Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics Public Policy Today 20240622

Dempsey, is to me intellectually dishonest. Senator aot. Mr. Chairman just for the record president george w. Bush signed an agreement with maliki government to withdrawal all forces. Well have that debate later on but it was clear we could have and Everybody Knows they could have and the people that were there knows they could have senator a yot. Thank you both for being here and your service to the country. We both appreciate it. Secretary carter you had answered to senator manchin that the arms were providing to the kurds were doing so with the consent of the iraqi Central Government. Are we doing that directly or through the iraqi Central Government . We are not the only ones but we and others convey the weapons directly to the kurds. But we inform the Iraqi Government and get their formal consent to it. So it doesnt delay the arming of the kurds but were who are trying to stick up for the Central Government. Because previously we heard complaints about it going through the Iraqi Government and then to the kurds so im glad to hear were providing it directly to the kurds and letting the Central Government know what we are providing. Mr. Berz anie was here in town and you may have met with him a few weeks ago and he was grateful and was being provided and noted that the delays which is the principal problem that was experienced early on are not being experienced now either in the shipment of our equipment or that of others for example the germans providing tank munitions which they value very much. But we are trying to stick up for the principal that iraq is a single unitary multi sectarian state and that is mult preferred to the alternative which is the zin aggravation accident aggravation of iraqi. And at this point are they receiving all of the weapons that they asked for because i understand it isis has unfortunately captured the armaments we left in iraq and some of them heavy armaments an the kurds are effective but it is hard if you are outarmed and are they now what have they requested and not received and if so, why. Ill let general dempsey answer that. There are 12 nations over all arming the kurds. And i was with the German Defense minister in germany last week and she was providing to the kurds these critical antitank weapons of a kind the germans make that is especially effective. So it is not just us. And the kurds are an example of what we are looking for, which is an Effective Ground force that will stick up for itself, hold together take and hold territory and that is why were providing them with support. So we agree with that . I think there is broad agreement on that and we want to make sure they have what they need . Senator, im not aware of anything they asked for that we havent provided. We probably havent provided it in the quantity they desired and were working to address those quantity issues. I wanted to ask follow up on a different topic. Because general dempsey, you mentioned in your testimony some of the other challenges we face around the world, including the malign influence of iran. And i read it today in the press that iran was actually pushing for the lifting of the arms embargo at the u. N. And also the resolution that bans iran from developing Ballistic Missiles so i wanted to get both of your thoughts on those two issues and the importance as we look at irans malign influence in the region as far as i can tell, we still see iran not only supporting the assad regime, hezbollah, the Houthi Rebels and also weve heard reports on the taliban undermining our interest. So your thoughts on those two issues . Ill start. Okay, youre right. I cant speak to the what is going on in the negotiations, secretary kerry is conducting the negotiations, but i agree with your perspective, namely that there are we have serious concerns with iranian malign activities outside of the Nuclear Issue which is the focus of the talks. And it is in several different locations around the region. And whatever happens as far as an agreement over the Nuclear Program with respect to where iran is concerned and i think we and certainly i feel this we have a clear duty in the department of defense first of all to defend our friends and allies keep a robust posture in the gulf our friends and alleys to allies to include especially israel, to maintain our robust posture and to continue to maintain the military means to strike irans Nuclear Program if we were ordered to do so. We work on all three of those things and well work on them whether or not an agreement is reached in geneva. So just to be clear secretary, it doesnt sound like, based on what youre saying, given their malign activities in the region, that it is a good idea to lift the armed embargo right now on what iran receives, would you agrow with that. We want them to continue to be isolated as a military and limited in terms of the kind of equipment and material they are able to carry. And also can you explain to us why it is important that we also continue to stop them from having an icbm program. Because we know they have one. It is in the Development Well the reason that we want to stop iran from having an icbm program is that the i in icbm stands for intercontinental meaning the ability to fly from iran to the United States and we dont want that and that is why we oppose icbms. And general do you want to answer that. Just because you posed it to both of us. Under no circumstances should we relieve iran relative to Ballistic Missiles and arms trafficking. Thank you. I wanted to point out something secretary, carter when the chairman had asked you about the Defense Authorization, one thing that i think needs to be pointed out, the president has said he will veto it. The Defense Authorization received 71 votes in the senate. I would describe that as very bipartisan and so it troubles me that he would seek to veto something that received 71 votes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. General thank you. Secretary, thank you. I just got back from iraq with senator cain who led our trip and one of the meetings we had was with the sunni tribe members and from the houthi area and in talking to them they said we have stood with you, we have faith with you, but we have people who are now eating grass in our town. We have no food. We have no supplies. And we have been told the only airlifts that can come in is on military transport. Is there anything you can do to help feed our people. So i wanted to put that before you to see if there is something we can do to be of aid to these individuals. Well ill Say Something about that and then ask the chairman if he wants to addiment first of all i want to thank you, Senate Donnelly and cain, for traveling there. We appreciate it. And on behalf of the 3550 members of the armed forces that are in iraq and conducting this fight, thank you for taking the time to go visit them this fourth of july weekend. The humanitarian situation is yet another tragic consequence of what has gone on in isil. It remains one of the coalitions efforts, as i indicated in my opening statement, to relieve the humanitarian situation. That is very difficult to do, when there is not order and control on the ground. And so this is why we need to get a security situation that is stable, Ground Forces that are capable of seizing territory Holding Territory and governing. That is the only way to get the humanitarian situation turns around either in iraq or syria. It is very sad. It is tragedy. And in the case of iraq, as has been noted, something brought about by the reemergence of sectarianism in a tragedy way. Jim, do you want to add anything. One of the reasons we went to tack atam air base is to advise and assist in the Anbar Operations Center which is where these kind of situations should migrate through and you should be interested to know the iraqis have the abilities to address that. They have stateoftheart i know they do but they are not. Well pass it to the guy who did and when youre hungry, your stomach doesnt tell you, you want iraqi food or u. S. Food you just want help. And one of the bonds created with the tribal leaders is they said we felt we could count on you. And to follow up on that as we look at ramadi and other areas, and the iraqi armed forces, one of the great tragedies of this whole thing was that the number of isis fighters in ramadi was extraordinarily insignificant in terms of the over all number but the iraqi forces heading the other way. And so i wanted to hear your thoughts on making sure that the iraqi forces know there is no back door any