Transcripts For CSPAN2 Former 20240703

Support ukraine and how nato could define a path to membership, hosted by the atlanta counsel, this is about an hour. Good morning. I am greg myre, National Security correspondent with npr and it is my pleasure to welcome you to the special event in washington, the councils Eurasia Center is launching a new memo to the president with some Ambitious Goals involving ukraine. The memo assigned by 40 National Security figures and lays out two specific points, one, how to help ukraine win the war against russia and how to help bring ukraine into in nato. The Atlantic Council has assembled an allstar panel here whose members need only the briefest introductions. To my left is debra kagan, Senior Advisor to the senior counsels Eurasia Center and to her left, ambassador john hurts john herbst, former ambassador to ukraine. We have two panels that will join us virtually, one of them is ambassador Alexander Vershbow, former ambassador to russia and former deputy secretarygeneral to nato and i believe our fourth panelist has been delayed but we hope you will join us soon, he is retired army general wesley clark, former supreme allied commander europe. Now i will turn it over to these distinguished individuals to present a memo to the president. Thank you very much. This paper is a result of concerns the group of 42 who signed on to this paper have the we face an existential challenge or Great Security challenge from Vladimir Putins russia. Is worn ukraine as part of a much broader effort to restore control across postsoviet space and if hes not defeated in ukraine we will face a major security challenge, direct threat to our interests in europe, possible provocation into war, the baltic states, poland, romania and a group of people, we did three roundtables, we sent many hundreds of emails to come up with the paper which we think represents american interests and calls for strong policy by the administration, to supply all the weapons ukraine needs, advanced weapons and adequate numbers on time so they can in fact defeat the russians ukraine so we dont have to worry about the russians in ukraine, and to ensure security in europe, stability in europe for generations to come, to bring ukraine into nato. The Biden Administration has done an admirable job providing substantial assistance to ukraine, military and economic, while our allies and partners to provide assistance to ukraine, to isolate Vladimir Putin, but theyve not been enough to ensure ukraine victory. This paper is a way to point out how to get that and secure american interests in the most economical way possible. Debra kagan . I want to talk about the military state of play. It has been a torturous long road here beginning with the latest iteration of this war, getting ukraine that he quit it needs to win as opposed to hold space that it already has an to take and hold new space. A lot of this is fear of escalation. Thats listening over time, because as we have seen every time the russians threaten to do something it really doesnt happen. Theres been a lot of damage done to the russians, those issues have not happened, but there still is this huge hesitation to give ukraine weapons that have long range ground launch fighters that can reach places in crimea to suppress russian air defense, russian command and control, and this reluctance to do that and very slow, torturous move to give them heavy armor which finally happened and to give them what they really need in terms of controlling any airspace. We know from many wars that if you control the air and the sea lanes, you win. Its not a difficult equation. It has been this way throughout history. The problems that still exist here, i was reluctant to give ukraine and attack 300 km, this is not just about one happen but contending weapons working together because of fear about striking russia. I wanted to act out two quick things here, one, there have been rules of engagement by number of countries who supply ukraine with arms and equipment, ukraine has never violated those rules of engagement, they never violated those caveats on how to use those systems and i want to correct a misnomer too. Some people think every country has the same rules of engagement on whether ukraine can use those against russia proper, not every country has those same caveats, only a handful do. Thats an important point. The second point, i have to give an iraqi analogy. Weve given a rack f16s, all the stuff we gave them. My question is do we trust your act to adhere to rules of engagement more than do we do ukraine . This is a really important point we have to look at and there is a no evidence that these have ever been violated so i would just say at the top of this but given what they need to win, not just dally, give them what they need to suppress the air defense, give them what they need to fight back against 40 of territory that has been land mind, the russians have a nasty habit when ukraine does Forward Operations and get rid of these landmines, russia puts new mines behind them. Thats really important. This is not a humanitarian war in the least and people need to understand that. One last word about cluster munitions, the screaming and yelling about cluster munitions come from human rights organizations that have said nothing about the massive casualties among women, children, and civilians in ukraine but somehow they are worried about cluster munitions which are mostly to take out landmines and to go after Russian Troops. I would really like to get some understanding of that, if and when the administration decides to give them the multiple rocket launch systems for the attack, only one hundred 50 kilometers, its the same thing, you are not talking about killing civilians with these but taking out enemy combatants and taking out the massive amount of landmines that russia has put in the way to kill as many people as possible. Lets go to Alexander Vershbow. Thanks very much. Good to be with you even virtually. I missed some of debra kagan ups presentation but i think she know what she has. Let me move to the second recommendation in our to set ukraine on a path to nato membership. We are united in the view the most effective deterrent against any future