[laughter] good morning everyone and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment for international peace, im a senior fellow of the endowment and its a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this Book Discussion of colin duecks age of iron. Which is a marvelous analysis of conservative nationalism. A couple things about the book in the moment before i do i want to extend on your behalf and mine a warm welcome to cal colin himself as you probably know colin is a professor at the stars School Public iuniversity and and a nonresident fellow at the american and Bryce Institute neighbor next door, literally. Colin has made his mark thinking deeply about medical politics. And this book is trademarked direct, it examines the concept of conservative nationalism, phenomenon that has been brought to public attention conspicuously to the rise of president from. In terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have filed manifestation in modern American History. Especially in the debates about the medical role in the world. The book is both encompassing and granular simultaneously. Despite the gravity of the subject i can assure you its also a very delightful read, i read the book of the last weekend and i commend it to your attention. Welcome colin, its a pleasure to have you with us. Im also very grateful that danny billiken and Richard Fontaine have consented to join us to discuss. We could not have asked for better commentators, given both their intellectual interests in conservativism and the practical contributions to the making and implementing of foreign and domestic policy in the United States. Danny has a long career on capitol hill where she worked on the Senate Foreign communications abappears widely on television and until recently was a Senior Vice President for foreign and domestic foreign policies at ai where she continues to remain er senior fellow in foreign and defense policy studies. Richard fontaine too has had a long tucareer, now the chief executive office of the center for new American Security which i say with some jealousy is doing incredibly Creative Work on our racial issues relating to u. S. National security. Richard worked many years as senator john mccains Foreign Policy advisor and prior to that worked at the state department, National Security council and also the center for Foreign Relations committee. Very warm welcome to both of you danny and richard, its wonderful have you both here again. Without further ado, let me invite colin to present the book for us before i yield the floor to danny and richard for their comments. We will have a brief conversation after and then i will open the conversation to the floor. I look forward thto your interaction in that time. Thank you colin, welcome. Thanks ashley, thanks very much for this invitation. It just so happens that this Panel Includes three people all of whom experience and expertise and views i really respect. So its a real pleasure to be here with danny and rich as well in fact, danny, without danny this book probably went to happen, she might regret that but thats the truth at the new york enterprise institute. Glad to be here, let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book, what motivated me, among other things, was the common argument over the last five years that the Trump Administration represents something completely unprecedented in American History and ththat this strikin rise of populist nationalism on ythe right, both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons really back into the 1930s, without downplaying some of the genuine causes for concern i think thats what overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism American Nationalism and the administrations Foreign Policy. The book isnt a polemic one way or the other if not proor antitrump but its attempt to situate this moment in some broader historical context, which i think is often missing amidst the furies of the day. What i argue is that American Nationalism come there is kind kof an american Foreign Policy nationalism going back to founding which is not undemocratic at all its quite the opposite. Working case at least, there is a civic nationalism which involves an american creed with powerful Classical Liberal elements rule of law, government, popular sovereignty, thats been bound up with an american sense of nationalism from the beginning. In a sense conservatives from the beginning have sought to conserve that tradition. At the same time, what comes to Foreign Policy the founders had a couple of key principles that were really a consistent paradigm for generations, if you have a dollar bill in your pocket you can see the idea of a new order of the ages, the idea of being the United States will stand for something it will hope the popular selfgovernment spreads, thats a distinctly american hope going back to the founding thats been the element of u. S. Foreign policy nationalism, that doesnt mean you can only do it by force but at least as an example, the second element, this is in washington for all address the idea that you maintain a free hand that there is, as jefferson put it later there would be no entangled alliances, no permanent alliances, that was a key element in american Foreign Policy nationalism from the beginning of the founders saw no contradiction between those two things, but was really a dominant one would call bipartisan tradition well into the 20th century. So what really shifted was i argue Woodrow Wilson innovation wilson believe not only that he needed to tie a new