Okay. The hearing will come to order once again. Id like to welcome our second panel. We are joined by mr. Garry reid, director for defense intelligence, office of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence. And stephanie miller, director of expressions policy, office of the secretary of defense for personnel and readiness. Mr. Joe ethridge, chief criminal intelligence division, and mr. Christopher mcmahon, executive assistant director, National Security directorate the naval criminal Investigative Services, and finally, mr. Robert grabosky, u. S. Air force, office of special investigations. Mr. Reid, well begin with you. Thank you, madam chair and Ranking Member. On behalf of the entire team here, i would just like to convey our appreciation for your time and interest and for the committees support to the department in getting at this problem. If you would allow, madam chair, i represent the Background Investigation piece of this process, and in a logical order, i would like ms. Miller to begin, and then i will come back and do it because its the front end on the session x then well go through to the military departments. Thank you. Appropriate. Ms. Miller . [inaudible] good afternoon, madam chair, Ranking Member tully and members of the subcommittee. My name is stephanie miller, director under the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness. I am pleased to provide testimony on this important issue, and i want to take a moment to thank the members of the first panel for their knowledge and expertise in this area which the department truly does value. I am responsible for the oversight of all matters pertaining to the recruitment of both officers and end listed personnel. I am responsible for establishing policy and recruitment matters, overseeing the establishment and adherence to enlistment standards, providing oversight of resources, managing the process and other matters relating to the general sustainment of the allvolunteer force each year the department recruits approximately 400,000 applicants for mill service of which approximately 2550,000 250,000 actually contract into the allvolunteer force. Representatives of the nation they will serve. And while todays economy has brought challenges, the department has been steadfast that the services should and will adhere to our established policies and only enlist officer and enlisted candidates that actually meet our high standards. The life cycle of military personnel from a sessions processing to separation is a complex process which is constantly involving based on best practices and newlylearned information. The beginning of the life cycle starts undergoing a though row screening process to insure that they meet the high standards. This multitiered screening process uses the tools available, and we believe we have been effective at screening for individuals that have exist ideologies extremist ideologies. For example, the department has recently launched a centralized screening capability that vets all to identify and resolve questions of allegiance. And its proven successful in identifying unique information not only available solely from the standardized Background Investigation form the sf8ing 6. Recruiters play a crucial role. Each applicant is interviewed by a recruiter to obtain as much information and documentation as possible about the individuals qualifications for military service. At our military entrance processing statements, applicants undergo background searches of Law Enforcement and other records. Applicants answer questions about any involvement with Law Enforcement agencies including arrests, charges, citations, parole or probation, detention and any other form of potentially adverse adjudication regardless of the outcome. Furthermore, all applicants provide a preliminary view of the history of any involvement with Law Enforcement including the federal bureau of investigation. Subsequent background checks screening recruits for extremist tries including criminal history terrorists and subversive activities checks and a ve you of the gang file. Upon entry into the armed services, the department of the military Services Expect individual share a responsibility to insure that members are afforded the opportunity to serve with dignity and respect in a very inclues weve environment. The departments overarching guidance is clear that military personnel must reject active participation supremacist or gang criminal doctrine, ideology or causes including those that advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion,est misty or National Origin or those that advocate the use of force, violence for criminal activity or otherwise advance or deprive individuals of their Civil Liberties. The department continues to work with the services and other agencies to provide commanders and senior military leaders the tools that they need to keep informed about the activities it is or adverse behaviors of Service Members. Commanders, working with Key Stakeholders such as the Service Criminal investigative offices, are split to take appropriate action when warranted. We are gaining additional insight through Service Members through the deployment of new technologies and have explored additional testing and screening techniques that assess a range of dimensions to identify applicants who best fit with the militarys culture of treating all personnel with dignity and respect. In conjunction with more these tools can be utilized