russian aggression is to bring ukraine into nato. That would complete the integration of europe that was so rudely interrupted by mr. Putin this invasion. This past summer, set ukraine on a path but didnt go far enough. Said the right words, ukraines future will be in nato, simplified the process of ukrainian annexation by dropping the requirements for membership action plan but it was a missed opportunity in our view to move beyond the famous 2008 bucharest summit decision which declared without explaining how that ukraine will become a nato member one day. Nato 75th anniversary is an appropriate occasion to take more historic and concrete steps that define ukraines path and start the nato wheels turning, at least to begin a process that leads to it. We dont pretend this is a simple decision for nato. Nato brought a divided germany in 1955, soviet troops were still on german territory, this would be the first time the alliance would seek to bring in a country engaged in active combat with a hostile neighbor. Any movement or ukrainian membership would have to take that into account and also be compatible with current us and allied policies not to become combatants in the current war. If ukraine were headed toward victory, with the fighting during a end we could follow the nato enlargement script that was used most recently with finland and sweden, an invitation to nato membership followed by accession talks, signature of accession protocol and ratification. I dont think we will be there in time for the Washington Summit next july and we need to be prepared for different more ambiguous scenarios. Some of our allies suggested we simply state that ukrainian accession will not be possible until the war is over. That would be a simple solution but it would give russia the incentive to drag out the war for years and it would be tantamount to giving moscow a permanent veto on ukraine and nato decisionmaking. Our approach in a sense lips the script that i just described to you. We would invite ukraine to begin accession talks at the Washington Summit believe an invitation to actual membership for a later separate decision. The United States and nato would show they were serious by starting the work to prepare ukraine for membership but taking positions on the ground. So the timing for ukraines actual accession would be left open giving allies in ukraine time to work out solutions to problems related to bringing in members still engaged in a war with russia for example in a scenario in which russia still occupied some parts of ukrainian territory, might proceed with accession but apply only to territory fully under ukrainian controller might agree to provide additional offensives and defensive capabilities so that we could prevent russia from reattacking liberated ukrainian territory. The aim would be to ensure the credit ability of the article 5 guarantee at the time of accession and over the longerterm, that means we would continue with the military assistance to ukraine which will provide the interim security guarantee so nato memory should becomes possible. Thats a short summary of where we come down. We think this approach could unite allies more proactive allies and provide a concrete symbol to ukraine, they are to place in nato, their ultimate destination, would be part of our transatlantic community. Thank you very much for that presentation. What we are going to do now is have a conversation for a little while and if you want to contribute questions, in the us or in europe, you can go to ask ac. Org and submit your questions and we will get to that in the last 20 minutes or so our presentation. I will direct these questions to individuals but everybody should feel free to jump in. There are a lot of strong opinions here. A very ambitious memo, helping ukraine win the war and helping ukraine find a path into nato. Ukraine defined victories forcing all Russian Troops off the soil. Is that your definition . Is there any other realistic definition . That s how ukraine currently defines victory. Im not sure how they will always define victory. I think there is a lesser possibility which could also be considered a victory, this would be for ukrainians just decided us officials to decide. Ukraine that emerges within territorially secure borders, economically viable borders, has full run of the black cd, has substantial Armed Forces Armed by the west, and as a member of nato, ukraine that can be secure and prosper and that would be a clear defeat for putin who wants to establish political control all over the country. It is not for me to determine this outcome but i could see that being a plausible one that ukrainians could accept if that is how things develop. That does not mean, however, that that has to be the outcome and i would add that even in a lesser possibility, ukraine must have certain control and, note the word certain, over crimea so that crimea can never again be a space in which moscow can launch military operations. I was in ukraine last november when the city of kherson was liberated by the ukrainians. The front line hasnt moved much since then. Theres no one single weapon the to magic bullet, there has to be a compendium of weapons but it sounds like you are talking about dramatically expanded levels of support, is that realistic . What countries are capable and willing to do that right now . Putins dream that support ukraine will fall by the wayside is putins fantasy and it is not accurate, many of our allies some of whom are here today understand the support ensures their own security, not just ukraine up security so thats not going away, the second thing i would say, a couple things about that, we tend to look at most people in the west, tend to look at war the way they fought their very last war, this is not 22 years of counterinsurgency, this is more like korea which was the last time the us actually went to war without air superiority which they never did again after that and it is not like the last war the Armchair Generals are talking about, its a different kind of war. Second thing as mentioned before is 40 , approximately 40 of the territory russia has occupied has been land mind. No other place on earth has ever had this many landmines or these sophisticated