My lady, my lords. The issue was not justifiable because it was political. It was political for two reasons. Reasons. One was that it trespassed on the proper province of the executives, and the other was the lack of judicial or standards. By which it could be determined. I paraphrase of course from the opinion of the assumption and hobbs and another case. Much reference has been made to constitutional principle. Constitutional principle may embracebr legal rules but it may also embrace convention. Convention that is not amenable to enforcement in a court of law. And an example of that was seen in miller one in reference to the convention which was expressed in statute four but nevertheless, remained the convention. In order to proceed under the heading of constitutional principle, there has to be an element of legal content, and if you take the example that was cited by my learned friend, the unison case, there went could clearly identify that the legal right of access to justice and, therefore, rely upon that in order to determine the declaration ofin a right and the enforcement of a right. Here we have reference to what is termed parliamentary accountability. But what legal content does that concept actually embrace . As distinct from its practical and functional content . Ultimately, what this court is being invited to do is to control the length of the pro edition of parliament as exercised under the prerogative. The length of each session of parliament and the frequency between sessions is regulated by constitutional convention, and not by the law. And, of course, that was not always the case. Because very early on parliament and acted the triangle act which determined that parliament could not be furloughed within 50 days of it having been summoned. And then in the triangle act of 1664, that provision was repealed explosive on the basis that it was in delegation of the exercise of the prerogative of which we are concerned. And since then parliament has not sought to legislate generally in respect to prorogation. Havent had an opportunity over more than 300 300 years to do. Of course it has legislated in order to determine that in certain occasions on certain times it should not be furloughed but will be recalled and most recent example is Section Three of the Northern Island executive formation. There havee been efforts to distinguish the exercise of dissolution from that. This has beenea repeatedly identified as the territory for therr court. It is not. And yet the distinctions that haveve been drawn between that d for rotation are far more apparent than they are actually real. In respect of dissolution, of course parliament cannot be recalled, and that will ultimately be an election. Following that election,at of course, provided by the act of 1694 that parliament might not be summoned for a period of up to three years. Even in the period from dissolution to election, and ill come on in the moment to look at that. N not, the executive would remain in place. And, indeed, would remain in place during the period when parliament had not been summoned following. Of course we now have a decision by parliament to regulate the solution by primary legislation. The fixed Term Parliament act. Under the terms of that act, and the periods are quite instructive i will suggest, the period between dissolution and an election must be 25 working days, or 35 calendar days. During which time the executive will clearly not be accountable to parliament. And there are as i will say it will be for the executives, essentially in the exercise of prerogative powers, to determine when parliament will actually be summoned. Now, in respect to prorogation, it is clear that political purposes may very well prevail over any formal purpose or requirement for preparation of parliament. We have seen many instances of that over thehe years. It in event of prorogation of Parliament Takes exception to that course of action, it has a very clear route to adopt. It may, following the progression to which it has an exception or in anticipation of the progression which is not begin, because that would be the instant case, at the beginning of september of this year, moved a motion of noconfidence in the executive. And such a motion that moved by the leader of the opposition would be heard. So if it has notice, as it did have, that it was n to be prorogued for a period that it took exception to, or at a time to which it o took exception, it was perfectly free to move a vote offe noconfidence. But would be conceived that was not to it political advantage . That is very point i am coming to. Im sorry, i keep anticipating your questions. Forgive me. That is precisely the point. It is in the determination of political advantage as toa whether such a motion is made and, indeed, the same can be said about the rebuilding of parliament to move a motion in fixed term polymer act, and such a a motion was of course moved in anticipation of prorogation, but the opposition chose to abstain. Again, and entirely political act. Wish to go to the country. They did not wish to go to the people. We for the suggestion dissolution is different because the executive is been answerable to the people. Well, by way of allegation, again the executive may very well be answerable to the people if Parliament Takes exception to theia prorogation that is being proposed. Attempt to draw some dn ofween the justify ability the dissolution of parliament, which of course prior to the Parliament Act would be determined as a political act essentially, and that of the exercise of the prerogative of prorogation, is simply not worthy of any detailed examination. The results may very well be the same. The Political Considerations of all sides of parliament are bound to be very similar, and the act of the executive can always has always been the subject of scrutiny ultimately by the people in the form of a motion. Should parliament choose to adopt that route, they may decide that it is not politically convenient to them to achieve that consequence. So that is where we stand so far as the issue of justify ability is concerned, whether it be dissolution or whether it be the prerogative of prorogation. This is for bid and territory. Forbidden territory. It should be between parliament. Parliament takes