Transcripts For CSPAN2 Rebecca Lissner And Mira Rapp-Hooper

Even i can say that its a vast understatement to say that we are living through a moment of profound upheaval by the domestic landscape. The american primacy is in the Rearview Mirror and the road ahead is in preoccupation. People lose perspective and to lurch from the illusion of neatly restoring our yen up oral dominance and the equally illusory idea that we can disengage from the rest of the world and focus on ourselves. What rebecca and mira have done in this illuminating book in an extraordinarily thoughtful and historically grounded am at least sensible approach to reinventing u. S. Foreignpolicy mindful of the limits of our power but optimistic about its possibilities. Their strategy of openness marries the crucial importance of discipline and restraint in an appreciation of the potential of the hand that we still have to play and a number of other players especially our allies and partners who share a broad interest in the world. None of that should surprise us because mira and rebecca who are two of the best thinkers and practitioners of our from Foreign Relations to they produce together and independently remarkable body of work on everything from the significance of our alliances to the role of technology and Great Power Competition to the National Security challenges facing the next administration. With so much to be pessimistic about these days mira and rebecca keep me hopeful about the future of u. S. Foreignpolicy in their new book really is essential reading at this transformative moment. I strongly encourage you to buy a copy if you havent done so already and the link on the screen can help you do that. I will begin with a few questions and the last 15 or 20 minutes turn to your questions which you can submit through youtubes chat function. Mira rapphooper its great to have you in bank so much for doing this. Its a pleasure. Size good to start at the beginning i think so rebecca maybe if i could start with you, why did you both decide to write this book now . Is this a foreignpolicy response the trump era or would you have taken this on regardless . Let me just begin by saying thank you for that incredibly generous introduction and its an honor for sub or tina nida share this virtual stage with you today an additional caveat that everything we have does say russ reflects her personal views and not in the institutional views at all. To your question our book an open world makes the case that the United States needs to reimagine its foreignpolicy or postpandemic and potentially post trump world before its too late. We started a project in the immediate wake of the 2016 election. It was already clear to us that donald trump himself was more an avatar that an autocrat of the domestic and International Stage acting upon American Foreign policy. Even if Hillary Clinton had 12016 he would have had to contend with massive effort in rapid technical logical political dysfunction at home. The notion that donald trump himself was solely responsible for American Leadership and International Order and second the idea that these was somehow returned to foreignpolicy business as usual when trump would take up as weather in 21 or 2025. At coronavirus pandemic is only passively demonstrated rules and laws and norms institutions built for the challenges of the 1940s are something not addressed to the opportunities so new approach is needed and thats what we try to set out in our book. Rebecca maybe you could tell us more about what the strategy of openness which you lay out and in the book involves and what would an open world look like or what should it look like in your view . I will start by just adding my tremendous thanks to rebecca and its an honor to be of the shared the stage with you today. Im so grateful for your support and guidance. The bottom line is an open strategy for which we advocate is a new strategy for United States senate should allow us to trust even as you so rightly noted in your opening remarks we have a lot of military and economic at least in the way we are defined in the postworld war. The suggestion of the strategies to keep the world open and to promote a direction at the same time. What does that mean in practice and what are we seeking to promote . At an open strategy would like to see seattle to remain politically independent and able to make choices free of clinical coercion. Political coercion. Like to see the Global Commons such as the season airspace as they accessible not been in foster cooperation beneficial trade as well as the free flow of air preparation and transparent governance and International Institutions even if the states that comprise them are not always themselves democracies. That raises the question of perhaps this all sounds well and good but what are we trying to prevent . Wouldnt open the strategy seeks to prevent is the hostel domination of geographic spaces and international politics. You could think of a domination by hostile state as part of her region. China dominated from the strategy opposes foreign interference and political processes such as foreign intervention and the like since and it also opposes any efforts to close off vital waterways air spaces or information spaces. Who would we possibly be talking about in all of this . When you hear us talking about what wed like to achieve and prevent the most central concern is that china is the country who could conceivably achieve some form of hierarchical dominance in the region or inside a functional spaces perhaps creating a closed system of technology through 5g architecture are governing the internet according to close principles. The reason we are so concerned about this is a close world is fundamentally last say for the United States. U. S. Economic austerity and National Security fundamentally depend on interdependence and economic terms and in security terms so if china or anybody else closes off parts of the geographic region or functional space the United States itself will be less safe but it does not describe all the goals the united United States wants are cheaper there some limits upon the senate does not mean that china or other states can have influence. Its a construct that which we govern for International Order while pledging would have to live alongside some strong authoritarian powers who did not share her preferences at all. Thanks mira and lucky draws both of you out on the following question and you greatly stressed at the start that there cant be a return to the status quo eve third to. The Trump Administration or what people imagine to be the heyday of post world american primacy. If thats the case policymaking which is the business of choices is what do not do . You dont do as much as you think you used to do and there are lots of examples especially in places where we got so infatuated with their own magical thinking. So how would the strategy that you both laid out differ from past american grand strategy is . What would the u. S. Do differently and what will we not do as much of as we did in the first 20 years after the end of the cold war . That such an important question and you are right to say that grand strategy is all about making choices and clarifying tradeoffs. Openness has long been an idea that is animated elements of American Foreignpolicy but our strategy is the first time openness would be the centerpiece of the american grand strategy. Looking back at fdrs vote idea of what postwar america would look like once the iron curtain america cannot shut closed [inaudible] in eastern europe. We set out to achieve something that was more ambitious. Back in embraces idea of the idea that political systems the market could permeate every order of the globe but it over reached and in many ways over the past 40 years youve seen donald trump one that retrieves very much from the corporate world of