landmines, just hasnt happened. Third thing, it is not just longrange fighters from air launched or ground launched about when an army moves with its armor because theres been, im sure you were leading to this question about the attacks on some of the tanks and heavy armor, you need short range air defense. We talk about air defense of cities and soft targets and the like but theres also a necessity for the sweet spot between, 4, 6, 16 kilometers that you put on the back of a truck that moves with that armor so that the russian attack helicopters, missiles, aircraft, cannot effectively take out that armor, so thats another point and then the mining equipment. I dont know that theres enough the mining equal and on the face of the planet right now to make a dent in this which is why the cost of munitions are so important because they can take out a big chunk of those minds so those are things to hit against, the type of Movement People expected to see and the last piece, not one, but if you have something other than the 27 in the mig 29, if you start getting the block 16 fourthgeneration aircraft, the f16s in there, we are not talking about dogfighting. The russians use their air force as a support for their army. An army platform. They dont dogfight. Everyone talking about that, its a misnomer. We are talking about being able to have the type of weapons you can shoot from a distance and take these out, you dont necessarily need over the horizon line of sight. There are sound reasons why the regaining of territory is slow. To introduce very briefly, youve seen that as ukrainians advance on the ground, their forces have come under helicopter fire, the fight against those helicopters is very critical but do you see any significant changes on the horizon, beyond what has artie been given and replacement ammunition, but as the war revolves and ukraine needs Different Things you see that coming . Or hitting a wall . I dont think we are hitting a wall. Defense ministers are meeting this week, the Ukrainian Contact Group tomorrow and defense ministers in brussels and i think what we are seeing in europe is really remarkable. I would argue that theres more burden sharing now among allies than there has ever been in the last 40 years and theres recognition of beeping up their own Defense Ministry and not to be insulting to ours but we have so many rules and regulations and our hot hands are tied, and in germany and sweden and the uk, france and others who are moving at light speed for new equipment, better equipment and supplying it to ukraine so i would argue they see this as critical to their own security as well and they are not extending blood and treasure and thats a worthwhile investment for them to make. Alexander vershbow, this is a radically different approach trying to bring in a new nato member that is at war. Its against the approach that has been taken ever since natos founding. Could you explain the difference between a membership action plan which is the traditional way a country gets into nato versus what you are talking about as a membership accession talk and walk us through a couple steps where you think there could be genuine progress even if the war continues. Our proposal is ambitious and complicated as well. In terms of the distinction about regarding the membership action versus what we call membership accession talks, the terminology could be changed as well but never ship action plan was a program launched 20 years ago to prepare any country interested in joining nato for the kinds of reforms, political and Economic Reforms we would need to undertake to become a serious candidate that might receive an invitation. Its a more longterm process over many years. One case macedonia was in the map ship action plan for 20 years. But it has worked very effectively to bring countries more in line with nato standards, to limit the kinds of reforms they need to be in the European Union in terms of rule of law, civil society, civilian control of the military and things like that. What we are proposing is a slight rearranging of the sequence of how prepared candidates are brought into the alliance and we saw this most recently with finland and sweden. They received an invitation to join the alliance, triggered several weeks of accession talks on these dimensions of responsibilities they would need to uphold as members of the alliance. We would flip the script slightly in order to deal with the greater challenge of bringing a country that is at war with russia. We would invite them to begin accession talks and start the practical work of membership, making a separate political decision as to when they would be brought in as members benefiting the article 5 decision. That in simplified form is what we have in mind. Some allies are nervous about going very far down the accession road, we think we struck a balance between showing the russians they cant exercise a they facto veto, while changing circumstances and risks on the ground as we go along. Have you discussed this with other countries even if just informally . At the government level if thats the case or just figures like yourself, National Security professionals or diplomatic professionals and what response have you been getting . We havent shopped around yet formally but now that the report is published we hope people will send us their comments and we can take that. A lot of insights from the process itself in drafting this memo with the different signatories, we have a lively debate whether to go farther than this or less far than we had in mind, thats where we found the balance that could make this a political winner and build consensus within nato. The timing on this would seem tricky no matter what you choose, if you say we will discuss ukrainian nato membership after the war, you give putin every incentive to drag the war out as long as possible, that would have that effect. But if you offer membership while the war is still ongoing you raise this whole thorny questions that havent come up before so talk about the thinking on trying to time this at the best moment. I will answer your question but i want to make one point that i said earlier. I described a less ambitious victory but one of the reasons we wrote this paper is