Its wonderful to have you here. My name is roger zakheim. Im the director of the Reagan Institute, the d. C. Office of the Ronald Reagan president ial foundation and institute. And hope you all have been enjoying this reception in honor of our very own director of scholarly initiatives, dr. Anthony eames, and this Exciting Book launch. I want to extend a special welcome to kelly for his there our kelly. I anthony anthonys wife and i havent experienced the completion of writing a book, but i imagine that labor wasnt only anthony so grateful to you and regret that the other member of the reagan team, owen, is not here this evening, but i know bedtime for him was probably about 10 minutes ago, so but so great to have you here and tell no one will have to come for the next book launch which gonna be within a year no doubt, right . Yeah. I also want to welcome our esteemed guests and distinguished reagan scholar, dr. Henry. Now, wheres henry . There. He is. Right. And you know, we are here at the Reagan Institute working on reagans scholarship, in large part due to henry now, not only is he a leader on this front for his years in the academy and his great work, so in many respects, were all students of henry, but also for this program of henry kind of hatches plan in his office at george wash. University and allowed me to be a person to to help realize it. So henry its great to have you here this evening. So were here tonight recognizing dr. Eames for the launch on his first book, a voice in their own destiny, reagan, thatcher and Public Diplomacy in the nuclear 1980s. Up here, youll have the opportunity to get one in just a little bit. And its especially significant in here at the Reagan Institute because it marks a milestone of our reagan postdoctoral visiting fellows program, which funds for those of you who dont know, a one year fellowship for scholars who study the reagan era, they come here for a year to revise their dissertation into a book length manuscript, and most importantly, get it published and i want to acknowledge here tonight our third class of fellows here in the audience will chew and nathan gibson. Well, all right, nathan, say there we are. No pressure, guys. But really, anthony is the model. He set the bar and no surprise to anybody that were here celebrating this accomplishment. His credentials are first rate holds a ph. D. In history from Georgetown University and may jointly conferred from Kings College london and Georgetown University has published widely and really a credit to to the Reagan Institute. Now, on may 1st, 2020, to go back in time a little bit and embarrass anthony, the most exciting part of the intro here we offered anthony a slot to be a member of our first class, our inaugural class of visiting fellows, anthony accepted that offer and said hes excited to convert his his ph. D. Into a book. But he did so in less than 3 hours after receiving the offer. And i have evidence of it here. If anybody would like to see which made us all feel great for our inaugural class. But i want to point out tonight that his excitement, his enthusiasm, his energy about the work we do here is not waned in the three years since sending us that email. And hes, of course, stayed on this team, completed his visiting fellowship and leads our scholarly initiatives program. And so its worthy of a great celebration tonight, which means that i get to grill you on stage and talk about this book. Thats our form of celebration. So please join me in welcoming dr. Anthony and Anthony Eames to the stage for our discussion on a voice and their own destiny. Well also get with you and at usc. All right, anything you want to say, your defense after that introduction now i think ill have about 45 minutes to do so. Okay, good. Well, lets start with this. Im a child of the eighties, but i probably would have written on nukes, you know, maybe a connection between michael jordan. Ronald reagan would reflect my childhood. But explain to us what brought you to this subject in this book. Well, i wish there was an aha moment. You know, maybe like i ran into Margaret Thatcher on the street or, you know, discover the day after when i was, you know, nine years old. But it was kind of iterative, which is the, you know, kind of a boring answer. But it started when i was at Kings College london. Um, i had the misguided goal of becoming a 19th century polish historian who doesnt speak polish. So that was soon to be realized that that can be a reality, but, you know, its these little things. You go to the imperial war museum, you force your wife to watch war games on youtube. That start to make the book come into focus. You have a course with a particularly great professor, one of whom is here today, toshi fukushima. This book wouldnt be anywhere close to done or hopefully near as good without his guidance. Um, theres a little, those little moments make a difference and then i will make one pitch for the importance of digital archives. Thatchers archives being digitized. And that was such an important thing to get me researching in that direction, something that id like to do with the Reagan Library. Okay, there we go. So weve just had an internal staff meeting. Uh, were looking to make an amendment to the reagan budget. Apparently, well deal with that later. One of the kind of really goes to the title here, you call it the nuclear 1980s, early on in the book, you say that nuclear arms ayade motivated westerners to become politically active. The flashpoints of the nuclear nineties were critical in stimulating a revolution on how the diplomacy related to the public sphere. All right, explain the rationale why you refer to the