On President Trumps nfc and worked previously on capitol hill at the hudson institute, Naval Reserve but most importantly is an allaround great guy and im sure this conversation will be fun but fun fact he is from cincinnati almost a finley market and not bad. No relation. [inaudible conversations] [laughter] we thought chris would give a few framing remarks and then leave time for us to ask clarifying questions but with that chris, welcome back. [applause] thank you, brian. Great to be back here. I applaud your persistence after last time and rescheduling this after the explosion that sounded so dire but its not that bad. Those whove been around washington will remember there is a series of exploding manholes in georgetown in the mid 1990s or so and that problem has not entirely gone away. Thanks for keeping at it and those were willing to come back. Its been nearly ten years since the last Nuclear Security summit was held here in washington dc and they have been three more after that and they brought many World Leaders together to declare their support for improving Nuclear Security practices. We all know that. While my own view some of the objectives declared at the outset of that process were more ambitious than the facts would justify the summit did play a valuable role in drawing attention to the challenges of Nuclear Security. Participating countries were encouraged to come up with or to sign up to get [inaudible] as they were called for Nuclear Security improvements. It did elicit good promises. A decade after president obama made his progress in 2009 to secure all vulnerable material around the world within four years a decade later all too much remains to be done. Despite that within four years rhetoric the world had a lot to do and i like to talk about what we were are doing to to help move that forward. As the sum of its receipt past the World Leaders must not forget about Nuclear Security. Its our challenge today i would argue to institutionalize and to regularize security by its practices and to make good security into nothing special in the sense as i have suggested before that it becomes ordinary and habitual and natural to all stakeholders in the states that briefing is to any individual human. Where the summit played a valuable role in job starting attention to these challenges we must now all do together the longerterm work of making sound Nuclear Security into a daytoday habit rather than just a pledge. In a world of terrorist organizations seek to acquire nuclear or materials its far too important to not be scrutinized. The summit process represented something again to a new years resolution, if you will that so many people make in order to lose weight and get in shape and promises that make one go to the gym and each write and work out for a while but thereafter to fade back into something more like but in the Nuclear Arena we need much more akin to a longterm Health Program but we need a new normal that establishes healthy patterns that can and will be sustained indefinitely. To be sure the daytoday promise keeping involved in ensuring sound Nuclear Security best practices and institutionalizes these practices worldwide is not easy. It also lacks the intuitive political draw a flashy summit promise making and there is still far to go before such practices are routine everywhere but bring back very outcomes is or should be, i would argue, the core of our collective Nuclear Security agenda. One of the ways in which we have been trying to advance the agenda is through the work of a Nuclear SecurityContact Group. An informal involuntary state improving Nuclear Security worldwide and together to compare notes, encourage each other and coordinate their own Sovereign National to promote effective steps forward. Have a limit among our members progress has been a somewhat slower than one might have hope in generating sustained attention and energy that these challenges require but there is a good deal going on and we are proud of it. As can symptoms happen in such wellintentioned International Groups there is sometimes too much of an assumption that simply being there demonstrates a commitment to the cause tends to meaningful little action but members are making only limited progress against the toxic political narratives of disinterest or antagonism to Nuclear Security that still exist in some courts. Narratives that hinder improvement to secrete practices and threatened the nuclear cooperative sharing. We have indicated there is progress. Things apart to Contact Group interventions and consciousnessraising from likeminded member states. We have been able to gradually over increases regular budget for Nuclear Security. Agency continues to increase the profile and activity levels of its Nuclear Security work and as suggested in the 2013 Nuclear Security division. The general conference has made a modest but significant step forward in 2018 with adoption of a Nuclear Security resolution with language empathizing that it contributes to the positive perception of people nuclear facilities. Thankfully gc who retain this language in 2019 and it Nuclear Security resolution signaling the Nuclear Security and its role [inaudible] sharing is not clearly getting more sustained attention then before. Ieas fork using a Nuclear Security in ways that complement and reinforce both the agencys ongoing work, Nuclear Safety and Technical Cooperation program as well for this new focus is helping to ensure the efforts are not to railed that they might lead to unauthorized access of technology or materials. As for the [inaudible] itself deliberations regionally produced a statement of collective commitment related to Nuclear Security. This document which is available on the website is not the sort of consensus negotiated lowest common denominator tax that one often sees from Multilateral Forum or simply a highlevel summary of inconclusive groups of liberation paid it is an informal statement designed to pull useful thinking together in a constructive way to help inspire and channel efforts to move forward on Nuclear Security agenda more effectively. Im proud of the role the United States has been able to play in bringing this document together and helping lead the group in this respect we hope it will prove useful. Both within and more broadly, it will be hubble. We talk about the paper. Many of you have a cnet and is available on the website and entitled our collective commitment to the great many things that i think are important and contribute to an international agenda. To begin with and reiterate our commitment the october 2016 statement of principle that the circular of 899 cents around making clear the spindles are still very much of the core of where the group is coming from paid the paper makes clear good Nuclear Security is required in order to prevent Nuclear Weapons proliferation and terrorism involving [inaudible] in order to ensure a Strong Foundation for sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of Nuclear Technology. That latter statement i would argue is important because it highlights the way in which other than competing with each other Nuclear Security actually go hand in hand. Specifically Nuclear Security improvements are clearly identified in the paper as a crucial enabler for sharing the benefits of the usefuls Technology Worldwide because they help form the Foundation Upon which rests global System Technology sharing that is already provided untold advantage to all mankind in which we intend to preserve for many years to come and thats a quote from the paper. Too much of you does most seems or does to me like basic common