Have steve coll with us to talk about his new book directorate s which is just out this week. In fact this is the first time steve has had an opportunity to do his kind of standup talk about the book. Steve is a legend in journalism for this prodigiousness, the clarity and incisesiveness of this process. His ability to perceive the big picture and his skill at presenting grand narrative of something. He spent 20 years at the washington post, including stints as a financial reporter, foreign correspondent, a head of the sunday magazine, and for six years, he was managing editor of the paper. After leaving the post a decade ago, he served as president of the new america foundation, then took over as dean of columbia universitys journal jim school. He also continues to work as a journalist on the staff of the the new yorker magazine, and along the wail he was written revealing books about very big, important subjects, including americas involvement in afghanistan, the bin laden family, and exxonmobil. Won two pulitzers, ghost wars recounted the cias history in afghanistan from the soviet invasion in 1979 to just before the 9 11 attacks. In his new work picks up where ghost wars left off. Examining the past decade and a half of illfated u. S. Efforts to achieve victory in afghanistan. Laid out chronologically, the story that steve tells is a bleak and appalling saga of missed opportunities, mistaken assumptions, misguided strategies and miscast individuals. Theres so much blame to go around, democratic as well as republican administrations, and implicating numerous intelligence operatives, military officers and diplomats, but steve argues persuasively that what has doomed the american war the most has been the inability of u. S. Authorities to understand the isi, pakistans Intelligence Service, and stop its covert interference in afghanistan aimed at enlarging pakistans sphere of influence. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming steve coll. [applause] thank you, brad. Thank you all for coming out. I feel badly about people standing so i wont increase the volume. Lean into it a little bit. Is that better . Everybody hear all right . Good. So im sorry about the folks standing. Wont mind if you turn around and leave at a certain point. Its warm in here. Cspan is with us so when we get to questions, im meant to ask you to come up to the microphone. As brad mentioned i havent given a talk about this book so youre going to get a pilot, trial, and im going to learn a little bit about what works and what doesnt. Ill talk for 25 minutes and leave time for questions. Im glad you could come out in the midst of a stock market crash, resignation of white house official for allegations of spousal abuse, and the imminent shutdown of the federal government to talk about the happy subject of afghanistan. So, as brad said, the title of the book directorate s refers to the covert arm of the Intelligence Service this pakistani Intelligence Service. Although the United States has struggled with isis intentions and activities, in afghanistan, really from the beginning of its war there after the september 11 am attack its not as if isi was a mystery to the u. S. The iaea co lab brateed with them to defeat the soviet occupation of afghanistan. Itself was during the 1980s with american and saudi subsidies and with the guns and the technology and the power that came from supporting the afghan mujahadeen that isi grew into a state within the state, crosssive force in mosquito that influid politics and policy. And its commanded by the army, the top general in pakistan is usually the most powerful person in the country, whether directly in power or indirectly. Its service has 25,000 people working in it. Some career military officers, some civilians. Spies on politicians and foreign diplomats inside pakistan, collects intelligence from roped the work usually about india, and military threat, and divided into direct doorats, like the cia is. One for analysis, one for eaves dropping and the unit that is in charge of covert aid to islamist guerrillas, known as s inside pakistan. So, the war in afghanistan that is now in its 17th year, its began in 2001 as a sured improve vacation and counterattack to disrupt al qaeda in the midst of real uncertainty in the Intelligence Community about what could be coming next. They midded 9 11 and fierce they feared they were about to miss another one and part of the intense of going in was to disrupt al qaeda to get whoever might be planning a Second Attack on the run or thinking about something other than that attack. It wasnt really much of a plan for after the war. It was bare lay plan to execute the war. And after the fall of the islamic emirate, the taliban government december of 2001, the question of why we were there and what we intended to do, evolved into a series of confused strategies, laced with contradictions, sometimes informed by illusions, that neither the Bush Administration nor the Obama Administration proved able to resolve. One of the central questions in the war all along for anyone who has been involved in working on it, was why the United States and nato was willing to accept isi support for the taliban even when the pakistans covert action and passivity about taliban sanctuaries directly undermine american interests and cost american lives there was a character in the book named chris woods, cia officer and ran the counterterrorism center, station chief in kabul and i think he rotate in around 2011, visiting congressmen and other officials who came out would go and see him and talk about the war. I was referred to as his hour of power, and he told everybody, we either address the sanctuary the taliban enjoys in pakistan and win the war, or we dont and we lose the war. Thats hat simple. It had seem that simple to a lot of unbelieves him. All the way back to 2006 when the taliban started