more, only one way through ramadi and that is forward . Ill Say Something about that and then chairman you may want to add. The way you recount the fall of ramadi is correct. Ramadi needs to be retaken and the way to do it is to have a force under the command and competent command and control of Iraqi Security forces commanders which has been a challenge and a plan and the means to as you say, make sure that they dont bag down and are able to take ramadi and move through ramadi. This will be a test of the competence of the Iraqi Security forces. And it is a test that they must pass and therefore our and the coalitions involvement is to try to train and equip and support them to be successful and were going to take the time and encourage them to take the time so that the operation, when they do conduct it, is successful. One of the side spinoffs when it is successful, and ramadi is taken back is that isis will then look for a quick p. R. Claim somewhere else. Yeah. And so i just want to make sure were ready in surrounding towns and surrounding areas that when ram yd a falls, we know they will step somewhere else and that we have a plan in place to protect the other towns as well. The ram yd a campaign which about a month ago was about to be executed precipitously, with our help, was been to first isolate it and then recapture it and with the supporting effort in fallujah. So our presence in the Anbar Operations Center is allowing the Iraqi Security forces to take a more deliberate campaign approach and to avoid the very tooth paste aspect of the way isil squirts around the battlefield when you squeeze it in one place and it turns up in another. And this is very much us helping them understand the threat and formulate a campaign to address it so they get credit for it and they became credible to the people in the anbar province. As im sure you know, the sunni tribal leaders they have tremendous value for the relationship theyve established over the years with the United States. Established in blood and treasure. And so what gives them confidence more than anything is knowing not that our soldiers are in the front, not that our soldiers are in the combat, but that were there to help guide and provide advice and help provide plan and help provide air cover is the other thing they talked to us about. They say you have no idea how our spirits soar when we see your air assets and so they want to make sure all of that is going to be in place as we move forward. Then they are willing to buy in. If not. They feel their families are exposed. One last thing i want to ask you. I see my time is running short. And that is in syria and you dont have to answer this. Ill ask in the second round. The question comes up so when assad goes if assad goes how does the space get filled with people who we think can be of help as opposed to nose raw or isis and it seems like were further behind the curve rather than in front of the curve on that question. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary mr. Chairman, thank you for appearing today for your testimony. Would like to associate myself with the remarks that mr. Mccain made today about arming the Ukrainian Government. He and i travelled there last month to as far east as we could go to pet rosk and we saw brave and scaled soldiers constructing things out of styrofoam to meet their needs and in addition they need a substantial amount of nonlethal aid, some soldiers need improved first aid kits and some look like they came out of the prop scenes in m. A. S. H. And in addition to radios and so forth. And moving on to the Islamic State. One thing i dont think that has been discussed today is the Islamic State in egypt. There have been a series of terrorist attacks in the peninsula and the Islamic State takes credit for those attacks. We have still have the observers in the peninsula for almost 1800 soldiers, 1200 of which are american personnel. Secretary carter, general dempsey, can you explain to us what steps weve taken to ensure our troops in the senai peninsula are protected and working with the egyptian Security Forces to not just depend themselves but work in the peninsula. Let me address that first and then the chairman can address signi. Thank you for going to ukraine. Ive been there very many times. The government and the people there, particularly in the western part of ukraine, Vladimir Putins conduct there has had the opposite of whatever he thought it might have in terms of attracting ukraine he has strengthened the feeling among the western part of the country that they want a future they determine and isnt determined from outside. And to get to your point, were constantly assessing and this gets back to the chairmans earlier point, the kind of assistance we provide to the ukrainians. The principal kind of assistance, however, is ill come back to the military part in a moment but i cant emphasize the importance of economic assistance to ukraine and that is largely in the hands of the europeans and so are the sanctions against russia and that is really the main event. And i cant emphasize enough the importance of that. Because that is mostly a matter for the e. U. Rather than the United States. We are less directly involved but we certainly support the e. U. , both in the sanctions against russia which we share but theirs are more important because the volume of trade is greater. And also the efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian Government and economy, support reform there and the independence of ukraine. I did talk to, as i mentioned to the defense minister there, about what he needed and his principal focus was on training and so as i said, well constantly reassess that. But we are assessing that and im open to what we do in the future. Ive indicated that. I continue to indicate that. But his emphasis was on training and we have trainers now in yavarif, which is a principal Training Range there that is much appreciated. He was asking me and us for more of that kind of training. And well continue to do that. And to support the ukrainian military. I should say the defense ministers used to be the interior minister very good combination. Because the russian and separatists threat is a hybrid kind of threat. Hybrid in the sense that its signified by the little green men phenomenon. A combination of the exercise of malign influence through kgb tactics on the one hand and battlefield on the other. Hes somebody that really understands that kind of hybrid warfare. Thats really where he wants our help. Thank you, mr. Secretary. I dont want to cut you off. I have other questions. About nine months ago, anticipating and watching the intel stream of the radicalization of the sinai and the fact that the Egyptian Armed forces had moved resources to sheer western border. We did an integrated vulnerability assessment. We moved tracker raid towers, changed movement techniques, enhanced their communication, put in counter mortar things you are familiar with. They have increased the number of Egyptian Armed forces into the sinai. They accompany us on our movements when we make them. And, of course we recently released some of the capabilities that have been withheld from them. So that they could address their terrorist threat and the sinai. You are confident the american personnel in the sinai currently had adequate protection against terrorist activeity there. I am confident today and i expect that threat to increase. I recently had a conversation with the secretary about the future of the fou mix, which really hasnt changed in the last 50 years. Thank you. Id now like to move to the hearts of the middle east and the Islamic States. For the record, i think the Islamic State is a grave and growing threat him until they grow their own Central Program and tons of uranium, i think the Greater Public will be a threat than the greater state. That is the republic of iran my objections to the course are taken are well known and i will fought repeat them here. But i will note that iran remains an antiamerican terrorist sponsoring outlaw regime, that is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of americans from lebanon to iraq afghanistan, general dempsey, you served three different tours and are associated with iraq, how Many American soldiers died at the hands of projectiles during your command . Yeah, i recently heard the chief staff in the army and the centcom commander put that number at 500. Hundreds of marines died and probably thousands were wounded or suspected of being wounded. What should we say to their family, the families that lost soldiers at the hands of the iranian militias or iranian roadside bombs once we reach a bill to give iran tens of billions of dollars without them changing their behavior . I tell you what i told them is solving the Nuclear Issue diplomatically is a positive outcome. But make no mistake about it. There is at least five other malign activities in which iran is endpajed that cause me dprav security concerns and we wont take our eye on those five. You know what those are, ballistic missile, sea based mines, cybers activity and surrogates and proxies. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman, thank you general carter and general dempsey for being here and for your commitment. General dempsey you testified before the House Armed Services committee that i quote i would fought recommend we put u. S. Forces in harms way. We are talking about iraq simply to stiffen the spine of local forces. You continued if their spine is fought stiffened by the threat of isil on tear way of life. Nothing we do the going to stiffen their spine. So general dempsey, what is it going to take to stiffen the spines of the local forces . Yeah, actually senator, what i said if it takes us to stiffen their spine in the face of a threat that is existential to them, then it doesnt seem as to me that theyre going to be stiffened. But i do think that you asked me the things that we are doing, i mentioned a few of them earlier, about expanding our network of points where we touch them, help them train help them target him help them understand how they intgreat with each other, army and police. I think those things have had the effect of giving them greater confidence. I just made the point i dont think the added step of accompanying them into combat would make a strategic difference, except if we get to the point where there is a major offense, we think we will only or could be increased in terms of its probability of success by our presence. So farce you are concerned, we are doing those taking those steps, that will enable them to be able to fight for themselves. Because i agree with you that there is no number of our troops that we can send there that will result in a lasting kind of situation. You also talked about your recent strip to israel, where you discussed various scenarios involving assads departure. I dont know whether assads departure is anywhere in the near future but lets assume that there is a departure. How would his departure affect the dynamics of what happens in syria . Would isil step in to fill the power volume and how would assads departure change our strategy regarding isil . So let me tell you about our military planning efforts. Our israeli counterparts and our jordanian counterparts very much believe that the possibility of either the regime collapsing or enclaveing inside in homes in hasntai is possible. They were eager about that that would precipitate and your description of it is one that at lowest our regional partners expressed, which is to say we dont want this to be a foot race if it occurs between nas syria and all these other groups converging on damascus. I wont sit here today and tell you i have the answer to that. I will tell you we are in consultations even as i sit here with the turks, the israelis and the jordanians about that scenario. Well, were so what you are doing is to prepare for that possible event weight and to ensure that these other groups will not just step in and take over. But if, lets say that well, let me put it this way. If assad departs does that somehow make our mission i guess isil simpler, easier to target . Is that a way to think about it . Im on a roll. Thats the subject of great debate actually. The debate framed somewhat this way. Is the presence of assad the catalyst for these issues, these radical ideaologist and extremist organizations or did they emanate somehow else and they simply used the presence of the assad regime as a recruiting tool . Depending on how you answer that question will largely shape how you think about solving the problems . The situation militarily is such that what you try to provide with partners is options. That is to say were trying to form a network of partners. Partners we may not have conceived before. Like the ypgt. Syrian kurds in and around kobani and the east bank of the euphrates river. We are trying to Shape Options to react depending on the internal situation how it evolves, we are working most closely with those that border syria, and have again the most to gain and the most to lose. Trying to turning to the training that we are doinged with moderate syrian forces, we recognize that you are having great difficulty while training not only the syrians but also in iraq. Youve described those as a generational challenge. So while were slowly training the local forces to fight for themselves, what are some of the other things that we need to be doing contemporaneously . Is it those nine action items that need to be occurring at the same time . It is. For example, senator if i may, in recognition of the fact that its going to take some time to build the forces that defeat isil in the territory of syria and iraq, thats a fact. Were going to do that. Im sure we will be successful at that. Its going to take some time. We need to defend ourselves in the meantime because there are parts of isil that would like to attack us and our friends around the world and thats where Homeland Security and the fbi and the rest of our efforts to protect ourselves come in. So on the one hand, we need to go to the territory where isil arose and coast it there. And we will do that. But at the same time and in the meantime, we need to continue to defend our people and our country against these guys and some of the ambition to go to syria, train and come back to the United States, you see that already in europe. We see some signs of that in the United States and thats why i was so laborious in describing the nine lines of effort. The ones were talking about, we have principle responsibility are two of those nine. The others really are critical as well. Because the senator cotton said a moment ago isil is a grave threat. These guys do want to do us harm and our friends and allies in the region. If i can Say Something about this. You are asked about the assad regime and the chairman answered that. Obviously, the what we would like to see ra kur is assad to leave the scene. But for the state of syria fought to disintegrate completely, because we know whats down that road sectarian disintegration and now that is a diplomat ig task that is under way as the chairman indicated. And that is the outcome that would be by far preferable i think not only for the United States and our National Security interests, but for the people of syria who are suffering so terribly now, there are so many refugees and its really a tragic situation in the human sense, but assad needs to go. But the structures of governance need to stay or we hope they will stay, because we know what life is like without structures of governance in the middle east. There thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator rounds. Thank you mr. Chairman. Gentleman, first of all, let me say thank you for your service to the country. We find ourselves as you have stated in a very precarious position a number of areas. General dempsey, as i sat here and listened to your assessment of the world today, from your point of view, it was alarming to find that in location after location, we find ourselves being challenged and we find ourselves being pressured into positions that perhaps ten years ago we would not have found ourselves in, whether it be with regard to the pacific rim areas or whether we find ourselves in the ukraine area and so forth. Our challenges are many and yet at the same time it doesnt appear that this has come in as a surprise. As you move farther along and specifically into the area that we had today, which was in terms of our challenges with isil and defeating isil it seems to me that we have found ourselves once again in a position where there werent surprises. Im curious the secretary stated that in iraq the Iraqi Security forces were severely degraded after four division dissolved in mosul fell a year ago this june. The secretary was in the position at the time you were, sir. Was that a surprise to you . Well they collapsed because of poor governance and sectarianism. I was surprised at the rapidity of it. And i suppose i would suggest to you that the degree to which the leadership had been changed out for all the wrong reasons by the maliki government were the conditions under which that occurred. If four division that were lost there, if