idea that the nuclear 1980 is distinct from any other period from when Nuclear Weapons were were used or, you know, the cuban missile crisis. Why the 1980s and this kind of title. Sure. Well, you know, the difference between the nuclear 1980s and say maybe the acute anxiety of the cuban missile crisis and anxiety of the cuban missile crisis less for, well, 13 days, anxiety of the nuclear 1980s last for almost the entire decade. And then in good historian fashion, i start the decade, a year before the decade actually begins in 1979 with the meltdown at three mile island. The dual track decision undertaken by natos allies to deploy what we know is intermediate range Nuclear Forces and in europe and simultaneously negotiate with the soviets an arms control that, you know, kind of a high stakes game of cold war geopolitics plays out, you know, in the closed doors behind washington in washington, d. C. , and in the kremlin on issues like the strategic defense initiative, on amex peacekeeper, missiles, whatnot. But theres also a cultural component to it, right. When the day after made for tv movie and abc premieres. In 1980, 300 Million People watch it. Most watched Television Movie in history at that time. And im sure most networks, tv stations would kill 100 Million Viewers to. When protesters stormed new york in 1982. In june 1982, its over a Million People in central part of central park doesnt really hold a Million People. But throughout the city, thats the biggest protest in the history of the United States. At that time. It still maybe depends on protest over the iraq war. So this really becomes a cultural moment. Heres another one. How many people have read dr. Seuss or read their kids . Dr. Seuss . Last night. Last night, was it the butterball. Book . No, it was not. Butter by book. 1984, right where the wind blows or when the wind blows. So so these moments are really kind of, uh, a cultural phenomenon in a way that that wasnt quite the case earlier in the cold war. And to no surprise, reagan himself is a both a creator of pop culture and kind of a broader symbol of the age. So. The decade is really wrapped around Nuclear Issues in a way that hadnt really been the case. Well, we have some great people in the room who are involved in that diplomacy and were seized by the nuclear angst that youre youre highlighting. Take us through kind of how reagan was part of it, a driver of this. I mean, you look at the book, right . So he was talking about this sort of thing, as you know, prior to becoming president these days. I mean, this is remarkably consistent in terms of his approach to the cold war. We when they lose that, were not going to do arms control, where if we do anything, were going to do arms reduction. But were also going to build up to force that again, this is the sort of thing that you outline and others. But we kind of when it comes to president , it really now some in the public and as well get to our allies have to contend with. So take a moment and explain how in many respects reagan was the trigger of all of this. And then, of course, 1982, 93. Right. So its a couple of years into his presidency and now this is those in many respects responding to his approach to the cold war. Good. That right . Correct me and then expand on if thats right. So first thing i want to say, because weve read a lot of books about reagan being a Nuclear Abolitionist and i think we need to get the order of operations right first. The first thing reagan cared about was the secure launching air gave him an element right now to make sure that your order of operation. Thats true, you know, get nodding or disagreement. We may have to bring on the state. And dont forget, spend christmas. There we go. Okay. All right. First and foremost, he was about the security of the American People, then the abolition of Nuclear Weapons. If you go back to the 1970s, he has a fairly popular radio show that in least know youve listened to and a couple of people in the room have listened to what hes really advocating is for a return to nuclear or strategic superiority, citing directly lee the eisenhower years siting directly paul nixons nsc 68, which is really when we take the policy of containment at a Nuclear Dimension to it. So reagans talking about this all throughout the 1970s, and when he gets into office, this is the way hes going to go. He doesnt actually mention nuclear abolitionism until 1982, and its only at that time where i believe you realize is that those two things can go hand in hand. Talk about the different camps there, because you know, their personalities that really like the way reagan approached nuclear superiority, they signed on for that. But in terms of arms control or even arms reduction, they were not looking to embrace that approach. You can start with Caspar Weinberger and on down and and people from the committee on present danger. You know they they were skeptical at best of that approach. You do a really nice job in the book of highlighting, you know, the kind of the nuance there and differences within the reagan team. Yeah, those camps have been growing really since the what we know as the strategic arms limitation talks had gotten under way earlier in the seventies under the nixon administration. But they really begin to differentiate themselves in pretty stark ways in the reagan administration. What do we see . We see and this is going to be somewhat of a simplistic breakdown. But what do we see . We see people like richard perle, fanatical Caspar Weinberger, who really dont necessarily see the benefit of arms control for restoring american strategic superiority. They see that as a potential to