Support ukraine and how nato could define a path to membership, hosted by the atlanta counsel, this is about an hour. Good morning. I am greg myre, National Security correspondent with npr and it is my pleasure to welcome you to the special event in washington, the councils Eurasia Center is launching a new memo to the president with some Ambitious Goals involving ukraine. The memo assigned by 40 National Security figures and lays out two specific points, one, how to help ukraine win the war against russia and how to help bring ukraine into in nato. The Atlantic Council has assembled an allstar panel here whose members need only the briefest introductions. To my left is debra kagan, Senior Advisor to the senior counsels Eurasia Center and to her left, ambassador john hurts john herbst, former ambassador to ukraine. We have two panels that will join us virtually, one of them is ambassador Alexander Vershbow, former ambassador to russia and former deputy secretarygeneral to nato and i believe our fourth panelist has been delayed but we hope you will join us soon, he is retired army general wesley clark, former supreme allied commander europe. Now i will turn it over to these distinguished individuals to present a memo to the president. Thank you very much. This paper is a result of concerns the group of 42 who signed on to this paper have the we face an existential challenge or Great Security challenge from Vladimir Putins russia. Is worn ukraine as part of a much broader effort to restore control across postsoviet space and if hes not defeated in ukraine we will face a major security challenge, direct threat to our interests in europe, possible provocation into war, the baltic states, poland, romania and a group of people, we did three roundtables, we sent many hundreds of emails to come up with the paper which we think represents american interests and calls for strong policy by the administration, to supply all the weapons ukraine needs, advanced weapons and adequate numbers on time so they can in fact defeat the russians ukraine so we dont have to worry about the russians in ukraine, and to ensure security in europe, stability in europe for generations to come, to bring ukraine into nato. The Biden Administration has done an admirable job providing substantial assistance to ukraine, military and economic, while our allies and partners to provide assistance to ukraine, to isolate Vladimir Putin, but theyve not been enough to ensure ukraine victory. This paper is a way to point out how to get that and secure american interests in the most economical way possible. Debra kagan . I want to talk about the military state of play. It has been a torturous long road here beginning with the latest iteration of this war, getting ukraine that he quit it needs to win as opposed to hold space that it already has an to take and hold new space. A lot of this is fear of escalation. Thats listening over time, because as we have seen every time the russians threaten to do something it really doesnt happen. Theres been a lot of damage done to the russians, those issues have not happened, but there still is this huge hesitation to give ukraine weapons that have long range ground launch fighters that can reach places in crimea to suppress russian air defense, russian command and control, and this reluctance to do that and very slow, torturous move to give them heavy armor which finally happened and to give them what they really need in terms of controlling any airspace. We know from many wars that if you control the air and the sea lanes, you win. Its not a difficult equation. It has been this way throughout history. The problems that still exist here, i was reluctant to give ukraine and attack 300 km, this is not just about one happen but contending weapons working together because of fear about striking russia. I wanted to act out two quick things here, one, there have been rules of engagement by number of countries who supply ukraine with arms and equipment, ukraine has never violated those rules of engagement, they never violated those caveats on how to use those systems and i want to correct a misnomer too. Some people think every country has the same rules of engagement on whether ukraine can use those against russia proper, not every country has those same caveats, only a handful do. Thats an important point. The second point, i have to give an iraqi analogy. Weve given a rack f16s, all the stuff we gave them. My question is do we trust your act to adhere to rules of engagement more than do we do ukraine . This is a really important point we have to look at and there is a no evidence that these have ever been violated so i would just say at the top of this but given what they need to win, not just dally, give them what they need to suppress the air defense, give them what they need to fight back against 40 of territory that has been land mind, the russians have a nasty habit when ukraine does Forward Operations and get rid of these landmines, russia puts new mines behind them. Thats really important. This is not a humanitarian war in the least and people need to understand that. One last word about cluster munitions, the screaming and yelling about cluster munitions come from human rights organizations that have said nothing about the massive casualties among women, children, and civilians in ukraine but somehow they are worried about cluster munitions which are mostly to take out landmines and to go after Russian Troops. I would really like to get some understanding of that, if and when the administration decides to give them the multiple rocket launch systems for the attack, only one hundred 50 kilometers, its the same thing, you are not talking about killing civilians with these but taking out enemy combatants and taking out the massive amount of landmines that russia has put in the way to kill as many people as possible. Lets go to Alexander Vershbow. Thanks very much. Good to be with you even virtually. I missed some of debra kagan ups presentation but i think she know what she has. Let me move to the second recommendation