Serious question that needs to be objected to. Senator menendez . I was going to add a small foot note to the issue of countries without diplomatic relations not being part of the inspection team. I want to point out again for decades now all inspectors have training here in the United States. Were very confident in a very, very broad set of confident people. In addition i could get you the exact number but right now i think we have a dozen americans in the safegardz efforts at iaea and they play a very critical role. I would love it if you would get me that information specifically. Senator, ill get you a list of all the mcnichls we have to prevent arms flowing. Those are critical questions to me and the american public. Thank you for service to our country. Thank you, senator. Were going to take a break when we have the second round start. Can you make it through three more senators . Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you for your service to our country. We very much appreciate all your great work. Sblgt moniz, one of the assertions which is made is that in 20 after 15 years that all bets are off and that iran can then begin to enrich theoretically, up to 90 if they want. Which is bombgrade material. Could you deal with that issue . That is, what happens in 15 years . What happens in wh iran announces it would go past 3 5 , 20 in terms of its enrichment of uranium . What is the law, the regulation the sense of the sense of the World Community what they could do at that point to make sure there was not a bombmaking program that was now put in place in iran . Senator, first of all, whether its 15 years 20 years or whenever, they will be required to report all their nuclear activity. Clearly, if they were to report they were enriching to 90 every alarm bell in the world would go off because theres no reason to do that. When the alarm bell went off what then would happen . I would imagine there would be, first of all, extraordinarily strong and i would imagine cohesive international pressure, perhaps sanctions and perhaps military response. For example, what would russias response be in 15 years if iran started enriching to 50, 60, 80, 90 . Everything i saw in the last month of negotiation is they would be solidly with us in very strong opposition to that. Secretary kerry, do you agree with that . They and china were welcoming and deeply committed to this effort and antiany nuclear women. Go ahead. If they declare this, alarm bells would go off. Furthermore f they didnt declare it which would be a more likely deal, frankly, we have through 25 years the containment and surveillance on any manufacturing of centrifuges, the uranium. Once again, they would need the entire supply chain covertly, which would be an extraordinarily difficult thing to car off. In the early years secretary moniz, if iran decided they wanted to violate the agreement after dismantling their program, how long would it take for them to take their rotors their components out of moth balls and to reconstitute their program if we were successful in watching this dismantlement in the early years . I would say in rough terms, two to three years, probably, to do that. That would depend a lot upon conditions of their machines, et cetera. Thats a ballpark. Secretary kerry . Senator, i just wanted to add something. Youre dealing with this 15year concept, but the truth is, because of the 25year tracking of their uranium, it would be impossible for them to have a separate covert track. So the only track by which they might begin to enrich would be through the declared facility and we would know it instantaneously. And the world would say, stop . Exactly. So, let me ask you this, secretary kerry. You spoke earlier about 9 the Iranian Foreign minister visiting the emirates this weekend. Can you talk about that and what your hopes are for the unfolding diplomatic opportunities that may be possible in that region. I will, senator mark y but i would preface it by saying to all my colleagues, nothing that weve done in here is predicated on some change or something thats unanticipatable. Can one hope that this kind of opportunity, perhaps provides a moment for possibilities in change . Yes, absolutely. And in fact president rouhani and Vice President both in their public statements embracing this arrangement talked about how it could open a new moment in the middle east and come together and resolve the differences that have separated them. I know for a fact the foreign minister of iran wants to engage with the gcc countries. That this is not the only country he plans to visit. He wants to sit down with them. The saudis have indicated a willingness to sit down. Who knows where that dialogue goes. I can guarantee you the United States will do everything we can to encourage it it and to try to help it find some kind of specific steps that might be able to begin to deal with yemen, houthi, others we face. You spoke earlier about the saudis. You have talked to them in the last week. Could you expansion upon that a little bit more in terms of what you feel is a possibility Going Forward. Generally what i would say, senator, is, of course all the countries in the region are apprehensive because they see iran engaged with the houthi and yemen. They see them also fighting against isil. They also see them in syria where they made the most out of supporting assad and supporting hezbollah over the years. Hezbollah is obviously a threat to the region, not to mention theres been support for hamas lately. These things concern us deeply. And it concerns them. That is precisely why we have come together and are working on what i talked about earlier with senator gardner, about the evolution of the camp david process that begins to fill out a new security arrangement and a new understanding of how together we can push back against these activities. Thank you. Secretary moniz did you want to add anything there could be a breakout against the legal regime in order for them to be an International Response . No. I think a breakout would be very, very quickly detected and then