We have a special guest with us tonight my friend and a wonderful writer and author. Ian toll doesnt really need an introduction it should be very long and to be extremely accomplished the author of six books as well the pacific war the third volume has been released 19441945 from the naval of the United States will writing the writers award so those anymore Samuel Eliot Morrison was out there that thank you so much with the twilight of the gods. Its my pleasure. I am struck by the book this is a big story of the western pacific but you began this book in an interesting way of looking at fdr and douglas macarthur. I will expand on my question. Military history there is the expectation and in this case almost 100 pages into the book. And the unconventional way to begin work of military history i thought it had a little bit of latitude in the case that they are committed to read it or not and with that observation with the pacific war there is a lot of literature and i went to say there is a pickup truck with the fdr biography i dont think thats an exaggeration. There is a large wheelbarrow full and with the most fascinating figures and for obvious reasons the story of the command conference which took place in all who july 1944 that story has been told over and over again because of how frequently the new biographies are coming out because it was a dramatic meeting that took place so for that reason we tended to look at the meeting through the present of politics and he announced to nobodys surprise he would run for the unprecedented fourth term of office as president. And was at the dnc on his way to the west coast. So the way the country saw the trip was a Campaign Stop and a publicity event it was a substantive command conference at fdr was doing something we would have expected the commander in chief to do to visit the pacific theater. With the only time he did it million one when men and women were fighting under our flag so i think it was important to try to unite with this biographical or political view of this meeting with macarthur and fdr which was a substantive military planning conference and also admiral lee he. In the spirit of American History. But of the strategic talks. Before we move away from politics talk about macarthur 1944. Macarthur with the presidency many times in the twenties and as you say in 1944 his supporters in the state powerful members of congress and certain conservative media owners and with the figures on the american right who saw their only chance to defeat fdr with the wartime election. So this was the dark Course Campaign it didnt lead anywhere because do we locked up the nomination. But the question has been asked did macarthur actually want to run for president what he of like to become president was the pressure on the joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do that essentially involved and the senate was divided the northern half was the theater commander and then in the southwest so with those two semi autonomous hitters and regardless in a way to settle this is we leaving the navy in charge of the naval war. So this question of macarthur the supreme command in the pacific and the route back to tokyo went through the philippines including the Northern Island and the start of Course Campaign for president. But the world has changed him and then earlier in his presidency he knew whose birthday it was and the children were having a birthday that day but by this point. No. Fdr this is the longest in American History and i remember at the outside of the Current Administration we were on the Washington Post is about fdrs relationship with the press using the charm tactics he was famous for to get the president on his side. Thats an accurate depiction in his first term in office by the third term in 1941 he had had it with the press. The way the press was covering politics the number of his bitter enemies were major media owners. And his twiceweekly press conference was king takers and was out on the campaign trail attacking the press constantly. So that was an important part of the perspective and with those Different Military services and with those policies the army and navy and the different approaches and i thought there was an important way to introduce the larger convention. In the way they make their decisions and jobs the point. So those decisions have to be made. The ray one the way you were writing a you come to a fork in the road and there was a big decision so can you break that down. To make a long story shor short, june 44 or july 44 and then with and the bombing distance within tokyo with the japanese fleet and then naval battle that took place during the campaign. And those were gone so the last days of the war, how do force the japanese to capitulate . That is Unconditional Surrender that was the policy is the right policy to occupy and supervise and then of course the regime was far away from that. And then to force him to surrender so then he was at the centerpiece of his conception and with those internal planners so major for china also calling on the chinese infantry man with the invasion of japan and the destruction of japanese armies and that was for most a settlement in 1844 and to safe to say that would take one of those two islands first most will call them taiwan one of the two islands and the immediate decision in may 1944 beyond that forcing the japanese to surrender without invading their homeland that played very much into the thinking they were confronting at this time as wel well. Down to a what if. I think our viewers know what the asiapacific war with the airbase and the b29 to intervene with the fighting of the mainland. But if we had landed in hermosa so the nature of the conflict with taiwan and china are