Because you havent been see havenest anyone been gaming on office anyway he had been gaming on us anyone. This month marks the 70 anniversary of the end of the war in the pacific. Hasegawasuyshi discusses this. Following the authors remarks, American UniversityProfessor Emeritus robert reflects on the event. Theamerican heritage Woodrow WilsonInternational Center posted this event in 2006. It is a little under 90 minutes. Christian with that, let me briefly our distinguished speaker, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, an authority, really, in the field of Cold War International history. He needs no introduction, so let me keep it brief. Because time is brief as well. He is a professor of modern russian history as well as the codirector of the center for cold war studies at the university of california, santa barbara. He earned his phd from the university of washington, and he has a distinguished, long a publication list that precedes his new book, racing the enemy. Let me just mention a couple of the major publications, he is the author of the nortehn dispute and russian relations, he has the the february revolution in russia, and russia and japan an unresolved dilemma between distant neighbors, and of course, has published numerous articles in journals in the field. His new book, racing the enemy, is a reassessment of the end of the pacific war, particularly in light of new russian and other evidence previously not taken into consideration. It is one could probably say the First International history of the end of the war and i look forward to his remarks. Now professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa has the floor. Tsuyoshi thank you, christian, thank you, hope. It is my pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss my book, racing the enemy. Stalin, truman, and the surrender of japan. Since its publication in may, the book has provoked more interest than expected. If you know the internet site devoted to diplomatic history, they have recently, they have organized a round table discussion of my book, and mobilizing the worldrenowned specialist on the topic of the end of the war, bernstein, the head honcho of this subject. Also, David Holloway and Michael Gordon and richard frank. So if you are interested, you can log on and look at the site. It is quite extensive. Richard franks comment on my book is 38 pages, singlespaced, in a comment. [laughter] tsuyoshi bernsteins comment is not as along as i claim, it is tsuyoshi bernsteins comment is not as along as i claim, it is only 20 pages, singlespaced, but he uses font 10. [laugher] tsuyoshi my response is consisting of only about 18 pages singlespaced font 12. [laughter] tsuyoshi so it is really nice to know that my book, in less than one year after the publication, is being discussed in such detail. What i would like to do today is very briefly, i would like to tell you why i wrote this book, and secondly, very, very briefly, tell you what it is about, and then i am going to take one example from the book and then to look at the issue of this in the international context, which is important when taking a look at this in international context. So that is the bulk of my time devoted to the subject. So first of all, why did i write this book, the end of the pacific war . Many books have been written about this for many reasons, and why should i add another book to the topic . In my opinion, the literature on the end of the war is balkanized. There are three distinct literatures. One is mostly american on the concentration of the dropping of the atomic bomb. The japanese literature is mostly focused on the political process of japans acceptance of the surrender, particularly the emperors role. And the least developed literature is the soviet role in the end of the pacific war. When i was writing on another territories book, one chapter was devoted to world war ii. And i realized how little was done on the soviet role, so i decided i would write the book and bring of the soviet role to the center stage. And i ended up writing an International History and incorporating all three aspects into one book. I am really convinced that you really cannot understand the aspects of american use of the atomic bomb or japans process of acceptance of surrender without really understanding the other, so that is why i decided to write the book. So basically, i am not going to go into the details of my argument. But basically, i make three arguments. One, is that there is an intense conflict, intense struggle between truman and stalin, between the soviet union and the United States, as to how to force japan to surrender. This is the struggle between truman and stalin. This is a competition between stalin and truman. Many people would say that leads to the atomic bomb. This is the first topic that i the argument that i make, and i challenge the commonlyheld view that it is the atomic bomb that provided the most decisive factor leading to japans surrender. So this is the first argument. And secondly, i examine very closely sovietjapanese relations. Then i focus how important the soviets became in policy, that is, the soviet union had a primary role in japanese foreignpolicy. And the other side of the story is how stalin exploited that situation to prepare for the war. This is the second argument and topic i pursue. And thirdly, the japanese domestic situation. How the conflict, the japanese war party that advocated the continuation of war, as well as the peace party that advocated peace, how they, particularly, how the peace Party Managed to maneuver the japanese process into accepting japanese surrender. That is the third topic that i pursue. I am not going to go into detail. I am sure we can discuss the subject if you are interested. Im