So i wanted to also ask about this idea, weve heard a lot about sanctions. And sanctions as i understand, iran has written the United Nations on july 20th about the sanctions regime. And one of the issues that has concerned me about this agreement is that once the sanctions, the long list of mainly congressally mandated sanctions that will be lifted under this agreement are undertaken if iran for example, engaged in terrorist activity, which is known to do, separate from the Nuclear Program, iran seems to have taken the position in its letter to the u. N. And ive actually read the agreement, and ive been concerned that the agreement provides the same that in fact, iran says it has understood that reintroduction or reimposition including through extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance which would relieve iran from its commitments in part or in whole. So my question is as i read this, im deeply concerned that if we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues related to their terrorist activities and support for terrorism, which is another tool in the toolbox, general, aside from our military options that iran can then walk away from this agreement. And if the answer is you disagree with this characterization, please tell me where in the plain language of this agreement am i wrong. Senator the language says we cant reimpose the Nuclear Sanctions if iran complies with the Nuclear Agreement. We have never given away any of our ability to use other sanctions, regimes. Terrorism or human rights or secretary lew, with all due respect, the Nuclear Sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would impose in other contexts, too, including on crude oil, oil and gas senator. On revenues. We reserve the right if theres a financial sfugs thats engaging in financing terrorism to put sanctions back on that institution, that is not a violation of the agreement. It is not a nuclear sanction. But iran seems to take a different position. Well, what iran does believe is that we can take the Nuclear Sanctions, put a different label on them and put them right into place. And what we would have to do is make the case, as we have on many occasions that institutions should be sanctioned for their behavior on terrorism, human rights and regional destabilization. We will continue to do that vigilantly and all of the sanctions that apply in that area still stand. Theres no restraint. Thank you mr. Chairman and general dempsey, thank you also. Of every time we say goodbye to you, you come back in another week on another panel. I know its not by choice but were thrilled to have you here again. Thank you very much for your service. Mr. Secretary, secretary of energy, if a year from now we have suspicions that something is going on does the iaea have access to go inside that building and see it or not . Well, again we certainly have, through the initial protocol and this agreement, access anywhere that there is suspicious of nuclear activity. The protocols, again i would have to see with the iaea. It is certainly a different forwardlooking its very different from revolving the possible military dimensions. We need to know forward looking on this whether it is parchin or other military facilities, does the iaea have access to go inside those . They certainly must have the access granted to, again resolve the issues that they need to resolve, and they must have integrity in the process. And if they do not, senator they would be in material breach of the agreement. Okay. So this is different moving forward than what has gone in the past. Its not only yes, it is different, and theres a different mechanism to bring it to a close for the 15 years. But even under the Additional Protocols, speaking to senator mccains concern about north korea, the lesson of north korea produced the Additional Protocol. Secretary lew and maybe secretary kerry on this one of the proposals thats been put forward is to say no to this deal and then to tell the other countries who are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative is to simply say to france germany britain and others, choose us or choose them as you move forward economically that, you know, if youre going to continue to do business with iran, then you cant do business with us. Do you see that as viable moving forward . Senator, we do have powerful tools that make it very dangerous for foreign business to violate u. S. Laws. And if they do business and violate our sanctions, we will enforce. Whether we can do that against the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is simple that we have to have serious considerations about. It is one thing when were taking action in concert with the world. Its another thing if were standing on our own. So the ability of a technical sanction to work is not the same as it being effective or necessarily adding up to what we would like to accomplish. Okay. Secretary carter, have you i know youre talking to the gcc countries. You have been in the region there. It seems to me that one of the challenges here is confidence. Confidence that theyll be safe, that israel be safe. Thats what this comes from is making sure that your child can be safe and sleep safe that night. And thats what mr. Netanyahu was trying to ensure and thats what were trying to ensure. So as you look at it when you talk to our gcc friends and others is there any putting together of a plan that says to iran not one more inch . That as we move forward, youll see from year to year to year that in yemen, not one more inch that against hezbollah, there will be massive retaliation if theres actions, that well stand with the sunni tribal leaders in anbar to make sure they have success and will be viable and strong against whatever, you know, efforts iran has in iraq to lay out the plan, let people know, let iran know in advance it would help create, i think, a better sense of confidence that theres a reason that theres a reason to stand with us. I think thats extremely important, and that is what the gcc countries are looking for in my conversations with them, namely the continued commitment of the United States to help them