Volume series on the pacific during world war ii. In our the doolittle raid of 1942 that were carried out in response to japans bombing of pearl harbor. Welcome to the National World war ii museums evening presentation webinar. My neighbors Jeremy Collins and for those of you watching on zoom, some brief housekeeping remarks. You are an attendee of our zoom event tonight. That means you do not have video or audio privileges but you can interact with our moderator and guest i writing your question in the q a box. The moderator would be reviewing those during the question and answer session which will conclude tonight program. Now to introduce the moderator its my pleasure to pass this program over to dr. Rob citino. Thanks, jeremy. Dr. Rob citino here, seeing history of the National World war ii museum, beautiful new orleans, louisiana. We have a special guest with us tonight, a friend of the museum, my friend and a wonderful writer and author, ian toll. Welcome. Iq, rob. Ian toll is one of those people who doesnt need an abduction. You will know what that means. The introduction could be really long. He is a next extremely accomplished scholar and writer hes author of the epic is a fan of the u. S. Navy, as well as a trilogy called the pacific wars, the third point of which has just been released called twilight of the gods war in the western pacific, 19441945. He has won the Eliot Morrison award of them enable order of e United States. He is one the William Colby military writers award. He is one the other aldie award that was given by the u. S. As constitution museum. Im kidding you. If there are any more awards out there, i fully expect to see you winning one in the nottoodistant future. But thanks so much for bringing and spends time in talking to us about twilight of the gods. Is my pleasure and my honor. What im struck by the book, im always struck by what how an author chooses to false in the story. Its a big story, war on the western pacific, the biggest naval battle of all times. Jampacked with action and hair was in every sort but you give this book an interesting way in the realm begin this book. In the realm of politics. Its nicely done. You look especially fdr and douglas macarthur. What open the book that way . I will expand on my question. Its a bit of the risk project and a lot of people are opening up the book, they want to get to why open it with assorted survey of u. S. Political military history is an expectation theres going to be led in the air at least by the Second Chapter and in this case share to wait until the third, almost 100 pages pages into the book. It is an unconventional way to begin a work of military history. I thought was i had latitude in this case because its the third volume of the trilogy and a lot of people have read and read the first two. They are either committed to read it or not but basically my observation was looking at the pacific war, was that there was a lot of literature about fdr, a lot of that macarthur and i like say theres a pickup truck full of fdr biographies i dont think thats an exaggeration. Theres a large wheelbarrow full of macarthur biographies. These are two the most fascinating figures in 20th century American History biographers love them for obvious reasons. The story of the Pacific Command conference which took place in oahu, the island of hawaii in july 1944, the story has just been told over and over and over again because of our frequently new biographies are coming out about fdr and macarthur and, of course, thats a featured incident. In any binary of either those two because that was a dramatic meeting that took place, the first time they met in seven years. Two of the most colorful figures of that time of American History. For that reason i think this started during the war and the way the press cover this event. We attended to look at that meeting through the prism of american politics immediately before leaving on his trip it took come to hawaii, fdr had announced to nobodys surprise he was going to run for an unprecedented fourth term of office as president. And it visited the Democratic National convention on his way out to the west coast. The way the press observed essentially the way the country saw this trip to hawaii was it was a campaign stop, a publicity that. In fact, it was much more than that. It was a substantive command conference and fdr listing something which we wouldve expected any commanderinchief to do which is to visit the pacific theater. Its the only time he did it, and for the millions of men and women who were fighting under our flag in the pacific that visit told them they had not been forgotten and that was important. Why i begin with that long account of press and that visit i think it was important to try to unite what had become these two very separate strands in literature of this biographical or lyrical kind of view of this meeting between macarthur and fdr and what was a very substantive and historically important military planning conference that involved fdr, macarthur, nimitz and also admiral leahy was almost always forgotten that this was the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, a local figures was immensely important in this time of American History. Some of the greats memoirs of the pacific war in the roosevelt presidency as well. I agree. We will get to the strategic talk about the conference but before we move away from the politics, tell us about macarthur in 1944. There was a move to make him president. How badly do you want to get to the oval office in 1944 . Macarthur will do with the presidency many times throughout his career beginning in the 1920s. His name had been floated in the republican circles. As you say, 1944 he allowed his supporters in the states, these were powerful members of congress from the republican party, certain conservative media owners, and various other figures on the american