Q a box and the moderator will be reviewing those during the questionandanswer session which will conclude tonights program and now to introduce the moderator, it is my pleasure to pass this program over to doctor rob said tino. Thank you, jeremy. Im here, Senior Historian at the National WorldWar Ii Museum in new orleans, louisiana. We have special guest tonight a friend of the museum and my friend and a wonderful writer and author, ian told brady ian, welcome. Thank you. Reporter and is probably one of those doesnt need an introduction and you all know the introduction could be long and and is an extremely accomplished scholar and he is the author of six the epic history of the founding of the u. S. Navy as well as a trilogy called the pacific war of the third volume of which has just been released called twilight of the gods. He has one the Samuel Elliott morrison award and one the William E Colby military writers award and has won the other Samuel Elliott morrison award given by the u. S. Constitution museum and if there are any Samuel Elliott morrison award other expect you to win want in the not so distant future. Thank you for talking with us about twilight of the gods. My pleasure in my honor. What im struck by the book and im always struck by how an author chooses to open the story and its a big story, war on western pacific 44, 45 biggest naval battles of all time and valor and heroism of every sort but you could give this book an interesting way in the realm of politics and i thought it was nicely done. Especially at the Douglas Macarthur so why open the book that way and ill expand on my question and its a bit of a risk and they want to get a [inaudible] its a survey of the u. S. Political team spirit military history in this case you really have to wait until the third hundred pages in the book and it is an unconventional way to begin military history and my thought was i had a little bit of latitude in this case because its the third volume of the trilogy and people are reading it and have read the first two and they are either committed to read it or not and basically my observation was at the pacific war was that there was a lot of literature fdr and a lot about macarthur and i like to say pickup truck full of fdr biographies and i dont think thats an exaggeration and there is a large wheelbarrow full of macarthur biographies and these are two of the most fascinating figures in the 20th century American History and biographers love them for obvious reasons so the story of the Pacific Command conference which took place in a while who in the island of oahu in hawaii in july 1944, that story has been told over and over and over again because of how frequently do biographies are coming out in both fdr and macarthur and of course thats a featured incident in any biography of those two because it was a dramatic meeting that took place in the first time they had met in seven years. As i said, two of the most colorful figures of that American History but for that reason and this actually started in the war we have tended to look at that meeting through the prison of american politics immediately before leaving on the trip that took him to hawaii and fdr had announced to nobodys surprise that he was going to run for unprecedented fourth term of office and it had visited the Democratic National convention to the west coast. The way the press observed essentially what the country saw this trip to hawaii was a Campaign Stop in a publicity event. In fact, it was much more than that in a very substantive command conference and fdr was doing something which i think we wouldve expected any communit community commanderinchief to do is visit the Pacific Theater and its the only time he did it. For the millions of men and women who are fighting under our flag in the pacific that visit told them they not been forgotten and what was important. So why begin it with that long account of that visit and i think it was important to try to unite what have become two very separate strands of literature of this biographical political kind of view of this meeting between macarthur and fdr and what was a very substantive and historically important military planning conference that involved fdr and macarthur admiral leahy who is almost always forgotten with a low profile figure that was immensely important in this history. Quote wrote some of the greatest memoirs during the pacific war. I agree. Must get to the strategic talk but before we move away from the politics tell us about macarthur in 1944 and how badly did he want to get into the oval office in 1944 . Macarthur flirted with the presidency many times throughout his career beginning in the 1920s and he had been floated in circles and he allowed his supporters and states and powerful members of congress in the Republican Party in certain conservative media owners and various other figures on the american right who sought macarthurs potentially their only chance to defeat fdr in a wartime election and so they essentially they started the Dark Horse Campaign with macarthurs implicit connivance and did not lead anywhere and for reasons for that we simply because the New York Times locked up the nomination early in the primary process. The question has been asked and theyve debated did macarthur want to run for president and would he have like to become president or was this just a way of exerting pressure on the president and on the joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do in the pacific which essentially involves sending more military to the command and it was divided as you know more than half with the commander and then in the southwest pacific you had macarthur and his division of the pacific autonomous theater