sure you can ask about that aspect, but what i would like to do is to zero in on one very important topic, and that is the issue of the potsdam proclamation, which plays a very Important Role in my book, and i argue in order to understand this issue, you have to put everything into the international context, and this is one example showing the importance of international context. I distributed i have distributed a onepage document, and the first point is the simple draft proposal for the potsdam proclamation. The potsdam proclamation is the the potsdam proclamation is the ultimatum that the allied powers issued to japan. The first document is the draft that stimson gave to president truman before president truman left washington for potsdam. After this proposal itself, the draft proposal was actually written by the main agent that produced that document is the Organization Called opd, the Operational Division of the army. And then i give you the second document, that is the final form of the potsdam proclamation. I was going to give you a quiz, and you would have to compare the two. You notice immediately the two major differences. One, in the stimson proclamation, of course, the soviet union was expected to participate in the proclamation. Stalin was supposed to sign the declaration, right, the proclamation. The final form was that the soviet union would have stalin not abandon his signature. But the soviet union was excluded from the potsdam proclamation. The question is, of course, why . The second point is very important, paragraph 12 of the stimsons draft, that is stimsons draft contains a passage that allows the possibility of japan maintaining a Constitutional Monarchy under the current dynasty. In fact, as far as stimson and the opd was concerned, that is the linchpin of the entire proclamation draft, because opd said it was very important that this be issued to japan so it could terminate the war before we launched the final invasion. So his idea is that the potsdam would modify the surrender so that the japanese could maintain their own election system. Now to look at the final form, now to look at the final form, that is excised. The question of course is why . Now, we know and understand that we have to go back a little bit to understand the background. When truman came to power in april 1945, he basically faced two dilemmas. Previous to his assumption of power, of course, the in 1945, the United States under fdr with stalin concluded the socalled yalta agreement, which pledged an end of the war against japan after the surrender of germany in return for all kinds of promises, railway, of course, supplies, and of course, some territory held by japan. Just remember that in return, you know that for stalin to gain these war trophies, the soviet union had to enter the war. Okay . At this time, of course, the at this time, of course, the United States needed soviet participation, they thought, and they thought that this was a precondition for invasion of japan because it was necessary to pin down the Japanese Army and the mandarin army in korea. Now there was conflict between the United States and the western allies and the soviet union over poland, Eastern Europe, and so truman and american politicians began to worry about the consequences of soviet expansion into asia. And so some policy makers, including truman, thought that if they could avoid it, they wished that they could avoid soviet entry into the war. At the same time, many were urging that the soviet entry would hasten the end of the war, and so therefore that would mean the sacrifice of american life. And so here is the dilemma. This is the first dilemma. The second dilemma is precisely that Unconditional Surrender demand. Truman was committed to the insistence of Unconditional Surrender, not because not merely because it was fdrs legacy, and not merely because it is the American Public opinion that demanded it, because American Public opinion was decisively against japan, against the japanese emperor. If you took a gallup poll, the majority of American Opinion would be in favor of hanging hirohito and putting him into exile and so on, so the American Public opinion was decidedly against japan. But also because he that is his gut reaction. He believes that to bring japan to its knees unconditionally, i think it is a just retribution of humiliation, for the humiliation that United States suffered. They think of all the atrocities the japanese have committed, and so they wanted to impose Unconditional Surrender on japan. On the other hand, his advisers, particularly after april, began to put pressure on truman. There is if you insist on Unconditional Surrender, the japanese will fight to the bitter end. We have to launch, really, the costly invasion. That will just make okinawa and the iwo jima look like childs play. So one sure way of ensuring early termination of the war was to promise japan and give them a assurance that they hope they will maintain the monarchial system. That will encourage the moderate element in japan to seek more earnestly for the termination of war. This is the idea. And truman has two conflicting dilemmas that he could not resolve. Where i am going to shift the gear to the soviet union. Stalin also faced a dilemma. As i said, stalin concluded in the yalta agreement that he had to enter the war, right . He had to enter the war. He was afraid that japan might surrender before the soviets were ready to enter. Ok . In april, 1945, the soviet union led the japanese government know that the soviet union and japan had a neutrality pact. The soviet union was the only country that maintained neutrality, but anyway, so in april of 1945, the soviet union notified the japanese government that they had no intentions to renew