right who saw macarthur as potentially their only chance to defeat fdr in a wartime election. They essentially started this Dark Horse Campaign with macarthur implicit connivance it didnt lead anywhere and reason for that is essential because the governor of new york locked up the nomination early in the primary process here yes, the question has been asked and history and biographers debated did macarthur want to run for president and would have liked to become president. I was discussed with exerting pressure on the present and the joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do in the pacific which essentially involved sending more military assets to macarthur is command, the pacific was divided, the northern half was under the control of the navy, nimitz as the to come in and in the southwest pacific to read macarthur. This pacific and the two semiautonomous theater commences very controversial and this regarded as a way of settling this rivalry between the army and the navy satisfying macarthur leaving the navy in charge of the naval war. This question of with macarthur eventually attained supreme command of the pacific which was his goal . Secondly, coody ensure our route back to tokyo went through the philippine and he would get the green light to liberate the philippines including critically the Northern Island and these were his goals and this kind of Dark Horse Campaign for president they simply a bit of weight of exerting pressure in order to fulfill those goals. , fdr . You write early on in the book that the war has changed him. Happy warrior, press conferences used to be one for the ages earlier in his presidency. He would be joshing with reporters. He knew whose birthday it was come he knew whose children having a birthday that day, making jokes back and forth. Its really not fdr by this point of the work on his . No. Of course this was the longest president in American History and often i remember at the outset of our current president initiation through story of i believe those awash in the post but about fdrs relationship with the press and about how clever he was an essentially using the sort of charm tactics he was famous for to get the press on his side. Thats an accurate depiction about fdr dealt with the press. In his first term in office. By his third term 1941, yet essentially had it with the press. He really was deeply offended i think in general at the way the press was covering politics. A number of his bitterest enemies were major media owners, and his twiceweekly press conferences were pretty cantankerous and he was actually out on the campaign trail attacking the press constantly. I thought that was an important part of the perspective and i wanted to get into the way the Different MilitaryServices Also developed their publicity policies, have the army and navy and macarthur nimitz at the different approaches. I thought that was an important way to introduce the larger dimension of what was happening in the pacific and the kinds, the environment in which military leaders had to make the decision to do their jobs during this bloody war. You mentioned again at the conference a big Strategic Decisions have to be made. The way you write it as i was reading your chapter on it, we come to a fork in the road. There was a big decision that he made and i guess you could break it down to simply can you break that down for the participant . To make a long story short, by june 1944, certainly july 1944 1944 we taken the maa islands. We taken saipan. We were about to take guam. That gave us islands that were within bombing distance of japanese industrial in tokyo with the new bomber. The Japanese Striking arm of the japanese fleet had been annihilated in the accompanying naval battle that took place during a that campaign. The japanese were finished in terms of any hopes they mightve had of winning this war. Those were gone and so the last days of the war was how do you force the japanese to capitulate . It was going to be unconditional surrender. That was our policy, i think was the right policy to say were going to occupy and disarm japan, supervised the reconstruction of the democratic japan. The japanese regime was very far away from that. The question became in the last year how do you force them to surrender . Macarthur really had the philippines as the centerpiece of his conception. Many said he wanted to liberate the philippines more even than winning the war. The navy and many of the powerful internal planners in washington saw a major role for china in the last stage of the pacific campaign. They wanted a foothold on the coast of china and the one of the first races for the b29s. It wanted the potential to drop on chinese infantry manpower in the invasion of japan if that were to take place and the distraction of japanese armies on the asian mainland. That point to it for moses. By mid1944 i think its fair to say were going to take one of those two islands first. The Northern Island of the philippines or taiwan. One of these two items. That was the decision fdr and his military cheese faced in 1944. Conduct was question of camera for suggesting system without invading their homeland. That play very much into the thinking that there were confronted at this time as well. We try to pin you down to a what if. We love what if, that we . Our listeners know, our viewers know of course luzon was the choice. How might that been different if we landed on big gigantic formosa, turn into a major base, airbase, baster b29s, may be intervened in the fighting in the mainland . Theres a civil war thats about to break out at the end of this war. I just wonder any thoughts on that . I know if we had landed in formosa it would be good that we still have troops there today. And so the nature of the conflict between today, the independent nation of taiwan and china would be that much more intense but the Major Military