The center for strategic and International Studies enables a host of todays forum with indication to speak. I thank this isit the ninth or tenth such forum and is the great opportunity in a timely to discuss a lot of critical issues. I also want to congratulate the csis andat john and victor cha, for the tenth anniversary for the korea chairs csis. It marks a decade of contributions of nonpartisan objective research has made to the Public Policy debate on korean issues that are so important to the American People and to the korean people. Its really been a significant accomplishment for victor and john and all it csis. I am delighted to be here today. Im also sure the leadership of north korea is delighted that i am here today and a private capacity. [laughter] at least thats what ive read. Perhaps there will be a little less delighted now that i can speak in unvarnished terms. About the grave and growing threats the north Korea NuclearWeapons Program poses to International Peace andm security. Lets start with a couple of what i thank the main precepts im dealing with north korean Nuclear Weapons threat are. First, it remains unacceptable for north korea to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons. By the word unacceptable, i do not mean some rhetorical floors, by politician. I mean, that our policy should be that we do not accept it. We will not accept it. Second, it seems to be clear, the dpr k has not made the strategic decision to give up his Nuclear Weapons. In fact i thank the contrary is true. I thank the strategicsi decision that Kim John Young is operating, is that he will do whatever he can to keep a deliverable Nuclear Weapons capability and to develop and enhance it further. And we try to relief from International Sanctions he may make some concessions. But on current circumstances, he will never give up the Nuclear Weapons voluntarily. This is if you will permit a personal observation, this question of both of there is a strategic decision to give up Nuclear Weapons, is what the libyan models 2003, and 2004, properly understood what it actually means. At that period, we saw make and im ambiguous decision that he and libya, would be better off that went out developing Nuclear Weapons. He came to that decision for a variety of reasons because of theri overthrow of saddam husse, by a u. S. Led coalition. The subsequent capture of sodom hussein, and the seizure of the ship the bbc china and its deliberate and Nuclear Components uranium enrichment components, manufactured by the a coupon proliferation network. The told him that we knew what he was up to. At that. , he made that clear decision that he was going to give up Nuclear Weapons. We have seen not only nothing like that from north korea as i say, we have seen the opposite. The is important to understand that the current north korea moratorium, on testing of Nuclear Weapons and testing of icbm intercontinental range Ballistic Missiles, tells us nothing about either north koreas intention or its strategy as is playing out. One reason one very good reason and troubling reason why there is no more testing of Nuclear Weapons for the moment, or of longrange missiles, is that north korea has in his judgment for well rl, finished testing. And its can produce Nuclear Warheads longrange Ballistic Missiles. This not an encouraging sign, is assigned to be worried about. Moreover, the testing of the shorter range Ballistic Missiles that weve seen in recent months, doesnt give us any reason to thank that those are not threatens. Because the capability and the technology and things like maneuver and ability of close range or short range Ballistic Missiles, by definition can be adopted to longerrange Ballistic Missiles. So i did the testing this going on no, its not an threatening and this course you have to be in south korea within range of muscles. Those poorly for the defensive capabilities of japan and even the United States we do get to the intercontinental range. In the past, we had been very clear what her expectations were of north korea both received respect to Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile testing. If you look back to Un Security Council resolutionte 1695, adopd on july 25th 2006, and Security Council resolutions 1718, adopted on october the 14th, 2006. After the and in the first instance in 1695, after north korea broke its moratorium on large testing of Ballistic Missiles from the Korean Peninsula, for 1718 after a Nuclear Weapons test. The United States and the Security Council were very clear in the response. Boi know this because i helped write both of those resolutions. 