Transcripts For CSPAN2 Nuclear Posture Review Part 2 2018022

CSPAN2 Nuclear Posture Review Part 2 February 20, 2018

From. [inaudible] its my pleasure to moderate this discussion with a group of folks who are prime movers in the development of the nature posture review. I will introduce them in a moment. We are not calling this a panel. Each group will give us five or ten minutes. We will get some conversation for the group going. Most of you know the group and let me introduce rob the Deputy Assistant secretary for defense for Nuclear Defense policy. Greg weaver is strategic director for staff j5. He runs the Defense Program shop and anita is the acting assistant secretary from the bureau of arms control. Im very pleased we can gather this group and we are looking forward to the discussion. As i said we will start with introductory remarks from each of our guests and then we will go in the following order. Well start with greg and go to phil, anita and rob has asked to clean up today. Thats what well do. Greg over to you. Thank you. When i thought i would do in my brief remarks is give you all a little more insight into the approach that three departments took in conducting the Nuclear Posture review over the past year. It will emphasize what general height and said which is consistent with the National Defense strategy which is that this was a threat based and i would add strategy based review and ill talk a little bit about those. Ill talk about the approach we took and how we did that and then what i want to focus my brief time having the floor is giving you a little more understanding of the rationale behind what i guess is the most controversial recommendation of the Nuclear Posture review which is our recommendation to present, to acquire two additional capabilities that expand the range of low yield nuclear options. Let me start by walking you through how we did this review. When we were tasked by the president , the secretary was tasked with doing this review of the tasking we got said nothing about what the answer should be other than the purpose of the review was to ensure that the United States would end up having a Nuclear Deterrent that was effective in the 21st century and against 21st century threats. We started out by basically doing a very extensive intelligence deep dive and reaching out to other experts on what the 21st century environment looks like from the perspective of nuclear issues. that infrastructure has to be able to last and be effective for decades into the future. We cannot afford to modernize the force every ten years. We need to understand what the security environment look like that far out. In the review we started by say what has changed since 2010. They give a very good explanation of the observations were made about whats changed. We then asked the Intelligence Committee how far into the future to have confidence to project the environment. It wasnt far enough for our purposes. Then we had to look at the on the timeframe was the nature of the uncertainty associated with the future security and how can we hedge against that as we develop strategy and capability. Once we get the deep dive that we did a comprehensive review given what we learned led to the Nuclear Weapons need to be in our Nuclear Strategy now and in the future. They are very explicitly laid out not to go into it they are you have read it but we were determined to be explicit about the role speak is the next step was once we have determined what the roles need to be we needed to decide what the strategy was to enable Nuclear Weapons to fulfill those roles. We then did a comprehensive strategy review i looked across the entire world and took a tailored approach of looking at strategy adversary including iran as a potential nuclear adversary. We develop tailored strategies but unclassified and classified. Only then which was about three quarters of the way through the review to return to capabilities. We literally did not look at what capabilities we would require until we got through the steps. Got into those capabilities we said given the strategies the roles they supported an environment, first we looked at is the program of record is on the books sufficient to support the strategies weve laid out we have concluded for the most part it was. But the comprehensive modernization of the force was sufficient to fulfill that strategy. One area we were not confident the program of record was sufficient was as a result of the russian Strategy Nuclear capability. So let me turn to the explanation of why we made the explanation to add a low euro capability to a small limited of warheads. And then a recommendation to field nuclear arms Cruise Missile in the future. We express implications and the growing disparity in Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities between russia, the United States and nato. Its not only replacing but expanding them in numbers and types. We concluded there are real indication our current strategy capability are perceived as potentially inadequate to from deterring them from doing two things, initiating Nuclear Strikes to curse nato in a nuclear war and the second to make wider use of weapons to defeat conventional forces that their efforts to course fails. We also concluded given the stresses on russias National Defense and investment they would not be expanding their limited resources to modernize and expand their forces if they had little or no confidence in that, the reason why the russians were rational actors why invest in the strategy they had no confidence in. Was to the people know that nobody can objectively determine precisely what capabilities are required to deter potential adversary. Anyone that tells you they can do that is an amateur, thats not the nature of