the neutrality pact when it expired, because as a provision of the neutrality pact, you would have to notify them one year before or else it would be renewed for five years, so the soviet government notified the japanese government that they had no intention to renew the neutrality pact. But it also let the japanese government know nonetheless that neutrality pact was still in effect until its term was up, that is, in april of 1946, fully intending that they are going to wage war against japan. So under the cloak of neutrality, stalin began to reinforce the forces in the far east. He began sending more troops, weapons to the far east, secretly preparing for war against japan. The question is, then how would he justify the violation of the neutrality pact to enter the war . And he did not want to be compared with hitlers attack on the soviet union, and hitler of course of the soviet neutrality pact, right . So how could we wage war against japan by violating the neutrality pact . Well, he wanted the United States to invade. When Harry Hopkins went to moscow in may, and promised that the issue of the ultimatum to japan would be placed at the upcoming potsdam conference. So if stalin was expected to be conservative on the issue, then he probably hoped that an ultimatum would be viewed as a declaration of war. So that is the game plan. Well, i am going to shift the year again. How about japan . In april, it was very clear that japan was not going to win the war or succeed. They accepted defeat. But defeat is not is different from surrender. They discussed, the policymakers discussed, what surrender terms. They could not decide on this idea the japanese peacemakers, the japanese policymakers, they were hopelessly divided on the issue. But one thing they could agree on that is that both the peace party and the war party were decisively against Unconditional Surrender. Because Unconditional Surrender, they interpreted it as the disruption of the emperor system. If they insist on Unconditional Surrender, they are going to fight until the bitter end. Both the war party and the peace party were in agreement. And so after of course the battle of okinawa is lost, finally the emperor himself came around to accept that it was time to terminate the war, and on july the 12 ambassador togo sent a very Important Message foreign minister togo, im sorry, foreign minister togo sent a very Important Message, and in that telegram, he said that the emperor now wishes to convey his desire to terminate the war, and therefore, the japanese government would request the soviet governments mediation to terminate the war. The first sign, very serious sign, of japanese willingness to terminate the war through mediation. But, he added, that if the allies insisted on Unconditional Surrender, then japan would have no choice but to fight the war to the bitter end. Okay . So thats thats the japanese dilemma. And so those are the situations if you follow the potsdam conference. And so the potsdam conference was open and it was held from july 17 until august 10, i mean august 2. In july the 16th you know, by the way, i must mention that when togo dispatched that telegram, of course, the United States intercepted the diplomatic dispatches. Through the magic interface. It was decoded and distributed to the highest members of the United States government, so truman knew and stimson knew that japan was very close to surrender, so they thought, if we demand Unconditional Surrender, then japan would fight it. Also, this dispatch of japanese request for mediation was exploited fully by stalin to prolong the war. The soviet government said, well, gee, we need more clarification. Right . So this is the situation. Then the potsdam conference was held. On july the 16th, stimson, encouraged by togos dispatch, went to truman did he said, mr. President , this is the first very important sign, and i urge you to adopt more than ever this paragraph 12, this Constitutional Monarchy, and we have a very good chance with japan. Now truman did not respond, he said, go see burns. So stimson went to go see burns, the secretary of state burns, and burns rejected it, he rejected that request. And he said this is according to stimson he said the president and i have worked out the timetable. This timetable, in my opinion, is a very, very important one. What timetable . A timetable for what . I think this is really key to understand the meaning of the potsdam proclamation. On july 17, truman and stalin met for the first time. There, stalin revealed the soviet intention to enter the war on or around august 15. Here, truman knew when stalin was going to enter the war. All right . But in order to understand this timetable, then there is another very important event that had to be taken into consideration. On july the 16th, the first atomic bomb exploded in new mexico. This was conveyed to washington and these reports reached truman on july 27. And in my opinion, therefore, here, the atomic bomb and soviet entry into the war and went to issue of the potsdam proclamation and the purpose of the proclamation is the meaning of timetable. Truman no longer needed soviet entry into the war. The atomic bomb resolved the first dilemma. Right . That we had the possibility to terminate the war by dropping the bomb on japan before the soviets entered the war. Secondly, also it resolved the second dilemma. We can impose Unconditional Surrender on japan and still japan would surrender immediately or shortly after the dropping of the bomb. And also, it fundamentally changed the nature of the ultimatum. The ultimatum was issued not for the purpose of inducing japan to accept earlier surrender, but, and this is the most radical interpretation i advance, and this is very controversial, but rather