to revive and neither the bush or Obama Administration could find the will or the way to address this. So why did we escalate the war after 2006 . And yet fail to achieve our goals and why are we still there . Thats really the subject of the book. Its a narrative about how we got from the eve of 9 11 where we are today. It has a lot of episodes in it, a lot of characters. Its one of my one source i was talking to, sort of late in the project in in the Fact Checking phase, kind of had a sense of what the books scope was going to be, and he said, probably not going to have a pentagon papers about the war for a long time. Hope this is the closest thing we have. And i thought, well, thats at least an aspiration for the book and a way to think about it. So i want to use my time to talk about four things that i think contributed to where we are today, appar from the kind of central problem or surrounding the central problem of pakistan and its relationship with the taliban and the talibans ability to access isi support and geographical sanctuary in pakistan. One is the problem of our war aims at different phases. Second is our the failure of our relationship with karzai and investment in politics broadly. The third is the illusion of our counterinsurgency war in afghan next fourth is the failure of american diplomatic and political strategy in the war at various points. So, lets talk first about war aims. The Bush Administration and the Obama Administration carried out more than half a dozen secret interagency reviews of why they were fighting in afghanistan and how to achieve the aim it. A lot of the conversations took place in the same conference offices next to the west wing and the narrative keeps going back to that room, scenes are remarkably similar, allday sessions, interagency representation, often in the morning the intelligence agencies would come in and analysts would try to brief the facts, heres a map, this what the taliban control and the estimate about men under arms, and then usually the professional anallies would leave the room and he policymaker wood debate what would we do now . Remarkable to excavate as best is could without access to all the notes and records but with substantial access, to what was discussed and what was written what papers were presented, that the problem was so repetitious and yet the solution was so evasive. Heres an example. In all of the reviews i was able to realun pack, of course its a duty of poll sick policymaker sending Young American women and win to war to think about the vital interests that justify the sacrifices. And in a number of the reviews they really work on the problem, and they settled on two. For example in 2009, during the Obama Administrations first review, they essentially found who interests that could justify the sacrifices that were being contemplated. One was al qaeda. And its affiliates. Because of the threat across borders of additional terrorist attackon those already evident. And the second was this left publicly pronounced usually because it was so sensitive this security of Pakistans Nuclear weapons. Country with 100 Nuclear Weapons, dozens of terrorist groups. Dont want them to fall in into the wrong hands. Okay. So, al qaeda and Pakistan Nuclear weapons. Remember, its 2009. Neither of these problems is actually located in afghanistan. Al qaeda had left afghanistan and gone to pakistan, what remnants survived the u. S. Campaign in the fall of township. Theyd not only gone over to pakistan by latched inwith local groups and gnawing thrilled winter weres of domestic terrorism that pakistan as ever phone, destabilizing the country, and pakistans weapons were not in afghanistan. Notwithstanding this mismatch, the surge of troops, 100,000 u. S. Soldiers at the peak, 150,000 international soldiers, counting nate nato contributions, was sent to afghanistan because of the rationale that if afghan fill apart, al qaeda would come back which was plausible. The second one is one at that time occurs to the present today. Al qaeda wishes agree, menace, threat, a relatively finite group. Membership under 2,000, at least in the region. But the taliban, are they an affiliate of al qaeda . As dangerous to the United States as al qaeda . On what basis in they didnt participate in the 9 11 attacks. Its not even clear from the best scholarship that the leadership of the taliban knew about the 9 11 plot. They created sanction wear for al qaeda. They refused repeated requests to do something about al qaeda. But after the fall of the taliban government, what did the reviving taliban pose by way of a threat direct threat across borer to the its or its a. L. Lies . Other question that all reviews in that Conference Room could never settle. That they had a plan that made sense in terms of the cost and outcomes to be achieved. At one point during those reviews they got into an argument that have we ever said we want to defeat the taliban . Im not sure that we have. The next day the pentagon came back with a powerpoint of all the statements of all officials to say we will defeat the taliban. I guess we have to Say Something so they came out of that review to degrade the caliban and reverse the momentum that language that is so strikingly vague that it begs examination. So i mentioned these reviews return to the vital interest of Pakistan Nuclear weapons. But also that was a fairly easy consensus to reach but what does that imply . The stability of pakistan and the militarys control over the Nuclear Facility was crucial so the more violent the war became the clearly destabilized pakistan pushing al qaeda into pakistan and after 2007 the worst years of internal terrorism the country had ever known. So you have dozens of militant groups more than 100 Nuclear Weapons and a worsening war. Now you recognize as part of your problem in afghanistan but what do you do if you are already constrained