about denuclearization, which they are right now, then were left empty handed, they have all of the agency to control the process because we, were not really interested in talking about anything else at the moment, even though we do have other security concerns and especially about preventing Nuclear Conflict on the Korean Peninsula. So i think we need to be more, we need to take these lessons to heart and actually start to, to pull that process apart. Instead of looking for the big ideal, get to the end of the road kind of agreements. We need to Start Building this steps. We need to start providing the kind of incentives and kind of early wins that would help create some momentum in any negotiation process. And we need to be open to talking about issues other than just denuclearization, especially just to rebuild the relationship itself. Thank you. Thank you, mr chairman for the last several years. The United States has expanded our approach to security on the Korean Peninsula, for example, deploying strategic assets to south korea like Nuclear Armed submarines, the restarted trilateral exercises and cooperation. And then earlier this year, it was already referenced, the us and south korea National Security authorities announced the Nuclear Consultative group so our two countries could talk about deterrent strategies. I think this is a step forward in what were doing. But dr cho, id like to get your assessment of the ncg. And what do you see as the long term benefits to the United States . And south korea . Thank you for the question, senator. So the as you know, well, the Nuclear Consultative group was created out of the washington declaration to try to address concerns about the credibility of us Nuclear Extended Deterrence on the peninsula. Why do, why do the koreans have these concerns . As jenny said, the train has left the station, north korea really has ramped up their capabilities again. 100 Ballistic Missile tests and the ncg was meant to try to address that in a way that goes beyond the existing dialogues like the kid, the korea, there are several other dialogues as you know, that take place. But this was meant to be a high level that provided more insight into us nuclear planning. Its not nuclear sharing, but its an important next step in terms of the us korea military relationship. And i think a good one, does it check the box in terms of credibility of Nuclear Deterrence . I think for the time being, it does. But in the longer term, as north korea continues to develop these capabilities and as china also continues to ramp up their Nuclear Weapons capabilities through the end of this decade, there will be more questions that come up both in korea and japan about the about the credibility of our nuclear umbrella. So those are bridges were going to have to cross in the future eventually. But for the time being, i think this was an important step that the administration took and all for the better of the alliance. So are there specific recommendations you have for the partnership that would make it more effective . So one of the things we we at c si did a report on this and one of the things that we suggest was taken up by the administration was more direct real time warning sharing. But there there are other things that we can consider. For example, one of the things i mentioned in my testimony is more cooperation between south korea, japan and aus in terms of not necessarily to supply south korea with Nuclear Submarines. But just as a very specific example, you know, australian Nuclear Submarines, if they get serviced now will need to go all the way to groton, connecticut. Meanwhile, in south korea, there are world class ports that could be nuclear certified where they could do the work, they could do the work there. Same is the case for japan. Although there, you know, there is a there is a different attitude and norm with regard to Nuclear Weapons in japan very clearly. Another which we have suggested in the past is is not to redeploy Nuclear Weapons to the us Nuclear Weapons, to the Korean Peninsula. But to at least just begin a preliminary dialogue about what would be the infrastructure prerequisites if we were to consider Something Like that, even beginning that dialogue at a working level, not at a high policy level, like at a working level would also send an important deterrent signal, not just to north korea, but in particular to our to our ally as you know. Well, deterrence is about capabilities and intentions and i dont think theres anybody, any of our allies in the region that doubt us capabilities, but there are concerns about intentions and these sorts of things as ive just described them help to send the right signal about the credibility of the us umbrella. The ccp has expressed concerns about this partnership. Do you have any concerns about them retaliating because of what were doing with the ncg . I mean, the type of retaliation i am most concerned about is not military retaliation but economic coercion when the United States put a Missile Defense battery in korea in 2016, 2017, china carried out a campaign of economic coercion against south korea that cost south korea tens of billions of dollars. And as you know, well, theyve done this to many countries in the region. And so i think that is the most proximate threat in terms of retaliation. And of course they would, they would draw closer to north korea as a result of that. But i really hesitate at the idea of thinking that if we dont do something to strengthen our alliances that somehow china and russia will then moderate what they do with north korea, i dont think thats the case. I mean, they will continue to pursue a tightening of their