Foreign Policy paradigm what we call today liberal internationalism or globalism vignette is tied up to the possibility of domestic progressive reforms in every country including the United States you need to be willing to intervene on the ground militarily in europe to vindicate democracy overseas but you also need to be willingo to make global binding multilateral commitments. Worldwide as he intended with the league of nations. Particularly in article 10, so thats up production if thats an alternative to the founders and wilson understood it as such and so did his republican critics. Which is what gave them pause, from beginning republicans and conservatives in the United States have never quite agreed on how to tackle o or counter or accommodate that liberal internationalist tradition there been internal divisions and debates and we see this over and over again and will probably keep saying it, id say theres three main groups of conservativism over time, one conservative internationalists are skeptical of some of the wilsonian overkill when it comes to multilateral commitments but they basically believe you should have alliances overseas or robust american presence and active role overseas, that for example was the position of somebody like abwho faced off against wilson during the treaty of versailles, lodge actually won in alliance he wanted alienation teaches thought wilson was overly optimistic and unrealistic. Then theres a second group on the other end of the spectrum were strict mom interventionalists, you see this to the present day with libertarians, some pale neoconservatives say actually u. S. Should avoid military commitments altogether, alliances, bases, interventions, trade peacefully with other countries but you have a military role outside of lets say the western hemisphere. Thats a tradition that goes back to that period you have people like robert a often populist from west of the mississippi thats a stream that runs through them there is a third strain kind of in the middle which is talk is your hardline unilateralism which doesnt get as much attention in elite discourse i would say its been underrepresented but a lot of conservatives over time actually have had a fairly strong willingness to spend on military willing to counter concrete adversaries soviet union, al qaeda but there enthusiastic about broader liberal projects. If you cant convince them atheres a enemy that requires response, they tend to shy away from more active role, thats the Pivotal Group over time. What you see is that they pivot back and forth between activism and disengagement. Depending on the circumstances. In the moment of the treaty debate, all three factions agree wilson was wrong but they ondidnt agree exactly why. In the 20s and 30s conservatives for the most part agreed the same actually detached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor settled that debate for some time and then of course the rise of the soviet union led many hardline conservatives to support more robust military roles overseas but if you think back to somebody like Barry Goldwaters committee actually was not enthusiastic at all about liberal internationalism and such. The reason most conservatives supported this was they were anticommunist. Staunchly anticommunist. Then the class of the soviet union is welcomed as it was but the question of what now for conservatives . In the 90s i think was wide open you had pat buchanan, you had ron paul you also had ivconservative internationalist he had everything in between. George w. Bush settled the debate for some time with war on terror and most are public and supported him in that for much of his administration, ob once bush leaves office during the obama years you back to that period of conservatives are asking what now . The big surprise in my opinion of 2016 2015 2016 in the republican primary was that a candidate could win the republican nomination, and presidency contending against that conservative internationalist tradition going back to the 40s, donald trump really led a frontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won which was astonishing. He sort of turn things upside down. Groups that have been marginalized felt they were better represented, groups that had been in charge for deeply concerned. But i think what trump is doing in a way, im not suggesting he personally read these older documents thats not what im saying, my suggestion is he instinctively is a kind of American Nationalist who draws from older traditions the idea that you need to maintain free hand for example when trump ran for president he had a particular American Nationalism of his own if you go back you can see he said the same sort of thing for 30 years and his own unusual way, 30 or 35 years actually he said over and over again that he viewed us allies as free riders, thats his view, primarily as free riders rather than assets. Thats not my view, thats his bucharest even quite consistent about that. He said they were taking advantage of the United States economically and taking advantage of the estates militarily and politically. He aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills, it was a complaint it wasnt really a plan, there wasnt much sense of whats the policy are tentative but it was a complaint with some popular residents as we saw. Particularly when you tighten the frustration over military interventions in iraq and afghanistan not to mention lydia, frustrations with patterns of economic globalization that seemed to benefit the well off and chinas middle class as