its a question of the response. Essentialpecially in the first decade or so, we have and beyond the first decade i think we have a very comfortable period of time to do diplomatic and or other responses. Thank you, mr. Secretary. Thank all of you for your work. Thank you senator. Senator paul. Thank you for your testimony. I continue to support a negotiated solution and think it preferable to war. I think military solution in all likelihood will accelerate the possibility of them having Nuclear Weapons of ending inspections, et cetera. However, it does have to be a good deal. And i think thats the debate we have. Secretary kerry, i guess i would ask, in general, how would you describe irans history of intins with International Agreements . Would you say theyre generally trustworthy or generally untrustworthy . Theres no trust built into this deal at all. Its not based on any concept of trust. I agree. I think everybody sort of understands that. The ayatollahs recent comments where he said the americans say they stopped iran from acquiring a Nuclear Weapon, they know its not true. So, we have the history of untrustworthiness. We have a lot of verbiage coming from the ayatollah already saying, well you know this really isnt any limitation on our ability to make a weapon. Really it comes down to a good agreement. Will this stop them from having a Nuclear Weapon . If they comply. The question then becomes compliance. My question, and my i guess my problem is that theres a great deal of credence being given to snapback you know, sanctions as this way as this lever to get them to comply. Secretary lew talked about there being a phased reduction in sanctions. Thats not exactly the way i read the agreement, though, because they do have to do some things. I think theyre significant things. Reducing the amount of enriched uranium, et cetera to a low level and getting rid of centrifuges, et cetera. The problem is is that the wording of the agreement then says the sanctions are simultaneously withdrawn. The vast majority are. Theres some compliance. To me its the initiation of compliance. Im more worried about the continuing compliance after that. And i think the argument would be that snapback sanctions will be that lever. I guess my preference would be there would be a step in the negotiations, was there discussion was there ever our position we shouldnt have simultaneous release of all sanctions but more stepwise or gradual reduction in sanctions to ensure. This was at the heart of the negotiation, which is why we drove such a what we consider to be a very hard bargain with respect to what though needed to do. That is look, it was always the fundamental equation of this negotiation. You folksed passed sanctions. We passed sanctions. Our passage of sanctions was specifically to bring them to the table to negotiate. So if that was the negotiating lever, clearly when they came to the table, they wanted the lever taken away. So the quid pro quo here was always what restraints will we get . What insight to their program . What longterm commitments can we get . They cant get a bomb. How do we fulfill president obamas pledge to close off the four pathways to a bomb . Thats the exchange. They get some relief from sanctions. Now, their insistence for two years was obviously this notion and all the way to the end, actually, has to all go away at once. All sanctions the u. N. , everybodys sanctions. We resisted that. We didnt do that. Thats not what happened. What we did was we wound up securing the oneyear breakout time going from two months to one year. Securing the safety of reducing their operable centrifuges and reducing the research they could do on the next advanced wave of centrifuges. Reducing the stockpile. Locking it in at a low level that couldnt produce a bomb. Locking in their enrichment level that cant produce a bomb. In exchange for all the things we required them to do, pitt senator, are genuinely extensive. They have to undo their piping. They have to undo their electrical. They have to move things. Theres a huge amount of work i guess when that is done, i dont know if its six months or a year, but when its done we lift the fundamental component of financial and banking sanctions that were the heart of what brought them to the table. But i guess the point is, is that everybody thats for the agreement, yourself included are saying this will prevent them from having a Nuclear Weapon and the ayatollah saying exactly the opposite. No. The ayatollah has actually and the Intel Community i urge you to connect with them. Theres no decision whatsoever. What hes doing is protecting his dough necessarytic turf. Hes saying the opposite. Hes saying this is not true. This is not stop us from acquiring a Nuclear Weapon. That troubles us. Zareef was saying the same thing in march. It troubles us here, let me i want a negotiated settlement. I want to believe we can have an agreement but it troubles us that immediately the iranians say the opposite no, hes not saying the opposite of this. The supreme leaders quote is in this document that iran will never go after a Nuclear Weapon and the iranians happily put that in. The Intel Community will tell you, they have made zero decision light, but you dispute what he said this week. I know what he said. They stopped americans from acquiring a Nuclear Weapon. They know its not true. Do you know why hes saying that . He doesnt believe the americans stopped them. He believes he stopped them because he issued a fatwa. So he is as a matter of sovereignty and pride, making a true statement. He doesnt believe the americans stopped them. He said he didnt want to get one in the first place. Thank you. Thank you. Senator kuhns. Thank you for convening this important hearing. I would like to thank all three of our witnesses for your testimony here today. I think we all share a basic premise, which is the United States must not allow iran to acquire a Nuclear Weapon. A Nuclear Armed iran would threaten our National Security our vital ally israel and the stability of the entire middle east. In the next two