Glad you are here on the friday afternoon. Not that many people will do something on a friday afternoon so that shows you are serious people and i thank you for coming. My name is john henry, president of csis and i want to say a hearty welcome to all of you. We are in for a very unique opportunity. Assistant secretary stewart, this doesnt normally happen. When something is kind of a breaking, very serious development, we dont normally have the opportunity to hear from a senior policymaker in the state department or any place, to share with us the thinking of the government about a big development. And this is a big development. We are really very fortunate. I dont know, it was a week ago, 10 days ago . Jake sullivan in a press availability, made note that we think russia has put a Nuclear Device in orbit. Now i mean, for 50 years, we have had what are called rtgs. These are Power Sources that are used to provide electricity for satellites. There is a Nuclear Court to those. But this is different. This is an implication that there is not a weapon in orbit or there could be a weapon in orbit and that is a very profound thing. First of all, its a violation of international obligations. But Nuclear Weapons in space are profoundly different from Nuclear Weapons here on planet earth. We are used to thinking about blast effects, they are the shockwaves, that sort of thing. All of that is the product of an earthly environment. But in space, Nuclear Detonation has no environment. To transform the energies. So it becomes xrays that have astounding reach. Its a threat not to something that is five miles or 10 miles, is a threat to something that is 100 miles away. When we think of how space is becoming the ubiquitous platform for so many, both companies and countries, this is a profound threat. It really a serious issues. So we are going to ask that today and i just want to say thank you to you, secretary stewart, for joining us today. Its a privilege to have you here. Government employees working on the friday afternoon, not that many of us civilians work on a friday afternoon. Clayton is working on a friday afternoon. Clayton swope will run this meeting, over to you, clayton. Thank you so much for coming. Clayton thank you for that introduction. Again, my name is clayton swope, Deputy Director of Aerospace Security project here at csis. Thank you, secretary for joining us today, coincidentally on International Space today. I want to thank everyone here in person and online. As dr. John henry noted, space is an important part of our everyday lives, it plays an Critical Role in our economic security. As many of you may know, the Aerospace Security project produces an annual report on the space threats and we are here today to discuss russias development of an antinuclear satellite weapon which was one of the most concerning developments in our report released just two weeks ago. We have heard a lot of speculation based on a few confirmed details about what russia may be working on since february news. We know the u. S. Is working with allies and partners, particularly at the u. N. , and through the Un Security Council resolution on this issue. To start off, could you tell us more about what the u. S. Assesses that russia is developing, and how is the u. S. Working on this threat . Asst sec. Stewart thank you all. Really happy to be here today. The United States is extremely concerned that russia may be considering the incorporation of Nuclear Weapons into its counterspace programs based on information we deem credible. The United States has been aware of russias pursuit of this capability dating back years, but only recently have we been able to make a more precise assessment of their progress. Russia has publicly claimed that there satellite is for scientific purposes. However, the orbit is in the region not used by any other spacecraft that in itself was somewhat unusual, and the orbit is a region of higher radiation than normal lowerearth orbits. But not high enough of a radiation environment to allow accelerated testing of electronics, as russia has described the purpose to be. I also want to take a moment to consolidate here what we have said previously, just to remind you. What we want to clarify is that this is not an active capability that has already been deployed. Although russias pursuit of this capability is deeply troubling, there is no imminent threat from that we arent talking about a weapon that can be used to attack humans or cause structural damage on earth. Instead, as assistant secretary said yesterday in his testimony, analysts assessed that a detonation in a particular placement in orbit of a magnitude and location would render lowearth orbit unusable for a certain amount of time. Of course the broader issue here is that placement by States Parties to the outer space treaty of a Nuclear Weapon in orbit is a clear violation of article four of the outer space treaty. And this is something that we have been discussing. We have been emphasizing and we have been trying to raise awareness of, we also, as clayton mentioned, pursued a u. N. Security Council Resolution to this effect, to try to strengthen the outer space treaty and try to reinforce state parties commitment to article iv particularly because of the extraordinary risk to vital communications, scientific capacity, meteorological capacity, agricultural, commercial and of course, National Security capabilities that satellites in this orbit would support and would be immediately eradicated by such violation. And the use of such a weapon. So, you asked what we are doing, and i am happy to talk about that. The president has directed a series of actions, specifically with search grave such a grave consequences to the interNational Security and longterm sustainability of