commands was controversial and regarded as essentially a way of settling the rivalry between the army and navy satisfying macarthur and leaving the navy in charge of the naval war. And so this question of when macarthur eventually gained supreme command and the specific which was his goal and second could he ensure that our roots back to tokyo went through and that he would get the green light to liberate critically the Northern Island and so these were his goals and this kind of Dark Horse Campaign the president may civilly have been a way of exerting pressure in order to fulfill those goals. What about fdr . You write marvelously in the book that the war changed him and this was a happy war and it used to be one for the ages earlier in his presidency he would be joshing with the reporters and knew whose birthday it was and his children were having a birthday that day and they could joke back and forth but its not fdr by this point is it . No, of course this was long as president and in American History and i remember at the outset of the current president S Administration there was a story and the leaders of the Washington Post it was about fdr relationship with the press and about how clever he was that essentially using this charm tactic when he was famous for to get the press on his side and that is an accurate depiction of how fdr dealt with the press. In his first term in office by his third term 1941 he had essentially had it with the press and really was deeply offended, i think in general of the way the press is covering politics a number of his bitterest enemies were major media owners and his twiceweekly press conferences were pretty cantankerous and he really was actually out of the campaign trail attacking the press constantly. I thought that was an important part of the perspective and wanted to get in the weight of the Different MilitaryServices Also developed policies and how the army and the navy had different approaches for this and i thought that was just an important way to introduce the larger dimension of what was happening in the pacific and the kinds of environments in which military leaders had to make their decisions and do their jobs during this bloodied war. You mentioned again the conference and big Strategic Decisions had to be made. I guess the way you write it as i am reading your chapter on it we come to a fork in the road, havent we . There was a big decision that had to be made and i guess you could break it down and say they simply lose on versus [inaudible] and could you break that down for the participants they are . To make a long straight short by june 1944 certainly july 1944 taken the islands and we had taken saipan and about to take an that was the islands we were with bombing in with the industrial heartland in the bomber and the Japanese Striking arm of the japanese fleet had been annihilated in the Company Naval battle that took place during the conveyance of essentially the japanese were finished. Any hopes they had of winning the war the last stage of the war was how do you force the japanese to capitulate and you know it would be Unconditional Surrender now is our policy and the right policy to say that we would occupy and disarm japan, supervise the reconstruction of a democratic japan and of course, the japanese regime was very far away from that. The question became in the last year how do you force them to surrender. Macarthur had the philippines at the centerpiece of his conception and many said he wanted to liberate the philippines even more than winning the war and the navy in many of those powerful internal planners of the joint chiefs of staff were Organization Washington so a major role for china was in the last stage of the campaign and they wanted to flip the coast of china and wanted that [inaudible] they wanted potential to drop on chinese infantry manpower and the invasion of japan if that were to take place in the destruction of japanese armies over the asian mainland. Byman 1944 i think its fair to say we were going to take one of those two islands first, either the Northern Island of the philippines or the island of the capital city manila or what we cultivate taiwan, one of these two islands. That was the immediate decision fdr and his military chiefs faced in mid 1944. Beyond that there was a question of can be forced japanese to surrender without invading their homeland and that played very much into the thinking they were confronting at this time as well . Let me try to pin him down to eight what if because we love what ifs, dont we . I think our listeners know interviewers know that of course [inaudible] was a choice. How might the pacific war or the asiapacific war, hmmm may have there been difference is if we landed on [inaudible] and turned it into a airbase or a base for b29s and may be in debt being in the fighting and the mainland and of course there is a civil war that is about to break out at the end of this war and im just wondering, any thoughts on that . I think if we had landed it would be or we would still have troops there today and so the nature of the conflict between today and the independent nation of taiwan and china would be that much more intense with the major American Military presence there and its a what if if you say and it was interesting and enormous questions for the world is had we taken formosa in 1944 we would then have led to a larger involvement in american troops on the asian mainland and my that have led to different results in the chinese civil w war. It so speculative and very hard to make really persuasive arguments and im not an expert on what happened in the chinese civil war but 1949 for years after the end of the Second World War mao had taken control of china and