openness by rejecting our alliance and International Cooperation by shying away and renovating the International Order. We feel finally now open this is an idea whose time has calm because the 21st Century International environment is one thats uniquely in a way that the 21st century is not in a way to level facts that our ambitions are matched with our power. Student thinks rebecca. Mira anything you want to atom . I will take rebeccas great answer and sort of the core store go strategic underpinnings and i have specific examples about what we are suggesting the United States would do differently under this construct. As rebecca noted its this idea of liberal universalism that is fundamentally challenged in this environment and the idea that the world is moving inexorably since Democratic Political systems of liberal values and ways United States can fundamentally promote we of course believe the idea of democracy and liberalism remains incredibly important and want to see the United States lead the world by its own example and continuing to adopt those ideas and ideals but we also knowledge where living alongside a forward terion like china russian others who are not likely to change the characters of their regime and the United States will therefore have to adopt the foreignpolicy and a set of strategies towards International Borders that acknowledge newfound constraints particularly when it comes to this idea of liberal universalism. One thing we are specific in saying we would not do much of it is efforts at arms regime change to transform the character of any given regime. That might sound like an idea that doesnt have much of an enemy in current day washington because there are forces on both the american political left and the political right that have strongly strong issues for wars and deftly not do not want to see the United States take on new military entanglements. Nevertheless what we are calling for here is extreme discipline when it comes to the american use of force for political ends in the international system. Thats a big departure from the first two decades of the first cold war. Another fairly specific area where we do see some need for change albeit with very heavy hearts is in the area of human rights. That is to say we have to understand these illiberal regimes with whom we are living alongside are very lucky to engage in human rights policies that are not linking and we will have to find ways to address them to existing International Laws and until the people ultimately changed their character themselves. What we mean there is we are going to have to have allies and partners to call china out on its human rights abuses on the basis of the existing International Law and agreements and do so under repeated basis until china makes the change themselves. That is we are relatively set on changing approach to human rights ourselves from the outside and again its with a heavy heart that we come to that position. The characteristics of regimes are characteristically not up to us and will ultimately be a long hard slog for folks inside these countries is part of the implications of living in a world where universalism is much more how do you think the strategy of openness that you have both laid out how does it look from the perspective of the chinese leadership in beijing and how does it look from Vladimir Putins kremlin in moscow . Rebecca why are you start. I will take that one. And open the strategy is very cleareyed about the fact that russian china do not share in our goals of International Openness and american grand strategy Going Forward needs to be oriented around the possibility that either china or russia achieves closure. Lets be clear though russia and china do not pose equivalent threats to the open world. China is by far the antagonist of International Openness. It is the only country that both has a preference foreclosure and the capability to bring about closure. That would take on a number of different forms. Closure could look like outright military dominance and territorial annexation by china and other states in the region but it could also take on the 21st century form whereby china uses its Technological Prowess to coerce other states and undermined their political independence for example by course of play leveraging 5g infrastructure that is itself by china. An open world seems to forestall that possibility in the chinese case. Russia sees it as a different kind of threat. Russia is fundamental in decline and it has been for while in covid and the crushing oil prices is only worsen their condition. Also that of our allies in europe is so the central charge of implementing an open the strategy when it comes to rest up is of course to maintain credible deterrence when it comes to nato but also to really develop the tools to forestall russias ability to form european states or United States by foreign meddling in its electoral process. An open world strategy recognizes living alongside her liberal russian china but it also creates clear bright lines about the types of behaviors the United States ought to oppose that portend closure and those types of russian and chinese behaviors that ought to be in the direction of openness. Bill if i may if i could add additional facts on china here. Rebecca has given a great overview about how we think about russian china and the strategy but a question that you are as might have jumped to mind is how is this different than strategies that think of dividing the world along ideological forms the free world strategy that sees democracy sesspit against authoritarianism. It is a rebranding of ideas that have become very popular inside the beltway in recent years. We dont think it is. A couple of Different Reasons that i was straight with respect to the question of how this would all look from chinas perspective. Number one is an open the strategy ballot to some of the existential issues of our time are going to require us to work with china on the basis of mutual interest. And Climate Change and the need to tighten and raise the ambition of the existing climate regimes that are already upon us. This cannot be done without cooperate should be in second of course the crisis right now covid and the intended economic crisis requires far more u. S. Cooperation or at least more than has received. The fact is some amount of power deconfliction and collaboration is going to be necessary even in an increasingly International Order that we describe here. Particularly with respect to north korea and iran. The second reason why the strategy isnt simply just about a torrid terionism versus democracies is because we have on their face acknowledged the need to live alongside a willingness to work with china or other nondemocratic regimes so long as they will abide by Transparent International Governance Principles in their efforts to build International Order. What we mean by that is even if china was willing to bring its initiative up to speed with prevailing International Standards and transparency about Development Norms and allow projects to proceed without potentially miring countries and debts and commitments that they dont understand we might be willing to work with china on those projects are at least help to upgrade the standards by which it is perceived. We are willing to work with mixed regimes like vietnams of the world and building new architectures to govern technology and internet so long as they are willing to abide. The mere fact of the country not being a fullfledged democracy is not a disqualifying factor to a country in International Water rather we hope you open and transparent principles we continue however modestly the domestic choices that nondemocracies may make in hopes of bringing them towards the bandage that we see in an open world. Mira let me followup on china china because ive always admired your thinking and