Good afternoon, everyone. My name is bill burps. Im delighted to welcome you to the Carnegie Endowment for international peace, and im especially delighted to welcome home to carnegie Nick Rasmussen, the director of the National Counterterrorism center. As nick completes three years as director of nctc and nearly 30 years of Government Service, were very fortunate and very honored that hes chosen to offer a few parting thoughts at the place where his professional journey began, at carnegie, where he served as an intern in the Junior Fellows Program after graduating from wesleyan. Ive known and admired nick since the 1990s when we served together in the state department when nick worked for dennis ross in the special middle east coordinators office. Nick went on to serve as one of the very few senior u. S. Government officials to serve virtually continuously since 9 11 in fighting terrorism around the world first at the white house and then at nctc. We are, over the last three years, hes led and molded hundreds of colleagues from across 17 different federal agencies into a remarkably strong and cohesive team. At a moment when theres an increasing tendency, i think, to disparage sometimes and politicize the work of career public servants, im especially glad to have the chance to highlight and to honor the Public Service of Nick Rasmussen because nick has embodied the very best in Government Service. So, ladies and gentlemen, i hope youll join me in a warm welcome for nick rasmus accept. [applause] rasmussen. Thank you, bill, for the warm words. And also my thanks to Carnegie Endowment and the carnegie staff in particular for pulling this event together. Making my last public appearance as director of nctc, but also as a career last appearance as a career Civil Servant here at carnegie seems right to me. My first paying job, as bill noted, as a National Security professional was as a carnegie intern, the precursor to what is today carnegies fellow program. 12,500 in Carnegie Endowment dollars i made that year [laughter] allowed me to live comfortably in my parents basement in fairfax city. [laughter] and subsidized my spiffy but very much used nissan sentra. [laughter] so closing this particular chapter in my professional career here at carnegie, as bill noted, feels like coming home, and its an honor to be here. I want to spend most of the conversation, or the time or the hour we have in conversation with bill and with you, but i wanted to offer a quick few framing thoughts on a couple of topics maybe to set the stage. First, ill Say Something about the connection that exists between whats happening on the ground today in iraq and syria and the threat we face from isis here at home and around the globe. Second ill say a few quick words about the particular terrorism problem that we face here at home inside the United States and how we might do more to deal with that problem. And lastly, ill offer some final thoughts about counterterrorism more broadly as a National Security issue, where it fits in our National Security landscape and our hierarchy of concerns. But first, isis in iraq and syria which is, of course, all over the headlines. Theres no question that things on the ground are trending well. The effort to shrink the amount of territory that isis controls as its socalled physical caliphate, that effort is playing out very much like we had hoped and envisioned that it would, and isis has been driven out of most of its urban strongholds and is increasingly under pressure. For the most part, isis now lacks the capacity to command and control and hold territory and exercise statelike functions; taxation, the exploitation of natural resources. The physical safe haven that was enjoyed by isis has largely been taken away. Isis now holds only 31 of 11 president of the territory that it held at the peak of its expansion in august 2014, and thats all tremendously good news. But if thats true and it is true why doesnt it feel that way . Why do we still find ourselves being besieged by isis threats and the isis narrative around the globe . The short answer i would offer is those of us in the terrorism world expected it to play out largely this way. We expected that as isis was driven out of places like mosul and raqqa that it would adapt itself and find new ways to implement the terrorism part of their agenda, and they have. The shift to attacks not centrally directed by isis leadership in iraq and syria, the increased emphasis on efforts to inspire or enable attacks by isis supporters far from the conflict zone, the surge in the number of attacks taking place all around the world, lone actors, people acting in very small groupings. These are all signs that isis has adapted to its more difficult circumstances by changing its operational model, and it will continue to adapt. Now, forsake of context, let me say this im not trying to take a very good news story that in many ways were winning on the battlefield against isis and turn it into bad news. Not at all, its not bad news. Stripping away the physical manifestations of the caliphate will have profound implications, positive implications for our threat picture. It just wont happen right away. Over time, isis will have fewer resources to support the terrorism agenda, the narrative of global success that isis propagates will begin to ring more hollow and likely appeal to fewer potential adherents in the months and years ahead. But as i said a second ago, those gains are not going to be realized overnight. Theres going to be a significant lag time, i would argue, between the success of the military campaign in iraq and syria and the time when we will feel appreciably less threatened by isis around the world. I say that not to spread pessimism and dread, but rather to suggest we still have a ways to go in our counterisis