Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recesses of the committee at any time. We welcome everyone to this mornings hearing, oversight of the federal Intelligence Surveillance act. Ill now recognize myself for an opening statement. The Judiciary Committee is holding todays hearing to carry out one of its most important tasks. To ensure that the tools used boby our government to keep us safe are consistent are our values and the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. This committee has long exercised its responsibility to shape the Legal Framework unto which intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies investigate threats and collect evidence of crimes. Although we do not conduct daytoday oversight of intelligence agencies, it falls to us in hearings like this to conduct a broad review of how our government exercises its legal authorities and whether that conduct accords with our values as americans. The outset, i want to acknowledge two things. First, the men and women in our nations Law Enforcement and intelligence communities including our Witnesses Today work tirelessly to keep us safe from attacks and other threats by hostile adversaries. Those efforts include working rigorously to comply with our laws. Second, there are countless americans in the privacy and Civil Liberties communities who are dedicated to keeping us safe from other kinds of threats. Threats to privacy, freedom of speech, and due process that take hold when the government surveillance authorities extend too far. Those who criticize and question the laws well be discussing today are part of this nations proud and robust tradition of holding our government to account. Questioning the governments reasons for its actions and safeguarding the freedoms guaranteed to us by the constitution. It is in that spirit that i hope to have a serious and substantive discussion today about the foreign Intelligence Surveillance act, fisa, and the provisions that are set to expire at the end of this year. In response to substantial concerns that the Intelligence Community had exceeded its authority under fisa, congress in 2015 enacted the usa freedom act which contains several important reforms. Notably, we put an end to the nsas program unto which it collected the phone records of millions of lawabiding americans using a highly strained interpretation of a provision in the 2001 usa patriot act. We reformed that provision known as section 215 to prohibit bulk collection of phone records and other types of records. Instead, to collect certain kinds of phone records, we required the nsa to apply to the fisa court for an order based on individualized facts and on a specific selection term. We also created an important mechanism to ensure the fisa court hears both sides of the legal arguments in cases presenting novel and important issues. And we enacted several measures to enhance transparency in the fisa court and in other types of reporting. At the end of this hearing, section 215 and t2 other fisa authorities known as the roving wiretap provision and the lone wolf provision are set to expire unless they are reauthorized by congress. Because these three provisions give the government powerful and controversial intelligence authorities, congress attached them to sunsetting provisions when they were first enacted and reauthorized them for limited periods of time ever since. These periodic reauthorizations provide this committee and other committees an important opportunity to review how these laws are used and to conduct the kind of oversight that we are doing here today. Last month, however, former director of National Intelligence daniel coats sent a let tore the leadership of this committee and other committees in the house and senate asking that we reauthorize all three provisions permanently. At the same time, former director coats letter acknowledged the nsa has dismantled the Records Program as theyve been conducting under section 215 as amended by the usa freedom act. Simply put the nsa dismantled the program because it was a serious failure. Nsa used it to collect hundreds of millions of phone records. In 2018, it discovered that it had no authority to collect some of the records it was receiving. Worse, it had no way of separating out which records were wrongly acquired from the ones that were collected lawfully. So it started deleting them all. This has all been publicly reported by the Intelligence Community. To be clear, it is not a bad thing that the nsa identified a problem, told us about it and tried to fix it. It is also fine that decided the program was not worth running. As former director coats put it, the decision to end the program was made after balancing its, quote, relative intelligence value, unquote, which was evidently minimal against, quote, compliance and data integrity concerns, closed quote. The nsa decided that the cost outweighed the benefits and it pulled the plug. That kind of candor should be appla applauded. Its baffling to me the administration announced they shuttered the program then in the very same breath asked congress to extend it permanently. The administration offered almost no reason for this striking position except the vague suggestion that we night need the program some time in the future as Technology Changes and as our adversaries capabilities evolve and adapt. When congress enacted the usa freedom act, we made a goodfaith effort to give the Intelligence Community the capability that it said it needed to collect records. That experiment has run its course. The administration really wants to keep this provision on the books, its going to have to justify it with more than a vague promise that it might come in handy one day in the future somehow. I look forward to discussing the other authorities set to sunset including aspects of section 215 and fisas roving wiretap and lone wolf provisions. I also look forward to discussing as well important reforms we enacted in the usa freedom act and whether any of those reforms should be strengthened. As i noted earlier, this committee has an important and longrunning responsibility to have these candid and rigorous discussions as we consider how best to ensure our laws are in line with our values. I thank todays witnesses for being here today. And for their service to our nation. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from georgia, mr. Collins, for his opening statement. Last week, we once again commemorated the lives of all the innocent victims lost on 9 11. The brave First Responders and dedicated recovery workers, the 9 11 anniversary reminds us each year of the shock, sadness and anger we all felt that morning. Our unity and strength following the attacks were palpable and encouraging also. Nothing the terrorists inflicted could defeat our nation as a worldwide beacon of freedom and liberty. As part of our resolve, the tools remain available work tirelessly to protect our country and secure the freedoms we cherish. Sempl of the tools are set to expire december the 15th. Its our duty to reauthorize these authorities otherwise the authorities revert back to our National Security posture before 9 11. I dont think anyone wants that. Im actually kind of glad were actually having this hearing. Expires on december 15th, we would have been working on this a long time. I guess weve been busy on other things. The act was originally passed to protect americans from surveillance abuses. Our National Security apparatus surveillance regime offers access to critical foreign intelligence that we need, but we must ensure that theres a balance in both protecting our security and our Civil Liberties. Fisa was created to do that. In 2016 during and after the president ial election, this balance appears to have broken down. While democrats accuse republicans of simply trying to divert attention for political purposes, its now clear that for those at the pinnacle of our National Security community lost on the objectivity that theyre required by law to exercise. And that is coming out now as we see a fisa report coming out soon. A necessary component for Americans Trust in the Intelligence Community is the perception of fairness particularly when implementing surveillance against americans. Like many americans, i wait the Inspector General who rihorowit report. Its a fact that multiple individuals at the top of the fbi have been fired, terminated, referred for or reported to be under criminal investigation, although that seems to have escaped the notice of the majority on this committee. Oversight and deterrence is clearly needed when the toplevel officials in our intelligence and Law Enforcement community are officially criticized and potentially even indicted for divulging sensitive and information and lying. That said, today we face the reauthorization of authorities passed in 2015 as part of the usa freedom act focused on battling terrorism. Three provisions. Sections 215, Business Records, lone wolf, and roving wiretaps. Must be reauthorized. Its admittedly difficult to separate our concerns on fisa abuse from reauthorization facing us but we need to protect valuable tools in combatting violent extremist and their evil goals. Two of the authorities are fairly straightforward. The lone wolf and roving wiretap provisions. The lone wolf provision, prev t prevents terrorists scheme s se harm us. We know this has been a trajectory of terrorist attack with a perpetrator or not, quote, members of these particular terrorist organizations but are inspired by their miedieval ideologies. The roving wiretap provision allows the Intelligence Community to follow terrorists and spies who attempt to thwart and evade surveillance by dumping and switching phones. If we can do this for drug dealers, we should be able to do it for suspected terrorists. Regarding section 215, i look forward to hearing more from the fbi on their use of this authority. The ability to obtain Business Records, particularly in terrorist and foreign intelligence investigations, but also suspected spies, is not something Whose Authority we can afford to let expire, however, section 215 is used for collecting call data records has been significant and technical problems in its implementation. Wed like to hear from the nsa on their thoughts and continuing validity for 215 for collecting cdrs. Id like to thank each of the agencies here this morning. I wish more would have been able to come this morning. I wish we could do this. In the spirit of 9 11 and countless other senseless terrorist attacks illustrate the need for our nation to always be on guard. The authorities are set to expire in december. Weve gotten to it now, thankfully, despite the apparent misuse and abuse of other fisa authorities are not the ones we should be removing from our counterterrorism tool belt. I look forward to the witnesses testimony. I yield back. Thank the gentleman. Ill introduce todays witnesses. Brad wiegmann is the Deputy Assistant attorney general at the department of justice National Security division. Previously he served in legal positions at the department of defense