because we think that if we properly supply ukraine they not might, theres a good chance they would make it untenable for russia to retain control of crimea. Without Ukrainian Forces having to enter the peninsula. I want to offer that clarification. As for your question, as sandy mentioned, this is a thorny question regarding how you bring ukraine into nato. A difficult call. General clark is joining us. We had a substantial debate within our group trying to see if it was possible to offer ukraine invitation to membership straight out and we decided, precisely because theres willingness within nato to wind up in a possible shooting war with russia that was not possible. At the same time we have to make it clear to putin and 2 ukrainians that in fact the only way there will be a stable europe for the foreseeable future is if ukraine in fact becomes a member of the alliance. So the way to thread this extremely thin needle is to say we are going to start this process now. For those who are skittish about being in a war with russia, this does not commit us to formally bring them into the alliance but we take steps in this direction, if we boost monetary support for ukraine we make it harder for putin to exact cost for that, we make it painful for him to pursue this war, a war which the russian people are not behind. They have a mobilization, people dont head to the exits so that is our strategy. Strengthen ukraine to win on the battlefield and set the stage for the eventual entry of ukraine to nato. Its worth noting that despite massive kremlin propaganda, serious russians including the man who stood up to putin say this war is not about ukraine and nato. This war is something very different. We need to act on that understanding and because we are not prepared to wind up in a shooting war with moscow, the possible real downside of current policy, we should set the stage so ukraine wins on the battlefield as we pull ukraine closer to nato without pulling the trigger on bringing them in. As far as ukraine, and nato army, ive seen this myself and ukraine, where they were using an air Defense System, old soviet is 300 Defense System at the beginning of the war, making it work extremely well given its agent limitations, may be run out of ammunition for those systems and cant get it anywhere else so it has been the patriot system, the stinger missile. To what extent just has this war made ukraine at the factor nato military . Ambassador Alexander Vershbow talked about why thats not essential for ukraine and a lot of membership actions and a big chunk of it was 300 something things you have to go through to become a nato military. Ukraine has already exceeded that and list people forget, ukraine deployed nato forces in the 90s, they were in iraq, they have done students with nato countries before intent integrated in the command and control structure and the like. This has given them a leg up on many nato members and they understand what it takes. I will go back to education. In ukraine, students get Stem Education in the eighth grade so they are not taking a bunch of 17yearold recruits some of whom had a hard time with high school, here, that is why they had such great efficiency in learning these weapon systems, you can give them a mechanical schematic and they understand it. You can do remote maintenance and the like for this equipment and fix it because they understand how to do it, that goes back to the education, they are not coming in as if they have no background in this. One could argue that if ukraine were to join nato tomorrow, it would already be superior to a number of other militaries in the alliance. You are with us without video. General clark, can you hear us . Okay. We will see if he can join in momentarily. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, this war has exposed many russian weaknesses, its military, its need for western technology, its inability to have an honest discussion about whats going on in the war in its own society but it is also demonstrated that Legendary Russian resilience, Russian Troops are staying and fighting, they are not fleeing, the russian economy is coping. Arent we are looking at a very long war with an outcome that is impossible to forecast at this point . I think you are right. Weve seen the russians who are formed abysmally in the first weeks of this war and suffered enormous losses, at least learning from some of their mistakes, not being quite as incompetent as they were at the start, we shouldnt be complacent about that. It remains to be seen how much they have improved and as the ukrainian counteroffensive is begin to get traction, later than we hoped but its getting more traction, whether the russians are going to have is easier time as they think they will have in rebuffing the Ukrainian Forces. I will be interested in general clarks view if he can come in on this but i think there are reports of declining morale, desertions from the front, russians treat their troops very inhumane ways, they are giving the people who are recruited or drafted very little training in many cases so the point the average soldier sends to the front only can expect to live four more months. So i think ukraine is to win. Thats white import and we not waste any time in terms of the equipment that we send and our allies are with us, in answer to the question you posed earlier, providing roughly the same amount in dollar terms of military aid as the United States which is quite extraordinary. Its a breakthrough for burden sharing and we will continue to ask for even more. But i do think it is not over until its over and the ukrainian still have the potential to tip the scales even more. What theyve done in crimea in neutralizing the russian navy is trade extraordinary given they have no navy of their own. I want to add one point to that. It is important to understand russians ability to continue to have weapons they need a lot of ammunition is highly dependent on iran. People should not forget that and theres some evidence systems have flown from north korea. So the drones are coming from iran. What else . We think, im not privy to all of this, there are also components to missiles as well and because the iran model, a lot of things on the russian