the outerspace environment. We decided to take this issue to the Un Security Council. There is no other forum right now in the International Arena for the implementation of the outer space treaty. It is different from other armscontrol treaties in that there isnt a body set up specifically to implement this treaty. Given the grave consequences of a potential violation, we thought there should be a resolution reconfirming States Parties commitment to article iv. We took several steps. One is to consider Un Security Council resolution and at the engage bilaterally with russia and with other countries, and as secretary blinken and i believe Jake Sullivan himself mentioned, we discussed this directly with china and with india. We have been discussing this with other countries that have a vested interest in the sustainability of the outerspace environment and at the u. N. Going to our u. N. Proposal, the u. S. And japan jointly proposed, and with ultimately 65 cosponsors in total, a u. N. Security Council Resolution that reconfirmed the importance of the outer space treaty. , recommitted States Parties to that treaty to abide by article iv preventing the orbit around the earth of Nuclear Weapons or other w. M. D. That reaffirmed the importance of the peaceful uses and sustainable exploration and access to space and encouraged those Member States of the u. S. And that word States Parties to the outer space treaty to consider joining and supporting this. But also importantly, that called upon states to not develop any Nuclear Weapons or wmd for placement in outer. So that went a step beyond, but it was a request calling upon countries to this. That outer space treaty is unique in that it prohibits the placement in orbit or around the earth of these weapons, but it does not talk about the development of the weapons as other armscontrol treaties do in certain circumstances, so we thought that adding the effort to call upon states do not develop such weapons would be useful. We thought it was a very nonpolitical, evenhanded approach to remind the world and to reinforce the outer space treaty and its commitments. We took it forward with a total of 55 cosponsors to the Un Security Council. As vetoed it. As was noted by our ambassador to the u. N. , this is inconsistent with putins statement that he intended not to place a Nuclear Weapon in outerspace. It raised questions, quite frankly, as to why he felt the need to veto this Un Security Council resolution, which also incorporated the idea of additional steps, point to that and i can talk about this in more detail if you want, points that both russia and china made. The idea of taking additional steps through either legally binding mechanisms or a not legally binding to reinforce, to support and to build upon the commitments in the outer space treaty to prevent an arms race in outerspace. Our Security Council resolution work to prevent an arms race in outer space through these mechanisms where we can develop essentially credible and reliable means to verify such additional steps. We try to accommodate the comments we heard from many both on the u. S. Security council Un Security Council and amended the resolution doubling the number of preamble or paragraphs and adding substance to the operative paragraphs to reflect the comments we heard from it we engaged with both russia and china numerous times. We tried to incorporate those suggestions we could agree to, but russia in particular really relied upon their efforts to insist on additional parameters as they proposed an amendment to the resolution that was not agreed to. So again, next steps, on monday, may 6, there will be a discussion at the u because of russias vetoed to talk about the circumstances for that veto and the u. N. Security council context and we look forward to this as a conversation that brings in all members of the General Assembly to hear their thoughts and understand their concerns on this issue. And then again, continuing to engage bilaterally and multilaterally and to use other diplomatic tools in the context about were actually mentioned by both china and russia, but specifically russia in its explanation of their vote for the resolution. The you and First Committee and other diplomatic forums in which these exact issues are being discussed. We hope to continue to have these conversations there. Clayton thank you for that information. And what the u. S. Is doing and plans to do. Looking at what language we have had specifically today from the u. S. Government on this capability, it has been very precise. It has referred to this as a device, not a weapon. It has been couched in very specific terms. Today just mentioned that one of the red flags with this capability was where it would be placed in orbit. Could you unpack some of the statements to date on what that really means, and what would be the effects on satellites, and why we should be concerned about it and how that precise language relates to the u. S. Position today . Asst sec. Stewart yes. We always have to be careful when we are talking about releaseable language and the context in which we are dealing with, intelligence operations and discussions. There has been some carefully chosen language. I ended up reading more so i could make sure i got the language right, so i appreciate you letting me do that. What i think john plumb very effectively articulated in his testimony yesterday, what we are concerned about would potentially entail again, the limitation of lowerearth orbit for a certain amount of time for all settlers. The implication for any satellites in that orbital arena is such a weapon were placed in a certain magnitude in a certain location. So i dont know that we know that much more about the potential consequence, it will depend on all the parameters