as part of a wholeperson screening process and tell us a great deal about the likelihood of successfully completing initial training and the ability of that individual to adapt to the rules, regulations and requirements of military culture. Dod remains committed to insuring that all personnel are treated with dignity and respect in an includes f environment free from maltreatment. This effort is accomplished while keeping each persons Civil Liberties intact, and while this is not always an easy endeavor, it is critical to protect those Service Members who are sworn to protect the country. Madam chairwoman, i look forward to answering your questions and appreciate you offering this opportunity to discuss this very important everybody shoe. Thank you, ms. Miller. Mr. Reid . Thank you, madam chair, Ranking Member kelly. Again, i thank you for the opportunity to testify on my overright of possessor oversight of personnel Security Policy and the steps we take to develop and sustain a total work force that embodies our values as americans. I will focus my opening remarks on Background Investigations, Insider Threat programs and continuous evaluation as these are the primary authorities and capabilities we employ to identify persons with extremist ideologies and deny them the opportunity to serve in the department of defense. Where indicated, we also insure they are investigated for any policy violations or criminal behaviors and are held accountable for their actions. Once a person has been selected for military service, the Department Initiates a comprehensive balled investigation. Background investigation. All applicants must complete the questionnaire for National Security petitions published if by the office of Personnel Management as standard form 86 or the sf86. All military applicants, regardless of job code, must pass a rigorous Background Investigation. That significantly exceeds the basic standard applied to many nonmilitary persons that enter public service. This is a choice made by the department of defense in recognition that there is a high level of public trust in our military that necessitates a strong commitment to insuring persons with criminal, extremist or other undesirable characteristics are not allowed to serve in our ranks. Applicants are asked probing and detail questions about their detailed questions about their personal conduct, job history, encounters with Law Enforcement, drug use, credit, foreign travel and associations with organizations dedicated to terrorism, use of violence to overthrow the u. S. Government and the commission of acts of force or violence to discourage others if exercising their constitution from exercising their constitutional rights. Supplement and enrich the selfreporting data on the sf86 with information provided by former educators, employers, coworkers and neighbors of the applicants. Investigators check federal and state Law Enforcement databases for criminal history and review public records, credit reports and if other automated data sources. Where needed, investigators initiate additional checks including personal interviews. This information is aggregated in a proreport of investigation and submitted in a report of investigation and submitted to a certified add jude cater who assesses overall ability for military service. Against the 13 federal adjudicative guidelines. Of the guidelines, personnel conduct, criminal conduct and allegiance to the United States are the primary criteria used to vet personnel that exhibit any extreme behaviors. Finish while cases with allegiance are uncommon, overall these three guidelines combine for almost half of the denials for military personnel x. Keeping in mind the prior screening ms. Miller described happens in front of this. Youve already narrowed down to a more selective population by the time we run this. Applicants with favorable Background Investigation results are subject to two sets of monitoring procedures throughout their military service. Each of our military departments manage their own Insider Threat programs that serve as a conduit for reporting behaviors of concern that are observable in the workplace. All dod personnel are mandated to report such behavior against reporting thresholds for Insider Threat that are similar but not identical to the federal adjudicative guidelines. The dod component Insider Threat hubs provide reporting to a central dod Insider Threat center led by our defense counterintelligence and security agency. Finish presently, all dod personnel are covered by at least one of the 43 Insider Threat hubs distributed across the department and reporting of suspicious or alerting behaviors is steadily increase aring. Any behavior that crosses an established threshold is assessed and acted upon by Insider Threat hubs, the chain of command or security managers within the owning component. In addition to monitoring for Insider Threat behaviors at the component level, the Department Also conducts a continue toous evaluation Continuous Evaluation Program at the dod level. Presently, 1. 