writing and u. S. Strategy in asia as well. How do you effect through an open the strategy the incentives and disincentives of the chinese leadership . And all the dimensions of that strategy so diplomatically in terms of work with partners like india to treaty allies like japan and south korea will would your view be on if you have a new administration about some form of effort to return to Something Like the transpacific partnership. In other words reading rules for economic openness that fit your strategy but also would leverage in dealing with questions like the norms surrounding because you cant fight something with nothing. What does it mean and security terms and really thorny issues like the South China Sea . If you could take it to one further level of practicality how would an open the strategy manifests itself in terms of u. S. Policy . Its a great question bill and you have also embedded the answer appeared we see a lot of u. S. China policy in recent air is has largely been frankly unilateral in a crucial change towards promoting openness is pursuing a policy that fundamentally relies on allies multilateral institutions and generating the existing Rearview Mirror<\/a> and the road ahead is in preoccupation. People lose perspective and to lurch from the illusion of neatly restoring our yen up oral dominance and the equally illusory idea that we can disengage from the rest of the world and focus on ourselves. What rebecca and mira have done in this illuminating book in an extraordinarily thoughtful and historically grounded am at least sensible approach to reinventing u. S. Foreignpolicy mindful of the limits of our power but optimistic about its possibilities. Their strategy of openness marries the crucial importance of discipline and restraint in an appreciation of the potential of the hand that we still have to play and a number of other players especially our allies and partners who share a broad interest in the world. None of that should surprise us because mira and rebecca who are two of the best thinkers and practitioners of our from Foreign Relations<\/a> to they produce together and independently remarkable body of work on everything from the significance of our alliances to the role of technology and Great Power Competition<\/a> to the National Security<\/a> challenges facing the next administration. With so much to be pessimistic about these days mira and rebecca keep me hopeful about the future of u. S. Foreignpolicy in their new book really is essential reading at this transformative moment. I strongly encourage you to buy a copy if you havent done so already and the link on the screen can help you do that. I will begin with a few questions and the last 15 or 20 minutes turn to your questions which you can submit through youtubes chat function. Mira rapphooper its great to have you in bank so much for doing this. Its a pleasure. Size good to start at the beginning i think so rebecca maybe if i could start with you, why did you both decide to write this book now . Is this a foreignpolicy response the trump era or would you have taken this on regardless . Let me just begin by saying thank you for that incredibly generous introduction and its an honor for sub or tina nida share this virtual stage with you today an additional caveat that everything we have does say russ reflects her personal views and not in the institutional views at all. To your question our book an open world makes the case that the United States<\/a> needs to reimagine its foreignpolicy or postpandemic and potentially post trump world before its too late. We started a project in the immediate wake of the 2016 election. It was already clear to us that donald trump himself was more an avatar that an autocrat of the domestic and International Stage<\/a> acting upon American Foreign<\/a> policy. Even if Hillary Clinton<\/a> had 12016 he would have had to contend with massive effort in rapid technical logical political dysfunction at home. The notion that donald trump himself was solely responsible for American Leadership<\/a> and International Order<\/a> and second the idea that these was somehow returned to foreignpolicy business as usual when trump would take up as weather in 21 or 2025. At coronavirus pandemic is only passively demonstrated rules and laws and norms institutions built for the challenges of the 1940s are something not addressed to the opportunities so new approach is needed and thats what we try to set out in our book. Rebecca maybe you could tell us more about what the strategy of openness which you lay out and in the book involves and what would an open world look like or what should it look like in your view . I will start by just adding my tremendous thanks to rebecca and its an honor to be of the shared the stage with you today. Im so grateful for your support and guidance. The bottom line is an open strategy for which we advocate is a new strategy for United States<\/a> senate should allow us to trust even as you so rightly noted in your opening remarks we have a lot of military and economic at least in the way we are defined in the postworld war. The suggestion of the strategies to keep the world open and to promote a direction at the same time. What does that mean in practice and what are we seeking to promote . At an open strategy would like to see seattle to remain politically independent and able to make choices free of clinical coercion. Political coercion. Like to see the Global Commons<\/a> such as the season airspace as they accessible not been in foster cooperation beneficial trade as well as the free flow of air preparation and transparent governance and International Institutions<\/a> even if the states that comprise them are not always themselves democracies. That raises the question of perhaps this all sounds well and good but what are we trying to prevent . Wouldnt open the strategy seeks to prevent is the hostel domination of geographic spaces and international politics. You could think of a domination by hostile state as part of her region. China dominated from the strategy opposes foreign interference and political processes such as foreign intervention and the like since and it also opposes any efforts to close off vital waterways air spaces or information spaces. Who would we possibly be talking about in all of this . When you hear us talking about what wed like to achieve and prevent the most central concern is that china is the country who could conceivably achieve some form of hierarchical dominance in the region or inside a functional spaces perhaps creating a closed system of technology through 5g architecture are governing the internet according to close principles. The reason we are so concerned about this is a close world is fundamentally last say for the United States<\/a>. U. S. Economic austerity and National Security<\/a> fundamentally depend on interdependence and economic terms and in security terms so if china or anybody else closes off parts of the geographic region or functional space the United States<\/a> itself will be less safe but it does not describe all the goals the united United States<\/a> wants are cheaper there some limits upon the senate does not mean that china or other states can have influence. Its a construct that which we govern for International Order<\/a> while pledging would have to live alongside some strong authoritarian powers who did not share her preferences at all. Thanks mira and lucky draws both of you out on the following question and you greatly stressed at the start that there cant be a return to the status quo eve third to. The Trump Administration<\/a> or what people imagine to be the heyday of post world american primacy. If thats the case policymaking which is the business of choices is what do not do . You dont do as much as you think you used to do and there are lots of examples especially in places where we got so