relationship regardless of what we do. So you would you agree that when the ccp actually expresses displeasure about something that probably means were on the right track with regard to deterrence. Yeah, i mean, thats, yeah, that would be a reflection of that. The signal is being heard and that were on the right track. Thank you, mr chairman. Thank you, senator ricketts. Thank you, mr chairman. Thank you to all of the testifiers for being here. I want to follow up on, senator romneys, line of questioning. I, ive been, now, ive been here for 11 years, not on the Foreign Relations committee the whole time and looking obviously very carefully about at this issue, both from the United States equities, but obviously specifically representing the state of hawaii. And it just seems to me that complete verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not feasible. And i remember being prepping for a hearing and one of my staffers recommended that i not be on the bleeding edge of admitting that. And then senator corker just went ahead and said it all and, and, and so i just kind of want to get on the record. Mr cha ms town in particular, your view of that because it seems to me that we just keep kind of whistling past this graveyard. And every time i get a briefing either at the National Security level or in the Foreign Policy context, its sort of like magical thinking, you know, maybe they wont be able to do this. Heres the technological piece they have, oh, look, they solved that oh, we thought they couldnt range. Oh, they can range. Now theyve got, and now they can range conus. And we, well, well, they got that and they keep Getting Better and better and seem to be totally undeterred and we just need a new pathway. And so ill start with you, mr cha. What is that new pathway . Thats a really hard question. Well, why dont we do it this way . Because i do only have three minutes. I want to hear from both of you. I agree with you. Its, and maybe its, its the wrong question to ask because the, the problem with our current policy is where we start with the end, right . What are some short term incremental steps that we can take to increase the potential for leverage and the potential for good outcomes in the short term . Forget denuclearizing the peninsula. Lets talk about Risk Reduction in the short term. Yeah, so i didnt, i didnt mean to be flippant about the question. I think its a very important one like as you know, im a part time resident of hawaii. So i think about this as well all the time, a couple of airplanes. Yeah. But i do think practically speaking, it is, it is a threat reduction. It is Risk Reduction. I mean cd is the Bumper Sticker and there are political and Alliance Management reasons why we need to say cv id having to do withan and having to do with our iran policy as well as the npt regime. But if we were ever to get back into a negotiation as a former negotiator, the first steps would be threat reduction, Risk Reduction, freezing y right. Getting inspectors back in trying to get into the experimental light water reactor. In exchange for what . Well, i mean, in exchange for things like reducing sanctions, the 2016, 2017 sanctions, the general sector sanctions, which were the ones that the north koreans were most concerned about when President Trump met them in, in, in vietnam, political recognition, security assurances, these sorts of things. The danger of course is that people will accuse whichever administration were to reengage with this is buying the same horse for the 15th time. Well, its, i mean, there are a number of dangers but the two obvious ones are what it does for non proliferation policy globally. And then the other is politics, right . Who wants to be the administration that softens its stance on north korea as theyre engaged in all this belligerent behavior . Im going to have to stop it there and go to ms. Town. Well, yeah, i mean, this is, this is the Million Dollar question, right of is denuclearization possible and if we believe its not, then what are we doing . I think, you know, if we think about denuclearization, north koreas thinking on denuclearization on its Nuclear Program has fundamentally changed. So whatever hope we had before is even less now. But that doesnt mean we give up. We should continue to try, we should continue to try to work for you know, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, which also includes preventing south korea from going nuclear. But in the meantime, i think we really do need to define what our other goals with north korea are. And there were trends for instance that were promising in north korea prior to 2017, 2018, when negotiations started and those were market, the rise of markets. The the growing kind of socioeconomic space and social change that was happening inside the country. And if we look at the policies that we have now our punitive approach to north korea because of their Nuclear Program is really cutting off a lot of the is really counterproductive to a lot of the productive things we thought were going on. So, you know, i think there is a reason to rethink our sanctions policies and really distinguish between that which is actually going to affect any kind of procurement of dual use goods versus that thats going to have spillover effects into the economy, right . How do we get, how do we re empower the people . We always talk about wanting to get information into the people, but we continue to cut off our own access to the people and their access to us and their access to goods and markets. Just one final comment, you know, when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And i just think it, we really need your help on developing