scanner and the like. So i think we have forgotten a lot of people have forgotten the key role iran is playing in this war. They have forgotten that putin who used to make fun of kim jongun is now his best friend and there is some journalistic evidence at least that things have started to flow from north korea. That is an indication that russia is not doing this on its own and also an indication that our sanctions and our policies blocking the assistance have not succeeded. Journalistic evidence, i like that term. Not sure if that was a pejorative or an endorsement . It is a compliment. How significant do you think the north korean contribution will be . This seems to be in artillery shells and that sort of thing but can you give me a sense how significant that might be . It is unclear at this juncture what they can do but the uranian piece is significant. We should not underestimate that. Its not just the drones but spare parts and everything else. Frankly, the us crackdown more on Companies Going through thirdparty cut outs, it will be even more. Ambassador john herbst and ambassador Alexander Vershbow, you think this memo, this proposal you have here would be ideal to introduce it at the nato summit in washington next july which would also be the 75th anniversary of the founding of nato but you might not have a lot of unity here. We are seeing friction over funding for ukraine right now. Wouldnt this potentially add another divisive element into the whole ukraine debate in the middle of an Election Year . There will be a debate over this. Thats to be expected and welcomed. One of the reasons we did not propose something more ambitious, the strongest National Security voices in this crisis argued for more advanced weapons to ukraine in the face of the administrations timidity our legal about earning ukraine into nato while the wars being fought. We took that into careful account but the point we are making, we are arguing to protect american interests by ensuring stability in europe. Without ukraine and nato there is knows to be in europe as long as the kremlin has these aims which they most definitely have, aims that go beyond ukraine. That is the purpose. We welcome the debate, we think that any sensible analysis in the international scene, any analysis recognizes that if you want us to rank, and peace, and security you have to be strong, you cant cower before the aggressor. Which by the way is why you want to stop china on taiwan and make sure putin loses in ukraine. This is the selfevident policy choice. We just need to make it clear to those who would rather keep their heads in the sand. You weigh in on this as well, address the idea of wanting to take on a big bold approach but also arent you, doesnt that create the possibility of more division on a ukraine policy . Theres always that danger but i am relatively optimistic that we have built a consensus in the alliance on the proposal along the alliance we put into this memo. There was already a debate on this at the last nato summit in lithuania earlier this year and it was surprisingly strong support not unanimity that nato needs unanimity to consensusbased organizations but a lot of support for taking more divisive steps forward and a few countries werent ready for that including the United States of america. But i think if we are going to take to heart what john herbst just said, there is more at stake in this conflict than the fate of ukraine itself but the fate of the international order, we cant simply reverse course and put this issue at a lower priority. We must defeat Vladimir Putin ukraine and thats why pulling out all the stops when it comes to military support, looking for shortterm security guarantees that can backup the ukrainians until they are ready for nato. That needs to happen even though there will be political ramifications. We have to get our own house in order when it comes to the defense budget, cant make any predictions on that but if we can keep our support going get and draw on strong allied support, theres an opportunity at the big anniversary summit in july to make a decisive step forward. The most radical advocates would seek something that begins the process, shows the russians this aggression is not paying off, it will only make their situation worse. Got it. I want to throw this out, black see security, one of the things john herbst mentioned, this is not just about ukraine, theyve used hundreds of untethered see mind and the black sea. Our romanian friends have already seen a number of accidents in the port of costanza of these ships that have been sit it by these, this is turkeys neighborhood as well and bulgaria as well and the idea russia is doing this is not just to block ukrainian grain but to control the lands of transit in the black see which of course is extremely important for even energy coming from the east, going up the danube and it is to make a threat toward days nato countries and commercial vessels the transit the black see but never going to be safe and i think that is a really important point to put out that this is not just about ukraine, it is russia trying to control the transit of commercial vessels, to hamper independent energy going to other countries in Central Europe and the like, so i think tying it to that little neighborhood of a couple of ukrainian points mrs. The broader strategic objectives of russia. They had the same idea in the crimean war. Anyway. We will save that for another time. John herbst, you served in israel as a diplomat. Israel very much in the news right now. There has been this talk about the israeli option, of the informal security guarantee without a formal alliance of sorts. Do you see an analogy or would that analogy Holding Ukraine or not . There are a number of reasons it doesnt hold, israel is a technological and military power in the middle east. Unlike any of its adversaries, its enemies. Whereas ukraine does not stack up as a comparable force and as we see with hamas assaults on israel, israel does have serious security concerns. I dont have any doubt that they will manage that unless the International Community forces they ceasefire, ukraines problem is, in fact, more dangerous because it is larger and more powerful, has greater