Your microphone is right on you. You have two of them. But they are not on . [inaudible] ladies and gentlemen, how are we tonight . So welcome to the American Writers Museum. Id like to get everybodys attention as we have a very special us tonight. The American Writers Museum is where we celebrate the impact that writers have had on American History and our culture and our daily life. Now, on our walls and in the exhibits at the hwm, our writers in fiction, fantasy, science, spirituality and politics and is not hyperbole to say that many of them wrote the words the change the course of history. From Thomas Jefferson declaring independence to i to be wells demanding accountability, americas writers have forever challenged the status quo, and advocated fearlessly for the rights of all to be heard. A wm surprise bookshelf series tonight features a man whose works in words have failed government accountable and his new book tonight is the latest chapter in a lifetime of confronting power, mr. Daniel ellsberg. [applause] tonight he is in conversation with rick perlstein, journalist and author who politico called the chronicler of the American Conservative Movement because of his books, before the storm, nixon land, and under the bridge. Please welcome tonight Daniel Ellsberg and rick perlstein. Thank you all. [applause] thank you, carey. Its truly an honor to be at this glorious new ornament, chicagos literary culture. And americas literary culture. Of course its an honor to be here with one of my heroes, Daniel Ellsberg. Its an honor to have him here because win the events that he writes about in this book began, when he basically squirreled away thousands and thousands of pages of documents about Americas Nuclear command and control system in tandem with releasing thousands of pages of documents about the lies that america told in order to create and sustain the vietnam war, he expected to spend the rest of his life in jail. He knew this and he proceeded, nonetheless, in our interests and in the worlds interest. So before we do anything else i think we should acknowledge the courage, the vision and the sacrifices of this man, Daniel Ellsberg. [applause] he is not in jail. He is here on michigan avenue. [laughing] and hes writing books. The book he has written is exquisite. Its extraordinarily well constructed and well put together, and it takes subjects that are highly technical and highly obscure, in which the powers that be rely on us believing to be highly technical and highly obscure, and renders them an exquisitely crystalline prose. When i embarked on the project in the viewing dan for the latest issue of esquire magazine, what are the first people i turn to was an author named fred kaplan the way back in the 1980s wrote a book called wizards of armageddon, which told a portion of the story were going to hear tonight. And i said, fred, have you read this book . He said, yes, i have. Its outstanding. These refuted in slate magazine. I said what is new about this book . What does he tell us about the Nuclear System works in america that we didnt know before . And what he told me was that this is really the first book that has put the whole system together, explained how it works from beginning to end. And it demonstrates very existence of a Nuclear Arsenal of necessity sets in motion a logic that creates a doomsday machine. Everything about it that is worth criticizing is an inherent feature of the logic of the whole system. This is what it is. This is what it leads to. Thats fred kaplan, the expert on nuclear wars. Yes, and to quote the book, he gives an absolutely astonishing account of cuban missile crisis and how they came exquisitely close to ending most of life on earth. That estimate the wee one or 2 left, so its not really, its an extinction hes an engineer. You say this. He says well, not quite. He says it wouldnt quite bring us extension and what it would probably, probably 40 to 59 people left their bidding wycombe after he narrates this, he says this. The existential danger to humanity of Nuclear Weapons does not rest solely or even mainly on the possibility of further proliferation of such weapon to quoteunquote rogue or unstable nations. Who would handle and threatened them less quoteunquote responsibly and the permanent members of the security council, nor does it rest merely on the boundaries of a small army recent Nuclear Weapon state, israel, pakistan, north korea. What the true history of the cuban missile crisis feels is the existence of massive Nuclear Weapons in hands of leaders of the superpowers, the United States and russia, even those leaders are about as responsible, he may and cautious as england weve seen postevent and still do in tolerable dangers to the survival of civilization. I would like to begin our discussion in the summer of 1958. You have just taken a job at the Rand Corporation, research and development, and air force think tank. And a very arresting image you talk about what happened on a certain moonless night. Well, the reason to be significant that it was a moonless night was that i was reading in, trying to read my weight in an topsecret and secret, mostly secret documens at that time at rand, in the sense of at last being an insider and seeing the way this thing looked from outside. So i was spending really 70 hours week pretty much seven days a week reading this stuff late at night and reading into it. And hypothetical soviet surprise attacks in great detail, to which the people at rand who i found were as smart a group as ive ever encountered as a group of people, were convinced that the soviets on the basis of estimates from air force in particular but then National Intelligence as well were racing to produce the capability to destroy the u. S. Specifically, to destroy our ability to retaliate our deterrent capabilities. They had been the first to put up an icbm effectively by