in our to set ukraine on a path to nato membership. We are united in the view the most effective deterrent against any future russian aggression is to bring ukraine into nato. That would complete the integration of europe that was so rudely interrupted by mr. Putin this invasion. This past summer, set ukraine on a path but didnt go far enough. Said the right words, ukraines future will be in nato, simplified the process of ukrainian annexation by dropping the requirements for membership action plan but it was a missed opportunity in our view to move beyond the famous 2008 bucharest summit decision which declared without explaining how that ukraine will become a nato member one day. Nato 75th anniversary is an appropriate occasion to take more historic and concrete steps that define ukraines path and start the nato wheels turning, at least to begin a process that leads to it. We dont pretend this is a simple decision for nato. Nato brought a divided germany in 1955, soviet troops were still on german territory, this would be the first time the alliance would seek to bring in a country engaged in active combat with a hostile neighbor. Any movement or ukrainian membership would have to take that into account and also be compatible with current us and allied policies not to become combatants in the current war. If ukraine were headed toward victory, with the fighting during a end we could follow the nato enlargement script that was used most recently with finland and sweden, an invitation to nato membership followed by accession talks, signature of accession protocol and ratification. I dont think we will be there in time for the Washington Summit next july and we need to be prepared for different more ambiguous scenarios. Some of our allies suggested we simply state that ukrainian accession will not be possible until the war is over. That would be a simple solution but it would give russia the incentive to drag out the war for years and it would be tantamount to giving moscow a permanent veto on ukraine and nato decisionmaking. Our approach in a sense lips the script that i just described to you. We would invite ukraine to begin accession talks at the Washington Summit believe an invitation to actual membership for a later separate decision. The United States and nato would show they were serious by starting the work to prepare ukraine for membership but taking positions on the ground. So the timing for ukraines actual accession would be left open giving allies in ukraine time to work out solutions to problems related to bringing in members still engaged in a war with russia for example in a scenario in which russia still occupied some parts of ukrainian territory, might proceed with accession but apply only to territory fully under ukrainian controller might agree to provide additional offensives and defensive capabilities so that we could prevent russia from reattacking liberated ukrainian territory. The aim would be to ensure the credit ability of the article 5 guarantee at the time of accession and over the longerterm, that means we would continue with the military assistance to ukraine which will provide the interim security guarantee so nato memory should becomes possible. Thats a short summary of where we come down. We think this approach could unite allies more proactive allies and provide a concrete symbol to ukraine, they are to place in nato, their ultimate destination, would be part of our transatlantic community. Thank you very much for that presentation. What we are going to do now is have a conversation for a little while and if you want to contribute questions, in the us or in europe, you can go to ask ac. Org and submit your questions and we will get to that in the last 20 minutes or so our presentation. I will direct these questions to individuals but everybody should feel free to jump in. There are a lot of strong opinions here. A very ambitious memo, helping ukraine win the war and helping ukraine find a path into nato. Ukraine defined victories forcing all Russian Troops off the soil. Is that your definition . Is there any other realistic definition . That s how ukraine currently defines victory. Im not sure how they will always define victory. I think there is a lesser possibility which could also be considered a victory, this would be for ukrainians just decided us officials to decide. Ukraine that emerges within territorially secure borders, economically viable borders, has full run of the black cd, has substantial Armed Forces Armed by the west, and as a member of nato, ukraine that can be secure and prosper and that would be a clear defeat for putin who wants to establish political control all over the country. It is not for me to determine this outcome but i could see that being a plausible one that ukrainians could accept if that is how things develop. That does not mean, however, that that has to be the outcome and i would add that even in a lesser possibility, ukraine must have certain control and, note the word certain, over crimea so that crimea can never again be a space in which moscow can launch military operations. I was in ukraine last november when the city of kherson was liberated by the ukrainians. The front line hasnt moved much since then. Theres no one single weapon the to magic bullet, there has to be a compendium of weapons but it sounds like you are talking about dramatically expanded levels of support, is that realistic . What countries are capable and willing to do that right now . Putins dream that support ukraine will fall by the wayside is putins fantasy and it is not accurate, many of our allies some of whom are here today understand the support ensures their own security, not just ukraine up security so thats not going away, the second thing i would say, a couple things about that, we tend to look at most people in the west, tend to look at war the way they fought their very last war, this is not 22 years of counterinsurgency, this is more like korea which was the last time the us actually went to war without air superiority which they never did again