Afraid to take your issue seriously. You are never too young to have an opinion so that your voice be heard now. For more information go to our website, studentcam. Org. Welcome to todays conference on Intelligence Surveillance reconnaissance and targeting. This part of the series conducted by Hudson Institution for american seapower. Im seth cropsey, senior fellow here at hudson, and also director of the center for american seapower. I hope that you have monograph the subject of our discussion today, and if you do not, i believe that we still have copies out at the front desk, so by all means pick up a copy on your way out. We are very fortunate to have with us today bryan mcgrath, this man, my friend and coauthor of the monograph was also a retired naval officer, formerly Deputy Director of hudson sector for american seapower, a prolific writer and also managing director of the Ferrybridge Group which is National Security and defense consultancy. Its also a pleasure to welcome david larter, this man, also a retired naval officer and defense news best writer. I will offer some thoughts based on our monograph. Bryan will follow, then the three of us will discuss. We will conclude with questions and probably some answers. To the untrained eye, modern military Technology May seem, seem to have eliminated the fog of war that defined premodern battlefields. Victory in historic conflicts relied on the coincidence of skill and luck. The great commander sought to place himself in a position to impose his will on a chaotic battlefield in a single moment of genius, or a series of moments of genius. Nevertheless, reaching that moment required good fortune and the alignment of factors that were beyond his control. Intelligence traveled only as fast as a man could run, or a horse could ride, or a pigeon could fly. Victory, therefore, required months, if not years, of careful planning. Despite technological advancements, confusion and improvisation still define the 20 century wars. The u. S. Fleet at midway could only strike japans carriers as fast as its a dive and torpedo bombers would fly. Luck proved instrumental. Commander mccluskey decision to continue searching for japans carrier force, and the American Strike groups arrival just as japanese air wings were refueling and rearming played a large role in deciding the issue. Today, however, missiles and jets fly at hundreds of miles per hour, were in the case of Hypersonic Weapons, at over 100 miles in two minutes. Satellites rococo, advanced raters track dozens of targets. The case of the aegis combat physical hundreds. Laserguided weapons are accurate to within feet, or sometimes inches. Its tempting to believe that conflict is now mechanical. That any enemy can be found and destroyed without much trouble, that they the key to victory is simply building faster and longer range missiles. Munitions and delivery systems, whether aircraft, ships, submarines or landbased launchers are integral to victory, but it is a mistake to think that finding the enemy is any easier than before. And more specifically, that the modern u. S. Military could locate and destroy adversaries at will. Contemporary u. S. Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance and targeting is under equipped for the demands of great power of competition. Particularly in the western pacific. Without serious investment and overhaul, the u. S. Risks being outpaced in peacetime and defeated in war. American sailors face the same difficulty as unassuming ways aging fisherman. The sea is big and old. The u. S. Into Pacific Command is responsible for 30 million square miles of open ocean in the western pacific alone. Several island chains break up this vastness while civilian ships and aircraft sale and fly between some of the world most populous nations. Moreover, the u. S. Pacific forces alongside the regional allies face the greatest threat to peace and order since the soviet union. Peoples republic of china has spent the past four years increasing its material wealth, and the last 20 one on the mony the u. S. Backed Global Economic order. Trying to substitute their own the last 20 here over the last decade it has transformed its military from force only suited to internal Security Missions to one that can protect power abroad. The chinese have developed a military designed to counter american and allied capabilitie capabilities. It relies on Maritime Transport in a region defined by strategic chokepoints. Any largescale economic disruptions could spark protests and threaten the regimes survival. Thus, any conflict china fights must be short, intense, decisive. General secretary xi jinping does not fear conflict. He worries about a prolonged confrontation with the u. S. And its allies. Thus, the Peoples Liberation army possesses capabilities that will destroy and local adversaries military while also forcing the u. S. And japan to choose between risking highvalue assets like aircraft carriers or risking taiwan secession to china. Deterring chinese ambitions requires a mix of american and allied capabilities. However, the u. S. Military must field a very specific set of tools. It needs longrange standoff weapons that can penetrate chinese air defenses, strike aircraft to carry them, range extenders to enable strikes while keeping carriers secure. Air superiority fires to defend high target, infiltrate chinas denial network, and Surface Combatants for air defense strike and command and control. These assets have dominated diminished value without enough intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting. China will deploy its missiles on aircraft, ships, submarines and landbased launchers. He is a relatively small and in most cases highly mobile targets that will be difficult to detect. The u. S. Must be able to identify these targets efficiently and at range. That is, there must be enough space between forward position in u. S. Surveillance tools and major fleet formations or longrange bombers to keep the latter out of harms way. Otherwise, the u. S. Must choose between the point carriers within strike range with chinas longrange missiles, thereby exposing them to risks not run since the second world war. Or backing out of strike range and allowing china to execute the opening stages of its plans unimpeded. Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance and targeting is of equal importance before conflict, chinese geography gives it strategic and bandages particularly and accommodation over taiwan. While the u. S. Must rely on supply and communication lines spanning the pacific ocean, and will have immediate access to regional reinforcements, china can consecrate forces in foreign reserves much more quickly. Nevertheless, china cannot strike from a standing start. It must concentrate air and Ground Forces across the taiwan strait, increased naval presence and prepare for a surge to disable taiwanese defenses while warding off the the u. S. And ad response. With enough warning, the u. S. Can increase the cost of the chinese offensive. Even two for 2. Attack separate plus a searching aircraft from japan and Pacific Carrier groups could make a real difference. But obtaining this Early Warning requires longterm surveillance. The u. S. Needs isrt feedback if it helps to shape the pacific battlefield and executed strategy of deterrence by denial. Specifically, it needs constant information on assets and positions within to utter miles of the chinese coastline, along with eyes on chinas coastal garrisons, airbases and ports in eastern military district. Important to note that similar thinking applies to Chinese Forces in the south china sea. The u. S. Requires constant surveillance of the pl lays pla Navy South Sea fleet ship and the Company Aircraft or amphibious units moving from force in Southern China toward both the disputed islands and the straits. China itself has recognized the importance of isrt. Even until a decade ago, chinas military remained largely backwards. It lacks centralized funding, did not rigorously simulate combat situations. Most of its Fighter Pilots did not fly at night. The pla primarily conducted Territorial Defense and internal Security Missions. Still china has steadily develop its antisunlit capability since the 1980s, staging a series of public tests from 20072018. And incorporating its antisatellite capabilities research into its space program. Satellite capabilities are critical to the u. S. Isrt complex. Not only do they provide valuable preconflict intelligence, they also serve as critical communication between, communication nodes rather between u. S. Forces and multiple theaters. The chinese strike would disrupt u. S. Operations globally while undermining american isrt specifically in the western pacific. Currently, the u. S. Lacks isrt capabilities with the range and staying power needed to properly to monitor the chinese. This impedes the trend its ability to deter conflict, to shape the battlefield United States ability and in the end to win a war. Opensource analyses can undertake the detailed technical examination of classified counterparts. Still, u. S. Maritime isrt has become so hollowed out, the lack of coordination and development is evident. U. S. Isrt is comprised of aircraft, surface and subsurface sensors, and landbased sensors equipped with radiofrequency, lightbased, electromagnetic and sound ranging tools. But neither the navy nor the department of defense have made enough effort to centralize the procurement, deployment and assessment of isrt architecture infrastructure. Thus, i think its fair to say that no one really knows what the navys isrt requirements in the western pacific actually are. By extension, no one really knows how current isrt capabilities actually relate to quantifiable u. S. Requirements. Im not making new observation here, but the fleet without eyes cannot fight. Several policy steps should be taken to overhaul the u. S. Western pacific isrt. For one, the navy should attempt to define the problem. Congress should provide funding for the navy to conduct a detailed classified study of pacific isrt capability and require it. This would allow navy to the target quickfix responses to capability gaps, as it would properly plan future acquisitions. Indeed, i think that all u. S. Armed services in every major theater should conduct a similar review. Certain stopgap measures and boost current capability shortfalls. The navys acquisition of him to foresee triton, uavs will boost isr ttip those by providing commanders with a high endurance, long loiter time Information Collection platform, but full Operational Capability isnt expected until 2023. In the interim, the Defense Department could we task u. S. Air force reaper uavs from Central Command and apply them to the pacific in a similar role. Those who answer or might object that we should not accomplish one strategic theater to benefit another are right. Both sitcom and indo pak, are essential u. S. Interests the navy should have feasible proposition since the program has only just reached additional, initial Operational Capability. In the mediumterm the navy should modify the stingray to serve as unmanned isr t platform, converting the unmanned carrier launched surveillance and Strike Program to the sievers, they