9 people are enrolled in our continue toous evaluation system, and the department has plans to enroll the full population by october 2021. Continuous evaluation complements Insider Threat reporting by providing data from outside the department with automated monitoring of multiple government, commercial and public data sources for indicators of behavior that violate standards of conduct. When alerts from continuous Evaluation Data sources indicate unacceptable behavior, the responsible security manager submits an incident report that is reviewed by the chain of command and the dods central adjudication facility. If appropriate, it can be referred to a Law Enforcement or counterintelligence investigation. If indicated, the subject can be ultimately removed from eligibility to hold position and processed for separation from military service. Madam chair, ill just close by highlighting that this is a dynamic process that is always in a state of improvement. As some members know and weve briefed here and supported by congress, the government is in the process of adding additional controls in the, what we call the personnel vetting enterprise moving to a continuous vetting model across the entire government so everything ive described to you will continue to be refined and inare riched to where enriched to where we have the greatest degree of awareness of where where threats are across the department including those posed by those with extremist attitudes. Thank you for your time, and i look forward to your questions. Thank you, mr. Reid. Mr. Ethridge. Good afternoon, chairwoman speier, Ranking Member kelly and members of the subcommittee. I am chief of the criminal intelligence division, Army Criminal investigation command. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide testimony on the important issue of raciallymotivated extremist threat. As the chief of cids intelligence division, im responsible for identifying and assessing criminal threats confronting the army and assisting in developing courses of action to prevent or mitigate. The cid identifies soldiers suspected of participating in extremist activities in multiple ways to include chain of command reporting, local police, the media, publicfacing social media searches, tipline reports and fbi domestic terrorism investigative reporting. We evaluate these reports to identify supporting facts. The majority of the soldiers identified as participating to some extent this extremist activities are not subjects of criminal investigations. The more common scenario is participation in an online forum that might be expressing extremist or supremacist views. In these instances cid notifies commanders via information report for action in accordance with army policy. Commanders have the authority to counsel, train and take disciplinary action to preserve good order and discipline in the unit. Additionally, cid notifies that dod consolidated adjudication facility and the intelligence is is intelligence and security command or personnel security adjudication. The cid initiates investigations when indications or allegations of a crime are present. In early 2019, cid observed a small increase in criminal investigations initiated with soldier participation in extremist activities as a component. Specifically, there were seven criminal investigations initiate with an extremist activity component in 2019 in comparison to an average of 2. 4 per year in the fy2014 to 2018 period. This up colludes soldiers from all includes soldiers from all components, active duty, National Guard and the army reserve. During the same time period, the federal bureau of invest notified cid of an increase in domestic terrorism investigations with soldiers or former soldiers as suspects. The fbi reporting also clearly stated that extremist organizations were actively seeking veteran skills. In may 2019 the Provost Marshal general of the army and i briefed the vice chief of staff of the army and members of the army staff on the cid and fbi observations. The vice chief of staff of the army directed the formation of a working group to review current policies and proceed yours to prevent procedures to prevent and address extremism in the ranks, recommending several adjustments to the army policy for soldier or participation in extremist activities stipulated in Army Regulation 60020, thats army command policy. The revision of ar60020 is scheduled for release in the Second Quarter of this year. Internally, cid expanded its liaison relationship with the fbi traditionally centered on the National JointTerrorism Task force and the National GangIntelligence Center into the fbis domestic terrorism operations unit. In summary, over the past year cid has increased collection efforts, informed our leadership of our observations, participated in the review and changes to army policy, expanded our relationship with Law Enforcement partners and made notification to commanders. Additionally, cid has formulated a request to the Army Inspector general to add unit implementation of extremist Activity Policy that is encapsulated in ar60020 as a focus area for the next inspection seeking for armywide inspector yen inspections. The army is postured to identify extremist activity in the ranks and has both policy and the leadership tools to prevent emergence as a pervasive issue. Madam chairwoman, i am happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have at this time. Thank you, mr. Ethridge. Mr. Mcmahon. Good afternoon, chairwoman, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on extremism in the military. I am christopher mcmahon, the executive assistant director of the National Security directorate9 for the naval criminal investigative service, ncis. I am pleased to provide testimony on this topic. As executive assistant director of the National Security directorate, i lead our investigations and operation