they were there today, would four divisions, does that make a difference between us moving forward with the defeat of isis or is that not the right number . Whats the right number that its going to take in terms of boots on the ground, not american boots on the ground. Literally, allied forces oak. Whats the number that it takes in order to move forward with whatever strategies are in place, if there are strategies in place. Im assuming well get into that. Whats the number that we want to see on the ground . The commander centcom has testified to recapture mosul eventually. He believes he will need approximately nine brigades worth of Security Forces six from the government of iraq, three from the kurdish region. That would be for mosul. Then, of course, restoration of the border which would be the ultimate step, rest rakes of their sovereign territory defined as the border between syria and iraq. That would be largely a federal police orb border issue and im not aware that number has been identified. The initial goal is to form or regreen, reequip nine brigades. Whats the time frame that that could be acome plished in. Putting a Temporal Division on this is risky at best because, ba us the campaign is dependent on a coalition and its dependent on the network of actors that include the sunni tribes, the Iraqi Security forces themselves, this Counterterrorist Service and the kurds, the act of describing when those groups could all come together to establish the conditions to do this is just difficult to pin down. Even if i knew the answer to that question, i would be low to report it to you in an open hearing. But ive said that from the beginning that it was probably a threeyear effort to restore sovereign di to iraq and were eight months into that. You know general, we pride ourselves and we point out the fact that we truly do have the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen. Yet right now we find ourselves as the president stated some time ago he called isis the jv team. Clearly, that itself not the position that i think the administration would take today. We have identified they are clearly a threat. Weve identified a ninepoint plan here, mr. Secretary, in which you have identified all the things that have to happen, including the defense of our country, from these individuals. At what point during this threeyear time frame or what is the possibility during the threeyear time frame that the patients that you have shown general. And the secretary has alluded to here to build this up what is the probability that this time frame gets away from us . What are we in a position to make this thing last for three years without literally upping on our own point in order to defend ourselves . At what point does it look like we will have to amp this thing up using our own resources to a greater degree than what we have today . I said three years for iraq. Isim and i have also described isil in general as a generational problem because of its allure in notably the sunni sective islam. Look, we just have to have a sunni partner in order to address this challenge of isil. So although i have said three years for iraq, its more like a generation which i suppose is loosely 20 years. To address the violent extremist allure of isil in the sunni world and that allure will only be stripped away when someone actually takes care of them and governs them. To your question, are there points at which we should and would consider the introduction of additional u. S. Military combat capabilities . The answer is yes. I think you have seen us do that in the raid that we conducted into syria to capture and kill the group affiliated with abu saef and the financial yoirk of isil and i think that we are always on the alert or always on the lookout for those opportunities and can use our capabilities as necessary to deal with those. You feel you are in a political appropriate position in that you would have the backing to step in when needed to take care of the problem when the time is right . If you are asking, i cant answer what answer i would receive. I have the confidence that my recommendation would be send and debated in the context of Everything Else we are doing. Let me help out here, if i may, senator. I think that if part of our strategy is to look for opportunities to do more in the sense of creating capable Ground Forces, that we can support, so we kind of welcome those opportunities. Were taking those opportunities in the case of syria. So i dont want to speak for the chairman. But in terms of is the opportunity to do more in that sense, not as a substitute for local people but as a way of enabling them and assisting them. That really is the strategy. So i think we welcome those opportunities. When we find them we are trying to create those opportunities in the sunni areas, as was noted earlier. We are taking some opportunities in the kurdish area. We hope we have more including in syria. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. But i would make one comment and that is that it appears to me that if our strategy is waiting on other people to get their stuff in order it doesnt seem to be as practical as taking advantage of and literally going out and proactively taking care of the problem if need be. And weve got the greatest fighting force in the world. The last thing i want to see is to have them engage boots on the ground. But if it means boots on the ground or additional folks there, fighting there as opposed to having a successful attack on this homeland then i think we all agree on what we ought to be doing. I hope this strategy includes that as a possibility. Senator hein rick. Secretary, chairman, welcome to you both. Thank you very much for your service. Let me start by saying that surge or no surge, i think its pretty clear at least to my constituents that the iraq war remains one of the greatest u. S. Foreign policy mistakes of the last century and one i hope we have learned a few lessons from. I want to follow up secretary, on what senator haro na raised. And one lesson i believe we should have learned by now is that eliminating one terrible middle eastern dictator can too often lead to even more brutal influences, filling the leadership vacuum. We have seen is that play out too many times. Weve seen it to some extent in both iraq and libya. Should we be concerned that syria, opposed to assad reality, could create a vacuum that isil is far better positioned to fill than any of the other Regional Forces . Im not sure we should be, i think we should be almost as concerned with forces likale like al nuzra front. Shouldnt we have a plan to make sure that some amount of governance remains, particularly in damascus . Well, yes we should and we do. That is our strategy with respect to the political transition. Now, i have, for reasons that are easy to understand our influence with bashar assad is that as u. S. Influence is not great and so we are trying to influence those who influence him to remove himself from the government of damascus while keeping intact the governance for the very reason you induce, which is we know what happens when the structures of government disintegrate and we would like to not see that happen in syria eastern though we know that the persistence of assad at the helm is in fact a fuel for isis and others who are fighting. So he needs to go to remove that fuel, but we dont want to see the structures of governance go at the same time and that is the challenge but thats what were trying to achieve. Well, i think thats certainly the right goal. I just want to make sure were prepared for that. Because weve sort of missed that ball in the past and syria is an enormous country and if we saw damascus lose its governance capability, the implications for the entire region and the world would be enormous. Secretary carter as you mentioned as well to be successful on the ground against isil, the fight needs to be led by local capable Ground Forces. I dont think we should give in to impatience. They should not be western forces, they should not be american forces. We certainly have heard that from our partners in places like jordan. This means that we have as to place a great deal of emphasis on training motivated and reliable partners. You have gone a little bit over the small number of Iraqi Security forces, recruited what some of those challenges are, the bottleneck related to the vetting process, but are there other factors that you a had attribute for the lack of trainees and i guess one of the questions related to that is what steps in addition to the steps that are you taking, what steps is the Iraqi