advantages. The analogy doesnt quite hold. Theres another problem with this. The administrations policy which overall has been solid because they prevented by a massive effort a kremlin victory, has been to bed, whether looking at the weapons portion or the nato portion of the policy because they are, lets use a polite word, overly concerned about Russian Nuclear escalation which i think is a problem. So they talk about an israeli option when it comes to possibly ukraine joining nato, but a key part of the policy position was maintaining his reals qualitative military edge whereas weapons policy towards ukraine is to give them enough to prevent a russian victory but not to provoke Vladimir Putin, a serious strategic error so theres a certain amount of confusion in Administration Policy when it talks about the israeli option because its driven by that timidity which is a problem. I would like to open this up to questions. Remember, you can write to askac. Org, quite a number of questions here. For the first question i would like to go to doctor allman of the Atlantic Council. Thank you and thank the panel. My first two question, the ambassador of ukraine. Im not clear on what the Biden Administrations strategy is towards ukraine. Obviously we will stay the course and do what we can and not provoke world war iii. I wonder if you can explain what the strategy really isnt how you plan to implement the changes that you propose given the administration has been reluctant to make change, how do you get that done and can you get that done and, wesley clark, if he is listening, somebody may want to take his place as a surrogate, the war in ukraine is interesting in the fact that there is a huge dichotomy. On the one hand, weve got ipad drone space satellite warfare which is almost like a videogame, on the other hand we have the most vicious war of attrition in which ukraine is expending more artillery shells than the west can produce in several months added that the pace. You have trench warfare, a return to a situation where world war i is not a bad analogy. The association of the u. S. Army people are saying we need longrange fire, air power will overcome, i dont believe any of those is correct. My point is what do we take away in terms of how to think about our forces in the future based on what is happening in ukraine . Regarding Administration Policy it is clear they want to prevent a russian victory so they will stay as long as it takes but also want to avoid american involvement in the war in terms of soldiers which i agree with and also prevent nuclear escalation. I think they go about that the wrong way. The problem with the policy, we are seeing this because of the revolt of the quasiisolationists of the republican party, congress, the basis for their may be undermined because the war is going longer than people expect but also undermined because the administration has yet to explain in clear language that vital american interests are at stake. If they did that, if they pointed out that moscow is a Nuclear Power on the march that is pursuing aggressive designs against core american interests, designs that included two Cyber Attacks without any serious response, went we have here is not so much supporting ukraine and its war against russia but containing aggressive kremlin at the least possible cost to the United States. I suspect there would be much greater support for our policy including especially among independents, republicans have been influenced by the tiny isolationists in their midst. The president is going to give a speech on the war soon. I hope you make that point. If he does i suspect support among the American People will rally and the quasiisolationists have a question here and direct this to ambassador Alexander Vershbow. What about eu membership . Should we be talking about eu membership for ukraine first, and membership later. It doesnt move as fast as nato has in previous cases but the European Union took the decision, for eu membership, the wheels are turning but it may be several years before they reach the finish line. Both are important, and the reforms the European Union insisted upon when it comes to rule of law, when it comes to civil society, these things are equally important for ukraine as it seeks to integrate in the Democratic Alliance nato represents. I dont think its a question which one comes first, both need to be pursued. I am encouraged that the eu is more serious about ukraine than in previous debates on the subject. What you favor accelerated eu membership as well for ukraine . Easy to tell europeans to move faster. Given the stakes as ambassador john herbst described them, the faster you move the better. It lies on the shoulders of ukraine in terms of the complex and comprehensive eu standards but i think the ukrainians can do it and possibility of membership give strong motivation. Deborah, 2part question for you. Vladimir putin. Is this war going to end as long as he is in power . Is he going to push it and put his chips on the table, there is no way out for him as long as he is in power and after putin, whenever he leaves the scene, the most likely prospect to be somebody else equally hardline if not more so and someone else from the security focus. I know what i dont know and im not an expert on domestic russian issues. Over to you, john. If you read history, you know every time russia has a splendid war it goes badly. Theres a change in power, a time of centralized control in the period of liberalization, happened after the russo japanese war, at the end of world war i. Those who talk about putin taking power, talk about a possibility, they are not talking about elected because this was clearly a putin special. His closest power in his inner circle were appalled he gave the speech that was publicized a few days before the big invasion. Putin could in fact if you wanted to, declare victory, punish the, quote, not teasing ukraine and pool out. I dont think he is in that direction. Chances are he will need a big defeat on the battlefield, either to reconsider or to provoke others in moscow to remove him from the scene. Thats the plea we should be making to help ukraine launch that decisive battle, to cut off russian supplies in the crimean