opposed to working americans. Frustrations over sections of National Sovereignty to supranational organizations. He bundled together a sense of frustration and niturned it int a winning platform. So its a older version of American National his own particular version that i think weve seen reinsurgents. Thats part of the historical context. Once he had to transition unexpectedly to government because i think his election came as a surprise probably to a lot of people in this room, i can tell you it came as a surprise to me, then the question is what now . Whats the plan . Of course theres been a lot of uncertainty from the getgo. There was severe personal challenges, in reality the trump Foreign Policy is more of a mixture of nonintervention, hardline unilateralism and some boys continued u. S. Foreign policy activism and engagement,e its a mixture commits a hybrid thats partly because of personnel around him thats partly because of his own adaptations over time, he is very flexible, flexible to a fault, hes unpredictable day today. But there does seem to be a pattern in how he handles Foreign Policy and thats one of the arguments i make as hewell, theres Something Like trump talk and if youll indulge me to sound like a political scientist i would picture as a 2 x 2 grid he launches Pressure Campaigns against allies as well as adversaries he launches Pressure Campaigns on Economic Issues as well as security ones so in other words, the Pressure Campaigns against security adversaries and north korea and iran, isis, telegram, thats pretty straightforward, another president might have done the same thing, in a somewhat different way but thats part of what youre seeing, maximum u Pressure Campaign in the case of iran north korea for example. Then you see Pressure Campaigns against u. S. Allies on security to increase defense method. Not entirely new but he is blunt in the way that we havent seen before. You see Pressure Campaigns on the economic front against china, u. S. Competitor, thats a trump innovation i think, that was not nearly as high priority for previous president s to really push china on the commercial side, then finally, Pressure Campaigns against u. S. Allies on trade, thats new. Thats very trump, thats trumpets. I dont think any other candidate wouldve done that, pressure canada, mexico, japan, south korea, looking for renegotiated trading arrangements, those of the Pressure Campaigns. What he does is he goes up and down the ladder of escalation. In ways that can be quite sudden and unexpected, he will raise the temperature, then he will lower it. He will make threats and then be willing to settle or talk to almost anybody. This tends to unnerve people, it unnerves our lives it unnerves adversaries and unnerves probably even some of his own staff but what i found striking if you look at it over time you try to turn down the volume which tends to be very high its not obvious that he himself knows the endpoint, which is interesting, im not dp sure he himself knows his own reservation on every one of these fronts. He keeps his options open, thats different from saying that hes held bent on dismantling what we call rulesbased International Order im not convinced he actually has that as a Reference Point one way or the other. In fact i doubt he could describe it to you. He is interested in renegotiating existing arrangements consistent with his 2016 campaign promises, its a portfolio assessment of u. S. Commitments overseas commercial, diplomatic, military, his reserving the right to either walk away from some commitments, renegotiate others, may team some may even bolster some, the c troops in poland more than under obama. The outcome is not predetermined, significant amount of the u. S. Forward presence is still there and made in some cases even increased, that seems to be the Foreign Policy be happy to talk and discussion about assessments of each of those fronts but thats what it looks like to me, just a few final thoughts, how my adoing on tim . I talk a little bit about Public Opinion the relationship ofs conservative opinion to the Trump Administration i found to my surprise that the distribution of the opinion hasnt actually changed that much over the last five or 10 oyears, in other words, trump took advantage of one end of the spectrum, the less interventionist, the more protectionist, he managed to turn that into a winning argument politically but the distribution actually doesnt change that much, the average voter in the republic and party has mixed feelings about u. S. Foreign policy activism but theres no less support for it then there was five, 10, 50 years ago, thats interesting, he hasnt really changed voters minds is much as you might think of rc he himself has made a big difference and captured a certain segment of opinion. For example, most republicans had a negative opinion of putin 10 years ago most americans have a negative opinion about putin today. Most republicans supported nato 10 years ago, most republicans support nato today. So you get on the list, thats the reality, political, having said that, i think theres been a longterm shift whereby the Republican Party has become more populist culturally conservative, white workingclass voters have become more and more over time as the base of the party, thats going to have an effect on your Foreign Policy including your trade policy theres no getting around it and he is as much a symptom as a cause. He has accelerated that but he also represents longterm shifts. I would not assume that just because he exits the seam that the longter