are analysts are looking at and what ultimately is the placement and the magnitude. But there has been an evolution in our talking points to reflect growing concern on the issue and also to reflect the need for more information. And i think as we talk with other governments and hear their concerns and we hear at russian responses, we understand there is a need for as much information as possible so that we are not raising alarm bells without some explanation for why we feel this seriously about this potential threat. Clayton clayton you clayton mentioned engagement with other countries and also at the u. N. , but outside of the. What is your biggest take away from u. S. Efforts to discourage russia from pursuing this capability . Are there any surprises, particularly with how the vote flitted out at the u. N. . Asst sec. Stewart thank you for that. We were surprised actually to be able to get to 65 cosponsors in a very short periods of time. We were heartened that it was one country vetoing in one country abstaining at the vote, so 13 countries agreeing with us that our resolution was important for National Security, for international stability, security and longterm sustainability of outerspace and i think it reflect the seriousness with which governments are considering this issue that 13 governments agreed this was the responsible and appropriate approach. Again, one country vetoing in one country abstaining. But i think it is really good to know that countries were able to see the potential threat so significantly and in such a short periods of time. Clayton can he say anything publicly about how china looks at this issue . We have not heard them being very vocal about this. Seems like they have such as dust just as many space equities of the United States, in some cases, and as much as a reason economically to want to preserve the use of space. How are they approaching this issue . Asst. Sec. Stewart i am certainly not going to speak for china, and i should be clear that we got a 13 countries on board, it is really to reinforce and support the outer space treaty and recognize the importance of the treaty, because ultimately, the first sort of approach to this is recommitting to an outer space treaty that for almost 60 years has provided the backbone of the sustainable legal architecture for the outerspace environment and for our use in longterm security of that arena. So, looking specifically to chinas response and their explanation of the vote with respect to their abstention, it seems they agreed in the importance of this they specifically said, we agree with the need to reinforce and to build upon the structure of the outer space treaty and they acknowledge and appreciate the prevention of an arms race in outerspace language, the idea in our u. N. Security Council Resolution that the cd has also been discussing this issue and is the one buddy established for a legally binding mechanisms associated with the nonproliferation of this architecture. They abstained and then supported the russian amendment. So, again, i dont know what their internal thinking is, i can only comment on what they themselves have said and in their explanation of the vote, they said they supported the russian amendment. Which, i should be clear, it specifically calls upon states for all time to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. And then talks about the prevention of force with the threat of force against space, from space to earth, or earth to space. This is a topic that has been actively discussed for many years in the disarmament context. We have two openended working groups coming up in the next several years to discuss more how we prevent an arms, and also how we get around are there politically binding or legally binding mechanisms to discuss this, how we solve the challenge of definition of what is an outer weapon in outerspace . Then could one country use a peaceful satellite but with a nice purposes . How do you really encapsulate this . China said they wanted to incorporate that amendment. The challenge there is several. That they are trying to sort of decide an issue that hasnt been decided even though it has been debated quite openly and assertively in other contexts for many years. Several examples. In the cd, we have had an open ended working group, a conversation about the placement of weapons in our space to that russia and china support. The challenge in that context is it defines weapons in outerspace it doesnt define them. It says, we are prohibiting weapons in outer space. Without the definition of weapon. The concern for many countries is what about those earthbased weapons that can be used against satellites in space . We have seen president putin himself talk about his space laser in 2018 and 2019, and their Deputy Foreign minister ryabkov talk about a subsequent laser that was used both in ukraine, and had the capacity to dazzle satellites in 1500 kilometers in orbit around the earth. So they have talked about earthbased antisunlight capacity for some time. The concern was if you are talking about venting weapons in outerspace but you arent covering a whole category, and there is description about how that would play out, what youre trying to do and how that would be implemented and verified in the absence of definitions and the absence of covering an entire range. Threat of use of force in space is a weird thing to limit given that that is something the u. N. Charter itself discusses. Its a lot of debate. Sorry to take you in the deep dive into specifics. We didnt want the amendment russia proposed to decide this issue which is being actively debated. We specifically limited our resolution to that very clear cut support for the outer space treaty and the obligations of States Parties to that pretty to lim