infatuated with their own magical thinking. So how would the strategy that you both laid out differ from past american grand strategy is . What would the u. S. Do differently and what will we not do as much of as we did in the first 20 years after the end of the cold war . That such an important question and you are right to say that grand strategy is all about making choices and clarifying tradeoffs. Openness has long been an idea that is animated elements of American Foreign<\/a>policy but our strategy is the first time openness would be the centerpiece of the american grand strategy. Looking back at fdrs vote idea of what postwar america would look like once the iron curtain america cannot shut closed [inaudible] in eastern europe. We set out to achieve something that was more ambitious. Back in embraces idea of the idea that political systems the market could permeate every order of the globe but it over reached and in many ways over the past 40 years youve seen donald trump one that retrieves very much from the corporate world of openness by rejecting our alliance and International Cooperation<\/a> by shying away and renovating the International Order<\/a>. We feel finally now open this is an idea whose time has calm because the 21st Century International<\/a> environment is one thats uniquely in a way that the 21st century is not in a way to level facts that our ambitions are matched with our power. Student thinks rebecca. Mira anything you want to atom . I will take rebeccas great answer and sort of the core store go strategic underpinnings and i have specific examples about what we are suggesting the United States<\/a> would do differently under this construct. As rebecca noted its this idea of liberal universalism that is fundamentally challenged in this environment and the idea that the world is moving inexorably since Democratic Political<\/a> systems of liberal values and ways United States<\/a> can fundamentally promote we of course believe the idea of democracy and liberalism remains incredibly important and want to see the United States<\/a> lead the world by its own example and continuing to adopt those ideas and ideals but we also knowledge where living alongside a forward terion like china russian others who are not likely to change the characters of their regime and the United States<\/a> will therefore have to adopt the foreignpolicy and a set of strategies towards International Borders<\/a> that acknowledge newfound constraints particularly when it comes to this idea of liberal universalism. One thing we are specific in saying we would not do much of it is efforts at arms regime change to transform the character of any given regime. That might sound like an idea that doesnt have much of an enemy in current day washington because there are forces on both the american political left and the political right that have strongly strong issues for wars and deftly not do not want to see the United States<\/a> take on new military entanglements. Nevertheless what we are calling for here is extreme discipline when it comes to the american use of force for political ends in the international system. Thats a big departure from the first two decades of the first cold war. Another fairly specific area where we do see some need for change albeit with very heavy hearts is in the area of human rights. That is to say we have to understand these illiberal regimes with whom we are living alongside are very lucky to engage in human rights policies that are not linking and we will have to find ways to address them to existing International Laws<\/a> and until the people ultimately changed their character themselves. What we mean there is we are going to have to have allies and partners to call china out on its human rights abuses on the basis of the existing International Law<\/a> and agreements and do so under repeated basis until china makes the change themselves. That is we are relatively set on changing approach to human rights ourselves from the outside and again its with a heavy heart that we come to that position. The characteristics of regimes are characteristically not up to us and will ultimately be a long hard slog for folks inside these countries is part of the implications of living in a world where universalism is much more how do you think the strategy of openness that you have both laid out how does it look from the perspective of the chinese leadership in beijing and how does it look from Vladimir Putins<\/a> kremlin in moscow . Rebecca why are you start. I will take that one. And open the strategy is very cleareyed about the fact that russian china do not share in our goals of International Openness<\/a> and american grand strategy Going Forward<\/a> needs to be oriented around the possibility that either china or russia achieves closure. Lets be clear though russia and china do not pose equivalent threats to the open world. China is by far the antagonist of International Openness<\/a>. It is the only country that both has a preference foreclosure and the capability to bring about closure. That would take on a number of different forms. Closure could look like outright military dominance and territorial annexation by china and other states in the region but it could also take on the 21st century form whereby china uses its Technological Prowess<\/a> to coerce other states and undermined their political independence for example by course of play leveraging 5g infrastructure that is itself by china. An open world seems to forestall that possibility in the chinese case. Russia sees it as a different kind of threat. Russia is fundamental in decline and it has been for while in covid and the crushing oil prices is only worsen their condition. Also that of our allies in europe is so the central charge of implementing an open the strategy when it comes to rest up is of course to maintain credible deterrence when it comes to nato but also to really develop the tools to forestall russias ability to form european states or United States<\/a> by foreign meddling in its electoral process. An open world strategy recognizes living alongside her liberal russian china but it also creates clear bright lines about the types of behaviors the United States<\/a> ought to oppose that portend closure and those types of russian and chinese behaviors that ought to be in the direction of openness. Bill if i may if i could add additional facts on china here. Rebecca has given a great overview about how we think about russian china and the strategy but a question that you are as might have jumped to mind is how is this different than strategies that think of dividing the world along ideological forms the free world strategy that sees democracy sesspit against authoritarianism. It is a rebranding of ideas that have become very popular inside the beltway in recent years. We dont think it is. A couple of Different Reasons<\/a> that i was straight with respect to the question of how this would all look from chinas perspective. Number one is an open the strategy ballot to some of the existential issues of our time are going to require us to work with china on the basis of mutual interest. And Climate Change<\/a> and the need to tighten and raise the ambition of the existing climate regimes that are already upon us. This cannot be done without cooperate should be in second of course the crisis right now covid and the intended economic crisis requires far more u. S. Cooperation or at least more than has received. The fact is some amount of power deconfliction and collaboration is going to be necessary even in an increasingly International Order<\/a> that we describe here. Particularly with respect to north korea and iran. The second reason why the strategy isnt simply just about a torrid terionism versus democracies is because we have on their face acknowledged the need to live alongside a willingness to work with