deterrence. Ultimately its not adversary perceptions. It doesnt really matter if we think our capabilities should be sufficient, we need to look for indications that is not the case. We were on comfortable that question that was the answer the russians were coming to giving the difference between what they say what they are doing. We also think its prudent to air on the side of having more rather than less capability. As long as we dont create new counterproductive threats. We do not believe the two capabilities. Reporter and added to the portfolio does that. They do not threaten the Russian Strategic Nuclear Deterrent in some way that it is not already threatened. We concluded the recommendation we made was sound imprudent. Let me go further, what were trying to do is redo reduce russian confidence the current display or dn range of low yield options in the two sides increases the risk of deterrence failure to appoint we needed additional action. Russian modernization is increasing that disparity in increasing that risk of deterrence failure. Let me make it clear. Reducing their confidence does not mean they match their capabilities and quantity or diversity. Natos strategy doesnt have the same role. Nato will no longer compass site for conventional inferiority by reliance on Nuclear Weapons nato does require a wider range of credible low yield Response Options to convince the russians but our response would tonight the objectives they seek and oppose cause that outweigh those benefits they could achieve. Additional those paired with the rest of the Modernization Program are designed to do that to reduce confidence in moscow in the strategy. The man emphasized that we do not see these capabilities is lowering them in the threshold. I will make a u. S. Response to russia more credible and raise the Russian Nuclear threshold the purpose of these capabilities is to make a u. S. Response more credible. Its a response. That doesnt lower our threshold for first use, it raises theirs. When attack briefly about specific capabilities we recommended and why. Recommendation to rapidly fill the low range missile is to provide a nearterm and inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike anything with russia. The your low yield launch would be survivable, prompt and strike targets heavily defended against their delivery. Were moving to modernize ours but the existing technology is aging. Fielding the capability want to increase the number of weapons or take us over the new start limits. Nsfs its reducing the make it tonnage a recommendation to pursue this to provide a longerterm response to the continuing expansion of the Nuclear Forces to enhance deterrence in the future. We provide a. Caller u. S. President with a wider range of credible options to respond to russian first use. If they were to agree to arms control measure u. S. Might be willing to agree or to limit or forgo the nuclear launch. Finally a nuclear see launch missile would provide a regional presence without requiring alice to field u. S. Nuclear weapons on their territory. Thats a summary of the rationale we had and how we got to that conclusion. Morning pleased to be here with my colleagues and im pleased to have the opportunity to talk about the npr the main point i want to underscore is the 2018 npr does not represent a significant departure from the work we are doing. Youve heard that from others to document that reflects continuity with their work over the past 3 5 years. With a couple of adjustments that greg mentioned response to the threat environment. It also applies to Nuclear Nonproliferation and counterterrorism before speak about the apia on highlight about the role of the National Security architecture to provide context for my remarks. There are three main missionaries. The largest is the Nuclear Activities in the role is to prevent in the third is to provide the navy with nuclear proportion. The weapons piece is about 40 of the department of energy budget. All of it is roughly 50 of doe. From the organization that is responsible for the safety, security and reliability, the stockpile. First we maintain the stockpile to routine maintenance and science based stewardship. We prepare for the future deterrent on the third we ensure we possess the capability the strategic material, infrastructure and people so were prepared to have future requirements and the including those we dont even envision right now this is meant to highlight what an essay plays a part of the deterrence all talk more about that in a minute is the largest that the enterprise had on its plate since the cold war and the npr did nothing to change that. [inaudible] is also going to supplement that workload in response to the changing threat environment. First to replace the w78 icbm warhead. We had a program on the books im about to the left, start a 19 to maintain alignment with the air force programs. The second item is to retain the gravity bob for longer than previously planned. The threat environment has changed. The u. S. Will modify a small number of existing warheads to provide a low yield option. Finally theyll work to pursue a nuclear see launch crews michelle. Theres been a lot of focus on the last two on that the other side of the coin is infrastructure the need to re all caps allies remind nice infrastructure clinton available through the mission. This is not a fiber tenure undertaking, the programs that will be around for many years. Much of the infrastructure and capability that was the best in the world and its time has atrophied since the cold war. A large portion day back to the manhattan project. As greg mentioned this npr was done were taken of fresh look at Delivery Systems when its critical we get the program started and completed because they