We will hear from japanese epidemics at the center for strategic and international studies. Good afternoon. Thanks for joining us. I am mike green and a professor at georgetown, we are delighted to have all of you join us in discussion over the next two hours with four of japans rising academic thinkers on Foreign Policy and economic affairs. This is the seventh cohort we have invited under a program called strategic japan. Eight years ago we discussed with the Prime Ministers Office how to expand Strategic Thinking dialogue, planning between the us and japan. One thing to think about which was new for japan was the need to go beyond the traditional bureaucratic sources and to tap into the growing expertise among japans academic experts on issues that affect foreignpolicy and to bring more academics into the tent in japan and expand the dialogue with the us and to make sure japanese scholars who are making an impact in japan are sharing their ideas with the us, getting reactions and responses so we have had seven cohorts come, 25 in total scholars from japan. Every year each of the scholars does an essay of history and analytical social Science Research and policy recommendations and we publish them as a collective edited volume and the theme changes each year. This year the theme we chose center on the question of multilateral institutions in asia and globally. What is the japanese thinking about the future of these institutions, the thinking about japans role and what can the us and japan do as allies to strengthen institutions and make sure institutions are working for our common values and interests . It is a timely topic because washington is not thinking much about the institutions right now. We are distracted, confused, polarized. Personally i have faith over the medium to longterm the public supports engagements but the Trump Administration pulled out of the Transpacific Partnership. Our attendance was pretty weak in terms of rank. Our role in the World Trade Organization has diminished. We are fighting the United Nations. We are not stepping up. Japan on the other hand is playing a significant role. Prime minister abe pushed for continuation of the Transpacific Partnership in new form in the g7 which we hear about. He is the bridge between donald trump and europe and canada. One of the things he will talk about is japan bridging the us institutions or setting the agenda or actually just responding . All of the above is true to some extent but the us right now is lucky to have a japanese government that is active in multilateral institutions and people in the lucky to have a rich group of japanese thinking about the future of multilateral institutions in that context. We go with two panels, the first panel i will moderate. The second panel, simon and share will moderate and after going global we will deal with papers on the g7, g 20, and United Nations. And asia. We have two speakers who have written papers who we will hear from. The first is shoji of the america, europe and Russia Division in the National Institute of defense studies. A phd from the university of tokyo and studied at Technical University of singapore and particularly an expert on indochina, his paper focuses on the association of Southeast Asian nations, evolution of japan strategy and what the us and japan can do to work better for Southeast Asia and us. Officer oba from Tokyo University of science received a degree from the university of japan and the university of tokyo. He received the incentive award, you will have to tell us what it is, and the develop of east asian regionalism. Ozzie and political institutions, with economic institutions in the region and we will hear from my colleague, doctor amy seawright, publishing a scholar from stanford which focused on japans role in the wto and regionalism and we will connect those two in the comments. The secretary of defense in Southeast Asia in the pentagon in 2016 and taught at george washington, also served in the usaid and state department. I will ask each of the scholars from japan to get a couple key points and have a bit of a dialogue. Our program has a break, we made a command decision. We will muscle through. We will go about an hour and 50 minutes and instead of taking a break we will end a bitterly and we have coffee back there and speakers will hang around so you can ask individual questions. We will end a bitterly. A bit early. Shoji is on the dance card. Thank you, doctor green. First of all, let me thank doctor green and the members for inviting me to this exciting program. I am from the institute of advanced studies. This is the strategic think tank of the minister of defense of japan and meets my expertise. Therefore my assigned topic is to explore how japan has been in the regional or security institutions, entering the security institutions. In my research i explore three cases which are the regional forum, the east asia summit and the defense minister. In my research let me mention briefly for key findings in the security institutions japan, concern about china, in particular has been steadily empowering and in this regard participating in these institutions in terms of embracing the challenge with major powers including the United States. The second point is the power station in the institutions, us prisons has not been consistent. It has been more sporadic. One of the major roles in the institutions has been to supplement. And with regard to the pacific, by japan and