exception. They have the tools available to address the matter. Employ theseot to tools and that is a political matter, and it is entirely up to them. I will just add this one further point. How, in the context of that political minefield, is the court to opine on the issue of purpose or improper purpose or legitimate political purpose or illegitimate political purpose . How are these concepts to be defined and applied in this context . The applicants and the petitioners are inviting the court into for bid and territory , and into what is essentially a minefield, and illdefined minefield an illdefined minefield. The courts are not properly equipped to deal with this. I turn from there to some of the particulars of the appeal in the the case at hand. The first point i wish to make is simply this. It may have been noted by the court already. In his submissions, the Prime Minister new and made no attempt whatsoever to respond to criticisms that i have made of the reasoning of the inner house or indeed, to defend a particular and inconsistent approach taken by the inner house, in the determination of that case. ,n my submission, the reasoning the reasons i set out before, is unsustainable and it must follow the the issues in that case are for this court to determine. Which they may do properly by reference to the documents. I should also note, the suggestion from mr. Oneill that a concession was made in the inner house about justify tifiability. I have spoke with mr. Webster and lookednston, and i have at mr. Websters notes. They do not consider any sick concession was made, but if it was, it is hereby withdrawn. If i can make that clear with the permission of the court. Thank you for that clarification. We will proceed on the basis that if something is starkly obvious, a concession is not required and if it is not starkly obvious, a concession is not appropriate. They suggest that if a concession was made as to the justifiability, i take exception to that but if primary parliament by primary legislation sought in any way to determine when or whether the prerogative of prorogation should be exercised by the executive, then of course, this court is entitled to interpret and apply that primary legislation. But i suggest that is no doorway into the general issue of justice ability in the power of prorogation. Point, seek to put that made by sir james, into proper context. To the issuesy that arise if this court now has in hand the appeal itself, i simply urge this court to do as lord reed suggested yesterday, and that is to consider fairly and as a whole the documentation , the contemporaneous documentation, the authentic contemporaneous documentation that has been produced in this case. Im not going to go back to the comments i made about affidavits in the context of the process. I simply noticed that the president was certainly satisfied that the affidavit was not the circumstances required and that is consistent with lord walker, where he felt that the documents spoke for themselves, and it wouldnt be required. The language of the document is important. That the letter from mr. Oneill used discourteous and indeed inendiary language describing ministers, advisors, and civil servants. That language is wholly unwarranted and it does reveal an error in his approach. If you approach the documents with a preconceived belief and mindset that they are a sham, then of course, that will leave a particularou to conclusion with regard to the construction of some passages in those documents. If, on the other hand, as i would submit, to read them fairly and with an open mind, and they are obviously authentic documents, and you realize that they are considered advice to a formal minister for cabinet meeting, i see a different picture appearing. I simply commend that approach, that interpretation to the court. There was a complaint, of course, that somehow, prorogation prevents accountability. It is a fact that for a period, prorogation will affect accountability in parliament. But it doesnt prevent accountability beyond parliament, where again, the executive will be questioned and held to account further by the public, media, or during a Conference Season at each of those conferences, no doubt. But prorogation no more intrudes accountabilityf than what then would dissolution. Even underpoint that the fixed Term Parliament act, there will be no accountability of the executive of Parliament Days afterd of 35 dissolution and nothing can be done then because parliament couldnt be recalled. There are a series of mechanisms that may be employed for that purpose, and according to particular circumstances. If one was to fall back on the comparison to dissolution, i would suggest that in fact, prorogation is so clearly a matter that is political in nature that it falls within the forbidden territory. And number of questions were raised, including one from lord sayle, about control. In a sense, the same arises with regard to dissolution. If there is dissolution and the government goes to the country and it is reelected, it may be held accountable the grounds upon which it sought to dissolve for political purposes at a particular time. There is no greater or lesser degree of control. Of course, the ultimate political control, whether it be dissolution or prorogation, is the ability of parliament to express no confidence in the government. And the ability to take the Government Back to the country. When looking at all of this, we mustnt forget that one of the primary aims of the opposition in parliament is to replace the government. They are not just there to hold them to account area they are there to replace them. Has as the government political imperative to pursue its own policies, so the opposition has a political imperative to seek to pursue their policies. That is all part of the political ground that the court should not be. Ofpassing, towards the end the submissions, the letter from mr. Oneill asserted the United Kingdom could not leave the European Union without a deal a must that was authorized by firmer further primary legislation. That was apparently because departure would impact upon individual rights. I dont want to dwell on this point. It arose in the inner house but not before the outer house. Our argument in the inner house address