Be watching cspan for what its surissure to be an exceptional discussion. This is a special gathering, where we will learn about and if you will rightly celebrate the publishing of a unique book as a colossal event from a fresh perspective, an opportunity to learn something new and profound about the Second World War or the bestselling history the Second World War how it was fought and won. Im the Vice President of the National Review and the trustee [applause] i didnt know they were serving alcohol this early. [laughter] i do this welcoming on behalf of my fellow trustees we have some of the board here and the president of the institute. [applause] the National Review institute was founded in 91 by william f. Buckley junior. It is a journalistic think tank established to advance the conservative principles though championed and to complement the National Review magazine by promoting and supporting its best talent. At the last National ReviewBoard Meeting in 2006, bill buckley ordered, literally, the directors to make the fight against islamic terrorism a Central Mission of the overall National Review enterprise. The institute took the firm directive informed the sense of western civilization which is the home if you were one of the fellows one being Andrew Mccarthy and the other the man we are assembled today to hear. Please visit nrinstitute. Org to learn about the programs. We are honored to call and a friend come and richard lowry, too. The son of california is a reason and almond farmer, the author of dozens of acclaimed book, the anderson senior fellow in residence and classics and military history at the Hoover Institution at stanford university, a nationally syndicated columnist and the author of the weekly column for the National Review online. Professor hanson is also a distinguished fellow in history at Hillsdale College and among others, he was awarded the National Humanities medal in 2007, the bradley prize in 2008, the award in 2002, and the buckley prize in 2015. We will proceed as follows. Professor hanson will give a talk is about 15 to 20 minutes. To provide an overview of some key themes of the Second World War. Then he will be joined by my other friend, the editorinchief of the National Review and acclaimed author in his own right. I recommend all breed of linking unbound and despite his youthful appearance, the man now separating his 25th year at the National Review and i am pleased to chair that. [applause] when he first came to the National Mall review and the fact that he survived that is quite a miracle. He will join victor for some informed qanda about the book and while they engage we will collect cards from the audience to further talk with one of the great historians of our time. Writing the National Review it is said that it is impossible to do justice to such a magnificent book in a short review given the vast quantities of accounts of the great conflict, one would think there wasnt much left to say. His fresh examination of world war ii cements the reputation as a military historian of the first order indeed. Ladies and gentlemen, it is a distinct pleasure to introduce the professor victor davis hanson. [applause] thank you very much for the nice introduction. Its different when i go to universities raising grower and former colleague [inaudible] to explain this idea that anybody can say anything new when theres about 7,000 books published per year on the Second World War. The title e. Use is one that trumps questions. I was talking to an editor in chief and explained this idea i had. She said it sounds like the Second World War to me, meaning that is th as the title we camep with. What we were getting at is Second World War coming into currency was used but only sporadically until 1941. Then it was the german border war and france, yugoslavia, greece, all of which germany won except they came to an impasse with britain. At the same time the japanese were creating this post [inaudible] the access had been won because they were actively colluding under august 23, 1929. The british were engaged still in the appeasement until Winston Churchill eight and 1940 and we were isolationists and that gave a misguided view of the strength of the United States and Great Britain and eventually the soviet union. And that land in 1941 to the three events that changed the course of history. I think they were the three most momentous and then they changed what we knew as the war and that was of course the soviet invasion of june 22, 1941 as well as the next day on the singapore december 7 and 8th 1941, and then the inexplicable declaration by italy and germany on december 11. And thats the point, the entire complexion of the boards were exchanged and they prided themselves on earlier probation for the verbosity and the wonderful technicians found themselves in a war they couldnt win with 170 million now against him alliance over 400 Million People and they would have a prewar gdp of six or seven times larger. As historians we dont like to go back and say that was stupid. There were all sorts if you were german number japanese we dont have time to go through them all, but very quickly sherman wasnt able to be defeated in what is now the European Union by 1940 and late june so the idea is we could be immune from the blockades and people said krantz never dated a friends collapse this time around. Theyve been very unimpressed. It was wrong, misguided impressions that he had been eager and surrendered in world war i earlier and they were right for the plucking and that distorted the idea that if they ever fought a global war they had no idea beyond. 