Government taking to address this shortfall in order to meet those kind of training starths wed like to see . Thank you, senator. I think in iraq the principle limiting factor on sunni trainee, which is is one of our focuses, has been their belief that the government in baghdad was not fully supportive of that. That is the challenge before Prime Minister abati. He says he wants to do that. And thats critical because only sunnis can take back anbar. Only sunnis can govern anbar when its all over. And so if we are going to rest anbar from the likes of isil which we must do we must have sunnis on our side. And so abati is saying all the right things as the chairman noted, we are trying to support him in doing all the right things and for us. Mr. Secretary, i agree with you whole heartedly in your analysis. I guess my concern is, is abati doing enough to begin to generate confidence in the sunni population in that region . I think he is doing everything he personally can. I think he is challenged in baghdad by others who would have it the old way, the sectarian way. And so hes not able to make everything happen when and as he said and weve had some delays and some frustration as a result of that. I think things are getting better. We are getting more trainees. It was noted earlier that there is some confidence among sunni tribes that we will help them train, equip them support them, and get them back in the fight. If there is a future for them, not even withstanding the difficulties of multisectarian governance in iraq. Thats the path were on. And in the meantime, just to get back to something senator rounds said, i think and i said this before, i just want to restate it. We feed to take action to defend ourselves against isil, not just in iraq and syria, but elsewhere, particularly foreign fighters, even as we coast them in the place from which they arose. They have metastasized now. They have aspired to be a Global Network and we have to fight them where we are. We cant wait for that. We need to do that. By the way, we do that every day, this past weekend. Mr. Secretary, i want to leave you with one last question. Its a very general one. You may have seen the political article from a couple days ago which examined the diesh effect. Its sort of a ancient proverb, the enemy of my enemy is my friends. Whether its Hamas Al Nusra there may be enemies of the u. S. Enemies of our allies, that currently share isil or diesh, what are your thoughts on that observation generally and wouldnt you agree its that reality that is a part of the reason why this is such a complicated nut to crack . There is a reason why its complicated. And again sectarianism is what brought us to this point. So we are willing to and we are and have supported elements of the Iraqi Security forces that have a very large shia composition to them. But if and only if theyre under the direction and control of the government of iraq and there are shia forces in iraq that are not under the direction and control. We will not support them because thats sectarianism. Its sectarian civil war. We know what leads down that road and were trying to stop iraq from going down that road. Senator, ernst. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you, secretary and chairman for being with us today. I appreciate your efforts in this area. And secretary carter, id like to start with you. Because right now i am very confused. You had stated earlier and then you affirmed to senator ayotte that we are directly arming the kurds in consultation with the Iraqi Government. Would you state that again, please, sir . Yeah, although i want to be, you are using the word directly. She used the word directly. I did, too. Let me just be clear about that. Which is that we do it in a way that doesnt delay the shipments and doesnt narrow down the shipments at all, but is by through and with the government of iraq. We are sticking with that principle not because we dont want to help the kurds and we dont want to help them in a timely way, but we also want to stick up for the principle of multisectarianism. That is the reason. But were insistent it not lead to delays. As i said, i spoke to mr. Barzani, i make sure he is getting the right equipment and the germans are aurming him in a timely manner and they are getting that equipment and theyre performing extremely well with it. We will see if the chair wants to add anything about the method of arming. So we are arming the kurds. Its not being delayed. I know that was stated earlier that there are no significant delays, because i do want to emphasize that as you know over the last several months, my colleagues, a number of my colleagues and i have been working on lejszlation to directly arm the kurds, in consultation with the Iraqi Government. And i know that you and secretary kerry also had very strongly worded letters to the chairman of this committee emphasizing we should not be directly arming the kurds in consultation with the Iraqi Government. Because there were no delays. And, yet, the president now has come out and said that we will be arming them in an expedited manner. Well, if there were no delay, i dont understand why now we need an additional, you know, several hundred mens of our Armed Services on the ground in iraq and that we are expediting the process. If there were no delay, we dont need to be expediting the process. So i just needed to clarify that. Because it was stated a number of times that we were directly arming the kurds, which secretary kerry had said last year he doesnt have the authority. The president doesnt have the authority to do. I still believe we need to be directly arming them in consultation with the Iraqi Government. Following the fall of ramadi, general dempsey, you stated that if the kurds fail to take measures to be more inclusive with sunnis, kurds or other groups u. S. Support for the Central Government could be curtailed. And, sir, considering the fall of the most western part of iraq to isis that doesnt trigger a Decision Point on the part of the Iraqi Government in its commitment to iraq or you know, im just not sure what else the Iraqi Government needs to fail at before the administration changes its strategy on how we support our willing partners in iraq. The kurdish peshmurga, they are willing partners. They r. I think we need to do more for them. We cannot defeat isis in iraq by continuing to beg, hope and pray that the sectarian Iraqi Government, which is still overshadowed. We have heard it a number of times by you know, previous Prime Minister maliki in iran. We dont think that they were vigorously defend the iraqi people equally. I dont believe they will. But weve talked also about being more inclusive. That was mentioned again. More inclusive. I hear this time and time again. But what i would like a definition of what does more inclusive look like and how do we measure more inclusive, gentleman, if you would address that please. I would begin by noting the words of Prime Minister abati when he was here. I think he used the word decentralized iraq and that is one in which there is a Central Government in baghdad and an integral state of iraq. But there is substantial opportunity for Self Determination around the country amongst sunnis among shias and among kurds. It seems to me thats a wise way of approaching what multisectarianism means. I think a government in baghdad that allows the different parties there a degree of self derrylation to maintain security within their own territory and to zbompb themselves, share in things like the oil wealth of the country and so forth, that is what he says he is for. And thats the way he described it when he was here in washington to all of that. And that is in my judgment certainly better than the alternative, which is sectarian disintegration, which could still occur in iraq. But i think we all looking into that abyss know what resides there. Its further violence for the citizens of iraq and further opportunity for groups like isil that dont arent preoccupied with the longterm welfare of the territories they occupy. They want to use them for further violence. So that is Prime Minister abatis definition. I think were trying to support it in his aspiration to make good on that definition. Thank you general. Anything to add there . Just militarily, what well be watching for in terms of the intentions of the government of iraq and its control over groups that are not directly responsive to the ministry of defenses whether there is retribution, whether they allow, it was tikrit i think i was saying after they are recaptured we are watching, its worth watching on whether