Morning. I am jane harman, happy to welcome a lot of experts and smart people and also to give a shout out to the swiss ambassador, a dear friend of ours and interested in history, among other things and i note that we are having swiss day on november 9th. A tradition we have long observed. This event is for our friend bruce bruce hoffman, the very first expert on modern terrorism period. He may have been the very first expert on modern terrorism. He surely was a valuable resource to me when he headed rands office in washington and i was a member of the United States congress. With his bushy beard, at the time, i thought he might be a terrorist and i thought his job at rand might just be cover. Bruce tried to help me create a commission to make recommendations to congress on how to intervene before an individual who is radicalized, having radical views is protected by the First Amendment but how to intervene before a person with radical views turns to violence. Violence is a crime. The bill which was carefully constructed to create a multidisciplinary commission, past the house overwhelmingly twice. It then went to the senate where a prominent member of the Senate Introduced it and all of a sudden out of nowhere a prominent Civil Liberties group which helped us draft the bill decided it was a dangerous bill and blue it up. The loser, i think was congress, and the resources that could have been marshaled to help us get further ahead on this tough problem. Todays book event is important because we get to hear bruces Current Assessment of the threat environment. Everyone knows how much it has changed and as smart as he is, i cant leave this out, he is one of our global fellows. You affiliate with wealth and you get smaller. The third edition of his book inside terrorism, which is available for purchase outside, will surely be used as a textbook in classrooms around the country. It now includes the creation and rise of isis and the origins of terror from the 19th century. It specifically explores the demographics of terrorists and the reasons behind the continued tactic of suicide terrorism. Finally it examines the rise of violent antigovernment militants, neonazis and white supremacists. Not all terrorists are muslim and not all terrorists are like all other terrorist. Bruce is joined by Senior Vice President robert litwak, who is no slouch himself in the terrorism business. He has written numerous books, he was critical of the term rogue state. One of his books has rogue state in the title. He is quoted everywhere in the north korea crisis. To paraphrase woody allen i often say rob is in the 35th minute of his 15 minutes. Please welcome is this just a conversation or is bruce going to talk first . In the twitter world, tweeting is not endorsement of the term. We will explain that in more depth. Please welcome our Senior Vice President who is engaging a conversation with very smart global scholar, bruce hoffman. Thank you, jane. [applause] welcome to those here today and watching on cspan. This is an ongoing book in the series. We heard from jane harman, we mark the publication of the latest edition of inside terrorism. It is the leading work in the field. Bruce is a professor at georgetown university, director of the center for security, Security Studies program. He served, in the Washington Office and served as commissioner of the independent commission establishing my congress group, the post9 11 response to terrorism and radicalization, part of the world center, it is anonymous soldiers struggle for israel, 19171947 so welcome back, global fellow, bruce hoffman. Lets start with today we mark the publication of a third edition of inside terrorism. What in terrorism changed since the second edition . How we as a country change in terms of counterterrorism strategy and tactics. Let me thank you for hosting this event, nice remarks, among the most productive years of my life. I couldnt have written my last book without it but an amazing environment that does better, objective type of research and analysis so much, associated as happened so long. I started writing inside terrorism in 1996 which was an awful long time ago, never expected it would be in principle, a need, one of the reasons for that, what i always tried to do is step back and give perspective, the book was published in 1998 right after the september 11, 2001, attack, tremendous pressure to bring a new addition and i thought it was too susan. The second edition in 2006 reflected prolonged engagement in iraq and afghanistan, some levels continued today and the rise of suicide terrorism and the emergence of the internet as a tool for recruitment even though we were not using the term radicalization. In the aftermath of the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 the arab spring, tremendous pressure, you got to bring out a second edition and i thought i have to step back and see what the consequences, enormously significant. 18 months ago i sat down to the third edition, and what called out the need of the new addition was the the rise of isis, and i still think that is it. Especially the emergence of social media, immensely powerful and unexpected tool that has enabled terrorists to do things that are completely different from before. Before terrorist propaganda recruitment, the proverbial bottle with a message into the ocean and if someone grabbed a washed up assure the terrorists struck all that had a recruit. What we see in recent years, two chapters in the book, terrorism in the media, what we might call our good friend, the world expert on communication and terrorism, the ability to use social media to very specifically target and home in on an individual and animate, motivate, engage in violence and those two things more than anything else calls for a new addition. Thank you. You refer to al qaeda. Thank you. It has proven more resilient than many anticipated, we dont hear so much about our qaeda. People wonder what is the status of this organization, blue up wall street at the pentagon, people associate that with launching the war on terrorism which is ongoing, given assessment where we are now . That was an important reason, to situate al qaeda in the broader context of where it is heading and what formidable challenges remain. 