more tools because otherwise we just keep hammering the same nail and saying how come this isnt working . And so we need to open up the aperture on a bipartisan basis to get smarter on this because as senator romney said, this policy is a failure and has to change if i could just say one of the tools on the enforcement side really is, you know, some of the, so as senator hollen mentioned, some of the work that has been done on things like the o warmbier act, the use of banking restrictions and especially on the secondary sanctioning side. I mean, i know sanctions dont solve all the problem but, but these are, these are important sanctions. Were starting a project now where were trying to identify supply chains for other things that are being imported by countries in the west and china with regard to north korea for secondary sanctioning. I mean, there is the engagement side but there is the is the sanctions side and that is an important piece of this as well. Thank you. Thank you, senator shots and i know senator romney has to has to leave. Now. Thank you, senator. And you know, when we were thinking about having this hearing on the Korean Peninsula, we thought we might get to the point where there was a consensus that what weve been doing clearly is not successful, at least in achieving the goal as weve stated it, which is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, thats a very worthy goal. But in practice, clearly, weve not been able to achieve it as, as you all have indicated in response to senator schatzs question and others. So i do agree that we need to be thinking of other sort of long term approaches. But in the meantime, i want to ask all of you about both north koreas relationship with russia and near term decisions that we may need to make and then north koreas relationship with china and what kind of decisions that we might be interested in making jointly with them . So on the case of russia, we had, of course, president yun in response to north koreas visit to the visit with putin, say we will not stand idly by. So my, my question is what, what would you all recommend that we do to put some kind of teeth behind that statement not sit idly by now, dr cho. One idea that you suggested we look at was south korea provide lethal assistance to support ukraine. So far, theyve been, theyve been providing important assistance, non lethal assistance. And then as i listened to all of you, youve got the, the, the issue of, you know, north korea providing munitions to russia on the assumed promise that russia would now help north korea in providing higher technology, more technology to its missile system, submarines and others in return. So, could you just speak a little bit to that, that dynamic . On the one hand, you could see how south korea threatening to provide more lethalistance to russia could be used. Maybe to get russia to commit not to provide anything more to north korea. On the other hand, obviously, you know, we would like to see as much support as possible go to to the people of ukraine at this point in time. So those are if you could talk through a little bit that that decision tree start with you, doctor. Sure. Very important question. So on the south korean lethal assistance, i was in korea about two weeks ago at a conference where the former National Security adviser to the current south korean president in a public venue had said that if russia is going to provide, i mean, north korea is going to assist russia and russians are going to pay the north koreans in technology and thats a direct threat to south korea. So south korea should actually do something about that. And i thought it was, i was surprised by the statement, but i think it sort of says where the thinking is on this. And as you said, ukraine needs help. I mean, if theres any place in the world where there are munition stockpiles. Its on the Korean Peninsula and i can pretty sure that south korean munitions are going to be better than north korean munitions in terms of what else could be done about it. You know, there is this kind of open question about china because i cant imagine that china is 100 behind all this and they certainly dont like russia and north korea getting closer together. So i dont know if theres some way to pull china away from this. They have not been very committal publicly. They were not at the un a couple of weeks ago, wang yi has gone has been to russia, but we dont know what came of that. And then the third thing is again, some of the work that is again, some of the work that you have already done on this and that is in terms of sanctions packages and secondary sanctioning of russian entities, companies and others that might not russian and these companies, but also secondary sanctioning to those that might be affiliated with those companies as a way to create some sort of some sort of compell so that there are costs to russia engaging with north korea. Thank you, mr snyder. I was actually at the same meeting that victor was with the former National Security adviser and i do believe that that was an important form of response that was reflected in the broader south korean media and i imagine was also transmitted to moscow. And so one of the key issues is making sure that putin got the message on that. I think he probably did. But the other aspect of that putin kim meeting that i think we need to keep in mind as we think about all the possibilities for the russian north korea relationship is that these are two isolated leaders that distrust each other and probably dont have much trust in each others products either. So this is a very transactional relationship. It may be more limited, but they have control of