they are able to return to their homes or not. I think the same will be true once ramadi is recaptured and well probably be watching how the campaign in fallujah unfolds to ensure that the Popular Mobilization forces propagate a campaign thats not characterized by retribution and dramatic collateral damage. Those are all things to watch carefully. I think we have willing partners there. I think we need to assist those willing partners. One further comment to just very briefly. You had stated you havent seen a request list from the kurds on the type of equipment and arms that they need. Is that correct . I have seen such requests. Weve honored such requests. Weve shipped a lot of equipment. I should once again repeat its not just the United States. There are a number of countries that are equiping the kurds and in some cases they prefer the equipment of germany antitank and thats fine with us. The germans are providing that. That is one thing. I know the president barzani had presented to us with his visit with the member of the Senate Arms Services committee. I wanted to make sure they were clear on that and they have provided a list. They did. We discussed exactly the same list. I discussed it for others the Germany Defense minister i mentioned when i was in germany, a couple weeks ago. Her commitment to do exactly the same. Theyve done a great job of equiping the kurds. Thats an example of a competent ground force that also governs within the territory that it controls and thats really the, what were looking for in that entire region. Its going to be hard to get. But its what we are looking for. They are there. I know they are willing. So thank you gentleman very much. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator cane. Thank you to our witnesses today. I have a number of questions and concerns about the Ongoing Mission against isil, which ill address but ive got to begin by saying my concerns about the Administration Strategy pale pale next to my concerns about congress and what congress is doing. What congress is supposed to do is to pry budget to you to defend the nation and win this combatle and congress is supposed to authorize a war that is now 11 months in. We are not done either. We are not giving you a budget. We are using a gimmick and whether the gimmick is the gimmicks of the past continuing resolutions, or the current gimmick dejour write is a use of nonrecurring oco funding. Were not giving you the bucket. Were not doing it lets just be blunt, congress to this point has decided that the budget caps enacted in august of 2011 is a Higher National priority than defeating isil. And as long as we view that as a Higher National priority than defeating isil were not going to give you the budget that you need. It is my hope as you testified, secretary carter that we will find a better path. Something like a murrayryan budget deal. I know the share has been significant in speaking out for this as well. But were not doing what we ought to be dock on the budget side and we are also not doings what we ought to be doing under article 2 section 8. Tomorrow is the initiation of the Bombing Campaign in irbil. We have 3500 people dough employed away from their families risking their lives, aside from a single vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in december, there has not been a house act of any significance. There has not been a meaningful debate about whether or not we should be engaged in this war. Even though threequarters of the memberles of congress by my estimation believe there should be military action with differences in detame. We dont want to have a debate and vote. We dont want to put our names on it. We dont want to be heldth ablheld accountable. Congress is not doing either of the two things we are uniquely supposed to do. Provide you a budget to win and authorize war. And. That i think we could make our criticisms have a much greater legitimacy as an institution we are to do what we are supposed to do. I just returned from the region and quick summary senator donnelly mentioned it. We are achieving some significant successes against isil in some parts of the battlefield. In iraq and syria, largely in the areas where we are relying on partners with the kurds. The krg, Regional Government in iraq and kurds in the north of sir 82. President barzani, we met him on sunday in irbil i guess two sundays ago. He said this, this is very important. Especially for anybody that says the u. S. Doesnt have a strategy. He said thank you to the United States of america. If the president had not started a Bombing Campaign on august 8th near irbil we might not be here today. That Bombing Campaign likely helped save the existence of the krg, which has been a good partner and they lead with that. They dont lead with were not getting weapons they deny lead with were not working with backed baghdad. They save our region, save our way of life. Thats important for us to acknowledge. That wasnt by accident. Thats a strategy. We helped save an important allie by acting the president acting when he did. There are challenges too. The iraqi unification challenge was very patent as we met with Prime Minister abati. And there is mixed reviews positive on the intent mixed on the followthrough. In the sunni area, in particular, a lot of criticism. Some support the anbar governor supports what Prime Minister abati is doing. A lot of the trialal leaders dont and a lot of the tribal leaders dont think were doing what we could do. When they look at what were doing with the kurd they compare with what were not doing with them, it sticks in their craw and finally the challenges in syria are significant. Let me ask you this question today front page article in the Washington Post dealing with the routing of isil in northern syria. Quote, the unexpected route of ishroomic state forces across a wide arc of territory in the northeastern syria heartland has exposed as a resultnerablys in the ranks of the militants and limits in the u. S. Strategy device to confront them. Islamic state fighters have been driven out of a 33rd of their flagship province of raka in recent wooekd weeks by a Kurdish Force that emerged as one of the effective partners in the war. The offensive has deprived the militants of control of tear most important Border Crossing with turkey and forced them onto the defensive in their self proclaimed capital of raka city, something that would have been unthinkable as recently as a month ago. Thats whats happening right now. But every success has a challenge. And there is a worm in this apple. The worm is this as we have succeeded in our partnership with the kurds in northern syria, its caused grave concern by the turkish government. Its caused dprav concern by a number of the other sunni forces in syria that were partnering with. How do we continue to manage the kurds to be successful in the battle against isil and partner with them to be successful without causing additional undue challenges in our effort to also help sunnis be successful against isil . Thank you and, by the way, thank you, once again for traveling there. Its much appreciated. Let me start with the turks. Turkey is, has a long common border with both syria and iraq, which has remained disturbingly permable to foreign fighters and to resupply throughout the course of this conflict. And we have some people actually talking to the turks just today as the chairman alluded to a while ago. In order to try to get the turks to up their game, they are a nato allie. Hay have a strong stake in things instable to their south. I believe they could do more along the border. And so in the meantime it is true the kurds are acting and because the kurts are capable of acting, we are supporting them and that is successful and it does threaten raka. I think the tension with respect to the sunnis is best managed in in the way we are hoping Prime Minister abati will manage it. Namely, by letting them each succeed within their own territory, defeat isil and have substantial, his word is decentralization of governance in iraq that gives allows them a substantial opportunity to determine their own destiny within the territory that they control. That is what multisectarianism in iraq would mean if you indicated its a lot tougher in syria but thats the objective that we have to have sunnis, i would like to see the sunni tribesmen, the tribal leaders that you met with be as successful as the kurds are. We would welcome that. Thats what were trying to stimulate in el takata. As the chairman indicated and i indicated within we have a camable ground force the way we can support over the weekend the kurds in the north with air power. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I also want to agree with the line of your questioning earlier. I think it would be absolutely foolish for us not to clarify the rules of engrajment for the syrian trained folks back in the field to make clear the u. S. Will support them as they come under attack by the assad regime. For them to come back in, we would lose our credibility if we dont provide that. I would encourage the administration to clarify that aspect. Thank you i have been asking that question a long time. I keep getting the answer where we havent made the policy decision. Its shameful to send people in and not assure them that we will defend them against attacks by bombs. Senator graham. Thank you. To build on what we are talking about. Do we have the Legal Authority to assist a Free Syrian Army that we train against assad . Is there a doubt about that . I am not sure about the legalities of it senator, to be quite honest. Im not. Lets put it this way if there is any doubt about whether we have the Legal Authority to protect the troops we train against assad please let the committee know you dont have to answer right now. But thats a big decision that there is a lack of Legal Authority, i want to know why and what can we do to fix it . I appreciate. That i take that back. General dempsey, thank you for decades of service. I really appreciate that. General dempsey, would you agree there are more safe hampbs, more weapons with more capability to strike the homeland since any time since 911 . Thank you for your as much as i know you are retired recently. Yes. Do you believe isil is expanding in other countries as we speak . Yes. Okay. When it comes to iraq, do you both agree petitioning iraq into three separate countries is probably not a bible strategy . I certainly agree with that. Do you agree the sunni world would object to giving the southern part of iraq to iran . Thats what would happen right if we petition the south . Do you all agree with that . Yeah, that sounds like sectarianism to me. We know what lies down that road. And independent kurdistan is going to create a lot of upheaval with turkey and the region as large. Do you agree with that . A separate independent state it would be problematic and within iraq, i think a stashlg autonomy with a decentralized by integral iraq is possible. I agree. Do you agree with that, general . I do sir. So petitioning that is not a bible strategy. As to the kurds do any of you believe, either one of you believe the kurds have the ability, will to go in and deliberate ramadi . Ill start that. I think they may have the ability and we are obviously trying to facilitate their movement south. Whether they have the will is another matter. The only reason that i say that is that theyre getting at that point to the edge of the territory that is kurdish. Well thats my point. For anybody to suggest the kurds have answer to all of our problems i frankly dont know the middle east. The kurds are fought going to liberate syria. Do you all agree with that . Theyre a part of the component. But theyre not going to be the liberating force. Part of the component, sure. As to assad . What is more likely, president Obama Leaves Office in 2017 . Or assad goes first . Well, its certain that president obama will leave. No i know that there so thats an easy question, but then its turning on whether assad will be in power then. Who leaves first, obama or assad . Well, i certainly hope its assad. Yeah, i do but i dont think so. So the bottom line, if assad stays in power, do you worry about jordan and lebanon being a victim of a war on sir 82 if it continues the way its going, that jordan and lebanon will become a casualty of a war in syria . I think jordan and lebanon are already suffering from the effects of war . It could even get worse . Thats exactly the concern we should all have about, one of the concerns we should have about what is going on in syria. Its not just the Syrian People. Its the neighbors as well. Do you agree that no arab force is going to go in and fight isil alone unless you put assad on the table . I see what youre getting at. It gets back to our train and equip program. We are finding people who are whose principle security fear for their own people and this is really for their own villages is isil. Well. So theyre willing to go and fight against isil. There are others who want to fight against assad. Thats another matter. Heres my point. Theyre recruiting more foreign fighters than we are training for the Free Syrian Army t. Math doesnt work. This is never going to result in assad or isil being degraded or destroyed. The only way i see isil to be degraded or destroyed is for the very ground force regional in nature to go into syria. Do you believe, do you agree with me no ground force made up of turks, saudis, egyptians, you name it are going into syria to fight isil unless one of the goals is to replace assad . Theyre not going to give half of syria to iran . That sound sensible to me. And i certainly wish that such a force would be created. One of the great disappointments in all of this is the sunni world more broadly isnt more involved . Lets dig into that for moment. If we went to turkey egypt saudi arabia tomorrow and said, we would like to use your armies, well be integrated. Would you agree with me for them to say yes that we would have to make assad a target of that army . And are we willing to do that . I would guess that its very hypothetical. Because sadly none has indicated the willingness to do anything of that circumstance. I see what youre driving at which is will the rest of sunni the sunni middle east participate in this conflict . I certainly wish they would. The one answer i know, senator is for the turks. The turks have stated their position which is that they definitely want assad to go. And the conditions for any participation so far has been that they want to fight against assad. Well, i would suggest you do the following. You travel a lot. We went to qatar saudi arabia, all over the middle east. They told us we would gladly join forces with you upon the condition that assad is a part of the targets. And nobody in the United States will tell them whether or not were willing to take assad on militarily as part of the ground force . So i would suggest instead of being upset with the sunni arab world that our problems lie within ourselves, that were not putting assad on the table militarily. Do you agree with that . Do you think assad is on the table militarily . Senator as im sure you know his position on the battlefield is more tenuous today than it has been for a long time. And i dont think it is but the point is our efforts designed to take assad out militarily . Or are we focusing on no, our approach has been stated clearly for some time, try to find a political exit for bashar assad rather than a u. S. Led military exit. That is the approach. Thank you. Thank you. And thank both of you for your decades of service. That includes you mr. Secretary, because you have given decades. I want to follow up on that line of quiestioning. So if assad exited tomorrow what would be the likely strategy that we would use going period . Period . Our strategy would be to encourage the moderate opposition as to partner with the structure of the government of damascus not directly associated with assad or with his deplorable behavior. I think we can determine what that is. Keep the structures in place. Unify with a moderate syrian open six and create a new government which is more reflective of the aspirations of the populous than assads is and then they would in turn need to go and reclaim their territory from isil and i think the United States and the rest of the International Coalition would be pleased to support them in that. And does assad exiting sooner rather than later, does that create conditions that are so chaotic for the interests of the United States or is the interest of the United States in him leaving sooner than later . I think sooner and in a way as i indicated that the reason for to get back to the earlier line of questioning, for a political rather than a military transition, for us to support and seek that is that it is less disruptive, less chaotic less sparks sectarianism and therefore violence. Thats why its much preferred over a simple toppling of assad, because you dont know whats on the other side of a simple toppleing of assad. I know its unsatisfying to talk about a political transition when he, himself gives very little indication of wanting to do that. But that is much to be preferred