Discussion of colin dueck, age of iron. Which is a marvelous analysis of conservative nationalism. I see a couple of things about the book in the moment but before i do i want to extend on your behalf in mine a warm welcome to colin dueck and to distinguish commentators. As you probably know colin dueck is a professor at george mason esiversity and is also a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise institute next door. Literally. Colin dueck has made his mark thinking deeply about american politics. And this book is trademark direct. It examines the concept of conservative nationalism that has been brought to public attention conspicuously to the rise of President Trump. In terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have found manifestation in the history. Especially in the debates in the world. So the book is both encompassing and granular simultaneously. And despite the gravity of the subject, i assure you its a delightful read. I read the book over the last ten and i commended to your attention. So welcome colin it is a pleasure to have you with us. I am also very grateful that they have consented to join us for this discussion. We could not have asked for better commentators, given both their intellectual interest in conservativism in their own practical contribution to the making and implementing of domestic policy in the United States. Daniel had a long career on capitol hill whereto she workedt the Firm Relations committee. She has also written extensively in Foreign Policy especially on the middle east. Appears widely on television and until recently Vice President for domestic Foreign Policy studies. Where she continues to remain a senior fellow in foreign defense policy studies. Richard has had a long career. He is now the chief executive officer, the center for new american security, which i say with some jealousy is doing incredibly Creative Work on issues relating to u. S. National security. Richard wrote for many years for john mccains policy advisor in the state department, National Security council and also the senate committee. So the warm welcome to both of you danielle and richard, its wonderful to have you both here again. Without further ado, let me invite colin to present the key teams of his book before i yield the floor for their comments, we have a brief conversation that will open the i conversation to the floor and i look forward to your interaction during that time. Thank you colin and welcome. Thank you ray much for this invitation. It just so happens that this mipanel includes three people al of whoms experience and expertise in views i really respect so it is a real pleasure to be here with Danny Richard as well without danny this book probably would not of happened. She may regret that but thats the truth. So i am glad to be here. Let me say a few words about the centerpieces of the book. What motivated me among other things was a common argument over the last five years that the trump a administration represents something completely unprecedented in American History and the striking rise of populist nationalism on the right, both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons back in 1930s. Without downplaying the genuine causes for concern, i think thatst overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism, american nationalism in the administration Foreign Policy. Is not one weight or another not pro or anything and broader or Historical Context for its missing amidst of the day. And what i argue, american nationalism, there is american Foreign Policy nationalism going back to the factory which is not undemocratic at all, its the opposite. In the american case at least, there is a nationalism which involves an american creed with powerful Classical Liberal elements, role block, sovereignty, that has been within american sense of nationalism from the beginning so incensed they have sought to conserve literally that tradition. At the same time, when it comes to Foreign Policy, the founders had a couple of keep principles and you can see a new order of the ages. The idea within the United States will stand for something in the government spreads, that is emerging hope pointing back to the founding, thats been the element of Foreign Policy nationalism. It does not mean you can always do it by force but least is an example the second element and no change as jefferson, and the alliances, no permanent alliance. That was a key element in Foreign Policy nationalism from the beginning, the founder had a contradiction between the two things. That was really a dominant what we would call bipartisan tradition, well into the 20 century. What really shifted was Woodward Wilsons innovation during world war i. He believed not only that you needed to tie a new Foreign Policy paradigm which we call liberal internationalism or globalism, you try that to domestic regressive reforms including theo united t states,u need to be willing to intervene on the ground militarily in europe to vindicate democracy overseas you need to be willing to make global binding multilateral commitments, worldwide. As he intended with the league of nations vertically under article 10. So thats a paradigm shift, thats an alternative to the founders and Woodward Wilson understood as such. From the beginning republicans and conservatives of the United States cannot agree on how to nntackle or counter or accommode the liberal internationalist tradition. There had been internal divisions in debates and we see this over and over again and we will probably keep saying it. I say there are three main groups of conservatives over time in the past century, one conservative internationalist are skeptical of some of the overkill when it comes to multilateral commitments. But they basically believe that you should have alliances overseas with a robust