40,000 new words in the new addition, the final chapter is completely new and completely different, theres new material in all the chapters but the final chapter put in context what has happened to al qaeda through the war on terrorism in the wake of Osama Bin Ladens death and most critically in response to the ongoing civil war in syria. That is part of the problem. The arab spring, eventually the events in syria, it gave a purpose, relevance, resulted in the split that created isis. That doesnt mean al qaeda went away. As i argued in the book al qaeda has been playing the long game compared to isiss much more shortterm, promiscuous attempt to burst onto the scene, to elbow itself into the limelight. It is rapidly fading. Al qaeda, on the other hand, i argue, has sat back, bided its time, observed as isis continues to preoccupy the world, consume all the option in counterterrorism, further weaken and enervate us, undermine confidence in elected political leadership, create fissures in western society, push societies to embrace increasingly illiberal solutions to security problems, that is exactly the kind of narrative al qaeda seeks to exploit. To the point that behind the scenes it doesnt get as much attention, al qaeda is the largest single i will use the term Militia Group because of the hodgepodge of various organizations and entities in the syria. The largest single rebel, largest terrorist group in syria today with 20,000 men. The Liberation Committee controls the entire province, our stride turkey. In the last three years al qaeda has created a new branch. Al qaeda is attempting to marshal its resources to carry on the struggle Osama Bin Laden declared 20 years ago and remains a threat in the sense that even five years ago we faced one adversary. Now we face two adversaries and each have multiplied in terms of their branches or franchises which creates enormous challenges. Many americans had no idea there were military forces deployed. Also in the news is isis which is lost territorial control over mosul, thousands of fighters, close to 90 of the territory once held has now fallen back into iraqi or government control or out of the hands of isis. You talk about al qaeda. For the layperson there seems to be a dichotomy and focus between al qaeda and isis. We had job warwick here on the rise of isis and one thing, you alluded to how isis emerged out of al qaeda. The fisher from the nonexpert perspective seems to be should the group seek to gain control over and hold territory . Or should it focus on kind of Regional Movement that seeks to strike the United States and make that a priority . Can you clarify, seems to be both at the same time. I cant resist asking, because al qaeda was so linked to the charismatic personality of bin laden who was taken out in 2011. But what about Ayman Alzawahiri, the number 2 . I am surprised with all the National Technical means and new capabilities like drones that he is still with us. The interesting thing about isis, it is not different from al qaeda, the ideology is the same. Isis portrays itself as the true exemplar, the most faithful air to bin laden. That is part of the rivalry between abu bakr albaghdadi, the leader of isis and Ayman Alzawahiri, the current leader of al qaeda. I would say isis is the is and al qaeda the ego. Isis is unrestrained. Far more violent at least in the horrific displays one might call ultraviolence. Not surprisingly it overstepped its market. It has no constraints. Al qaeda is the more mature of the siblings with a longer view. It is not spending everything they are in but putting it in the bank for the long term but the problem is even thoughs isis are burned bright and is fading it is here to stay for several reasons. First you dont change the nature of terrorism that isis has done in a short time. Not just the use of social media but the fact that isis was able to deliver what bin laden only promised, created this supernational caliphate, the islamic state. Exacting revenge is an important motivation. You could argue revenge and retaliation is more a visceral emotion and better rallying cry. We see isis pivoting from come help us build a state which is the old recruiting slogan, so retaliate and avenge the loss of the state, isis is also the cutting edge of terrorism. The learning curve is adapting new technology. And pioneered use of drones on the battlefield. Wait until we see that technology in urban areas and the reason isis is here to stay not as a state but a terrorist group is in its dna. It was a terrorist group and began, it is not going to give up. They see themselves much like al qaeda, they are not going to give up. Part and parcel of that, this speaks to the similarity between 2 groups. They differ in tone and style more than substance and ideology but isis to ensure survival took a lead from al qaedas playbook, creating a series of what it calls branches. The way al qaeda a decade ago created franchises in west africa, east africa, south asia, east asia to ensure its survival. Isis has done the same. Isiss staying power and longevity is a Study Released 14 or 15 months ago by the National Counterterrorism center. They reported when Coalition Operations against isis began in september 2014 isis had 7 branches throughout the world. That doubled by 2015. The report was issued, isis had branches throughout the world. That ensures that on some level, isis was able to sustain itself. The one thing isis has done very successfully, much better than al qaeda, even before the november 2015 terrorist attacks, the conventional wisdom in the beltway was that