china or other nondemocratic regimes so long as they will abide by Transparent International<\/a> Governance Principles<\/a> in their efforts to build International Order<\/a>. What we mean by that is even if china was willing to bring its initiative up to speed with prevailing International Standards<\/a> and transparency about Development Norms<\/a> and allow projects to proceed without potentially miring countries and debts and commitments that they dont understand we might be willing to work with china on those projects are at least help to upgrade the standards by which it is perceived. We are willing to work with mixed regimes like vietnams of the world and building new architectures to govern technology and internet so long as they are willing to abide. The mere fact of the country not being a fullfledged democracy is not a disqualifying factor to a country in International Water<\/a> rather we hope you open and transparent principles we continue however modestly the domestic choices that nondemocracies may make in hopes of bringing them towards the bandage that we see in an open world. Mira let me followup on china china because ive always admired your thinking and writing and u. S. Strategy in asia as well. How do you effect through an open the strategy the incentives and disincentives of the chinese leadership . And all the dimensions of that strategy so diplomatically in terms of work with partners like india to treaty allies like japan and south korea will would your view be on if you have a new administration about some form of effort to return to Something Like<\/a> the transpacific partnership. In other words reading rules for economic openness that fit your strategy but also would leverage in dealing with questions like the norms surrounding because you cant fight something with nothing. What does it mean and security terms and really thorny issues like the South China Sea<\/a> . If you could take it to one further level of practicality how would an open the strategy manifests itself in terms of u. S. Policy . Its a great question bill and you have also embedded the answer appeared we see a lot of u. S. China policy in recent air is has largely been frankly unilateral in a crucial change towards promoting openness is pursuing a policy that fundamentally relies on allies multilateral institutions and generating the existing International Order<\/a> in writing new rules which will ultimately an overtime perhaps overlong period of time help to shape chinas incentives. I welcome back to the question on security because thats different. What comes to the approach to International Order<\/a> more broadly we see this being a huge object of an open the strategy and that is the United States<\/a> must overhaul its approach to International Border<\/a> building if it is to. An order that can safely allow it to live on alongside china. Some cases this means overhauling existing institutions that have to obviously become sporadic for example of the wto overhauled before its members can start to press issues like into load intellectual property theft and Digital Services<\/a> not covered by the institution but which china itself is brought to the floor. One way to think about the wto is the possibility of rejoining which has up prolateral trade group can help raise the standards and set the standards that would ultimately be adopted by the wto down the line. In some cases the efforts for acquirers to. New rules and institutions were very few exist. Areas like cyberspace or retrospective new technology were there almost no governing rules at all. Heres an area where there is bilateral disengagement last four years has been to our extreme detriment because chinas managed to advance its preferred norms and rules for governing spaces with almost no pushback. Chinas efforts against preferred technical standards to International Standards<\/a> or its efforts for preferred norms of cyber and the internet in a way that is fundamentally inimical to american and allied norms. So by moving quickly to try to overhaul the Center National<\/a> cetacean to write new rules where they are only just beginning to crystallize the United States<\/a> takes a multilateral approach so treatise principles that when the day and hopefully down the line xi jinping will come up with a slightly more of an set of preferences but in certain areas like the South China Sea<\/a>s the United States<\/a> is not going to deal with all the problem through an open a multilateral set of choices that fundamentally aim at universal membership. May need to rely on alliances and in fact it does need to rely on alliances to keep areas like the South China Sea<\/a> open. And to cooperate with allies to. A secure chain and some National Security<\/a> likeminded allies and partners and only there do we have the possibility. Just quickly to really explain why this is a really different way of speaking about International Order<\/a> and the one that prevails in the postwar period has the liberal International Order<\/a> that is subject to so much deception especially over the past four years to disinvest an International Order<\/a> is a single monolithic monolithic entities but in the future it will vary quite a bit in its scope and its substance and its membership and its not going to be universally liberal universally orderly or entirely international. As we modernize the International Order<\/a> and to build new norms and regimes and institutions to meet these challenges in the areas like emerging technology in areas like climate we need to use likeminded partners as a focal point for building a new structure and understand that they are not going to be universal or universal membership for the future of International Order<\/a> is going to be highly differentiated. There will be different rules and regimes for different issues and different participants in each ruling regime. What this will mean for the United States<\/a> is a really vigorous diplomatic effort because we need to understand which countries both democracies and nondemocracies share issues understanding there may be countries like india that align with the u. S. And our vision of a free and open in the pacific that are more mutual anymore chinese or russian view about sovereignty is illustrated by their own internet shutdowns. This is going to be multipolar multilateral efforts that looked are different from the type of International Organization<\/a> that we have become accustomed to when the United States<\/a> is at the peak of its power. The world you describe were diplomacy is important and as you both argue that puts added importance on not just reviving but reinventing some of our most important alliances and especially the Transatlantic Alliance<\/a> and its role is our partnerships in north america which in many effects has been our naturals to treat base and here in recent years we have accomplished a rare diplomatic feat of tipping off the canadians. Theres an opportunity there i think but im going to ask you first in looking at Transatlantic Relations<\/a> which clearly trouble if you look at recent polls that have come out in the last couple of days a lot of her closest european allies and their citizens think the administration is not necessarily going to wipe away their concerns and their skepticism about the american role being taken for granted for a long time. In an independent. So the challenge Going Forward<\/a> is going to be the shared preferences in a coordinated strategy. Not just any coordinated strategy. The strategy that leads the type of 21st talent we are likely going too see. Many of those be non military in nature. So weve argued in her book as well that means modernizing American Alliance<\/a>s they can absolutely leverage the competencies that our allies have that are not always military. Any of our allies in europe are powerhouses. We see the way