their public communications. And i think that putin and kim were sort of trolling the us and south korea a little bit. I dont want to dismiss the risk of greater russia north korea interaction as a way of expanding the north korea problem. But i also think that we shouldnt allow it to be overblown. Got it. Thank you. Thank you, senator. I think on the russia angle, i wasnt at that conference. But i was on a panel recently with a russian diplomat or former diplomat and the way he described it of russias approach was a bit more strategic than just the ukraine. It wasnt just about ukraine, it was about building a Security Partner for the war against the west. And i think theres, i think that also feeds into why russia would be more willing to build actual military cooperation and not just do an arms deal because we know, you know, kim jong un didnt need to go to russia to broker an arms deal. So i think this plays into all of the Great Power Competition thats going on. And i do think, you know, the it will change south koreas calculus on ukraine and because it does suddenly now make ukraine more of a Korean Peninsula security issue if russia is going to directly grow its military cooperation with north korea. But i think the china angle is also really important here because china does still care about its International Reputation and is worried about worst Case Scenarios in east asia. And i think this is one area of cooperation and one area of discussion that they would be willing to have of how do we prevent this from actually changing the balance of power in such a negative way that we cant come back from . Well, let me pick up there. Because as i indicated, i want to talk a little bit about both the, you know north korea russia relationship and how thats developing but also the the north korea china relationship. And i think all of you have made the point that if you go back a number of years, china was willing to work much more closely with the United States with respect to restraining north koreas Nuclear Program, Nuclear Testing missiles. They were with us at the un a couple of times many years ago in terms of sanctions, all that has changed and now, you know, china is, has sort of not cooperated with us in that way. At the same time, i have to believe that they continue to have an interest in constraining north koreas Nuclear Programs, both missile and another potential other weapons test. Maybe talk a little bit more about how we communicate that with china because at the same time, we have these other big challenges. I agree with dr we cant sort of forfeit the strengthening of our alliances. Whether its through having a south korean role in aus or other other issues. But at the same time, if we agree that china does have a mutual interest with us in constraining the north korean Nuclear Weapons program overall. What, what, what can and should we be doing on that front . Maybe well start with ms. Town and then go this way. Thank you, senator i, it is a tough question because there are a lot of competing interests here and it is, you know, north korea tends to be fairly low on chinas priorities as well. And so i think the the military cooperation between russia and north korea, i dont think came as a surprise to the chinese and certainly they sent a delegation to pyongyang ahead of that summit and there was presumably meetings with the russians before that as well. And there was no condemnation of it that came out from the chinese after it happened. But again, i do think there is concern there and in recent discussions ive had with chinese scholars is that theyre also wondering what to do and theyre very concerned that the situation is getting out of control. I think theres room for perhaps a a Regional Security discussion to happen at a high level, not about any specific country, but where the region is headed as a whole to see if you can start that dialogue and under the premise of preventing nuclear war. But i also think theres interesting opportunities for other kinds of incentives to be given to the chinese as well. Especially with the prospects of a china south korea japan trilateral summit coming before the end of the year. If theres some concessions that can be made in that, that could incentivize the chinese to also think twice about where it stands in terms of north korea russia cooperation. Thank you. Mr snyder. The biggest concern i have about the development of the north korea russia relationship is actually that will damage the possible apparent restraint measures that china has urged on north korea as related to a 7th nuclear test. I mean, we dont know necessarily with any assurance what precisely china has done, but the Us Intelligence community has been expecting this test and it hasnt happened. And so my main concern is really that kim jong un might misread his engagement with russia as giving him license to do what he did, what his grandfather did in the cold war play the chinese and the soviets off against each other. But i think that chinas overall north koreas overall level of dependence on china is great enough that china does not have to go down that road. I do think that this is an area where both the us and south korea have an interest in continuing to engage with china even if theyre not fully forthcoming about the actions that they take as related to north korea. Thank you. Doctor. So i think unless youre a super hard line in china, the majority of sort of, i think china Foreign Policy thinkers cannot see this dprk russia thing as in chinas interest, like it just cant be, i mean, first of all, they want to neutralize russia and north korea getting closer together historically, theyve always