speeding Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, a missile that could reach swedish yes, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile of the kind that North Vietnam is striving for. North korea. What did i say . [laughing] wrong adventure. I am still living in [laughing] right, thank you. North vietnam did not acquire such capabilities. But north korea is trying to get an icbm and we might come back to that because we will come back to that. Of similarity between the reasons i think for wanting to do that, and for as charles reason for wanting to put mediumrange missiles the range of the United States. Still in 1958. Coming back to 1958 without it icbms and were going towards hundreds of them at the time when we did not really have any. It wasnt thought they had that in 58, but in 1959 they might have a couple hundred which would be enough to destroy, i seem different figures on that but the figure always use at the time was 26, depends on what you count as major basis, indeed what was called the zone of the interior. The american continent, not including i think alaska or youre reading all this stuff and suddenly you and existential threat. Right. What i was reading was report saying they would want to coordinate the attack with the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, which by the way when initially called Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ibms. [laughing] a corporation objected that and, of course, so they became icbms. Just as, by the way, the center for International Affairs at harvard that i spent a lot of time was run by kissinger was at that point, they decide to change it from cia to the center for International Affairs, see foia, they preferred. Same idea. So the idea was though that would be hitting with the icbms into the interior, deep into the interior and are aces, but they would correlate that attack with short range of mediumrange missiles, cruise missiles from submarines cost basis at our command and control. The submarines would be very close in a very short flight types. They can essentially no warning time. That phenomenon is still a factor in our analysis of both sides. So okay, its going to be a coordinated attack, and the best time for such an attack would be in august for various weather conditions and so forth on a moonless night about midnight, coordinating this. I look out my window at rand which is right above muscle beach in santa monica, looking out at the ocean. It was a moonless night and it was about midnight. I looked at my watch and this brutal expression of hairs on the back of my head rising i remember it from the time that shell actually, this could be the night basically, or a night like this in any case pics i looked out expecting almost to see submarines at a secret i could see that in my minds eye because it was christmas at that time. They didnt have Ballistic Missile submarines. The sounds within the service. I looked, was looking for stops. That was a time, also probably saw this in the book, where the youngest members of the department, alan from mit and i, were offered like all rand people actually a mixture, tiaacref insurance where rand paid most of the premium actually, ive recoup retirement insurance. Neither of us signed up because they didnt seem there was a chance that it would pay off, you know, on that. [laughing] most we could hope to do was to postpone this attack, to make it unpromising for the soviets by promising retaliation, if we could convince them that we would be capable under such an attack for a heavy heavy retaliation that would deter them. And we were trying to save us and save the world from a soviet nuclear surprise attack from war begun in that fashion. The scene but the greatest danger in the world and we were privileged to work long hours obsessed with the subject of how to avert that. But the highest level of devotion and the highest level of energy, and a certain kind of trust which you narrate over the course of the book becoming kind of a little more complicated. What im thinking about is one of the reasons why it seemed credible to you that the soviet union might launch this first strike against the United States and had the capacity to do so, us that having the capacity to retaliate in kind was that there was a very strong belief in the air force and other Intelligence Services that there was something known as a missile gap. Why dont you tell what that was and why it is so important . And by 60 at the latest, 1960 that they would have perhaps 300s general thomas head of Strategic Air command send in 1960 that he thought they had 300. And herman con, my colleague rand wrote a book on thermonuclear war and the primary concept doomsday machine, the hypothetical concept, he was estimating about 300. With the notion that would suffice to prevent a retaliation, possibly nothing else would come but a premise of that was why do we believe that so much . All the intelligence agencies within the army, navy, for different intelligence agencies. Army, navy, air force and cia shared a premise with my mentors at grand, all anticommunist as i was in the cold war years but the premise was that not only in stalin but in his successors we were facing essentially hitler with Nuclear Weapons. And very much the promise that just as hitler had been bent on World Domination and first domination of eurasia, that through all the bolsheviks, you mentioned the operational code of the communist and the notion that they were totally obsessed with the idea of taking over either by threat like hitler in the 30s or by attack, my actual attack and thats what we were facings taking over the world the essentially the world. The next bit in that logic was what was in their way . The United States was in their way. So even though we were threatening them, the idea was they had to dispose of us. They want us out of the way and then the field would be clear and even wood