after that and it is not like the last war the Armchair Generals are talking about, its a different kind of war. Second thing as mentioned before is 40 , approximately 40 of the territory russia has occupied has been land mind. No other place on earth has ever had this many landmines or these sophisticated landmines, just hasnt happened. Third thing, it is not just longrange fighters from air launched or ground launched about when an army moves with its armor because theres been, im sure you were leading to this question about the attacks on some of the tanks and heavy armor, you need short range air defense. We talk about air defense of cities and soft targets and the like but theres also a necessity for the sweet spot between, 4, 6, 16 kilometers that you put on the back of a truck that moves with that armor so that the russian attack helicopters, missiles, aircraft, cannot effectively take out that armor, so thats another point and then the mining equipment. I dont know that theres enough the mining equal and on the face of the planet right now to make a dent in this which is why the cost of munitions are so important because they can take out a big chunk of those minds so those are things to hit against, the type of Movement People expected to see and the last piece, not one, but if you have something other than the 27 in the mig 29, if you start getting the block 16 fourthgeneration aircraft, the f16s in there, we are not talking about dogfighting. The russians use their air force as a support for their army. An army platform. They dont dogfight. Everyone talking about that, its a misnomer. We are talking about being able to have the type of weapons you can shoot from a distance and take these out, you dont necessarily need over the horizon line of sight. There are sound reasons why the regaining of territory is slow. To introduce very briefly, youve seen that as ukrainians advance on the ground, their forces have come under helicopter fire, the fight against those helicopters is very critical but do you see any significant changes on the horizon, beyond what has artie been given and replacement ammunition, but as the war revolves and ukraine needs Different Things you see that coming . Or hitting a wall . I dont think we are hitting a wall. Defense ministers are meeting this week, the Ukrainian Contact Group tomorrow and defense ministers in brussels and i think what we are seeing in europe is really remarkable. I would argue that theres more burden sharing now among allies than there has ever been in the last 40 years and theres recognition of beeping up their own Defense Ministry and not to be insulting to ours but we have so many rules and regulations and our hot hands are tied, and in germany and sweden and the uk, france and others who are moving at light speed for new equipment, better equipment and supplying it to ukraine so i would argue they see this as critical to their own security as well and they are not extending blood and treasure and thats a worthwhile investment for them to make. Alexander vershbow, this is a radically different approach trying to bring in a new nato member that is at war. Its against the approach that has been taken ever since natos founding. Could you explain the difference between a membership action plan which is the traditional way a country gets into nato versus what you are talking about as a membership accession talk and walk us through a couple steps where you think there could be genuine progress even if the war continues. Our proposal is ambitious and complicated as well. In terms of the distinction about regarding the membership action versus what we call membership accession talks, the terminology could be changed as well but never ship action plan was a program launched 20 years ago to prepare any country interested in joining nato for the kinds of reforms, political and Economic Reforms we would need to undertake to become a serious candidate that might receive an invitation. Its a more longterm process over many years. One case macedonia was in the map ship action plan for 20 years. But it has worked very effectively to bring countries more in line with nato standards, to limit the kinds of reforms they need to be in the European Union in terms of rule of law, civil society, civilian control of the military and things like that. What we are proposing is a slight rearranging of the sequence of how prepared candidates are brought into the alliance and we saw this most recently with finland and sweden. They received an invitation to join the alliance, triggered several weeks of accession talks on these dimensions of responsibilities they would need to uphold as members of the alliance. We would flip the script slightly in order to deal with the greater challenge of bringing a country that is at war with russia. We would invite them to begin accession talks and start the practical work of membership, making a separate political decision as to when they would be brought in as members benefiting the article 5 decision. That in simplified form is what we have in mind. Some allies are nervous about going very far down the accession road, we think we struck a balance between showing the russians they cant exercise a they facto veto, while changing circumstances and risks on the ground as we go along. Have you discussed this with other countries even if just informally . At the government level if thats the case or just figures like yourself, National Security professionals or diplomatic professionals and what response have you been getting . We havent shopped around yet formally but now that the report is published we hope people will send us their comments and we can take that. A lot of insights from the process itself in drafting this memo with the different signatories, we have a lively debate whether to go farther than this or less far than we had in mind, thats where we found the balance that could make this a political winner and build consensus within nato. The timing on this would seem tricky no matter what you choose, if you say we will discuss ukrainian na