isis was incapable of operating outside iraq and didnt have interest in doing so and we were stunned by this horrific attack but terrorism is not serendipitous or spontaneous. It is premeditated purposeful and the best terrorist groups are those that are strategically mind and in that sense even two years before the paris attacks isis created a robust external operation that still exists and is poised, maybe not to do the paris type of attacks on a regular basis, but to do so methodically enough that it provides a sharp shock to the system that isis is able to become relevant, threatening and prolong its existence. Any guess where Ayman Alzawahiri is right now . Like bin laden, somewhere in the netherlands between afghanistan and pakistan . If you had to bet your overdraft . Before bin laden, in urban areas, concealed himself. I think Ayman Alzawahiri, we know for a fact that bin laden was not conventional in the beltway, living in a cave somewhere isolated from his followers. He was on top of al qaedas operations. I would say Ayman Alzawahiri is too but has taken extensive security precautions, not made the same mistakes. If you read many of the accounts, manhunt, the book by cathy scott clark, the exile, how bin laden existed, he took precautions but they were not extensive enough. So Ayman Alzawahiri is a longterm person, enormously consequential for al qaedas future and the possibility of a reamalgamation of isis. Ayman alzawahiri is cultivating bin laden as his successor, and capable of bridging the divide between both groups in the future, not to give away the end, that is where it ends talking about the possibility of reunification or some sort of strategic cooperation. You referred to the paris attacks, there have been attacks in britain, and follow it on the expiration day to day level. There are two versions of this, people who are so radicalized by the internet and Autonomous Agents inspired the alternative explanation that in some instances explicit links between external patrons, can you put this relationship between people inside countries, the boston bombing, london, how do you address this divide and where do you come down . We have it both ways, and load actors, a semi truck on the promenade, the person a year ago in berlin, drove a truck into a christmas market, and very good at creating an infrastructure, terrorists attacks, deploy the lone wolf to overwhelm to completely distract Security Services and recently the director general of mi 5, active investigation, with 20,000 on the back burner. You have an Intelligence Service at the end of the cold war, to track that many people. That is part of the deliberate strategy to overwhelm security and Intelligence Services, Police Forces with the, quote, low hanging fruit, people who havent been trained at septem 2014 in isis, and to the caliphate, carry out attacks on their behalf, and interesting thing too. The same in december of 2001, as he is fleeing Operation Enduring freedom, the treatise published in december 2001 in arabic language london newspaper, said the same thing, talked about lone wolf. If you can come fight with us in south asia, use a car, it was on paper, in a newspaper. No one saw the differences in september 2014, using the array of social media to tap into this vast reservoir of maladjusted, semi adjusted individuals that were susceptible to that clarion call in a very successful. At the same time isiss strategy was to build the external Operations Network operating in a more organized fashion with financing and communication and carrying out more consequential attacks in the sense they are coordinating simultaneous is attacks as opposed to one off. They are throwing everything at the authorities. A decade and a half since the war on terrorism started, not the same results accountable a counterterrorism and a profound sense of exhaustion. How long can the struggle go on to isis is attempting to exploit while al qaeda stand in the wings, biding its time. That is a really complex and often subtle process, excellent analysis and you allude to one change since 1996 first edition, the growth of the internet and ability for there to be cyberstated the difference between the 2001 statement in the newspaper now reaching all the people in the world wide web. My last question before we turn it over to the audience, october 2017, 16 years ago, i remember the be 2 missions in afghanistan launched the iraqi Operation Enduring freedom and we are now in the year 16 of a war in afghanistan, deployment against isis, iraq and syria. Al qaeda is resilient. The war on terrorism is very resilient kind of phenomena and. What accounts for our inability to end it beyond the obvious the terrorism is a tactic, and objective in and of itself. Tell us about the durability of this war and something current millennials have to take into account this is the new normal for them as they grow into adulthood . That is exactly what it is, the new normal. That how we conceptualize terrorism throughout our 50 year struggle with modern terrorism commenced in the late 1960s. It has become a permanent fixture of International Relations and conflict simply because at least tactically successful because terrorism is filing to attract attention to themselves and their cause and to create profound anxiety, exactly the things terrorism does through history, undermine confidence in elected political leadership, create depolarization in society, pushing societies to become more illiberal. This is what they have always done but it is easy for them to do. The latest version of inside terrorism, terrorist use of the media because terrorism is filing communication. The problem we face now is we made tremendous progress in various intervals on the war on terrorism but if i were to diagnose where we have gone wrong, we declared victory. What we dont realize is we are up against adversaries who see a struggle as divinely ordained, they wont