as bolsheviks, coldblooded, calculated communists would be willing to sacrifice very considerable numbers of their own people. Let me say right away i think looking back on it, that was an extreme qualification of the mentality of russians from top to bottom had lived through world war ii but the idea was well, they lost 20 Million People in world war ii. Look at them now . They came through that very well. When i say that im saying when i said anything like that to a russian leader they would almost vibrate. We suffered this going in, the germans coming in and then coming out fighting both ways. The idea of repeating world war ii this entire logic is based on the entire idea that they had the capability of doing so. And the well as well, im just saying but what happened to the missile gap . The corona satellites. Are actual reconnaissance capabilities were known only to a couple people, a halfdozen or so. They didnt know except for this halfdozen about the u2 flying phase, very high flying airplane that flew above what the russian capabilities at that time until 1960 were able to shoot down. Then that was replaced by reconnaissance settling which are still operating of course. We used not over russia and various places. People didnt know the existence except for this handful, maybe as many as a dozen most. And its not that we knew anything about what was going on in the ground. In 61, actually, i was out in Strategic Air command headquarters in omaha and i spoke to a kernel i known back in the pentagonwas now chief of war plans in effect. He said you knowwhat the old man thomas power , know whats that. What was dramatic about that was that the cia and the others were estimating at that time about hundred 60. This is a lot more. And that was in august of 1961. In september, the west cayman based on total overall from the reconnaissance settling. And very few people have. Almost no one at grand. And i was told about it and its in the book but i wont go into it now in detail. It was kind of only. I wasnt supposed to be told that i was told about this new estimate at the basis which i was not able to communicate, it was not something i was supposed to know and the fact that i knew it would expose like a journalist to sources. And what the soviets had was more icbms, not 1000 and not 160, not 120. And actually, the army and navy had been estimating for two years that they had only a handful. And the air force, the people that i was talking to regarded them as traders. They were so determined not to give the air force a basis for asking for a lot of missiles of our own. They were prepared to underestimate what the soviets had to this extreme degree and putting our country in danger. It was almost inconceivable amount of treason. But it turned out they were right. They hadnt seen any. The u2 had not seen them. The reconnaissance settlements had not seen them but there was an Overall Coverage until september. And then they sent for, thats what they had. That was what you asked. That means the soviet union it was a Stunning Development for me. I went back to rand and we mostly operated at a secret level in rand on most of the documents. It was topsecret reports but not so often and we took it very seriously unlike the pentagon. Topsecret was an everyday thing, everyday thing was topsecret. I call for a topsecret briefing and at the time, my colleagues had said. Anything youve seen, by the way, its a funny scene. Its funny in a way. I was not someone who operated and said you always had to have a chart. Powerpoint. But then you had powerpoint so charts with bullets. Equations, complicated stuff. Very simple, that was the point. I made very simple charts and we call atopsecret briefing which was unusual at grand. And it was unlike the pentagon, that meant everybody had to be checked in by a guard, check your name off, make sure they knew who was there. Like herman says, you should always have a chart and i didnt use charts like tonight , and but tonight i have somecharts. So i had a table here and id letter these myself. Topsecret from the top and the first chart was yes virginia, there is a missile debt. The second chart, is currently running 10 to 1. Third chart, i saved it because we had about 40 icbms. 40 was not a large number but it was 10 times more than they had. We had 2000 bombers in range of russia. We had polaris missiles in submarines, some launch missiles, cruise missiles, tactical bombers, about 1000 tactical bombers in range of russia and it was an immense and no one believed me. How would you know that . How would they know that . I couldnt tell them, actually. That was higher than topsecret and i didnt have the clearance at that time, i did later for this higher than topsecret so i did get it later but they didnt have it. They just didnt believe it. Thats ridiculous. More than that, it raised potentially questions that we are not raised at grand at all, it took them a long time and in a way never recovered because it totally turned around this obsession in our head but once you had come to movementand they did in washington , it questioned the entire axiom of the cold war. Kristof had not tried to have a first strike capability. He could have, his early missiles were bulky and unreliable. He couldnt have aimed, he was aiming to have first strike capability which we assumed he was passionately obsessed with having and could have. And the question was he could have what he didnt. And that implied, should have implied an entire recalculation of who it was our adversaries were and what were their names, what were the after . And what was possible. For example, another axiom then which by the way applies to north korea right now is you cant negotiate with these people. Hitler with nukes, it was true. Youcouldnt negotiate with. He would violate everything, he would just observe it as long as it was worthwhile for him which might be months or weeks or