the Major Military american presence. And with that enormous question had we taken hermosa in 1944 then we word have led to a larger involvement of troops and that could of been vastly different. And with those persuasive arguments and im not an expert what happened chinese civil war but in 1849 at the end of the Second World War. And the significance of that event it is just incalculable. So the chief of Naval Operations and then looking back this might have led to a different result that would have diverted the course. Thats one of the fascinating whatifs and with any change in with that on historical timeline. So one of the reasons the Second World War is so unique and fascinating that has shaped the post war in asia and europe and those choices being made by the generals and the admirals how to prosecute with those implications that were living with today. You were describe yourself as an expert and this is as good as it gets. You know youre talking about so i appreciate that. Most of what you deal with is necessary with us commanders there are some unforgettable but let me read you a quote from the book talking about carrier warfare and the pacific. We were swap benches with them but im stronger than they are. I dont give a damn known can stop me if i go to destroy all their aircraft and how does that stand up to your idea 1944 1945 quick. With those carrier tasks force and in the first year of the war with the crucible we had battles between small Carrier Task Forces in which really it was a question of hit and run and then based on an island. Menu get the hell out of there. And by 1944 the Carrier Task Force in the pacific, you are talking between 12 and 16 aircraft carriers and with that semi autonomous task groups within shouting distance of each other and then a single integrated strike with the japanese airbase on some island with the japanese defending fighters to go in and those destroying the planes on the ground so that hitandrun approach was no longer necessary and with that Carrier Task Force and essentially just destroy that and overpower that to count off any counterstrike with the American Fleet thats how it changed in late stages of the war. And one of my favorite characters his Mother Organization man. He wanted to be one of the professionals so all the odds to be stacked in my favor. And he was a black shoe not in a theater. And he had the style the kind of guy being as a ceo. So very smart by everybodys account. And with that style of command for that reason. And to be ascended to the top command in the u. S. Navy really it is a series of accidents to be excellently thrust into that position at the battle of midway and for winning that immortal battle and then called to show duty so he and limits became very very close professionally and personally. And then to take out the fleet he also commanded sce during the Second World War. So he intended to take the fleet to see so by 1944 we have overwhelming naval superiority. We will win the war women take unnecessary chances with the japanese to come into score a Lucky Victory against us is by the numbers and i think that was the direct approach and that generally was the judgment of historians who rated the best as the commanders in the pacific. You referenced halsey and this volume with the spirit of the pacific war. How do you rate him and to phase. Whatever his ability as the operational commander . And then Say Something about his seamanship. Because the question asks itsel itself, so is operational commander with the problems he ran into as well. He has significant errors in the last year with the two typhoons and a number of influential subordinates from the drawer on the junior admirals that served under him and they were commercially critical of these decisions and perhaps that was one of the most infamous command errors in the history which could have led to disaster but didnt because the commander retreated at a critical moment. So the list of indictments against halsey in terms of his management of the fleet and as long and more broadly, the senior Task Force Commander in the pacific to when the japanese to take pearl harbor 1941 he had the carriers at sea that was fortunate so halsey really was the character and the commander at sea with what was left of the navys capability in the first months of the war there was a period where air force was not ready for war and quickly had to get up to speed to learn to fight by fighting. And halsey was the leader in this critical early months of the war. And he gets a lot of credit for that. He had a colorful style of blood and thunder style that was the halsey style with a foot forward approach to diversity talking to the forces under his command and of course because he talks through the media he talks to the American People and becomes the face of the navy during the war often compared to general patent and that is a fair comparison in many counts and then with the headquarters in New Caledonia he loses touch with the daytoday job of running the fleet and when he is brought back in 1944, its totally different what he is commanding and he hasnt kept up he insist on bringing his loyal Staff Officers that had been at headquarters for two years with him and they were not up to speed. So essentially a Large Organization coming to take over the fleet became the third fleet and they were ready to do that. There is a mistake you can attribute to the chain of command. It wasnt a good choice to bring halsey back to put him into the world in 1944. You write beautifully about one of the most complex actions in Human History there is so much going on in the account that the reader can follow and into that marvelously so when the japanese chances of winning . By that time the japanese