For those watching on zoom some housekeeping remarks. You are an attendee of our zoom event tonight, that means you do not have video or audio privileges but you can interact with our moderator and guest by writing your question in the q and a box. The moderator will be reviewing those during the question and answer session which will conclude tonights program and to introduce the moderator it is my pleasure to pass the program over to doctor robert citino. Doctor robert citino, Senior Historian at the National WorldWar Ii Museum in louisiana, we have a special guest with us tonight. A friend of the museum. My friend and a wonderful writer and author, ian toll, one of those people who doesnt need an introduction as we like to say. The introduction, he is extremely accomplished scholar and writer. He is the author of the epic story of the founding of the u. S. Navy as well as a trilogy called the pacic war, the third volume of which has just been released called twilight twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945. He won the Elliott Morrison awarfrom the naval order of the United States, he won the William Colby military writers award. He won the other award given by the uss constitution museum. If there are any more awards out there i expect to see you winninone. Thanks so much for agreeing to spend time with us and talking about twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945. My pleasure and honor. Im always struck, it is a big story, more on the western pacific 4445, with action, valor, heroism of have resource but in the realm of politics, nicely done. Especially fdr and douglas macarthur. Why wasnt the book that way . I will expand on the question. You have to know people opening up, why open with a survey of the us political scene . Military history, an expectation that there will be lead in the air in the Second Chapter and you have to wait until the third almost 100 pages into the book and it is an unconventional way to begin a military history. I thought i had a little bit of latitude in this case, the preferred volume of the trilogy, a lot of people reading it read the first two, committed to read it or not but basically my observation looking at the pacific war was that there was a lot of literature about fdr, a lot about macarthur. I like to say there was a pickup truck, i dont think that is an exaggeration. There is a large wheelbarrow of macarthur biographies and these are two of the most fascinating figures in 20thcentury American History. Love them for obvious reasons so the story of the Pacific Command conference which took place in oahu in hawaii through july of 1944 that story has been told over and over again because how frequently new biographies coming out of fdr and macarthur and that is a feature incidents in any biography of either of those two because of the dramatic meeting that took place, two of the most colorful figures of that period of American History. For that reason, the started during the war with the way the press covered this event we tended to look at the meeting through the prism of american politics before leaving on history that took him to hawaii, fdr announced to nobodys surprise that he was going to and unprecedented fourth term of office as president and the Democratic National convention on his way to the west coast so the way the press observed or the country saw this trip was it was a campaign stop. A publicity event and it was much more than that. It was a substantive command conference at fdr did something we would expect any commander in chief to do which is to visit the pacific theater, the only time he did it and millions of men and women fighting under a flag in the pacific that visit told them they had not been forgotten and that was important. Beginning with that long town, that visit, it was important to try to unite what had become these two separate strands of this biographical political view of this meeting between macarthur and fdr and what was a very substantive and historically important military planning conference that involved fdr, macarthur, nimitz and admiral leahy who is almost always forgotten but is chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, local figure who was immensely important in this period of American History. The greatest number of the pacific war and roosevelt memory. Get to the strategic talks. Before we move away from the politics, tell us about macarthur, there was a move to make them president. How badly did he wants to get to the oval office in 1944 . Macarthur flirted with the presidency many times beginning in 1920s, his name had been floated and as you say in 1944 he allowed supporters in the states, powerful members of congress in the republican party, media owners and various other figures on the american right who saw macarthur as their only chance to defeat fdr in a wartime election so they started this Dark Horse Campaign with macarthurs implicit the reason is essentially the governor of new york locked up the nomination early in the primary process but yes, the question has been asked and they have debated did macarthur want to run for president and would he have liked to become president or was this a way of exerting pressure on the president and joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do in the pacific which involved sending more military assets to macarthurs command, the pacific was divided, the northern half, with control of the navy, chester nimitz was the Theater Commander, and semiautonomous Theater Commands was very controversial, regarded as a way of settling this rivalry between the army and navy satisfying macarthur, leaving the navy in charge of the naval war and so the question of macarthur gaining supreme command of the pacific which was his goal and could he ensure our route back to tokyo went through the philippines and he would get