not liked it when russia and north korea get too close, they dont want to be seen as tacitly supporting this in a way that involves them in expanding the war in ukraine or prolonging it. And then i think the other thing that they should be concerned about and there, theres actually a very good long form interview in jennys program in 38 north about this is the concern about russia supplying fuel for north Koreas Nuclear reactors. I mean, this the absence of fuel is one of the biggest constraints right now on north korea really expanding their Nuclear Weapons program. But if russia provides fuel under the under the guise of civilian nuclear energy. So within npt regime, within the npt regime, as i said in my testimony, north koreas goal is to develop a Nuclear Weapons force the size of the uk or france. And if the chinese cannot possibly think that is good. So the real question is, can they get out of their own way to do something thats in their interests and not tie it to how upset they are at us china competition . Can they get out of their own way and do that thus far . They havent been able to it that the un basically when they were asked about this, they said, oh, thats just a russia north korea bilateral issue. Its not something we should we have any comment on which i think is a placeholder as they try to figure out exactly what they can do here. So i agree, i think with the gist of my colleagues comments that this is something that we should really investigate with china and try to engage in a dialogue with them because its clearly in both of our interests to see, to see this stopped. Well, thank you. Theres much more, id like to ask all three of you about, but theres a vote on and uh i am being summoned to cast my vote since my colleagues are, are waiting. But thank you for much food for thought as we move forward uh on all the issues that we covered. We may submit some questions for the record if you are all willing to entertain those. You covered mentioned doctor, the issue of responding to economic coercion and thank you for having me over at csis last week to make some remarks on our Important Alliance between the United States and the rok. There are issues of making sure that we coordinate it when it comes to the export of sophisticated technologies that could be used to enhance chinas military without trying to herd their economy, just focused to hurt their economy, just focus on the military peace, but that requires collaboration. There are issues around cryptocurrency and the r. O. K. s use of cryptocurrency, theft of cryptocurrency, in itself and to evade sanctions. Theres a lot to talk about that you successfully hit some of the Big Questions that we have to deal with, some of the longerterm questions we have to address as well as identifying some shortterm important interest regarding, for example, working with china to try to discourage another nuclear test, those kind of things, so i know i speak on behalf of all my colleagues who are here and others that wish they could be here thinking thanking you for sharing your expertise and your ongoing efforts in this area and let me close where i began, which is with the importance of the alliance between United States and south korea. And with that, this meeting is adjourned. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2023] oday, a Memorial Service for california senator Dianne Feinstein will be held in n francisco with in person tributes expected by kamala harris, nancy peli, and Senate Majority leader chuck schumer. Setor feinstein died last week at the age of 90 as the longestrving woman in u. S. Senate history. Watch live coverag of the funeral starting at 4 p. M. Eastern on cspan, cspan now, our free mobile video app, or online at cspan. Org. Cspan is your unfiltered view of government. We are funded by these Television Companies and more, including charter communications. Charter is proud to be recognized as one of the best internet providers and we are just Getting Started building 100,000 miles of new infrastructure to reach those who need it most. Charter communication supports cspan as a public service, along with these her television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. Watching cspan this saturday at 8 p. M. Eastern for an exclusive interview with colleen shogun, the 11th archivist of the United States. Step inside her Historic Office as she talks about her stewardship of the National Archives and controversies over white house records during the donald trump era to the current debate surrounding joe biden. Under the law of the president ial records act, the National Archives asserts and determines what records would be responsive to the specific requests from, for example, a chairman of a committee. Then we have to notify the president of Whose Administration those records come from as well as the current president , the incumbent president. In this case, president obama. That would be for vice President Bidens records. And of course President Biden himself as the incumbent president. 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Watch books that shaped america featuring narratives of the life of Frederick Douglass monday live at 9 p. M. Eastern on cspan, cspan now come our free mobile video app, or online at cspan. Org. Also be sure to scan the qr code to listen to our companion podcast, where you can learn more about the authors of the books fead. Tu the resolution is adopted. Without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. The office of speaker of the house of the United States house of representatives is hereby declared vacant. Stay with cspan as the battle over how speakership continues. Follow every