limit a pathway to restoring american strategic spirit, because they see it through the lens of, well, basically sold and sold, you know . Yeah. I mean, the you can say what you want about salt. It certainly wasnt as good of agreement as in a four star agreement that actually administration was able to either negotiate or set up perfectly for kind of george h. W. Bush to carry over the finish line, then you have whats called the state department side. And i know that any number of folks in this room and in our broader conversations with our scholarly initiatives here, these battles of the state department and the pentagon continue to echo today. Were a little more friendly towards arms control or optimistic about what it can do to restore strategic superiority of the United States. This idea that Nuclear Parity is the way to go, theres often a public line that you hear something that dates back to the seventies when nixon and kissinger were talking about nuclear sufficiency as a way to assuage public concerns. I wouldnt buy that. I, i dont think it should come as a surprise. A president who is as hard line and is you. You know, im fully committed to American Security would settle for sufficiency sufficiency. Different s what he liked. I believe its supremacy so we remember we win. They lose. Yeah and so you know, the state department, though, says theres actually a way we can use arms control to our advantage. We can get the better side of this deal and reagan, you know, kind of i dont want to say plays one off the other. Right. Really does take a kind of i dont relaxed managerial approach to letting those to kind of duke it out. But he is a man of his own mind, which is something that, you know, in the literature, if you will, theres a debate is reagan a man of his own mind or is he a man of his advisors . Well, well get back to that. Dont know, dont you worry. But in some ways, unpacking the subtitle of the book here. Right. You have you got Reagan Thatcher in Public Diplomacy the nuclear in 1980s weve talked about nuclear 1980s weve just discussed reagan. Well get to thatcher in a moment. But you ascribe significant importance to Public Diplomacy in this book. And it really interesting to me, we Work Together every day and, you know, we havent really talked much about the book. Ironically, that reagan was communicators. You mentioned the radio with a radio address from the seventies all the time about the stuff he was he was, you know, continue, you know, kind of carrying out the great communicator, right . Even out of office. And what would happen when he when he entered office. But you call it Public Diplomacy once he enters office and and really, its quite great value to that. So was talk about the importance of Public Diplomacy how it kind of plays in here in your book the argument you make and then was reagan kind of a natural for this, given what hed been doing, you know, in the in the decades prior . One of the things i wanted to focus on when i was thinking about, you know, theres a lot of people who write on the end of the cold war. How does the end of the cold war come to be . And a lot of the focus is on kinetics, actual military hardware or Nuclear Weapons. These Different Things that are traditionally focused on when youre talking about the end of a war. But the cold war ended without a shot, fired. It ended surprisingly peacefully, unlike, you know, World War Two or vietnam or whatnot. And so the question is what actually moved people to accept that that there was the end of the cold war . Because its not just when president United States and the premier of the soviet union say, guess what, its over. The people on the streets actually have to accept that its over. And so Public Diplomacy became the way i started to look at that question is it over . We talk about reagan is the great communicator. Well, of course, there has to be an apparatus behind that communication. You know, you cant just walk out of the white house and expect your words to be carried all over the place. Oh, maybe it can, but theres an actual apparatus. In the 1970s. What we know is the us, iaea, the us information agency, its budget had been pretty minimal, especially compared to pentagon budgets. There had been a bunch of reform efforts. The name was change the us Information Communication Agency and what we saw is that the white house was diskin acted from usaid field offices. It was the idea is we should cultivate a favorable impression of america over the long term, but we shouldnt really give too much thought to the immediate Foreign Policy goals of the United States. Reagan comes to the office and he says, wait, those two things arent mutually exclusive. Maybe we should start thinking about the immediate Foreign Policy goals of the United States, one of which is how do we end this cold war on terms that are favorable to the United States . So what does he do . Well, he brings in his friend, charlie wick to head up the u. S. Yeah. Tell us about charlie. Charlies colorful character here. Really colorful character. So charlie wick is a big band leader. Winston churchills literary agent, wellknown figure in hollywood, la, the government bureaucrat, very good friends with Ronald Reagan. Their family spent christmases together. Reagans oldest son lived with him for a year when when he went to the governors mansion, really colorful character, id say the career bureaucrats in your cia werent necessarily a fan of charlie wick early on that started to change when he doubled their budgets. That started to change when u. S. Actually had some sway in the administration. Because heres the thing. When the president s best frien