you have already destabilized pakistan and if you go in heavy with pressure you only make the situation worse. During the last review of the Bush Administration president bush approved an analysis that was more or less along the lines of what i described at a National SecurityCouncil Meeting but pointed out we are suggesting that they increase horses and Gas Resources to afghanistan but youre telling me the problem is in pakistan. So the cia says we can do drone attacks across the border to make some difference but the real problem is in the heart of pakistan. The president said can we go there . The director of the cia says blowing buildings up in the middle of pakistan then the isolated mud hut is different. They were constrained. President obama could not figure out how to resource the war to win it or on the other hand how to define the aim so narrowly to focus only on al qaeda that the talent then problem could be invaded. They went forward with the plan to degrade the caliban to momentum because they knew pursuing military defeat was impossible. So with karzai it is fashionable to think about to think of him as somebody who was unstable consumed by conspiracy theories, no question with his behavior was unbalanced there is a scene where karzai goes walking in the garden with one of his ministers and he says mr. President i do think the americans have been unfair to you. Initially you are an afghan first you were mandela and that is not right. [laughter] that one of the threads of the narrative is how the relationship unraveled. Even as somebody who was going there a lot like a magazine reporter interviewing him a couple of times what really struck me when i went back to unpack this meeting by meeting yearbyyear documenting what was said in private as i possibly could, that every time karzai received an american visitor 2004 through the last day in office, the first and last of most of the attic thing he said you have to do more about isi and pakistan the war is over the border. And over time he could not understand why the United States was unable to address this problem. He took it for granted the u. S. Could force isi to stop eating the taliban if it wanted to do so and since it did not take this action is thinking spun into conspiracies that there had to be another explanation that the u. S. Was secretly hoping isi was destabilize afghanistan to keep the longterm military base in the country. As a diplomat in 2013 he goes to visit karzai he rolls out this theory and he said something to the effect by now you have the snowdon documents, wikileaks materials and millions of pages can you see any trace of this plan . And karzai says maybe you dont know the plan. [laughter] there is a deep state in america. Another episode that is the spirit in one dash that this reporting allows was the 2009 election debacle. When karzai was reelected and Richard Holbrook came in and was meant to be the special envoy and was immediately a strained from the white house because they did not appreciate his style that they thought diplomacy around the election that he would try to shape the selection and he used to say diplomacy was like jazz a little bit of improv is required and he started to move toward the election date by talking to as many potential alternatives to karzai as he could identify. He runs into the brother in kabul he says i think im the only person that you have not invited to run against karzai and i feel insulted. [laughter] of course he got wind of this almost immediately and became understandably upset and paranoid the americans were out to overthrow him. But holbrook had no authorization to replace karzai and no plan to achieve the goal. And to make an episodic story short, we end end up with the worst of both in this case because karzai is reelected and he believes with reason the United States is out to get him and he is infuriated and hit talks about our inability to talk to pakistan about changing it conduct with the growing estrangement from the u. S. I mentioned this walk with the lung with the minister with mandela and karzai says to his colleague if we cannot run the government after all of these pleadings then we should bring the taliban back to punish both the americans referring to the northern alliance. His younger son happened to be with him and the minister asked do you want this boy to grow up under a taliban and resume . I want that for my son. If the government collapses he says u. S. Will not be threatened but we will be wiped out and that is what kept karzai with the knowledge that they were a dependency ended infuriated him more and more as time went on on the one hand the americans would say you are the sovereign president they respect you and we will deal with you as a sovereign but on the other hand every time they objected to the counterinsurgency with the policies or military campaigns or the way they were involved in the election, he was ignored and he understood he was powerless despite this loose talk repeatedly offered to his as and the americans about changing sides or cutting a deal with isi to bring the taliban back. He was not in a position to do so. Have about five or six and left. One was the Counterinsurgency Campaign that began in 2008 in earnest when Obama Took Office after a series of tangled reviews partially endorse the recommendation of Stanley Mcchrystal to carry out the Counterinsurgency Campaign decided at the same time to announce he was ordering an additional surge of troops into afghanistan but also the date they would withdraw that we are going in and going out. That paradoxical announcement so typical a strategy reviews and policy. But as a Counterinsurgency Campaign with the afghan war in 2009 created a math problem so that doctrine the typical idea is a ratio of 20 soldiers and police for every 1000 local inhabitants. That means 600,000 Security Forces which was unr