will be with us for decades. There is no margin for further delay. There is been some items in the media about nuclear testing. Be clear about the policy, despite the Media Coverage there is no change to the policy. Although the u. S. Will not seek to ratify the comprehensive Nuclear Treaty we will continue to test that began in 1992. The effort will continue. Taking a step further there is but another media commentary about the Nuclear Test Readiness posture. Theres also no change it remains as it was largely since 1992 with minor changes. The cemetery does not reflect any change from that. Continuity is evident a secretary mentioned these are not mutually exclusive what the weapon side they are complementary, much of the expertise we put to use this link to the capability we have in the labs originally established for the weapons mission an effective deterrent there is a declining emphasis on the deterrent that minute declining emphasis on infrastructure. For the last five years you started the process to climb out of the hole were in. As he continued to respond to this its critical the nsa as part of that response this is the bedrock of the nations security. Part of that is the nsa infrastructure. Thank you. Thank you to the center for hosting us today. This dod led interagency review for Nuclear Policy has received a lot of attention and deservedly so. Its important to determine this discussion today and here at mdu to better understand the underpinning of the strategy that went into the npr. I want to interject some notes on the importance of education the fact that we are here today and that we have such a rich group of participants this is a phenomenal opportunity for a stub benefit. I also want to put in a plug for interns. And many other agencies and departments that ever rich interim program so, i will emphasize many of the opponents the speakers before me have made. They dared to be repeated. First and foremost just said the fact that while there certainly changes in the review theres much continuity. So i want to emphasize five points today. First, the 2018 Nuclear Posture review consisted of several decades of u. S. And now i think it friday Nuclear Weapons. At the same time any policy must take into account the real World Security environment i prepare for certain future. Certainly a point thats been said here today. Other has been cut annuity in our strategy each npr is a product of our time. Changes from 2018 to may 2010 as discussed on the security environment for decades the u. S. Took the lead and arms control hoping to set an example that others would follow since 2010 lucina return in a degradation of the overall security environment. These notable exchanges have been in the area of Nuclear Capabilities, were fighting doctrines on the actions and behaviors of three countries, russia, china, m. D. Dprk. Just because theres a different focus does not mean we have abandoned our control or abandon any of our commitments to the npt. I just means the reality is were in a different environment. Id also like to pull in our allies here. The u. S. Government view of the security situation is nonexclusive. We had more than 30 governments we consulted the grade the security environment since 2102nd it clearly calls for deterrence and assurance. They determined that they will keep up and remain effective will also tailor our response to those in respective regions. The United States extends deterrence over 30 allies. Each individual view therefore, our strategy must be built to deal with different security environments capabilities and alliance structures. As the npr emphasizes its based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat common threats. It includes ongoing allied dialogues to understand threats to perfection and to arrive at shared understanding to best align our capabilities. These are critically important. I would have to say its one of my great pleasures in honors that my job to work on these issues with allies. One thing i would like to highlight is the u. S. And japan my bureau is the state department lead for organizing undersecretary level u. S. Republic of korea deterrence strategy ill try not to use too many acronyms because i can keep track. Our beer pace pace to lead in the Defense Department would be the republic of korea. So the deterrence dialogue and the u. S. Republic of korea Deterrence Strategy Committee evolved from alliance consultations that informed the 2010 npr. This is the first time we brought in allison partners to ask what kinds of things they expected to see would like to see in the npr. Weve done this again and 2018 npr and quite successfully so. Since 2010 we have established the eds cg, the undersecretary deterrence with the republic of korea. And that was formed just last year to better coordinate and employ all of our elements of National Power visavis the north korean threat. The United States extended deterrence to ella during the most challenging part of the cold war and continue to do so now i will continue to do so in the future. Next, changes to our posture designed to ensure the United States Nuclear Threshold remains high. Only consider this an extreme circumstances with its allies and partners. Our aim is to clarify the circumstances to consider Nuclear Response to increase the ability we further note that the United States will not use or threaten to use Nuclear Weapons against nonnuclear states that are party to the pts and in compliance with the air obligation. The very same negative assurance in the 2010 npr. We are not lowering the u. S. Threshold, here seeking to raise the threshold for others. The president said in his february 2 statement this strategy develops capabilities a

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