months i will review the details of this Nuclear Agreement and consider its ramifications for our nation and for the region. Ill compare it to the alternatives and support it only if im convinced it sufficiently freezes every iranian pathway to a Nuclear Weapon. In my years as an attorney for a corporation, i would often get handed a big complex deal by optimistic Business Units that believed theyd launched a new marriage, a new partnership, and my job was to review it. Not with the wedding bells ringing in my ears but with the likely divorce day in the picture before me. Because frankly no one ever pulled those agreements out again unless there was a violation, there was a disappointment, there was a breakdown in the relationship. And ill say as i look not at the spin or the politics of this agreement but as i dig into the substance of it, it is an agreement built on distrust. It is a wedding day where the bride is shouting i hate you and your family and the groom is shouting i distrust you and youve always cheated on me. And each is announcing their distrust really at the outset. And i do wonder what the alternative is given the disagreement here seems inevitable. So let me turn to the wedding guests and a question about how that may play out. A key piece of this agreement is the joint commission. A joint commission that has eight representatives, p5 1 and the European Union and iran. And they will resolve access disputes. They are a key piece of how we would get access to undisclosed sites. And if iran doesnt sufficiently answer iaea concerns about a suspect facility within a certain number of days theres a consensus vote and so forth, but our confidence about our ability to resolve disputes under this agreement depends on the reliability of those votes. And i dont mean to impugn the partnership of our vital allies whove gotten us to this point but i am concerned that ceos from many european nations are already winging to tehran and talking about significant economic relationships. Should we be nervous about the votes in the future on that joint commission of the eu or our other allies given what will be i suspect significant economic interests that might inspire them to either direct the eu to vote against access or block access for us . How confident can we be of our allies enduring support of our interests in the, i think, likely event of cheating . I think we can be very confident. Heres the reason why. The access issue goes to the core, absolute core, of this agreement which is preventing them from getting a weapon. And if we have sufficient information, intelligence, input, shared among us by the way. We share all this information. And by the way israel will be feeding into that. The gulf states will be feeding into that. When we have any indicator that there is a site we need to get into and were all shared that amongst each other, this goes to the entire agreement. They will prosecute that. And by the way theres a converse, you know, theres another side to that coin about the economic interests. You have a young generation of iranians thirsty for the world. They want jobs a future. Iran has a huge stake in making sure there isnt an interruption in that business and that they are living up to this agreement. So if in fact even when youre way beyond the 15 years, if we find theres a reason for us to have suspicion under the Additional Protocol and we cant get in the United States alone for the duration of the agreement has the ability to snap back in the u. N. By ourselves. We always have the ability to put our sanctions back in place. And given our position in the world and thats not going to change in the next 10 15 years economically. Were still the most powerful economy in the world. We will have an ability to have an impact on their transactions and ability to do business. So we believe we are very well protected here, senator kuhns because we created a onenation stability to have snapback. If i can follow up on that mr. Secretary. The snapback functions, are they the broad sweeping Financial Sector sanctions we worked on together that brought iran to the table . Or are they a paler version of that . Oh, no, theyre the full monty. Because, you know weve had debate among some of the colleagues on this committee whether or not this agreement prevents well, we have some discretion. I mean language is in there that says in whole or in part. Now, if we find theres some minor something and we want to slap the wrist we can fine in part. So in your view we have the ability to ratchet back sanctions in pieces or in whole . If needed or in whole. Let me if i might turn to secretary moniz in the time i have left about centrifuge development. If you would just ill articulate the question and then if youd have an answer for me. How long did it take iran to master the centrifuge . Whats the difference in performance between the ir1 and ir8 . And how long do you think it will take iran give p the restrictions of this agreement if observed to master the ir6 and 8 and then what would the impact be on their ability to enrich after years 10 to 15 . So, senator kuhns first of all of course theyve been working on it for quite some time. They have some challenges still. In terms of the r and d in the more advanced machines of course first of all the program does substantially shift back in time, their program plans. Where they are today is the ir6 that you mentioned is lets say seven or eight times more powerful than the ir1. And they are already spinning small cascades of that with uranium. The ir8, which is projected to be maybe 15 times more powerful is at the mechanical testing stage only. Thats what got frozen in in the interim agreement. So if i might in closing, mr. Chairman, it would be perfectly reasonable to expect that on a tenyear time horizon the ir6 and 8, which theyre already testing cascades of the 6, theyve already got mechanical testing of the 8 under way, it would be reasonable to suspect from a decade from now theyd be 15 times better faster at their enrichment . No, we dont believe they will have with this schedu