if we can have that. Otherwise, we know what happens when these countries disintegrate. And were a political solution to be found for his exit which of course, is going to be difficult with iran being his mentor . But Vladimir Putin could be instrumental in arrangeing some kind of exit strategy, but were it to be a political solution do you think it reasonable that there would be some accommodation so that the aloite minority would not be slaughtered . I think there has to be that ingredient. First of all the alouite community will fight for the territory in the northwest. But once again, thats further conflict, further civil war and ethnic cleansing of any kind is the kind of thing you could see on the other side of a collapse there and we know how tragic that is for people. What would his arranged exit do with regard to hezbollah and will they resist it the whole way . Hezbollah has been one of the principle supporters of the assad regime. So they do not give any indication of welcoming the path that were discussing here t. Russians perhaps and i know that we have been in contact with the russians about that over the years and certainly i think that they would, if they threw their weight behind such a be influential with assad. And so i certainly hope they would, but i have no confidence as i sit here right now that they will. When mr. Secretary, when you look at a map like this, a map of syria that i assume you handed out. Somebody did. Thats a mess. And maybe it is the only solution is the solution of a political exit for assad. So that we can go after these extremist elements. By the way, i had to leave the committee to do an interview on cnn. And the whole focus that they wanted to jump on was your statement earlier in the hearing that we had only trained up 6 00, but i pointed out to them what you said was the vetting was very difficult and, in fact we are vetting some several thousand s thousands additional. And the vetting is a lot more tortuous because you dont want to have a guy trained up and then he turns arn and ss around and aims his gun back at us. In iraq do you think that this new Prime Minister has the capability of getting out of his shiite mold and does he have the capability of bringing in all the shiites with all the iranian influence in his government in order to reach out with an olive branch to the sunnis . Thank you. With respect to the first part of your remarks im always going to be truthful with you. And the number is 60. And i think weve stated that number before, but i said it today, and i always tell the truth. And that is a small class. It results from the fact that that is the number that got through the very rigorous vetting and Selection Process we have. General nagata that runs that program believes he has learned a lot. He has 7,000 behind that. So i expect those numbers to increase. But i wanted to tell the truth and i did tell the truth we expect that number to improve, but you deserve to know where things stand. And im telling you where things stand. With respect to a body there id abadi, he has spoke to us and i believe to many of you as well his intention to proceed in a way thats distinctly different from the way his predecessor proceeded which led to the situation we now have in iraq. Were certainly supporting him in that regard but one can see that his intentions are contested in baghdad and so we continue to support him. To get back to the earlier question we believe that a multisectarian future for iraq is the best for peace and defeat of isil. But he will have substantial influence over that but its clear he doesnt have absolute control in baghdad. We are supporting him. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And thank you, secretary carter and general dempsey for being here today. General dempsey i especially want to thank you for your decades of service to your country and to the cause of freedom. We wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors. Im not sure whether this will be the last time were privileged to speak with you in a hearing, but regardless, please note how much we appreciate all youve done for our country. I want to thank the men and women deployed in iraq and so many other places in the middle east and for their service to our country. Although theyve not been labeled combat troops, theyre still operating under dangerous and uncertain circumstances and are far removed from their families and the people they love. I want to follow up on the discussion between senator Mccain Mccain and secretary carter on how we might support Syrian Rebels once they return from training. Mr. Secretary, you stated that you believe we have an obligation to those we train to provide them with protection, and i agree with that. And i also believe we have an obligation to let the American People know and that you have an obligation to let Congress Know and help us to fully understand what the strategy entails what that means. And the funding, the time and the effort that providing any such protection might entail and what it will necessitate. So can you tell us when will the department of defense fully explain to the American People and to congress what the strategy will involve, what its going to cost our government. You know ive said this before, but this is something that should have been made clear last year when the president came up with this plan, but regard also its better late than never. Its good that we do it now rather than not at all. Can you tell us when that might occur . I continuously ill continuously tell you whats going on. Over there with respect to what were doing in iraq and what were doing with respect to syria. And were going to have to we have an obligation to support those fighters. Well have to decide which way when we introduce them. But i think the main thing is that we increase that number from what is now a very small number, and im not surprised that its running on television into a much larger number. I think we can do that. And the officer that runs this program believes that he will be able to do that. And well keep you apprised of our progress, and ill tell you every day what i know as ive done here today. Thank you. I appreciate that and look forward to that. Now, u. S. Strategy in syria is to empower the quote unquote, moderate opposition to defeat isis and to put enough pressure on the assad regime to achieve some type of negotiated peace settlement. For the sake of discussion, lets say if these moderates are successful in degrading isis to the point that theyre no longer a factor in syria, what does pressuring assad or his supporters into a negotiated settlement look like at that point, especially given the support from iran and hezbollah they currently enjoy. Specifically what role will the United States play in bringing about the pressure and support to achieve this kind of element . I think the way it would look, the outcome that we are aiming for, is one in which Bashar Al Assad and those who have been associated with his atrocities in syria are removed and but the structures of government in damascus and iraq that remain continue on, are in an inclusively governed way that the is multisectarian to include alawites and others and that can then turn to the task of regaining its sovereign territory from isil to the east in a project that would look like that were working with baghdad to accomplish in the west in iraq. Thats the postassad transition that would be the best for the Syrian People and the best for our counterisil strategy. By the way, do you believe the 2001 authorization for use of military force gives authority necessary to engage the assad Regime Forces that may come into conflict with any rebels we may train . Im going to be very careful about how i answer a legal question in that regard, and i prefer to get back to you in that regard. Okay. Now, mr. Secretary, what level of command and control in your opinion does isis leadership have over these various affiliate groups across the middle east and Northern Africa as well as lone wolf individuals or groups in europe and the western hemisphere . Its mixed, but in the main not entirely but in the main, what one sees is a mixture of groups that were already radicalized and are already intent upon attacking the west or attacking western interests or destabilizing things in the middle east, rebranding themselves as isil because of this seeming success it had. And then to get to the loan wolf part you see people who have had no training, no association with it, including americans, who go on the internet and find themself shave had no training, no association with it,