american presence overseas. That is over who faced off wilson during the treaty debate. He wanted an alliance with written defens prints, but he tt that wilson was overly optimistic and unrealistic. Then theres a second group on the other end of the spectrum. Libertarians, some paleo conservatives the say the u. S. Should avoid going through commitments altogether, alliances, interventions, with peaceful other countries but not have a military role, outside of the western hemisphere. That is a tradition that goes back to the period as well. Often populist from west of the mississippi. That is. A strain that runs through. Then theres a third string in the middle which is a hawkish unilateralism which does not give much attention in an elite discourse, its been missed under representative but a lot of conservatives over time had a fairly strong willingness to spend on the military, willing to counter concrete adversaries of the soviet union, alqaeda, but theyre unenthusiastic about broader international projects. If you cannot,de convince them t there is an enemy that requires a response, they tend to shy away from a more active role, thats a Pivotal Group over time. What you see, they pivot back and a forth between activism and disengagement depending on the circumstances. In that moment of the treaty debate, all three agree that wilson was wrong but they did not agree toe why. In the 20s and 30s, conservatives for the most part agreed the u. S. Should be attached from military affairs in europe right. Pearl harbor settled the debate for some time and then the rise of soviet union they were anticommunist. The plot to the soviet union as welcome as it was led to the question to what now orr conservatives. In the 90s it was wide open, yet pappy cannon, ron paul, conservative internationalist, everything in between. George w bush settled that debate with a comfortable war on terror and most republican supported on him for much of his demonstration. And during the obama years your back to the. Where conservatives are asking what now. The big surprise in my opinion of 2016 2015 and 2016 during the republican primary was a candidate could win the republicanan nomination and presidency campaigning against that conservative International Tradition going back to the 40s. Donald trump really led a aontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won which was astonishing. He turn things upside down. Groups that have been marginalized for they were better represented. Groups that had been in charge were deeply concerned. But i think what trump was doing hain a way, im not suggesting e personally read these older documents, that is not my argument, my suggestion is he instinctively is american nationalist who drawls from older tradition to maintain every hand forns example. When trump ran for president , he had a particular nationalism of his own and if you go back he can see he said the same thing for 30 years and his own unusual way 32 men 35 years and he said over and over again thatt he viewed them as free riders, that is his view. Primarily as free riders rather than assets, its not mine is his. He was quite consistent about that. He said they were taking a vantage of the United States economically and taken advantage militarily, politically. And he aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills, it was a complaint, it was not a plan or what the policy alternative but it was a complaint with some popular residents as we saw in the 2016 primary particular when you tie into frustration over military interventions in iraq and afghanistan, not to mention libya, frustration with pattern of economic globalization the benefit the welloff and chinas middle class as opposed to working americans, frustration over sessions of National Sovereignty to organizations. But he bundled together a sense of frustration and turned it into a platform. So its an older version of american nationalism, his own particular version that i think weve seen the research. That is part of the Historical Context. Once he had to transition unexpectedly to government because i think his election came as a surprise probably to a lot of people in this room, it came to a surprise as me, then the question is now, whats a plan and what the policy. Theres been a lot of uncertainty from the beginning, severe personal challenges and in reality, the trump Foreign Policy is more of a mixture of nonintervention, highlighting i laterals of and continued u. S. For up policy engagement, that is partly because of personnel around him, that is partly because of his own adaptations over time, hespt very flexible, flexible to a fault, unpredictable day today. There does seem to be a pattern and how he handles Foreign Policy and thats an argument i make as well, therecy is somethg that if you indulge me too sound like a political scientist, i would picture a two by two grid. And he launches per campaigns against allies as well as adversaries and he launches pressure campaigns on Economic Issues as well as security ones. In other ways security adversaries in north korea, iran, isis, taliban, thats pretty straightforward, another president mightve done the same thing and somewhat different way. But that is part of what youre seeing, National Pressure campaigns in case of iran and north korea for example prethen you see n pressure campaigns agt u. S. Allies for defense spending. Not entirely new but he is blunt and away. You see pressure campaigns on the economic front against china, u. S. Competitor, that is a trump innovation i think, that was not nearly as highpriority for previous president s to push china on the commercial side and finally pressure campaigns against u. S. Allies on trade, that is new and that is very trump, i dont think any other candidate wouldve done that, pressure canada, mexico, japan, south korea, that you looking for trading arrangements. And what he does, he goes up and down the ladder of escalation in ways that can be sudden and unexpected, he will raise the temperature and lower it, he will make threats and be willing to settle or talk to almost anybody. This tends to unnerve people. It unnerves allies, it unnerves adversaries, and probably even some of his own staff. But what i do find striking, if you look over times, we try to turn down the volume with tends to be high, it is not obvious that he himself knows the endpoint which is interesting, im not sure he himself knows the reservation weight on every one of these friends, he keeps his options open. That is different from saying he is hellbent on dismantling what we call rulesbased international order, immvi not convinced he has that as a reference. 