peninsula, to advance 30 miles south. Theres a lot of talking ukraine about domestic munition production or western companies coming into ukraine. Does that make a difference in the shortterm and an absolute resolution ukraine, drone production and drone use but fairly small scale. Is this something that could help in a limited way in the shortterm oryza longerterm idea . Maybe longerterm. There was a very large conference in ukraine last week where you have the minister of strategic industry, ministry of defense participating in a number of countries, both national and private companies to this conference including ones from the United States that went. I think the concept of joint ventures and doing things together is good. It is the wave of the future, i think a number of Check Companies have already stood up, joint ventures in chechnya, designed to bring in ukrainian workers to transfer the industry back to ukraine when it is safe to do this. 50,000 tons of equipment, and keep production going out of the range of russian systems. That the wave of the future, ukraine has a huge technological base, to talk about the educational assistance. Theres wherewithal and they know how. Harlan asked part of this question. They learned how to mcivor almost anything and i will say one thing about this. A war against a near adversary, we havent done it. These things about munition burn rates, and no one understood what was going to happen because they have never done it before. I give kudos to the us Defense Industry and european Defense Industry who are taking Lessons Learned of what they need to do on this and i do think there is a future here for joint ventures Going Forward and some of the europeans who have more flexibility than us companies do will be on the ground floor of this and i would hope the United States government allows our industry to have that access. General clark has joined us. Hello, general clark. Thank you very much for letting me in. This is the problem. We have a major conflict in israel, and the news is on israel. Meanwhile, north koreans are shipping artillery and ammunition into russia as a result of the last visit. The military situation ukraine is urgent. It is a crisis. Solving that problem is essential. For ukraine to go forward, we have to remember, for ukraine, crimea is the same as the Golan Heights is for israel. There is no effective ukraine without crimea. Without crimea they lose the mineral resources, export, control of the seas, there coastline, so this is not going to end easily with a ceasefire freeze in place and permanent negotiations. Lets tie some of these things together. We are focused on ukraine here, but it does seem there are links to whats going on in israel. Iran is providing drones to russia. Whatever role they may have had in the latest events in gaza, a longtime supporter of hamas in terms of money, technical support, that sort of thing. Talk about the Palestinian Leader in the west bank, mark muto boss mocha mood makhmoud abbas is meeting with putin. The need that it is not one isolated thing, how to approach the thing about a counteroffensive in ukraine or the fighting in gaza, but linkage in terms of actors that are playing together and addressed in a comprehensive way. Exactly right. The soviet meddling in the middle east goes back a long way. Yasser arafat had his first ideas on terrorism from the soviet union. They are the ones that encourage the first terrorist acts against israel. What is happening now is a benefit to Vladimir Putin. He is off the hook. Ukraine is off the news, north korea is providing support. Iran is providing support. We dont know what will happen in israel. What it has done is drawn an American Carrier battle group, focused allamerican attention there. On the other side of the world, trying to block it and asking how strong is this country, america . They are easily distracted, politics doesnt work, they cant put money into ukraine. Looks like a pretty good time. When you are looking at israel, we look at the situation in israel. The same the same way putin did two years ago. Being enmeshed in gaza, looking at the effectiveness of the United States, asking itself, must it wait until he gets a Nuclear Weapon to unleash hezbollah to destroy israel or is this going to be the opportunity . We are sitting on the edge of that right now. It is a very difficult time for the u. S. National security itself. Greg one more for you, general clark, one of the things discussed earlier would be if ukraine were to get membership or move if ukraine were to get membership or move toward membership in nato how would you do with articleou v . And i believe ambassador herbst and others have sorted said it would only apply to territory under ukraine control. So, for example, taking todays status, the don box and crimea would not be covered under article v. Could you talk more about how you think about that and perhaps also you can just imagine what if ukraine were to retake crimea . Would become under article v and then even if the russians are still very active nearby in the black sea . Your thoughts on how that might be addressed. I think the formulation ambassador herbst gave you, territory of ukraine control is a good initial formulation. The concert is this. If you believe and rolebased internationaled order, which we say we do, and we say thats with a fight in ukraine is about, then does the reason right now why u. S. Forces cannot assist ukraine in this legitimate defense of its own territorial integrity. Except that from the beginning theres been a sort of agreement, was it a tacit agreement, implicit agreement, explicit agreement, who conducted it and how did it happen . Somehow we know putins red lines and we say no, we cant possibly bump up against the russian force. Ratherno than saying we are supporting ukraine in its legitimate territory, its on russia if they can us. We have Nuclear Weapons, they have Nuclear Weapons. They are afraid of our Nuclear Weapons. Why are they not afraid of hours . I think we have to be very careful about deterring. If we dont believe in its credibility, no one else will. Theres been asphyxiation Year Campaign by the soviet union to say oh, no clue what would be impossible and