were desperate they realize their problem is if americans took over they would be cut off from the fuel supply in the Dutch East Indies and rarely their own source for india and sumatra so there was an oil field but they had to bring the wheel back to japan the that critical artery of the japanese empire may not even be in a position where the entire remaining fleet against us to take off with this awareness that they had so the motive was just to be sure they didnt the preflight ending the war to be destroyed and they had to go out with a bang and the japanese given the significant disadvantages that they had come in the plan is to remain Striking Force at the third fleet to get at this formidable and fabius. And then happy to do that but then to put them in the significant commander with halsey. So with that military establishment by october 45 and yet still manages with Us Amphibious landing by that point in the war. And the military philosopher who never quite sure whats going to happen. And you bring this on really well with your discussion. Thank you. So lets go to the japanese home islands. So by now 1944 must have been clear that the board had been lost and there was no real position United States could not take it was willing to accept the loss. There were these six principles so its really with the Army Air Force to destroy the industry where there is no redundancy so what cap the japanese people going . An interesting book yet to be written with the not see germany propaganda and then contrast that to at the japanese did they have attempted to have total control over with their own public actually knows what is happening outside in the world beyond. And the regime had little control and told the newspapers exactly what you write and to tell the japanese people so the average japanese person had a limited understanding of what was happening. And then to converge on starvation and famine was a very real danger. Of the war had gone on i think famine would have Major Regions of japan to be hit but the japanese people did not know how dire things were until the emperor came on and said this is it. We are throwing in the towel. And appreciation of what life was like with the japanese man or woman on the street and to present through their eyes what they saw that limited information which was available to them by this benevolent regime who took control of japan during the years. Writing about the philippines but it climaxed in a particularly horrific way in the capital of manila the worst pathology of the military culture and ideology. What do we mean by that . And in particular inculcated the idea that you can Never Surrender under any circumstances. Or take your own life rather than be captured. Generally i think this has been understood but it is a radical idea in Japanese Military culture didnt come through the samurai condition in the samurai era the japanese warrior had fought if he had done his duty he could lay down his arms and surrender with his honor intact so traditionally in Japanese Culture this is something the Japanese Army from the war in 19 oh five to say this will make us invincible if we order the soldiers never to surrender. May be the single best example. In 18 or 19 or 20 employees. And then to fight to the death. And those results can be pretty severe so the fact manila is in part an outgrowth of the distortion of the military traditions and cultures were that is one of the darkest wars of history. And that is the new radicalization of warfare. And i found all portions are extremely enlightening. For any book on this. And you write about it and twilight is possible to fathom . And then to go the mind. And it helps so many of the diaries or other writings or letters with the genre in japan. And then even in english translation. And then with the suicide attacks. And then the psychology with a common cause the pilots and that was the largest kamikaze campaign. And then pressured essentially to volunteer and they were deeply reluctant and indeed they would take off to the bases and then turned back saying they had engine problems and they cannot find the fleet. Into that americans point of view with those hundreds of enemy planes come in essentially behaving like men. Unique set of folders and it contributed to the sense that many people on our side that the japanese were fundamentally different and fanatics in a way that made it very difficult for us to understand. And with the Strategic Bombing and the atomic bombs as well . And then they were hit by a kamikaze. Write about the word time conferences with prompt and other discussion if they did not agree on Unconditional Surrender with the japanese Prime Minister that can mean a lot of things. I am no expert at japanese but it can mean a lot of things we interpret it one way he may have meant something different. The japanese ruling circle to hold the nationstate in their hands. We are deeply divided at this point in part of the japanese regime was essentially ready to recognize the necessity of surrender. The germans had been defeated they were on the verge of the homeland being totally destroyed with the Japanese Army in particular to fight off the invasion of the japanese homeland. So the Prime Minister and that case demanding surrender. And then to articulate a vague policy to satisfy these elements with the regime and with politicians today if you cannot articulate a clear policy you have a vague language to satisfy both sides. So hes talking to the hardliners in his regime saying that we would simply ignore this. Will not accept that and pretend it doesnt exist. When our translators get a hold of that and the conclusion that our government makes is the japanese have rejected so perhaps the language barrier may have c