and state and at the National Security council. He also served as a law clerk for judge patrick higgenbatham on the United States court of appeals. He received his b. A. From Duke University and jd from harvard law school. Michael orlando is the Deputy Assistant director at the federal bureau of investigations counterterrorism division. He entered duty as a special agent in the Pittsburgh Field Office in 2003 and since worked on counterintelligence matters at the honolulu, baltimore, and Washington Field offices. Previously, mr. Orlando worked as the assistant section chief of east asia counterintelligence investigations. Prior to working for the fbi, mr. Orlando served in the u. S. Army. He received his b. A. From the State University of new york college at cortland and received a masters in leadership from georgetown universitys mcdina school of business. Susan morgan has worked in nsa o operations for 18 years. We welcome all of our distinguished witnesses and we thank them for participating in todays hearing. Now, in you would please rise ill begin by swearing you in. Raise your right hand. Unless youre a lefty. Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony youre about to give is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, information and beliefs, so help you god . Thank you. Let the record show the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated. Please note that each of your written statements will be e entered into the record in its entirely. Accordingly, i ask you summarize your testimony in five minutes. To help you stay within that time, theres a timing light on your table. When the light switches from green to yellow, you have one minute to conclude your testimony. When the light turns red, it signals your five minutes have expired. Mr. Wiegmann, you may begin. Chairman nadler, Ranking Member collins, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about four important provisions of the foreign Intelligence Surveillance act or fisa. These are authorities that will expire at the end of this year unless reauthorized by congress. The administration strongly supports permanent reauthorization of these provisions. Three of the authorities, the roving wiretap, Business Records, and lone wolf provisions, have been part of fisa for well over a decade. Theyve been renewed by congress multiple times. Most recently in the usa freedom act of 2015. Before that, these same authorities were reauthorized multiple times between 2005 and 2011 and each renewal gained bipartisan support. Today, i will give you a brief overview of these three legal authorities then turn it over to my colleague from fdi to address how theyve been use in practice and their value to National Security. Then my colleague from nsa will address the fourth authorityd i practice and their value to National Security. Then my colleague from nsa will address the fourth authority, call detail records, or cdr authority. Nsa can engage in collection ofof telephony metadata. Continue surveilling a fisacourt approved target, the target is taking affirmative steps to thwart the surveillance. These are individuals who rapidly and repeatedly change Communication Service providers in order to evade government monitoring. The roving provision allows us to continue surveillance without having to go back to the fisa court for a new order each time the target switches its phone. The government has used this authority in a relatively small number of cases each year. The case s tend to involve highy trained foreign Intelligence Officers operating within the United States or other important investigative targets including terrorism targets. The wiretap act has for decades contained a similar roving provision for ordinary criminal investigations of, say, drug dealers or organized crime figures. Second, the Business Records authority, this allows the government to apply to the fisa court for an order to collect records, papers, and other tangible things that are relevant to a National Security investigation. It allows the government to obtain many of the same types of records that it can obtain through a grand jury subpoena in an ordinary criminal case. For example, it can be used to obtain drivers license records, hotel records, car rental records, shipping records, and the like. In most cases these are rosheco the government can obtain in ordinary criminal or civil investigation without any court order. A fisa Business Records order is typically sought because National Security interests p s preclude the use of the less secure criminal authorities or because there may be no criminal investigation under way in the intelligence context. This authority has been used several dozen times a year on average over the last several years. Now the Business Records provision is also the mechanism for the targeted collection of cdrs from u. S. Telecommunications service providers. As my colleague from nsa will discuss in a few minutes, this provision provides a way for the government, first, again, to a fisa court order, to identify telephone contacts of suspected terrorists who may be within the United States. Finally, the lone wolf provision. This enables the government to surveil a foreign person whos engaged in International Terrorism but who lacks traditional connections to a terrorist group. It also applies to foreign persons engaged in international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the government has not used the lone wolf authority to date, it fills an important potential gap in collection capabilities wher