the eu can set new standards when it comes to technology. So that is a massively important force of power that the u. S. Should be leveraging. At the same time, the last norms with emerging Security Issues<\/a> like cybersecurity. The United States<\/a> as an opportunity too expand its article five defense equipment to cover a task on infrastructure. Understanding we no longer live in the world were Russian Forces<\/a> are going to be coming through to attack germany and the way nato had originally intended. There is great opportunity here. Also there are challenges. Europeans have been much more skeptical of the United States<\/a> over the past four years. And our preferences are not entirely in alignment. For example their areas of where the european see certain privacy issues differently than the United States<\/a> does. So about the convergent end divergences. But understand an open road simply cannot succeed if we do not stand together with our allies and partners to make it a reality. And ask you about the prospects for u. S. European cooperation to corroded areas. One end technologies, she both of argued we make progress United States<\/a> is going to make progress to develop more standards that reflect openness is not quite come to some grand convention is going to us building leverage with like the United States<\/a>. A lot of differences ranging from data privacy to various forms of regulation between the European Union<\/a> a big america based Tech Companies<\/a> as well as u. S. Government. What you see first as the prospects for narrowing those differences on technology, building genuine partnerships on issues like 5g or European Countries<\/a> actually have a lot more capacity right now that the United States<\/a> does. And second china coming back to what you said before it seems selfevident youre not going to have identical u. S. And european internment approaches to china. Its possible to have complementary and coordinated approaches in dealing with strategy towards china . So technology in china and u. S. European relations. Wonderful question though. Short interest of both alliant agendas are pursuing in the coming years may not run through additional alliant structure at all. We take out these agendas and where they are situated, there is Foreign Policy<\/a> is absolutely necessary for either one. The question of technology we have seen the Trump Administration<\/a>s blackandwhite approach to 5g technology. Basically arguing implications work of china they could be disqualified as an American Alliance<\/a> and intelligent partne partner. But the problem with the strategies United States<\/a> did not offer the alternative knower did it develop that could provide 5g infrastructure much less the competitive pricing to china nonetheless. So i do believe exactly as you suggest United States<\/a> and European Partners<\/a> are going to have to Work Together<\/a> to Start Building<\/a> capabilities relatively unprecedented and perhaps be able to offer the same. Obviously that potentially happening 35g along the lines that is been suggested by number of International Thinkers<\/a> and leaders. I would probably include a configuration it would include some european allies some asian allies and finland who are not part of nato at all who could run 3g7 aptly think this was the way forward on new technology and alliances and thinking about ad hoc private holding parade the second one relatedly on china because china is the reason for this 5g concern is the question but the conversation of allied about china. Think weve actually seen some significant progress and transatlantics perspective on china in recent years. Whether the sister eu strategies that acknowledge the china challenge the fact that nato has acknowledge for the first time china as a challenge in its statement. Are the fact that European Public<\/a> opinion turned starkly against china after seeing aggressive diplomacy in the early months of this crisis. The best way too pursue the European Union<\/a>. I think European Partners<\/a> are likely too recollect the idea of over militarizing china and well be important to keep china on nato agendas and related agendas will move forward on issues from technology, to democracy to investments inside your will be a really rigorous diplomacy. I think that on aligning our views even if they are not perfectly coordinate or entirely compatible in the years ahead. Thanks mira. Rebecca let me turn to another big challenge you addressed very squarely in the book, that you both do. That is especially in a pandemic world. I know you started writing this before over 19 broke. I just said it accelerate a lot of the challenges including the anxiety they are trying to take into account in the book. How do you connect and openness strategy and u. S. Foreign policy to the huge challenge of domestic renewal over the next decade or so. Well domestic renewal is absolutely essential and open strategy recognizes that the United States<\/a> simply cannot exceed internationally mostly begin by reinvesting in the American People<\/a> and the vitality of american democracy. Needs to be really theyd add to those domestic challenges to improve the health care to rationalize the immigration policy and ended in growth and innovation. Another important of that is the necessity of bridging the gap between the United States<\/a> federal government and our technology. Over the past several decades you have seen growing estrangement because washington d. C. And is a number of reasons for that. People often point to the cultural or libertarian politics from the federal government and from National Security<\/a> imperative. Actually argue the deeper causes come from decades of underinvestment by the federal government nor domestic sector. We have fallen far far below levels of Government Investment<\/a> in r d. And as a result retracing Foreign Policy<\/a> with our interes interest. Unchanging strategic like ai, computing through initiatives that lower the barriers to cooperation to Tech Companies<\/a>, tech talent in the federal government. Changing the way the u. S. Returns and technologies can all help bridge this divide. As kelvin has shown, our governing capacity increasingly relies on her ability to Leverage Technology<\/a> for things like Contact Tracing<\/a> apps that are publichealth function. Less United States<\/a> government combined away to take this world leading innovation and marshall for the national interest, we are going to be operating tragically below our capacity both domestically and internationally. Not bad to very important point. Going too add to that in terms of domestic renewal openness strategy beyond those that you clearly laid out. You can put into practice some of those ideas. Guest i will just add that the domestic openness actually what help make it credible. That is to say after this obvious American Power<\/a> in the rather unilateral on the internationally last four years, partners have very clearly a really big challenge about American Power<\/a> and the weighted ute u. S. Leadership on the global stage. The changes in Public Protection<\/a> will not easily be reversed. Unless the United States<\/a> takes on the domestic issues that are challenging its power on the international page. Making reinvestment that rebecca is talking about. Can actually suggest to the worlds not doing what it needs to do too tend to its own capacity as a major power. It may actually have the ability with the International Order<\/a>. So by addressing these domestic capacity issues i think we provide some assurance to international and suggested them they should have more confidence in the ability too get on board with this strategy take on these most centralized challenges, think important issue both indicated earlier, three discipline openness strategy are demonstrating to american citizens the benefits of