this in paragraph 6670. I should add that mr. Oneills case was directly rejected by paragraph 110 of the opinion. A relevantcted as challenge to prorogation in paragraph 71. Rejected thedent prorogation could have any effect on individual rates, that individual9 rights, that is paragraph 59. Admissions we learned from mr. Oneill do not take where he would wish to be and the appeal should be sustained on the unchallenged grounds that i sought to advance in the opening before the court. The court will be aware if we produce more notes, it is appropriate i should make couldnce to these, if i [indiscernible] with the effect of the notes on prorogation to the legislation. There was some discussion of this yesterday and we have addressed the fact on a legal position in the notes we produced this morning. In short, the government is and has for a considerable time and shared that the statute is for exit from the eu and has taken extensive steps to achieve that result. Most of that work was done earlier in the year in anticipation of an exit on march 29. Further Statutory Instruments are required to address changes in eu law since march. Technicallargely of a nature. The 2018 act advises of an urgent process, and in the small number of instances where such things need to be in place for exit, they can and will be in place. Should be debated within 28 days. The government will consider if there is an opportunity to debate all of these before october 31, and it wont be a case of addressing a debate on these instruments after that date. Thisk to reassure them on point. In these circumstances, we expect there will be there wille requiredeal with all primary legislation. In that context, i should stress that some of the brexitrelated primary legislation that has by the dlp, are not an exit date. We seek to give explanation for that. There are issues that will be addressed after 31st october. Requirednot actually on the day itself. There is some element of confusion in the minds of some about what bills were being referred to. In paragraph three of our note, we say in paragraph five of the second witness statement, the public law project suggests all havet related bills fallen, that is not correct. With fiveem passed remaining. I should add with fairness, if you go back to paragraph 37, he to totality. There i think there has been a misunderstanding on that point. On the subjecter of a further note is the matter of relief. We have thought to explore why this might be more complicated than it first appeared. What i would observe is this. While we go in detail through these matters and we do maintain very strongly that the prorogation of parliament did take effect understanding the complaints made by the applicants and that parliaments prorobes in that the impugned,n cannot be standard article nine of the bill of rights, there is course for the court to make a declaration if it comes to the the advice was unlawful. That is all that would be required in the context of this case. Declaration a would be essential for parliament and the executive in particular to decide how to respond to that. Considering the reasons that may be given by the court if it comes to that determination. Is your position that if such a declaration were made, the order in council, the prorogation affected by missioners would remain would be legally effective . Lord keen yes. It be that it would be for parliament to respond . Parliament would not be there. It would be for the executive to respond. Act, e 1794 it seems very strange article nine would protect parliament against the executive and the against the executive and the crown, but then have the well, i dont accept the proposition if i may respectfully say so. It appears to me that the first question is, was the proclamation by the lord commissioner a proceeding parliament, and weve given six reasons why thatt must be the case, and if it is, then it falls within article nine. Why should one start at the other end to see whether they were properly charged . To deliver the message to parliament. The answer is that they were not. Ultimately, that would mean impugning the proceedings of parliament wouldve taken place and the consequence of that could be farreaching. I would suggest, well, first of all we say the ordering council itself has leaked the proceedings. More particularly, the third stage of the process, the declaration by the lord commissioner prorogued parliament. Yes, but it it may be impugned as having been secured by some means that without appropriate. It may be impugned on the grounds it was on the basis of the advice given was unlawful. But the sovereign, the sovereign make the decision on the advice of the Prime Minister and ordering council is made and the declaration of the proceeding in part. But my last question is this. Due to the interior stage, if the advice given to her majesty, the queen was unlawful, then the relays of instructions to the lords commissioners was also unlawful. Lords commissioners may be entirely unaware of the advice given speedy whether or not theyre aware of it or not speedy have their commission for yes, appreciate all that, but they could only act on instruction from her majesty, the queen. And if the advice she has been given is unlawful, then the instruction that she gives to them to act under the great seal or otherwise seems likewise to me to be unlawful, is it not . If i i may respond in this. It were majesty, having received the advice of her minister had entered parliament and prorogued it, would that prorogation be amenable to challenge in this court . Well, i i dont know if that the circumstance is that she receives advice which, lets say for the sake of discussion, is unlawful, then she cannot convey to has nothing to do with the queen of w course. She simply does perform her constitutional function. The advice, the instruction she gives to the lord commissioner, surely the argument goes, simply based on unlawful advice. So its at this stage before it gets anywhere Near Parliament that the attack on the lawfulness of what is to take place occurs, is that right . No. The attack which was made in the applications was on the lawful advice. If the advice was unlawful would not follow the counsel was liable to be quashed . I would submit that it is not liabl