the significance of that event for World History including today is just incalculable and so it is, you know, ernest who was the senior officer in the navy during the Second World War and in 1949 looking back he raised this question and if we had done what i had wanted to do, he said, take formosa and this might have led to a different result perhaps mao would not have gotten the upper hand in china and of course that would have diverted the course of asian in World History. That is one of the fascinating whatifs but the pacific war is so large and almost any change you make and it changes the course of our own historical timeline, you might say. It is true. In europe as well and that is one of the reasons the Second World War is so unique and so important and so fascinating. It really has shaped the post world war in both asia and europe and choices made by the generals and admirals in how to prosecute the war and those of major downstream implications to the postwar world and indications that we live in today. Let me shift gears, ian. So much of your book, describe your book as an expertly written and its my breadandbutter is to read Operational History and its as good as it gets. You know what you are talking about that when you say that so it i appreciate that. Thank you. Much of what you do with i think is necessary and operations but the personalities of the u. S. Commanders are some unforgettable folks here. Let me read you a quote from the book by vice admiral talking about carrier warfare in the pacific and i would like you to comment. There are so many japanese planes on any island and we will go in and take it on the tenant and swap punches and i know i will have losses but im stronger than they are and i dont give a damn if they do bomb because i can go anywhere and no one can stop me. I go into destroy their aircraft [inaudible] how does that stand up today and your idea and in the mountain of the pacific war in 1944, 9045 . It was certainly an accurate statement about the validity of our Carrier Task Force in 1944. In the first year of the war which i covered in the pacific you have these carrier duels where you had battles between small Carrier Task Forces involving maybe three, four carriers and most and in which really it was a question of hidden room, try to attack and get your planes over your enemy suites first and hide your ships and whether if you can and if youre checking in airbase on an island where you get in with complete surprise and attack and recover your planes aboard your carriers and get the hell out of there before the landbased air counterattack. By 1944 the size of our Carrier Task Force in the pacific so this was task force 58 with the task force 38 when halsey had it were talking about 1216 aircraft carriers [inaudible] these are fleet carriers and operating in semi autonomous task groups which are operating within shouting distance of each other and they are launching a thousand, 1200 planes in a single integrated strike that is descending on the japanese airbase on some island in the pacific lets call it the marianas and they are just wiping the skies clean of the japanese defending fighters and then going in there and bombing the living daylights out of their airbase is destroying their planes on the ground so what he saying there is that the carriers had gotten powerful enough by this stage of the war that the hitandrun approach was no longer necessary. You could simply bring your Carrier Task Force into range of a major japanese airbase and essentially just destroy it and overpower it it with airpower and communally fight off any counterstrike on the american fleet. That is how carrier warfare changed in the late stages of the war spirit lets move to the admiral and for some reason one of my favorite characters because hes colorful. Hes more the Organization Man so every commander he said must be a gambler. He wanted to be one of the professional variety and he wanted all the odds i could get stacked in my favor. Little different than [inaudible] . He was a black shoe in a navy parlor which means hes a circus Naval Warfare and not an aviator and a never skippered a carrier and he was this very sort of had this style and very much, as you say, Organization Man and the guy you could see being a ceo of a Major Company today and a cool character, cerebral and very, very smart on everyones account. But really didnt believe in the kind of blood and thunder sort of style of command so he was often contrasted to halsey for that reason. Sort of ascended to the top seagoing command in the u. S. Navy by a series of accidents and accidental event thrust into the position of commanding one of the task forces at the battle of midway and was president for any net immortal battle and then had been recalled to shore duty so he and nimitz became very close professionally and personally and essentially emmett said i trust this guy to take the fleet out and make the same decisions that i would if i was commanding at sea and nimitz never commanded at sea but was in a shore bound headquarters for the entire war. He had pat said take the fleet to see. By 1944 he was getting in and the quote is we have overwhelming naval superiority but we will win this war and lets not take any unnecessary chances and that may allow the enterprising japanese to get in and score a Lucky Victory against us and lets play by the numbers and i think that was the correct approach in that late stage of the war and that certainly has been the judgment of historians who have rated it as the best wartime commanders in the pacific. You reference bowl halsey and a lot of this volume is about bowl halsey. This time of the pacific war and how would you rate him . Let me ask you that i