smart, disciplined engagement abroad is connected to taking on a lot of the other challenges that americans face today too. I think the covid crisis could not more vividly demonstrate Foreign Policy<\/a> should be protecting American Security<\/a> at home. I we should be comfortable explaining responsibility any new leadership in the United States<\/a> think thats important part of the strategy. Really good questions from our audience in the course of writing the book and now bringing it out and discussing it, what you both think of the most legitimate critiques that you run into . He of the questions that people ask about. Whether or not this strategy could run aground. On whether to national reality, whether its a domestic support, whether it is succumbing to the temptation to overreach and crusade which is an important dimension of American Foreign<\/a> policy. What are the most legitimate critiques you run into so far . I think the viability of the strategy comes from the scale of challenges that the United States<\/a> is facing right now that has nothing to do with building a new International Order<\/a>. If you surveyed the landscape, even the Incoming Biden Administration<\/a> would inherit you have a raging pandemic that is yet to be brought under control. You have a massive economic crisis its in its early stages. You have a regional reckoning on social justice issues and you have a working Climate Crisis<\/a> were significant loss of our country are quite literally on fire. The scale of challenges at home truly a bandwidth issue above all else. Whether its indeed the right approach to the states because of course we think it is. Really whether the United States<\/a> has the capacity to be in the vigorous diplomacy. Thinking of National Security<\/a> choices that we provide going to be consumed by the ordinarily pressing crisis. If i may another critique which may see more scholarly. I think actually has some Practical Application<\/a> for policymakers. Hassett are the limits of openness. Course were advocating for International Openness<\/a> and keep most is open. But domestically does not exist without limits that is to say of course like china and russia have long advance their own interest by exploiting the openness of the United States<\/a> for a democratic society. Whether on the form metal and disinformation campaigns or through economic practices that take advantage of open markets while keeping. Critics might reasonably ask openness suggesting we should keep our borders open to un mitigated immigration . And the course estoppel we are suggesting here. We believe that individual people should be able too manage in generations that allows them to keep. [inaudible] where exactly you draw those lines. What is it mean to be upholding International Openness<\/a> will still fundamentally taking the individual nations will need to take to keep themselves safe and secure . That in no way in our view the international viability of this idea. But it does mean that the states adopting it will have to be judicious in the choices they make fundamentally how they protect openness domestically while still contributing to the International Openness<\/a> effort. Thank you. We wanted turned out got a number of questions from the audience has submitted. Through youtube chat. Lets start with cliff who asks, how are other nations looking at the choice americans face in the 2020 president ial election . And what if anything of the do too prepare for what lies ahead . Are they prepared for u. S. Openness strategy . Thats a nice narrow question for you both. I think we take the first crack at that. So taking out broad aperture. With that being a battle underway for the international politics. As a lengthy conversation has indicated thus far countries fall on openness of the side of closure. Udc traditional allies like japan and germany that are trying too achieve openness in their region and in the world. But are struggling to do so as america retreats. So for those countries i think they are going to be looking for november that ratifies and affirms to be globally engaged and to fight for this idea of openness. Especially after the u. S. Has been retreating and moving in the opposite director the choice will be determinative. We know as he states that are increasingly cooperating for closure. They wanted international thats friendlier and more amendable for their system at home. I think and theyre hoping the American People<\/a> will make the choice for nationalism and retreat. If the United States<\/a> can band together with other allied partners to affirm and advance an open world states like russia and china will not be able to wish the 24th century would have. And finally you have states like india. I think they are youre going too see their choices very much depending where the work falls diplomatically. This is india, china is pushing it away from china. Supplies were intergenic diplomacy is seriously and within an openness coalition are going to be really important. In all of these cases choices in november fairly stark. They met working at ways at odds with International Openness<\/a> and to adopt a strategy and many ways it should if its serious about competing with china. May be tempted for openness pool also help with the crises at home. Lets head to one point about rebeccas act excellent answer. And that is to note well rebeccas absolutely right that we see it many ways divided in the openness enclosure, the charge to even have to choose does provide some may have not had to confront for the last four years but that is to say when its relatively more disengaged or doing unilateral policies of withdrawal, they often dont force that many choice allies. There pushed up against the wall and try to hold the line as the United States<\/a> retreats. If we pursue the openness allied others would actually have to take on a more affirmative role as a strategy. Potentially banding together in the South China Sea<\/a> as they escalate they are taking a stand under Technology Issues<\/a> that we have been discussing. So these are many ways harder choices for allies. Their own forward the division we have provided here. Online is so important that the United States<\/a> topend affirmative strategy for what it takes to achieve the world rather than convince the many crises that are referred to her here. We positively hope to protect on the International Stage<\/a> is very difficult worth coming along with this these objectives. Everythings rated negatively of pushing back against china with the latest advances. It will be all the harder to keep friends and allies on boar board. Having this objective we do hope that openness will be taken up with the charge. Another good question from our audience is of both of you have been saying from kenya. The ot china bring the u. S. And russia closer together. Im happy to take first crack there. Its a really perceptive question for think its important because as i said and washington is been russian china are increasingly they have some form of alliance. Whats possible, rebecca and i think her a little more skeptical of the idea with this russian relationship is one of the permanent entity. That means the parishes its taking place internationally we actually do think its possible that it could be more of a transient phenomenon. We recommend that the United States<\/a> not. Policies that push them closer together. Set a backup for mama, what do we mean why they will affect the relationship . Rebecca started laid out we see russia as a power thats fundamentally on the decline for number of reasons. Unlikely to be able to reverse the decline anytime soon. Will china will continue to be a power on board, course china and russia are not. [inaudible] but former allies themselves to what you were a period of crisis in their own relationship. In countries that share what constitutes