also the United States we it is more like the indochina, a recent release. With regard to that, japan is trying to play a breeding ground to connect the us authority about the indo pacific view. It has recently been releasing the report about the indo pacific which was titled the outlook on the indo pacific. It is more thorough economy rather than security oriented and pursuing a middle way to connect the security and economic coverage. Regarding the point of the third point. One of the most important points for japan and the United States to garner support to the political leverage in the security institutions, strikes a balance between economy and security. Too much security oriented approach. And related to the third point, it is a good balance between economy and security. In this regard, to the United States in developing in Southeast Asia in other regions. In this regard the cooperation is quite significant if it materialized and also the final cooperation in terms of engaging prochina and Southeast Asia in the continent of Southeast Asia in particular, cambodia, laos and vietnam. Thank you and all the people who are late for this excellent program. I am so happy to be here to have an opportunity to give a presentation and enjoy the talk with you. My major is specific and i want to focus on the development especially now at the end of the cold war era. From my point of view japan or the japanese political elite, there regionalism, three main things, the one is tokyo policy, tokyo policy after the desire for autonomous diplomacy so not just in the United States. The second one is japanese political elite after la 2000, always and rare over the light of china and the power shift in east asia and the third one is the japanese political elite maintain a regional order based on the norms and values following the cold war end, vital diplomacy or the freedom of other cases. So now the pursuit of the three things but the big difference between past and present is it has taken Stronger Leadership to promote regionalism done before and the example is negotiation in both cases, japan has taken strong leadership to finalize them and it is ongoing. Japans government has strongly finalized. So japan began to show strong leadership done before. From my point of view, into that order is in between. So japan now took an Important Role to sustain the process such an order in the region by using regionalism so in the past the regional order is given, was given from the japanese perspective but now japan has to take innocence to sustain the regional order so in this sense japan is a very active player, not a passive and reactive player in east asia and the indo pacific now so it can be said that china is the challenge are to another International Order and it is not only caught up with economic ascendancy over the us but has provided its own model for the governance to which it is accomplished by state capitalism with consensus so the escalation of the final us confrontation deflects the competition between the two different systems, political, economic and social system so in these situations, japan recognizes its own role as an active players to sustain the regional order. However japans leadership is facing several challenges, the first is japans leverage as an economic power is declining because of china and the japanese economy. The second challenge demand interest of other regional powers and they are so diverse. They do not always share the region with japan. For example india. So the possibility of withdrawal from the house up negotiation. The japanese government is fixed so india is a good partner but indias behavior over the selection and another example is malaysia. Malaysia is a member of the cpt pp but malaysia is not ratified yet so took very cautious and reluctant attitude to the cpt pp and the opposite direction of japanese expectation and third challenge is japans council on china. Because japan has to consider what is going on with china and importance over china led or china centered Production Network in this region although japans economy is still as much. The final challenge for japanese leadership is us policy is uncertain. This is a very big challenge for japan because the United States is an important partner for japan to sustain this order in the region and in the global scene so the most important issue is whether the us joins or rejoins the cpt pp. It depends on the result of the president ial election so if the trump is not elected japan has a very Good Opportunity to persuade the us to rejoin and join the cpt pp. Excellent. Or not a good choice. It depends. Thank you. Amy . Thanks. Happy to be here talking about japans role in multilateral institutions which takes quite a bit of my focus and attention. As you can tell from the presentation, the scholars here in their papers do an excellent job looking at japans role, interests, strategies, growing activism or leadership in regional architecture and regional institutions especially over the last decade, they have a very nuanced understanding of the dynamics of japans choices and impact but what i wanted to do is take a step back in time. From the Vantage Point of 2020 it is easy to look at japan and the United States and the kind of approach taken by both countries in trying to sustain a rulebased order to strengthen regional institutions and coordinating very much with each other and other likeminded countries to strengthen these institutions. It