1695, dealt only with missiles in 1718. With both and i quote from 1718. An operative paragraph two, the unanimous Security Council said in a quote demands that to be k not conduct any further nuclear testar or launch of a Ballistic Missile. An operative paragraph five, the council said thatc besides, the dpr case shall suspend all activities related to his Ballistic Missile programs and in this context, reestablishes preexisting commitment to a moratorium on this earth launch. North korea today as we speak, is violating those resolutions. I say this not because of a theological commitment, to Un Security Council resolutions, i say it because when the United States having led the fight to get those resolutions says we really dont care. Other countries can draw the conclusion that they dont really care about the sanctions contained in those and other resolutions. So we do ask for consistent behavior from others, you have yourself. Rate and we failed to do that, we open ourselves and our policy to failure. Remember also what it is that because the concerns, in 2006, when north korea broke this moratorium. In 1998, north korea for the first time launch the Ballistic Missile that landed in the Pacific Ocean east of japan. Needless to say, got the attention of people in that country. In the moratorium was intended to signify that people are in north korea, having in a more responsible fashion. And yet the only thing it really gave up was launched testing. Static testing continued, very important part of Missile Development and all of the evidence we ve have in the public domain, is the north korea simply shifted its emphasis on launched testing to collaboration with iran. This was also developing scud based technology. To create Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons. So that they 1998, launched by north korea, and the subsequent enhancement of cooperation with iran, was actually a clear demonstration, dominant responsible behavior but of the continued aspiration half deliverable Nuclear Weapons. So i thank right now, we are in a classic standoff with north korea. They want a piece of something that we should notot be prepared to give them. People was staying look to be heard. What can bewh lost. By negotiation. What about partial agreements. When i have some progress with some indication of something that north korea can do that will allow us to alleviate the sanctions. There are h several points i thk that are important to understand here. If you believe in you may not, if you believe its unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, first for the would be prayerful later, a partial listing of sanctions is far more importantmp than it is to the opponent of proliferation. To have a partial cessation of the Nuclear Weapons program. The history both of with respect north korea or iran is very clear that the economic kick to the proliferator of getting economic benefits and relief from sanctions is far morel beneficial than marginal production in the Nuclear Weapons effort. From the perspective of the philippian country, action for action as North Koreans call it, is the way to sustain their authoritarian political system, keep their economy going, and yet still have the benefit of the bulk of their ballistic programs. D nuclear and theres a world out there, this ready to fall sucker to that kind of argument even now we see, governments particularly south korea, watching. North korea test can 23 and can 25 missiles, but providing them food aid, because the north korea and say their harvest had been bad in Economic Conditions are difficult. Not so difficult they cant launch Ballistic Missiles. The two difficult to buy food for their people. Are people whose a come to that line of argument. I thank this is something that weekend apply this lesson both to a run and north korea. Because there is a second Common Element as well. That is the element of time. Time for wouldbe Nuclear Weapons stay its not a neutral factor. In fact, the more time goes by, almost inevitably, benefits of proliferation. Because it takes time to overcome complex scientific and technological difficulties inherent in Nuclear Weapons program. So when weewe say, why no rush r no cute good negotiations, learn no rush for resolution of this. We are staying to north korea and iran, take your time and keep going. Youve got more time to plan to utest and to produce to deploy, these capabilities. Time works against those who oppose nuclear liberation. The relaxed attitude of time, is the benefit to the legs of north korea and iran. And finally, and this applies specifically to the circumstances on the korean liz mileti, for about a year and half, the United States and south korea have not had what is some has called wargames. We have not had largescale military training exercises. Ill leave it to the pentagon to describe exactly what we have been doing but i thank you are all familiar with what i am talking about. It is inevitable that when exercise are not taking place, readiness can come into question. Any failure to be militarily prepared, results in a weakening of structures of the turns. Im not going to make any assumptions here today. But the loophole american and south korea red isay on the peninsula. But seven day, both of from the department of defense or congressional investigations, we are going to hear judgments on what military readinessss is. And i thank, that this is something that should be a priority both for americans and for South Koreans. There are other issues here that i dont thank are currently adequately addressing the public debate. Not only should we be concerned with north korea his own weapons technology, but to the ongoing danger that north korea will sell Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile technology or actual weapons and missiles themselves to other aspiring political brent states. That is a risk of a Nuclear Capable north korea with north korea itself is the threat in its immediate region. Analso believe that there is only one country in the world that can stop nuclear for pollution. And we are in it. We can use help over this for sure but this United States fails in this mission, there is no other state or combination of states and no International Organization that can be a substitute. If we fail, Nuclear Proliferation succeeds. Now we just readat to you a quotation from winston churchill. Its very optimistic statement. He made it to prone parliament 1935. I thank it applies to american policy over Something Like 30 years when it comes to north korea. A. Churchill said describing germany of course, he said when the situation was manageable, it wass neglected. And now that it is thoroughly out ofn hand, we apply to late n e remedies which then might have affected the cure. There is nothing new in the story. It is as old as the sibling books. It falls into that long dismal catalog of the fearlessness of experience. And they confirmed im teachability of mankind. Boats of foresight on willingness to act, when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking. Confusion of counsel until emergency comes until selfpreservation strikes its jarring gong. These are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history. Lets hope that churchill his pessimism, its not borne out in the case of north korea. There are things we should look to and have serious discussions about. One is the possibility of limited its it may be a regime change in north korea. Second, we should look at and discussed with china, and we shouldve done it long ago, aiming toward the ratification of the peninsula on a freely elected government like that and south korea. And third, if you believe in you may not, that is unacceptable nuclearh korea to have weapons, at n some. Military fore has to beha an option. This is obviously the most controversial subject and many people say just unimaginable. The you would usese military f force. Sonic what to you, the words of general joe denver, the chairman and the joint chiefs of staff on his last day i might say the chairman. He said an outstanding job. He said this to the Aspen Institute seminar in the summer of 2018. Its on this question on what is unimaginable. General gever said as i told my counterparts, both friend and foe, its not unimaginable to have military options to respond to north koreas nuclearil capability. What is unimaginable to me, is allowing the capability to allow Nuclear Weapons to land in denver colorado. My job will be to develop literary options to make sure that doesnt happen. Thank general dunfordrd was completely correct. If you dont like his options, there are others is it too. The ensue when north korea keeps Nuclear Weapons. The dpr case could become the new a coupon. The walmart of the amazon of deliverable Nuclear Weapons. We could have more Nuclear Weapons states in asia. Japan, south korea, so these are questions that need to focus our attention. Not can we get another segment with kids on film. Or what the state of staff are to achieve commitment from north korea. It will never honor. Before i close, what to take one minute on the subject of usjapan south korea relations. This is also not a happy subject for discussion. It is well below the radar screen here in the United States. Its a big mistake for our country and not paying more attention to it. I am almost that went out words to describe how distressed i am that these tensions between south korea and japan have grown to the point where they currently are. I believe that over the past period of time, that american past 70 on this. , has been a mistake. Im not staying that the United States should engage in a public mediation, between the two countries. I thank in fact the Public Participation would be a mistake. And not underestimating how serious the issues between south koreat and japan are. I have heard at length from both sides. I thank i understand well both their logic and their emotions. But i thank if the United States does not operate here, we face a very serious deterioration of Alliance Capabilities at precisely the wrong time. We see at this. , that the hub and spoke system of alliances, that they had in the asiapacific region, is in need of modification towards a richer and deeper cluster of relations. Mixing efforts of trilateral spot with the use japan and australia. Yes japan and india, also the progress. To see south korea and japan moving in effect in the opposite direction from the u. S. Of view, is extraordinarily troubling. This is something that if the other disputes that have been suede the best you must have a clear, south korean decision to suspend the general security of military information agreement, social media has really no right to an acute. Because this has a palpable impact on america ability to cordate among our various allies. I put this down as something that requires urgent attention to the United States. All of these concerns, and everything we could say about chinaat, thei