their own influence and backyard. As china moves through western and central asia russia considers being its is being supplanted by china is essential arms dealer in several regions. And as diminish the pali seems to grow russian role is diminish in relative terms. So its potentially provoking china not nestle tomorrow or next year but five to ten years from now. But we help with Foreign Policy<\/a> will be judicious and not simply characterized by chinas being authoritarian allies to necessarily pose together. Rather make Foreign Policy<\/a> decisions that might perhaps expose some of the daylight between them. Not necessary trying were not suggesting some form of latter day cold war. But there are fundamental differences that are to be exacerbated over time with u. S. Foreignpolicy gives them the chance. Sue beck thanks very much. Another china question, how significant is the u. S. Trade war with china . And how can the next administration, if there is a next administration, use the strategy too deescalate tensions . Guest well it is impossible too predict what exactly the next Administration Whether<\/a> its a second truck term renew Biden Administration<\/a> will do in regards the trade war. I sincerely cannot prejudge tha that. There is an open strategy about trade as an element of the strategy. Their trade continues to be central to american prosperity. 95 of Global Customers<\/a> of the border so we really cant grow as a nation and become wealthy or collectively and we engage in global trade. But as we talked about earlier, the American Worker<\/a> and the american businesses have been consistently exploited on the part of china. Other illegal subsidies, enterprises or Technology Transfer<\/a> on the part of American Companies<\/a> are working within china. So the United States<\/a> needs to lead in performing a Global Trading<\/a> system that reflects our interest in our values. So what is that mean in practice . Number one, the u. S. And china are both participants. So if there is a way too reimagine to for example include a code of contact for enterprise that would have unique progress in cracking on the unfair market practices. The problem is the wto is a consensus based body. Quite frankly china does not have very much incentive too agree to any set of that would constrain its ability too maintain its liberal markets at home. So as we mentioned earlier we imagine instead is an end strategy. Whereby the u. S. Can go to unilateral trade agreements with standards and that encompass new areas of the Global Economy<\/a> like additional trade that do not encompass the deputy right now. By expanding the scope of what countries are included in this new trade agreements to find countries of asia, the United States<\/a> can change the incentive china faces as it continues to grow economically. And in the idea openness. There still going to be some carryover where the u. S. Is going to have to take targeted, tailored protections too ensure its most vital technologies for example are not exploited or turned against us in the industry. But as a general matter the United States<\/a> can pursue a more open and fair High Standard<\/a> International Trade<\/a> regime by pursuing policies that do not just entail trade wars. Host thanks rebecca. We have probably just got time for one last question. This comes fiona who asks, with segmentation of multilateral International Institutions<\/a>, how will the u. S. Not only strengthen but re incentive by nations to revamp these organizations and strengthen their power . Guest that is a wonderful question, i will take first crack and im sure rebecca will want to add some thoughts heret hereto. The first part of the answers ultimately Many Americans<\/a> and frankly in some cases russian china of the world brought into existing they might not all agree on the exact agenda that lights the way forward, many of them i very much committed to the idea of the institutions should survive. That is in and of itself a basis too begin renovation. When it comes to questions whether to continue to consider the Un Security Council<\/a> reform, we see a need for the United States<\/a> not only work closely with allies and partners in the japans and germanys of the world, to frankly try to strike bargains with places like india who constitute a finnish state and international politics. He viewed the trade and economics may not be firmly aligned with our own, may we willing too come along with reform agendas and raise their power inside of existing institutions. So we see that sort of down and the weeds diplomatic brokering thats absolutely necessary to any kind of institutional reform effort with other International Swing<\/a> states on board. We also recognizes some of our International Institutions<\/a> dont govern the issues we care about the most again in areas like internet, cyberspace, new technologies. You have to build those institutions making International Order<\/a> more layered, more patch worked less universal than it was in the past. Their think incentives for our nations to move quickly before norms crystallize pretty exactly as her becca said this new form of International Order<\/a> will not be fully international in the way it proceeds. Rather mutual interest in acting quickly before they do the same ill pass it over to rebecca first. Well our time is almost appear. So i just want to conclude by highlighting for everyone with the most interested a what the stakes are. Because the stakes are incredibly high. The u. S. And the world are the most consequences geo critical since 1991. The u. S. Being small but also narrowing window of opportunity too imagine its Foreign Policy<\/a> and its oppressed International Order<\/a>. And that means rejecting both trumped out nationalism and the 2016 progress in favor of discipline but also globally engaged in odd. Because america still very powerful. So it can affect this type of change. If we dont, we will see a worlds increasingly hostile to u. S. Interests as the power isnt china cooperate for closure. Its also a world thats increasingly disordered. Because the absence of American Leadership<\/a> that may prove a much worse borders to comfort that is really an important point on which to end. I hate to bring a fascinating conversation to a close. I dont think everyone in her audience for joining us today. I especially want to thank mira and rebecca and congratulates her again on your terrific new book which is open world on america, burdick urged all of you to buy it and to read it. And thanks again very much, mira and rebecca take good care of yourselves. Enke its been a pleasure. Thanks everyone. Starting now it is book tv in prime time first up sociology professor Jamie Mccallum<\/a> argues that the key to building a more just society, lies and workers gaining a greater say over their labor time. Then Cato Institute<\/a> yuliya shapiro offers his thoughts on the traditional nomination process and how to improve it. Also this evening philosophy professor weighs in on what it means to be a feminist. Political commentator Candice Owens<\/a> offers her thoughts on why black americans should vote republican. And, professor chair gates examines what he calls the myths of americans exceptionalism find more Schedule Information<\/a> a booktv. Org or consult your program guide. Now, here is Jamie Mccallum<\/a>. The professor of sociology at Middlebury College<\/a> his first book mobile union local power when the prize for best bo o","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia601906.us.archive.org\/4\/items\/CSPAN2_20201017_220200_Rebecca_Lissner_and_Mira_Rapp-Hooper_An_Open_World\/CSPAN2_20201017_220200_Rebecca_Lissner_and_Mira_Rapp-Hooper_An_Open_World.thumbs\/CSPAN2_20201017_220200_Rebecca_Lissner_and_Mira_Rapp-Hooper_An_Open_World_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240716T12:35:10+00:00"}