work around the world. There are chapters yet to be written in this campaign especially as we deal with the array of isis branches and less formal networks around the globe, places like libya, yemen, afghanistan, the philippines, egypt, turkey and perhaps a dozen other countries i could mention if there was enough time. And, of course, none of this is comfortable to the policymaker, because when the policymaker looks at what weve committed in blood and treasure on the ground in iraq and syria, they want results, and they want to understand they want to see an outcome in which our threat condition is somehow softened or eased, and it simply isnt there yet, in my view. My second set of thoughts narrows more specifically to the homeland, here inside the United States. And unlike my time at the state department, i spent a lot of time thinking about the homeland and what happens inside the United States. For the most part, i feel really, really good about the work done over the 16 years since 9 11 in terms of hoardenning our hardening our defenses as a country. I can certainly think of a lot of things that remain to be done, i could rattle through those at great length in the question and answer period, but i think we can say weve made it very difficult, very difficult for a terrorist organization like alqaeda or isis to penetrate the homeland with a group of operatives. To grow a sleeper cell literally under our nose. Groups like isis and alqaeda at this point know and understand that we are a difficult target, we are difficult to penetrate. And thats why their focus is on inspiring and mobilizing young people who are already here, people who are already living here in the United States. Now, the term of art we use in the Counterterrorism Community to describe this populationing is hve, home grown violent extremists, and they clearly represent the most immediate and the most ubiquitous threat to us here inside the United States on a daily basis. If you look back at the last half decade in particular, most of our terrorism problems here inside the United States can be tied to individuals who were either born or raised here or who only became radicalized well after they arrived into the United States. So the challenge we face here at home, ill argue, isnt really a hardedged intelligence challenge. Its really a challenge tied much more to soft power and community engagement. Working with communities here in the United States to give them the tools to counter the rise of extremism inside their own communities. And as i step away from Government Service in a couple of weeks, i think i can say with some credibility that were not doing enough on this score and that we need to do better. And if that sounds like im taking a shot another either my former colleagues in any current or former administration, its not a shot at any of them at all. Im being entirely selfcritical here, because ive occupied senior positions where this set of challenges has fallen to me to contribute solutions, and i dont think ive done a good enough job of contributing to those solutions. We can talk more in the q a if theres any interest, but my bottom line is that the battle to defend ourselves against home grown violent extremists wont be won by the fbi alone, and we need to make it easier for local leaders to play a role in that effort. Starting in a few weeks when i leave government, i will try to contribute with my voice from outside government. Now lastly, a few quick words, very quick words about terrorism as a broader National Security issue and why its been the focus of my professional life for every day of the last 16 years. I think most people know that 9 11 had a way of changing most americans who were of a certain age, and i was certainly one of them. But for me it also set me on a path both personally and professionally that has brought me to this job and, ultimately, to the end of my federal government career. And my involvement in that c. T. Mission, that counterterrorism mission, has been the most extraordinary privilege of my career. Its allowed me to work with some of the most talented and dedicated professionals serving anywhere, in the just at nctc, but at places like cia, fbi, nsa, dod, department of Homeland Security, the state department, the Justice Department and, again, i could name a dozen other organizations. I often tell my new employees when theyre joining nctc and counterterrorism work, they are now playing the ultimate team sport. Their own success and how well they do at hair job will not be their job will not be pled candidated on their own good work, but the work of thousands of others, partners in the federal government and partners overseas, and certainly our partners here in the United States in the state and local Homeland Security enterprise with whom we work so closely. And i would argue that that is why c. T. Work is so rewarding. Sharing both the successes and failures with fellow c. T. , counterterrorism, professionals has been one of the highlights of my career. At the same time, i also know well that terrorism and counterterrorism do not sit either above or in isolation from broader National Security interests or other National Security challenges. These days when i sit in the situation room and i see what secretary mattis, chairman dunford and secretary tillerson are carrying around on their shoulders overabove whats on my plate over and above whats on my plate, its hard to fathom how they do it. North korea, china, iran, the array of cyber challenges we face, all of that weighs heavily on me even those responsibilities arent mine. Terrorism and counterterrorism will continue to fit into that National Security landscape for a long time, but i accept that there are other National Security issues which do demand more of our time and more of our