1 way or another. In fact i doubt he could describe it to you. He is interested in renegotiating existing arrangement consisting with his promises, is a portfolio assessment of u. S. Commitments overseas, commercial diplomatic military, he is reserving the right to walk away from some commitments, renegotiate others, maintain and maybe bolster some their u. S. Troops in poland more under obama. So the outcome is not predetermined, a significant amount of the presence is still there and in some cases may be increased, and that seems to be the Foreign Policy, now we can talk id be happy to talk and discussion of assessments of each of those fronts. Just a few final thoughts, how am i doing on time . I also talk a little bit about Public Opinion in the relationship of conservative opinion to the Trump Administration. I found to my surprise that the distribution of opinion has not changed that much over the last five or ten years, in other words trump took advantage of the one end of the spectrum, the less intervention, the more protectionist and he managed to turn that into a winning argument politically but the distribution has not changed that much. The average voter in the Republican Party has mixed feelings about u. S. Foreign policy activism but no left support for then there was five or ten or 15 years ago. That is interesting, he has not changed voters mine as much as you might think, he himself has made a difference on capturing a certain segment of opinion. For example, most republicans had a negative opinion of prudent ten years ago, most republicans have a opinion of him today. There is mixed feeling about globalization ten years in a mixed feeling today. Most republicans supported nato ten years ago, most republicans support nato today. So you go down the list, thats reality politically. Having said that, i do think there has been a longterm shift by the Republican Party becoming more populist culturally conservative, white workingclass voters have become more and more porton overtime av the base of the party and that is going to have an effect on your Foreign Policy including your trade policy, there is a no getting around it. He is as much a symptom as a cause. He has accelerated that and also represents longterm shifts. So i would not assume that just because he asked that these longterm shifts disappear, we cannot assume he is a one off and as soon as he is gone everything was not back to 2014. I am a little bit skeptical about that. Conclusion would be in the future most trump conservative leaders would have the opportunity to make Foreign Policy cases that they believe in and think they make sense to play a leading role, the public is open to it, there is still a fair amount of support among conservatives for u. S. Activism in the world. But some of the longterm shifts are reale and create and will outlast him. So there is going out to be coalition building, more than one type of conservative, and they will have to figure out how to live within the same party. Not to mention with other independents and democrats. So one way or another my conclusion would be that conservative american nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. [applause] can i ask you to say a few words. Sure. Thank you so much for being here. I love the fact that i did not need to put on a coat to come over from my office. And i appreciated your words of thanks, feeling very kindly saying that he would not have done this because hes already working on, but he was the first cohort of a program that we have that were really proud which we named after kirkpatrick which was our first scholar. People come from academia to a think tank to try and work on policy related issues and move away from the Academic Work that they have been doing. And we wanted you because we knew you would be productive and indeed you were and this is fine work and i know everybody is super happy about it. Of course sitting next to richard is nice for me too, i feel like im in the fulcrum because richard was my legislative assistant when he was a wee little thing. That was a long time ago. He has not changed a bit. [laughter] but onto the substance. So this is i think every sober and fine treatment of the questions that confront us all. And the thing that i like best about it it dives in to the origins of various different types of american conservatism in our National Security but it does so in a way that is hysteria that characterizes as every conversation about the issues that go on today in washington, its good to have a sober serious conversation that does not reference twitter in any d way. And i actually bookmarked one little part of this because i thought i know who youre talking about. And you go back to in the title and then in your final chapter called age of iron and its a gorgeous quote in your and he writes he was hardly optimistic about the new era in which scoundrels will be honored in fame will vanish. And i thought i know who you are talking about. And it is true but th