carrierbased refueling system, was an intelligent organizational choice. The navy has lacked carrier air wing organic range extender since the early 2000s. Since the retirement of the a six and f14, carrier air wing strike shrunk. Any strategy employing standup strikes will require an aircraft that shows the mq25 role. By expanding its Mission Profile to include isrt with both increase u. S. Navy capabilities and i believe avoid extreme costs. Designers could emphasize longrange sensors rather than stealth or speed, thereby avoiding the difficulties that the program encountered. And ironic characteristic of strategy, i will close my remarks here. This is cyclical nature, tactical and operational message thought to be obsolete revived with new technologies or strategies to the same deadly effect as before their initial decline. Think about the scout plane concept that fell out of practice with the decline of battleships. The navy should consider reviving this concept, developing Medium Altitude long endurance uav like the mq4c or nine that can be deployed and recovered by u. S. Surface combatants. This would increase u. S. Isrt coverage for also making the uf Hypersonic Weapons and real guns by Surface Combatants more feasible. These spotter uavs could direct missions toward their targets while the destroyer or cruiser launching the missile, or whatever launching the missile, would remain out of strike range. The u. S. Was also coordinate redundant and independent Capability Development with its regional allies, particularly japan. The Japan Selfdefense forces are sophisticated. They are highly competent. But the Ground Forces, ground force, still receives most of the funding while air and Maritime Forces have not developed robust isrt capabilities or assets that would survive a massive chinese strike. The suggestions of hudsons isrt report apply equally to the defense of japan, and the suggestions of hudsons isrt ill leave it at that for the time being. Bryan . The podium is yours. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon of doing. Its nice to see Friendly Faces in the audience. Im not sure you all understand just how fortunate you are today to be here, because you get to see david larter with his hair combed, his beard trimmed and in a suit and tie. And that is, thats like a unicorn sighting here in washington, d. C. Thank you for the invitation, seth. Its good to be here. I also want to thank the third silent member of the writing team of agenda named harrison who happens to be one of the most deep, deep or insightful operations analyst that i know, and he the math because seth and i dont do math. Why did we do this study . What caused it . Someone just asked that the of the deeper actually somebody in the navy just asked me that the other day. A couple of things. Number one, there was 18 ndaa, National Defense authorization act, that directed the navy to do Something Like this, to do a study of its isrt sufficiency. Specifically, one of the things they asked for was the study include operations and a satellite then i advisement. It seemed if congress were asking the navy to do such a study, smart people in the congress were worried that the wasnt work being done and so we watched. Seth and i, i remember communicating with that light which came out in the ndaa and we watched it we didnt see much coming out into the press, didnt see much attention being given to it so we decided we with get some attention to. Another reason to do this study was the National Security strategy that came out in the early months, i think january, 2018, 2018, had a very big idea in it. That very big idea was the United States posture for conventional deterrence would move from that of deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. These are very different ways of attempting to deter conventionally. In the one, the aggressor obtains some level of success in their objectives, and that, the threat of being pounded into submission by the cavalry coming over the horizon is thought to be enough to dissuade them. The other is deterrence by denial, in which forces that are present are sufficiently lethal and capable to keep the opponent from the aggression in the first place. Because when you look at geography in the region will look at in the western pacific, because there are so many possible targets of aggression, so close to the chinese mainland, where so much force could be marshaled in so little time, this decision by the Trump Administration to change the nations conventional deterrence posture i think was a very, very smart one. But it levies requirements. The force thats in the neighborhood has to be better. It has to be stronger. It has to have more weapons and ask to have more isr and it has to Work Networks that link all that together. There is a missile isr mismatch in the navy right now. In the january 2015 issue of proceedings, the three admirals in charge of the navy Surface Force then vice admiral roden, rear admiral fanta and rear admiral wrote an article where a put forward this idea of distributive leaked locality. In this article under the section where they were suggesting some things that they needed to operationalize this concept, they write persistent organic airborne Intelligence Surveillance isr and data relay come something they need, call, and important as if it is to the fellow is ability to confidently conduct dispersed operations apart from centralized command and control networks. Local combat Information Networks are essential to achieving localized how space awareness. Those networks need to be more capable than those existing today. They must be pers