80 of transportation was by horses and at that point it was just a question of time to get up the full strength. The second position is even more explicable because why would you attack the unite United States n gdp during the 20the gdp duringd 30s often during economically diverse and unpredictable times have been anywhere from ten to 30 times larger than japan. It produced 70 of the worlds oil and the idea was if he were a Japanese Bank or that they havent done anything during the blitz and their key ally meant they were wide open. There was no more friends or east asia that could be conquered and that there was a dispute whether you should go into the philippines or bypass the harbor, but like the german impression, they had run wild, they would run wild. They didnt have the wherewithal or didnt know about the ship program in progress that would make a fleet within two years but was larger than all that had participated in world war ii put together. So, again, what causes the war is this impression of what enemys capabilities are both spiritual and material. Hitler declared war in the United States and partly it was because he felt the uboat even though we have ten or 15 active could ship to miami with ease and more importantly the impression that the Japanese Navy would occupy the americans and they would never be able to get across the atlantic again. Again the misimpression because a member in world war i, we have transported people and produced more artillery shells in france and britain supposed started a war against the new alliance that the access could end when. We cooperated more in fees ideological that dont trust each other so when they say wheres pearl harbor and the germans just declared a pact with their enemies and they did the same with the germans. The theme would be to finish to question 1942 would they fight in world war i if they didnt settle for the armistice. We cant do this because the oversight treaty was partly to blame for the present war was punitive and debilitating but i didnt address the problem of emasculating german aggression. This time we were going to rome, berlin and would impose a surrender in the existential war. More importantly, we have the wherewithal to do it. The United States and britain have the longrange bombers and the idea was the soviet union would be supplied 20 of the material needs and destroy two out of three soldiers. Out of the calculus came the idea that the allies were thinking when you get into the war you have to address the manpower and the reserves of the enemy. In the war with britain, he has no lift capacity, they were incapable of defeating and then he declared war on the country he couldnt reach new york punchless detroit or san francisco. What was he thinking that it makes no sense other than hed livehedoes in the world of the battlefield efficacy spiritual excellence all of these intangibles and practicality and reality. But again, because no ability to reach and there have been more than 700 miles. They didnt have a single pair of carrier. The japanese, what were they thinking when they attacked pearl harbor . Bathos that we wouldnt use the resources of our potential disposal but more importantly, they thought we put in tree act anin the way we did. The question after 42, could they pull it off when we were in this room the answer would be yes. Within a week they were cutting it off. The japanese had the battles off the guadalcanal. It is successfully invaded australia would be cut off, they were barreling 70 miles an alexander on the way to the suez and then it vanished. Within three months there were 300,000 people surrendered in february 1943 and algeria and morocco they couldnt build and supply as americans could and it was just a question again on the Unconditional Surrender because to do so you have to deal with 15 million access soldiers and these economies were still not damaged so the story of world war ii was how much blood and treasure are you willing to expend to defeat fascism and impose a different constitution that would preclude the resurgence of this martial ideology. World war ii became the most deadly event in history. 65, sympathy 60 now because the chinese and russian archives that might have been 70 million. It was the first major war where the losers lost more than the winners by the margin there were far more civilians. 80 were civilians. If you look at the war in the reductionist terms, average people who were killed the story of the german and japanese soldiers killed unarmed and armed uniformed people in soviet union and china, 50 million i think that should remind us a little bit when we worry about the firebombing of japan dropping the atomic bomb it was still if you look at the 27 million that were killed in russia and 16 million in china, eight or 9 million if was still the story of people who said they were the greatest warriors in the world and yet they killed 50 Million People who couldnt defend themselves and they took on three major powers that humiliated them and ended their way of existence. When you look at the people that participated the United States would rise and the question but can remember was the only country to fight and not because it was a surprise country they were far more mobilized. There was the bombing of Manchester Liverpool during the entire period dayold produced the spitfire productions, so at the end of the war they almost outproduce all in almost every category. Japan got off easy in that no nations army killed more people had suffered fewer losses given the carnage and get they were the only country that wasnt invaded. That wasnt really the story. The story was that he got in his way we would have on april bombing was because it had been open in three months. Can you imagine having 15,000 bombers. It would have made the carnage childs place