protect themselves so they can sleep well at night maintain our regional role counter irans maligned influence and activities. At the same time, they recognize perfectly well what has been said up here, which is an iran with Nuclear Weapons would be an enormous problem, and are supportive of an agreement that heads that off. But at the same time they want to make sure that were there. Thats what the gcc countries were told at camp david by the president. And my trip was in part to solidify all of the things were doing were just about out of time. I just want to say i think its important to publicly state and not one inch more policy and then additionally, i am not at all comfortable with our people who are still in iran. They have to come home. I wish they had come home as part of this agreement. I know you do, too. But this cannot rest because we dont leave anybody behind. And we dont intend to leave them behind either. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator fisher. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Secretary muniz, id like to follow up a little bit on what senator blumenthal was asking you about with regards to the breakout time. What are some of the main factors that you consider when you calculate that breakout time . Well the key factors are the enrichment capacity and the stockpile of enriched uranium but there are many other factors as well which come in such as the rate at which additional capacity could be built in during a breakout time. So all of this comes into our National Laboratory evaluation. That would include the number of centrifuges as well, is that correct . Correct. After 15 years of this agreement, what limits do you think will be in place on those things that you just mentioned . Well after 15 years, they will probably expand their capacity after those restraints. And thats why such a key element are the verification measures that we put in place for all time basically. So were talking about tracking the Nuclear Material to make sure its not diverted from a civilian program correct . And thats 25 years, right. Correct. We are basically just checking irans math, correct . Checking the math. No, were checking our math, if you like. So the idea is to follow sfroo were were checking our math. And for 20 years weve followed all the manufacturing. So its the supply chain that we follow. Making a and our intelligence people will tell you that to actually reproduce the entire supply chain covertly probably in multiple places would be very, very difficult to conceal. And were just looking at of course the declared facilities is that correct . No we have we have, of course, strong measures in the declared facilities, but key is the undeclared facilities, which by definition ultimately rests on the actions of our and our allies and friends intelligence capacity. And do you believe well, do you have confidence in that capacity that we will be able to locate any undeclared facilities and pressure iran to allow us to make sure that we have verification in those as well . Well again, i would go back to the statements of general clapper and cardillo and cohen. Again, clapper said specifically that this will give us much greater insight into what theyre doing. That, then, leads us and other intelligence agencies that we work with to point iaea in the right place, and now we have a unique new tool of a finite time to get access to that place or they are in material breach. Are you concerned at all on what i view as the discrepancies between statements made by our administration and compare those to what is being statements being made by the adviser to the Supreme Leader when it comes to access to allowing the iaea to look at the military centers in iran, where i think i believe ive heard our administration say that we do have access to those. They are declared facilities. But yet the adviser to the Supreme Leader says the access of inspectors from the iaea or from any other body to irans military centers is forbidden. Whos correct on that . I think we are correct. First of all, i just might point out that there were many statements made before luzon, before vienna this one was made july 21st. Yes, maam, but im saying there were many statements made before then, and you can check those statements against the agreement. They dont square up all the time, shall we say. Now, in terms of the how are you reconciling those . Those statements were very clear. First of all, the aim is not to go to military sites. And by the way its not us its iaea, of course. The aim is to go to where there is is there suspicious or suspicion of nuclear relevant activities . If they are in a military site, it doesnt matter. Theres still the iaea access to those sites. I only have a few seconds left. But i would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the public. We cannot control their statements. Youve stated that the 24day waiting period for International Inspectors wont allow the regime to conceal any illegal activity, but as i read the agreement and many other people have pointed out, the inspectors request to visit those sites could be delayed much longer than 24 days. I know that youre not concerned about the 24day period. Do you believe that we would or the iaea would be able to handle that, but if you look at different parts in section q of annex 1 of the agreement, i think we have the potential that were looking at an 89day delay. Do you think that would be possible, and how confident are you about us being able to inform them . We certainly cannot allow for that. I might say i did not say any illegal activity. I focused specifically or especially on activity with Nuclear Material as my real focus, number one. Number two is the iaea has and any sign of lack of cooperation, they have to launch the process with their request for access. Then comes the 24 days. As i mentioned also there is in the unclassified literature an example in iran of a sixmonth delay, an attempt to conceal, which did not work. They were caught redhanded. You said you wouldnt allow the 89day, you just couldnt allow that. What how many days after 24 days would you allow . No not after 24 days, its that the process to launch the formal request for access from iaea has got to be prompt. That launches the 24day clock, and thats the end. You would not allow anything past that . I would not. Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman and thank you all for joining us. Thank you for your intense work on this. Obviously, we all care about the National Security of the United States and our allies. Secretary muniz, you and i had a very long conversation about nuclear details. And what id like you to discuss with the committee specifically, is the Nuclear Capabilities that iran has today are considerable. And most experts have given it a two to threemonth time frame to have enough enriched uranium for one bomb. Id like you to talk a little bit about their nuclear expertise, and if left unchecked, how quickly can they ramp up to greater production, to more highly enriched uranium excluding this deal arrangement . And then after you describe that, i would like you to describe what the rampup time would look like post8, 10 15 years. Because what i understand from reading the agreement is that youve spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so that they dont run a military risk. And so id like that more fully described. And obviously, and the last point i want you to address is my constituents are very concerned about clandestine operations. To the extent you can talk about it in this setting, i would like you to address how you detect a clandestine ebbnrichment facility during at greemt. Quite a few questions, senator. In terms of their current capacity, well they have again, demonstrated the capacity to rehn itch uranium, thats clear. But i do want to emphasize that theyve also demonstrated they have enriched to 20 enrichment. 20 is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high enriched uranium. But the point here is that the amount of work needed to get to 20 is nearly all the work you need to get to 90 , which would be weapons grade. So they have the capability. And as ive already mentioned they are already have full cascades running of the next generation five times more powerful. This agreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. So whats critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. Now, in terms of the breakout time, again, the president was very clear and our p5 1 partners were very clear. The quantitative criterium for the negotiation was there had to be at least a oneyear breakout time in terms of fissile material it ten years. Weve accomplished this. Our Lab Scientists are fully behind this, as are those of other countries. Then that will roll off. And after 15 years at some point, fendingdepending upon what they do, then we may revert to the current kinds of breakout times for fissionable material. We still need to keep the lid on weaponization activities and make sure those are not taken. And that was a notable improvement from luzon to vienna. Right. So the agreement says they cant ever make the steps towards weaponization . And thats the point where we will be much better off at that time than today because we will still have enhanced verification procedures that can point our and other intelligence agencies to any violations. And after modifications at iraq, is there any way that you can reverse those modifications and make it a heavy water plutonium facility again . The iraq reactor, in its redesign would provide us, in this language, a breakout time of years. Right. But to unwind, it would be significant. Because once its online they would have they would need years of operation to get enough plutonium to be relevant. And the iaea would detect their change of the operation within one or two months. And with regard to forta whats the assess am there . After modifications, if they wanted to breach the agreement and try to get up and running again, and that take a significant amount of time in well, first of all yes. First of all, most of the centrifuges and infrastructure will not only be stripped out completely, but they will not even be stored. They must be taken up to natanz. Secondly, we will have a Major International not only iaea daily presence but an international presence, the russians working with them on stable icesotopes. If they kick everybody out you know the alarm bells will go off. Secretary carter with my last few seconds do our military options become marginally better or worse before or after the agreement . If the agreement is implemented, they become marginally better for the reason that the agreement the facilities are we learn more about them many of them are dismantled. And so in that sense, that purely technical military sense becomes somebodys ear. Senator cotton. Thank you. I want to discuss the two secret side deals between the iaea and iran. I had to travel to vienna last weekend. The administration has now confirmed their existence. Theres still some lack of clarity about their content. Secretary kerry have you read either of these two side deals between the iaea and iran . No, i havent read it. Have you read any previous drafts . No i havent. On any form paper, tablet, computer . I have been briefed ive been briefed through our team that met with the iaea. Did anyone on your team read the text of these agreements . I believe one person may have read it at the facility but doesnt have it they dont possess it. What is that persons name . I its possible i dont know for sure but its possible Wendy Sherman but i dont know that for sure. Secretary moniz, have you read the text of these agreements . No, sir. I have not seen them. Have you read any prior version . No, sir. On any medium computer, tablet, phone . Nope. Has anyone on your team at the department of energy . Not im not sure. I dont know. I think not, but i am not sure about that. I can ask in terms of the technical team, maybe saw something. Please do and get back to us. Okay. Secretary kerry, besides potentially undersecretary sherman, has, to your knowledge anyone else in the United States reviewed the text of these agreements . Not that im aware of. I dont know. I dont think so. If undersecretary sherman