sense. It seems obvious to me that would be difficult to imagine the continuation or expansion of todays world wide sharing of the benefits of nuclear knowhow without confidence that technology and materials would be relied kept out of the hands of unbiased persons such as terrorists. Nevertheless there are still some people who dont see the Nuclear Security practices as a facilitator for technology sharing. They worry that security equities exist in some kind of tension with the global cooperative. Thankfully this view is wrong and im pleased nsg collective commitment paper makes it so clear there is not attention here but rather strong complementarity but the paper does not just give us insight about how security reinforces butter to glades a number of practical topics or themes of emphasis that can provide focus and attention for us at. As members and the broader Nuclear Security community we work to write if i were in their efforts can be most successful. It stresses the importance of each state ensuring an adequate National Security legislative develop and read literary framework by pointing out the countries important roles in assisting each other as appropriate in developing and maintaining such best practices. It makes clear the states should to strengthen their own legal and read literary framework by such things as promoting universal adherence to an accommodation of relevant legally binding [inaudible] such as the convention on the physical protection of Nuclear Material and International Convention for the suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism. As well as universal implementation of secured Council Resolution 1540 which seeks to prevent the spread of weapons of mass instruction to nonstate actors by mandating the protection of sensitive goods and knowhow ensuring relevant transfers between states are appropriately regulated. The paper emphasizes the importance of all states improving their own National Security practices such as protecting against insider and Cyber Threats strengthening the security of radioactive sources and ensuring training and for fairness coordinating with Nuclear Security support centers and reconciling safety and security and sharing best practices with other countries. This paper places a strong emphasis on expanding the iea as well and encouraging its work in the regard but also stressing the agency must undertake this work with vigor and attentiveness providing Nuclear Security promotional activity with the resources and political Institutional Support and encouragement to succeed. Not least the regular rising budgets for Nuclear Security and core activities and encouraging the deferred cave diversification of sources. [inaudible] again the Critical Role of Nuclear Security as an enabler for sharing the benefits of peaceful uses of Nuclear Technology. This paper is a very valuable way for it to help guide our collective approaches here and that we think it would be useful and i encourage you to read it and try to focus and spread awareness for the points it raises but were trying to use this as a stepping stone for her own engagement with other partners and hopefully likeminded estates in the security Contact Group can and will do likewise. In practical terms the work were doing at the state department in addition to working bilateral with our partners in the ways i just described we have great deal of engagement with very kind of Capacity Building that was referenced in the paper itself. Our office of Nuclear Energy safety and security needs efforts to develop an opponent policies into poetic strategies that are related to sigourney such as cochairing several u. S. Interagency coordinating bodies focused upon their security in this Group Supports our engagement with the Contact Group and serves as the department lead on interagency physical protection assessment teams tasked with ensuring physical protection of u. S. Obligated materials abroad and efforts of that so on. Office are Multilateral Affairs that assist an opponent in the offices or the efforts of the division of Nuclear Security that i mentioned before to help prevent Nuclear Terrorism throughout and minimize risks associated with vulnerable material. Weapons of mass destruction Terrorism Office provides a focal point for our work against terrorists crying acquiring radioactive materials outside of regulatory control. The Office Managers our role as a cochair of the 89 member Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism which is incidentally one of the bright spots of the u. S. Russian cooperation and i will be cochair with the russians and recently avenue iteration of that Co Chairmanship was just started up last year and spent quite a cooperation i must say. We work with forensic technical working groups to identify best practices in Nuclear Forensics with foreign partners such as iea and inedible and in many ways these are multiple facets of how we engage on these issues and through our office of export control cooperation we do a great job of building assistance to bring up their best practices in ways that complement the goals. Effectively as well as threat reduction. That is a sampler of the many ways in which the department engages these questions but let me finish up in terms of throwing out what we see the conceptual challenges as we look ahead at the future. If you would ask me what i think the main challenges are as we try to move from the era of promise making to this era of what i think of as institutional i promise keeping normalizing bricks best practices if you will i would point to what someone might call the three camps in the two [inaudible] in iceland with that means later. Some countries may fall short in providing for adequate Nuclear Security because for one reason or another they simply cannot meet the standard rate these are the camps. They might not be aware of the need for good Nuclear Security in some particular contexts or might not be aware of what best practices actually entail. Thats the first possible. The second relates to possible failures of education or capacity or despite good intentions the government may not know how to strengthen Nuclear Security in his country in order to come up to appropriate lehigh standards. Or perhaps it lacks the resources or capabilities necessary to do so. Third leads to governmental bandwidth and the challenges of prioritization in a world that is full of pressing challenges such as where government may not address it properly because relevant leaders or personnel are preoccupied with meeting some other pressing challenge or threat in their country. As a practical matter is not always easy to solve the challenges presented by these three but most of the diplomatic engagement that we engage in as well as with the deferment of energy or nuclear ringlets Rate Commission not to mention the iea itself is indeed devoted to helping partner states handle these problems and we got a pretty good track record working with countries to improve things whereas it comes to the cans. Things are more challenging on occasion with regard to what i described as the two wolves. Some countries choose to deemphasize Nuclear Security or perhaps even hostile to it. The first potential wont relates to perceived costs of appropriate Nuclear Security or competing economic interests such as where parties convince themselves that proper Nuclear Security measures will unduly increase the expense and equipment or capabilities they wish to acquire. This attitude may perhaps times them to cut corners, sometimes potentially quite dangerously. Similarly, the supplier may see security as a