the green right to liberate the northern ireland, these were his goals and this kind of Dark Horse Campaign forresident may have been a way of exerng pressure to fulfill those. You wrote that the war changed him. A happy warrior type. Early in his presidency he would be joshing with reporters, he knew his birthday was, children grabbing a birthday that day, by this point of the war fdr, this was the longest presidency in American History and i remember at the outset of the current president s administration, in the washington post, it was about fdrs relationship with the press, how clever he was at using the charm tactic he was famous for to get the press on his side. That is an accurate depiction of how fdr dealt with the press in his first term in office. By his third term, 1941, he had essentially had it with the press. He was deeply offended in general at the way the press was covering politics. A number of his bitterest enemies were major media owners, and his twiceweekly press conferences were pretty cantankerous and he was on the campaign trail, attacking the press constantly so i thought that was an important perspective and i wanted to get into the way Different Military services developed policies, how the army and navy and different approaches to this and i thought that was an important way to introduce a larger dimension of what was happening in the pacific and the kinds of environment in which military leaders had to make the decisions and do their jobs during this bloodied war. Host you mentioned the conference, big Strategic Decisions had to be made. The way you write, as i was reading your chapter on it, we came to a fork in the road. A big decision had to be made it you could break it down, luzon versus poor mose a. Break it down for our participants. To make a long story short by june of 1944, july 1944 we had taken the mariana islands, we were about to take one, islands that were within bombing distance of japanese industrial heartland in tokyo, the Japanese Striking arm of the japanese fleet had been annihilated, naval battle took place in that campaign so essentially the japanese were finished in terms of any hopes they had of winning this war. Those were gone. This last stage of the war, how do you force the japanese to capitulate . It was going to be Unconditional Surrender. It was the right policy to say we occupy and disarm japan, supervise the reconstruction of democratic japan and the japanese regime was very far away from that. How do you force them to surrender . Macarthur really had the philippines as the centerpiece of his conception. Many said he wanted to philip liberate the philippines, winning the war and the navy in many powerful internal planners for chief of Staff Organization in washington saw a major role for china at this last stage of the campaign and wanted a foothold on the coast of china, they also wanted potential to draw upon chinese infantry manpower, the invasion of japan if it were to take place, the district and japanese armies and so that pointed to formosa. By mid1944 it is fair to say we were going to take one of those two islands first either northern ireland, the philippines, the capital city or formosa or taiwan, one of these two islands and that was the immediate decision fdr and his military chiefs faced in mid1944. Beyond that was the question can we force the japanese to surrender without invading their homeland and that played very much into what they were confronting at this time as well. Let me pin you down to a what if. I think our listeners or our viewers know luzon was the choice. How might the pacific war and asiapacific war been different if we had landed a big titanic force, turned it into a major air base for b29s, maybe intervened in the fighting in the mainland, the civil war breaking out at the end of this war. I know it is a big. If we had landed at formosa we would still have troops there today. The nature of the conflict would be that much more intense, a major American Military presence there. It is somewhat speculative, really interesting, question for the world is had we taken formosa in 1944 with the then have led to a larger involvement of american troops on the asian mainland and might that have led to a different result in the chinese civil war . It is speculative, hard to make persuasive arguments but im not an expert of what happened in the chinese civil war but 1949 four years after the Second World War, taking control of china and the significance of that event for World History including today is incalculable. Ernest king, the chief of naval operations, in 1949 looking back he raised the question, if we had done what i wanted to do, this might have led to a different results. That would have divergent World History. A fascinating what if. It changes the course of our historical timeline, dramatic changes across the board. One reason the Second World War is so unique and important and fascinating it really has shaped in asia and europe, choices that were being made by generals and admirals in how to prosecute thear had major downstream implications we are still living with today. Let me shift years on you a little bit. I would describe your book as an expert, my bread and butter is to read Operational History and as good as it gets. You know what you are talking about, appreciate that. Much of what you deal with is something i think is necessary and the personalities of the us commander, there are unforgettable folks. Let me read you a quote from the book by feiss admiral, to our audience. There are so many japanese planes on any island, we will swap punches with them. I know about losses but i am stronger than they are. If they do spot me i can go anywhere and no one can stop me. If i destroy all your craft on their island they are no good to them anyhow. What does that stand up today in your analysis of the