resources. But theres still something i would argue pretty unique about terrorism and its ability to the strive the agenda for our National Security community. Asymmetric attacks are called that precisely because their impact extends well beyond what rational assessment would suggest they should. So i would argue that that argues for sustained investment in counterterrorism capabilities in the government. Even as other National Security priorities begin to take over. Now, i havent said much about it this afternoon, but our work in counterterrorism is, in fact, getting harder and more challenging, so we need to continue to try and hire and train and retain the very, very, very best of our and brightest of our young people to be counterterrorism professionals. Yesterday afternoon i spent about an hour meeting with 11 young people at nctc who showed up last monday for their first day of Government Service as entrylevel terrorism analysts at nctc. I have to say that spending an hour talking to these incredibly smart and brave young people who have joined the c. T. Fight was truly inspiring. They really want nothing more than to be able to serve their country, and that made me feel very good about the future. I told them i would be watching and rooting for them from the sidelines in the years ahead, and i hope each of you will do the same. So again, bill, thank you for having me at carnegie today. Its ab an honor to be here. [applause] well, nick, thank you very much. I mean, youve just given us a vivid reminder of why we were all so fortunate to have you as the trekker of nctc director of nctc and over a professional lifetime of service. Ill get the conversation started with just a couple of questions, but i dont want to monopolize it, so i hope youre thinking of your own questions, because ill open it up shortly. Let me just start by, you know, you provided a very good overview, i think, of a lot of the challenges that youve seen over the last 15 years. And, you know, as we look at the landscape over the decade and a half or so ahead. But as you look back to the period when you first started engaging in c. T. Work, you know, just after 9 11, how have your assumptions change over that period . I mean, what surprised you most as the land scape has shifted in the last 15 years . I guess it would be this, we tended to think of terrorist organizations during the period right after 9 11 as being covert, clandestine, cellbased movements that could pose a threat to us, but they were certainly not Mass Movements, they certainly were not mass, ideologicallydriven movements. It was about trying to root out small cells of highly capable and highly committed, highly ideologically are committed bad guys who were trying to do us harm. And, of course, isis has changed the model in many ways. Isis, obviously, wouldnt win any elections in any country. They are not the majority in any muslim state or certainly any muslim community. But certainly isis opened the door the a Mass Movement approach to terrorism, almost a crowdsourced approach to terrorism. And thats, that requires a different set of tools if were going to fight back against that particular problem. And thats enough of a challenge, but that whole other challenge that was already there that we had after 9 11 still sits there. Weve just added more onto the table. Nothing fell off the table in the interim. We are, you know, it frightens me to think that i just talked to you for 10 or 15 minutes and didnt use the words alqaeda once, and if that i somehow suggests that were not totally focused as a government, totally focused as a Counterterrorism Community on the continued work to protect ourselves from alqaeda, then ive made a mistake in not having it part of my remarkings. So we keep adding problems to this problem set, and at the same time the resource picture, as i suggested at the end, is destined to get tougher as some of these other issues begin to crowd out the space. Just to flip the question a little bit, i mean, its one thing to the look sort of backwards at the experience of the last 15 years, but as you look out over the next decade and a half, what worries you the most . You talked a little bit in your remarks about cyber tools and the way in which the revolution in technology is going to create more vulnerabilities in a lot of ways. Extremist terrorist groups, state actors can take advantage of. Are we doing enough, do you think at stage, to anticipates kind of threats and prepare for them . Where should we be focusing more of our attention and resources . Its a good question, and i wish i had a pithy, concise answer. I think one of things ive taken away from the last 15 years is the requirement to be, to exercise a fair amount of hue pillty in terms humility in terms of projecting and predicting. We need to put out these futureoriented bits of analysis. I struggle to take them seriously if they go beyond the 35 year time horizon because im just not sure how useful that is. What i have challenged our analyst ares to think about and to try to contribute to solutions about though is where does this ideological struggle go. We had a conference last fall at nctc that i commissioned just by asking the question how does it all end. What it was in my mind was not isis or alqaeda, but it, this particular form of extremism largely emanating from sunni communities but which has taken on different flavors over the past decade, alqaeda, isis, certainly other regional terrorist groups. And the question has to be not how do you defeat isis, because if they are defeated, probably Something Else will pick up the mantel of that struggle probably fed by some regional conflict in some difficult or challenging part of the world, so how do we get at that problem and not just think of to it in terms of defeating isis or killing bin