possible. Yes, thats a campaign. It is certainly affected opinion in the west but hasnt stopped russia from modernizing its Nuclear Arsenal and threatening it during thisar conflict. So we are at a real pivot point in u. S. Global stabilization. Weve had extended deterrence for 70 years based on president eisenhower and the Strategic Air command. It saw us through the cuban missile crisis. We use 1973 when the soviets tried to intervene into part of egypt and the war then. And its kept us safe and generally extended protection to all of our p friends and allies. But if we dont believe in ourselves, no one else will. And one of the problems are having right now with the global south is that weve been so cagey trying to play hooton off andd help us get in the grand agreement, made we can do this but we dont want to do that to putin. How can it be this is a man who is a murderer, who was unleashed aggressive war, we know where his money is, but we havent taken his money . We know where his daughter is but she stillll treated well. Why is this . Because we think we can still work diplomacy through this conflict. But we should learn by now that putin is not a reliable partner in diplomacy. So we have to face a very difficult emerging situation and were going too come back once again to the fact that our Strategic Nuclear deterrent is the ultimate arbiter. We have got to face it, understand it and went to act like we believe in it. So were running a total short on time here. I want to have one question that will go around the horn and perhaps all of you could speak to, sort of asphyxiationsecond and two. The Biden Administration policy sort of 60second. What could you do right now if you could change or alter or shape that policy going ahead. Debra lets start with you. I dont think, i think as long as it takes assumes us will go on beyond the next election and then some. I think it doesnt have to go on that long. If we make the decision that we should of made months ago, give ukraine what it needs to win this war, understand this that could be any peace treaty with that u. S. Boots on the ground because the last 100 years at shown that no peace treaty last without you boots on the ground. And understand all those little articulation and games people look at are not going to work and just understand give them what they need to win and let them win. Give them the assistance they need to take out the russian land bridge, let them reassume control and letef the countriesf the fund the black sea have free transit, give them the error so at least that eric parody, and we will not be talked about as long as it takes anymore because it will take a lot less long. Ambassador herbst. I hope debra is right in to do think if we gave all the arms needed theres a good chance ukraine could deal a decisive blow. But the main thing is to understand the longterm threat which again putin is coming for our last breakfast. We need to stop him inas ukrain. If we understand that theres a policy of containment, the money were sending to ukraine is like 3. 5 of our defense budget. We sustain cost well over 13 containing the soviet union for 40 years. By that measure the 37 dont figure to ukraine is small and the threat is longterm. While we might be able to win this quickly, we need to be in it for the long haul, recognize the dangers to us. Ambassador bushnell. Yes, i agree we need to do more and everything possibly can to enable ukraine victory. We need to embrace victory as the goal what weve been dancing about it for a year and a half. I think thats contributed to questions asked what is our policy. Just saying were going to stay as long as it takes doesnt define the endstate were trying to achieve. At the same time agree with general clark that we need to do everything we can to ensure the credibility of our strategice Nuclear Deterrent and not be spooked by some of the rhetoric coming out of russia. Its interesting that even putin himself seems to have gotten concerned about the excessive warmongering amongst some of his erstwhile liberal advisers about first use of Nuclear Weapons. We just have to continue to reinforce the message that the russians will suffer catastrophic consequences if they actually use Nuclear Weapons, and not allow our policy to be hamstrung by exaggerated fears of russian red lines. General clark, you get the last word. The Administration Needs to commit itself to a policy that ukraine will win. This win includes are regaining its territory including crimea and don baas. Needs to the weapons as soon as possible to do that. Time is not on our side. This needs to be done immediately and thats whatever the red lines that were agreed with putin, that was an entirely different situation. We need to put him on notice. Is going to lose. Put the force behind it with ukrainian weapon, our weapons in Ukraine Forces to accomplish that goal. Thank you, general clark. Thank you to all our panels hert today. And too her audience here in person and washington, around the u. S. And in europe, and perhaps even points beyond, so thank you all very much. A roundnd of applause for our panel, please. [applause] this morning theene Foreign Relations committee holds a confirmation heangor jacob lew to be the next u. S. Ambassad t israel. He is expected to the questions on the israel has war and h the u. S. Can help support a longtmtrategy in the gi. He previously served as treasury secretary during the obama administration. Watch the hearing life begin at 10 30 a. M. Eastern on a frequent cspan now helped you out or online at cspan. Org. American history tv saturdays on cspan2 exploring the people and events that tell the american story. At 7 p. M. Eastern the swearing in ceremony of the archivist of the United States Colleen Shogan. Followed by our interview with Colleen Shogan who is the 11th archivist and the first woman to hold the job. She discusses her stewardship at the National Archives and controversies over white house records involving donald trump and joe biden. At 9 30 p. M. Eastern on the presidency the Ronald Reagan president ial library is a host of discussion looking back at the rhetorical legacy of Ronald Reagan known as the great communicator. 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