seems natural, it seems obvious but if you go back in time, to step into a time machine is go back 15 years or 30 years i think it would not be obvious at all that we would necessarily be where we are today in terms of japan at the merging leadership in the region and how closely it is tied, interest and approaches to the United States, which you heard in both presentations. I think the choices and impulses that japan has had over time and continues to have in some ways as well as choices by the United States have led to particular outcomes but looking back at some earlier examples you could easily have imagined if you stepped into a time machine a very different outcome from what we see today. Talking about japans impulses when it comes to multilateral institutions and regional frameworks, first a very natural one, japans economic power rose in the cold war period, japan had a natural tendency to look at the fact that it was relatively shut out of a lot of global and regional institutions and wanted more voice in them and wanted to demonstrate it could play a real contributing role to regional prosperity. One of the earliest examples of japan stepping up in leadership, and Asian Development bank and coordinated with its ally the United States in the late 1960s, the us was reluctant to approve this idea. Japan has a dominant role in the institution and it is evolved to become an important part of the Development Architecture over time, similar to the way china wanted to set up its own idea for the asia Infrastructure Investment bank, the United States and japan have different reactions. Another impulse japan has long had, a high degree of comfort and support for multilateralism and diplomacy and especially in the past really focused, even to the present day, on economic diplomacy, what japan can bring in terms of the relevant assistance through regional frameworks that would contribute to mutual prosperity and stability but the other impulses are somewhat contradictory and have led japan to have a split personality over time. The third impulse, japan has often sought to bind the United States more closely to the region. Many of japans steps in trying to promote, strengthen, create regional institutions have come at times that they are not sure of the International Commitment to the region and us unilateralism and sought to engage the United States as a partner in building some institutions but the final impulses japan, going back to preworld war ii history there has been an impulse to look at playing a role in creating asian framework where japan could play a prominent role and shape regional dynamics without the United States. When we look back we see the a dbs successful case and back to the early postcold war period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the United States, we have to remember, under the first president bush and in the early clinton years there was a lot of talk about the peace dividend from the cold war. There was not a clear sense the United States was committed to maintaining its large global footprint and large strategic presence the United States had in asia. A lot of talk about bringing the troops back home. The United States withdrew from bases in the philippines and there was a lot of concern about us withdrawal of its naval and air force assets in the region, to play less of a security role and on the economic front japan was a big trade rival, a lot of conflict with japan and talk about reciprocity and the need to engage more bilateral or unilateral tactics to get fair trade with japan in japan was worried about this and that led to japans in place embrace of the asiapacific, a key driver and it was focused on trying to get the United States engaged in the region and we can look at the arrival proposal for east asian economic grouping. In the 1990s where he especially wanted japan to take leadership in a regional block that would exclude the United States and japan politely declined, and double down on the apack idea but go a few more years into the future to the late 1990s and early 2000s and the Asian Financial crisis the United States is relatively disengaged in terms of a response to the devastating financial crisis that hit thailand and indonesia and other countries in the region and japans response was to propose the Asian Monetary Fund which was in japan providing leadership to create a rival institution to the international Monetary Fund which is failing these countries under american leadership, led to a disagreement to the United States and japan, japan moved away from that idea but instead proposes an initiative that leads today. And the financial safety net in the region supplemental to the imf. Theres a lot of momentum in the plus three mechanism, japan spent a lot of time talking to south korea and china about freetrade agreements and other initiatives they work on together which also included the chang by initiative. In this regional approach, go into the years where dpj led japan of the priming is to propose the east Asian Community in 20082009, early years of the Obama Administration and it was very vague, the United States would be offered membership. The office was much more on engaging asia and in asia framework. Japan moved away from that and embraced under obamas rebalance, when the United States joined these data summit and was back, makes sense now the United States and japan coordinating policies, looking to strengthen them and strengthen centrality