american presence there. That is somewhat speculative to it is a what if as you say. Enormous question for the world is had we taken formosa in 1944, would within, would that have led to a large involvement of american troops on the asian mainland and my family ledger different result in the china were . Its hard to make really persuasive arguments and another an expert on what happened in the chinese civil war. But 1949, four years after the end of the Second World War, now had taken control of china and significance of that event for World History mao that she is incalculable. Ernest king, the chief of naval operations, Senior Leader of the office of the navy during the Second World War, 1949 looking back he raised this question. If we have done what i had wanted to do, he said, take formosa and bypass luzon, this might lead to a different result, perhaps mao would not have gotten the upper hand in china and that would have diverted the course of nation and World History. Thats one of the fascinating what its. The pacific were so large almost any change you make any, changes the course of our own historical timeline you might say, dramatic changes across the board. Its true in europe as well. Its one of the reasons the Second World War is so you unie and so importance of passing, it really has shaped the post war world in both asia and europe. And took choices that were being made by the generals and admirals and how to prosecute the war. Those that make it downstream implications for the post war world. So much of your book and i would describe the book as expertly operationally written. Its my bread and butter is to read that and this is good as it gets. You know what youre talking about when you say thats i appreciate that. Thank you. Much of what you do with is Something Else i think is necessary and Operational History and its the personalities of the u. S. Commanders. This an unforgettable folks here. Let me read you if you dont mind a quote from the book by vice admiral talking about carrier warfare in the pacific and i like you do, after id read it to the audience. There are so many japanese planes on any island. We will swap punches with them. I know i will have losses but im stronger than they are. I dont give a damn if they do spot me. I can go anywhere and no one could stop me. If i go in and just sort of aircraft their damn island is no good to them anyhow. How does the standard today in your analysis of the pacific war over 194445 . It was an accurate statement of the ability of our Carrier Task Force is by 1944. In the first year of the war which i covered in pacific crucible you had these carrier duels were you edit battles between small Carrier Task Force is involving maybe three or four carriers at most in which really was a question of of hit and run, try to attack, get your planes over your enemies fleet first, hide your ships. If youre tacking and airbase on an island, you get in with complete surprise, attack, recover your planes and then get the hell out of there. Before the landbased air can counter attack. By 1944 the size of our Carrier Task Force in the pacific, so this was task force 58, there was a task force 38. You were talking about 12 to 16 aircraft carriers, later independence class carries but these are fleet carriers. Operating and semiautonomous task groups which are operating kind within shouting distance of each other. They are launching a thousand, 1200 planes in a single integrated strike that is descending on the japanese airbase on some island in the pacific, call it the marianas for example. They are just wiping the skies clean of the japanese defending fighters and their going in and bombing the living daylights out of their airbases, destroying their planes on the ground. What he is saying is the carriers had gotten powerful enough by this stage of the war that the hit and run approach was no longer necessary. You can simply bring your Carrier Task Force into range of the major japanese airbase and essentially just destroy it, overpower it and fight off any counter strike on the american fleet. Thats how carrier or change carrier air warfare change. One of my favorite character characters, hes more of the organization man. Every commander he said must be a gambler when you wanted to be one of the professional variety. He wanted his own court all the odds i could get stacked in my favor. A little bit different. He was a black shoe in navy parlance which means he was a Naval Air Force office. He never skippered the carrier. He was this come had this style, very much as you say organization man, a kind of got you could see being a ceo of a Major Company today. A cool character, cerebral, very, very smart by everybodys account. But really didnt believe in the kind of blood and thunder sort of style command and so is often contrasted with halsey for that reason. He had sort of ascended to the top seagoing commit in the u. S. Navy but really i series of accidents. He had accidentally been thrust into position of commanding one of the task force is at the battle of midway and was credited for winning that immortal battle. Then he had been recalled to shore duty at nimitz chief of staff said he amendments became very, very close professionally and personally and essentially nimitz said i trust this guy to take the fleet up and make the same decisions that i would come if i come nimitz, what if i recommend at sea. Nimitz never commanded at sea during the Second World War. He was sure about headquarters for entire war. He tapped him as a sky to take the fleet to see. By 1944 we have overwhelmingly superiority. We are going to win this war. Thats not take any unnecessary chances that may allow the enterprising japanese to get in and score a Lucky Victory against us. Lets play by the numbers and the think that was the correct approach to take by the late stage of the war, and that has generally been