so they were necessary not just in the American Invasion but to save lives from a campaign that already destroyed. You can imagine 2,000 more. I will finish with questions it a leadoff off easy and nobody gets off easy when you lose half a Million People but they have been an ally in world war i and the only country with mussolini and the only country to have a homeland fought over for more than three, two years. We kept the soviets out and it was considered that they suffered. We occupied in a very benign w way. Whatever the faults of the allies that we left Eastern Europe to be subject to the totalitarian subjugation, that is one of the reasons they went to the war, added to the list we have to be good, we dont have to be perfect, so the primary aim is to the fascism and not to let it come again and Everything Else after that was considered a. I will open up for questions now. [applause] we will see what Victor Hanson has to say about this. Could you immediately strike off a column which i believe he did and the email wasnt working that day and you can imagine it was a compelling read once a week basically for 16 years since then and now victor has written a book that is grand military history in the tradition of Martin Gilbert and i have to say that for davis hanson. So congratulations on this monumental book. There is a wellknown book [inaudible] we will discuss a little bit and then in the form of note cards please scribble them out and they will be passed out of here. We dont have a lot of time so my question may be redundant. Lets discuss the points of the war. How close of a battle was hitler to knocking the british out of the war . Then the cabinet deliberations were happening. Late june he thought there were people that made it impossible and he had a very great insight. He said to the generals napoleon may invade britain but they almost did but they cannot defeat and then he said it is inevitable they would do that. The idea i cannot have my enemies homeland. The turning point was next year or 43. If you look at the point that it wouldnt be able to go against the premier army they didnt mean a sort of optional but sort of like a defeat and nobody really got out of the army of over 300,000 people. About 11,000 survived. So is it too simplistic to say they were the ones who defeated hitler . They did kill two out of three. It was soviet blood and the knowhow and experience but in our defense they were able to concentrate because we were supplying the tanks and artillery. Second, the soviets were onedimensional. We conducted the campaign. 10,000 of the best were away from the Eastern Front. We contacted a Circus Campaign and supplied all of these and they did it at a cost of 27 million. We should remember this was from normandy to the there were. 03 and we invest about 45 of the budget without two to 7 . We were very versatile but they wouldnt have been able to off offer. Discussable but more if you dont mind, why is it wrong to be a material determinist when considering conflicts of this time . It can be impossible for the north to lose and there was this industrial phase and we are going to wear down the confederacy. You can hear this when we talk about your not going to conquer russia. Its taking on too much but the leadership matters, spiritual factors matter. What is the balance among all of those . You have these parameters and sideline and material conditio conditions. The sidelines were going to be hard to shift into diversified us a. Splitting the forces and declaring the war on the United States. It took about an hour of maintenance for two hours of operation. All of these investments meant when they started the war, they had no margin of error with the case of the british, we could go into the marine division, which we did and then they compounded that with china where they lost 700,000. Our losses were not catastrophic and if they were, we had a margin of error. Lets talk a little bit without weaponry. Was there anything characteristic or typically about the tanks to. Theres better armor, better guns, were selected. But if youre going to build 15 will they ever see so they have one hour or ten hours of operation to take up the transmission of two hours in case you have to send it back to factory. The factory. So the question is the same thing they called the 72,000 because it was so expensive to operate. The americans said japanese you made the best destroyer in the world you could have made 40 destroyers. By 80 for the cultural and political reasons were much more pragmatic and they build things that were large enough for the t. 34 tank or a p. 51. Final thing, the industry was across so they factored in the idea that they had to be transferred. So you dont want to live to 60,000 when you can do two or 30. [inaudible] it became best fighter and when they got to normandy and said we didnt know what youre going to do basic lets put a 17pound gun into wha his basically 70millimeter and hitler didnt share the technology with japan or italy and they would add on to. It was a power cut cooperated and consulted with. What was the japanese theory of what the endgame would be in the war against the United States . The warnings that we are going to get bogged down and never when it was the theory of how they would when . We created and formalized in 1940 sort of what china is doing right now, and the americas havent done anything. When we look at the chance british and frencdutch andbritie military assets commensurate with the colonial ambitions anymore. The fleet isnt quite comparab comparable. We feel its in a decline. The japanese attache growing up in portland had the opposite, so they didnt understand but spiritually or politically or culturally the