pacific war 19441945 . It was accurate statement of the capabilitof our Carrier Task Forces. The first year of the war i covered pacific crucible we see carrier duels where you had battles between small carrier sk forces involving 3 or 4 carriers at most, not merely a qution of hit and run is getting your planes over your enemies first, hide your ships anweather fronts if you can. If you are attackingn air base on an isld and a complete surprise, you recover your plane or your carriers and then g the hell out of there before the landbased air can counterattack. By 1944 the size of our Carrier Task Force in the pacic, task force 58 when hollhad it, you are talking about 1216 aircraft criers, later independence class carriers, these are fleet carriers operating in semi autonomous task groups operating in shoung distance of each other. They are launching 10001200 planes in a single integrated strike that is desnding on the japanese airbase in some islands in the pacific a they are just wiping us guys clean of the japanese fighte and bombing the living daylights out of their airbases deroying planes on the ground they are saying the carriers had gotten powerful ough at thistage that the hit and run approach was no long necessary, just bring your rrier task force in range of a major japanese airbase and just destroy it, overpower it with airpower and confidently fight off any counterstrike on the American Fleet and that is how carrier warfare changed in the late stages of the war. One of my favorite characters admiral spruill, he is not so colorful, wearable organization man. The commander must be a gamble, one of the professional varieties. He wanted his own i could get snapped in my favor. He was a black shoe in navy parlance meaning he was unable warfare officer, not an aviator, he had never skippered a carrier and had this phlegmatic style, very much an organization man, you could see a Major Company today, a cool character, cerebral, very smart by everybodys account but didnt believe in the blood and thunder style command so he is often contrasted with bill halsey for that reason and he had ascended to the top seagoing command in the navy by a series of accidents. He was accidentally thrust in the position of Commanding Task forces at the battle of midway and credited for winning that battle and shore duty to nimitzs chief of staff, they became very close professionally and personally and nimitz said i trust this guy to make the same decisions if i was commanding at sea and nimitz never commanded at sea during the civil war, just for bound headquarters for the entire war. So his guide to take the fleet to see. By 1944, we have overwhelmingly superiority, we are going to win this war. Lets not take unnecessary chances that may allow the japanese to score a Lucky Victory against us. Lets play by the numbers and that was the correct approach. That has generally been the judgment of historians, in the pacific. You reference to bill halsey, a lot of this is about bill hsey, all over the action in the period othe pacific war. First, his abilitiess operational commander, the question asked itself, not one but two, a black mark on the first. In the pacific war. The typhoons have often been mentioned. A number of influential bordinates, junior admirals served under them were harshly critical of major decisions was at the battle of lte gulf he made one of the most interesting miss infamous commander errors in naval history which could have led to disaster, e japanese commander retreated at a critical moment. The lists of indictments against bill halsey in terms of his magement of the fleet in the last year is pretty long and pretty damning. Looking at halsey he was the senior Carrier Task Force commander when the japanese hit pearl harb in 1941, the caiers at sea, that was fortunate ando halsey was the carrr admiral, the commander at sea who had what s left of the navy striking capability in the first month of thewar, a period in which our forces have not been ready r war, to get up to speed and learn to fight by fighting and halsey was the ader in critical early months of the war. He gets a lot of cdit for that. The style i mentioned earlier was halseys style, he had a foot forward approach to talking to the forces under his command through the media, because hes tking through the mea hes talking to the american people, becomesery famous in the face of the u. S. Navy during the war, often compared tgeneral patton in europe and it is an apt comparison. The middle years of the war, the South PacificTheater Commander, surbound in headquarters in necaledonia, losing touch with the daytoday job of running the fleet and whenes brought back to take over the fleet in 44 it is a totally different animal. He hasnt kept up. He insists on bringing his loyal Staff Officers who we sure bound pacific headquarters for two years with him and they werent up to speed. You had a Large Organization coming in to take over the fiftfleet which became the third fleet when holly had it and they werent ready to do that, so it was a mistake you can attribute up thchain of command to admiral king and admiral limits and that was not a good choice to bring halsey back and put him into that role in 1944. You write about one of the most complex military actions in Human History and i read it all, the battle of leyte gulf, it requires a deaf dodge to make up an account the reader can follow, it is a naval bonsai charge among the japanese, what are the japanese chances of winning the battle of leyte gulf . By that time the japanese were desperate, they were losing the war on all fronts and realized their problem was if the americans took the philippines they would be cut off from their fuel supply so the japanese to back up launched the war in the first place, the most productive oilfields in asia, indonesia, east indies, they wanted those