Okay, thank you to those who came this morning. Thank you for staying. Thank everyone else who has just arrived. Im barbara slavin. I direct the future of iran initiative. We just had a fascinating discussion with the e3 ambassadors and the Eu Ambassador about the iran nuclear deal. And the challenges that are currently being presented to it from the United States. So were now going to look at the attitudes of the region toward the iran nuclear deal. Were going to examine whether there is support, strong support for the agreement, reservations about the agreement, concerned about u. S. Policy or support for u. S. Policy on the part of some of the main regional players. And im really delighted. I have three fabulous panelists to discuss these issues. First, were going to hear from hussein, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in washington. Arab gulf states. Its a modifier of the states, not the gulf. Okay. Okay, the arab gulf states that are across the persian gulf from iran. It doesnt say that either. Its neutral on the gulf. Hussein is a longtime friend. Im sure many of you have read his commentaries. Hes truly an expert on the region. Hes a weekly columnist with the national, which is based in the United Arab Emirates. He previously served as a senior fellow at the American Task force on palestine, and Communications Director for the american arab antidiscrimination committee. Then were going to hear from another dear friend who is executive director of a foundation at washington, d. C. This is the Turkish Foundation which has been very active for the past dozen years, ten years . How long now . Seven. Seven years. Yeah. At a time when, of course, turkeys policies have been very dynamic. He also served as assistant editor of inside turkey, an academic journal published. He holds a ph. D. In middle eastern, south asian, and south African Studies and a mastered degree. If anyone has attended the events, they know these are really interesting and give a lot of insight into how turkey sees the region. And then finally, we are really pleased to have ambassador hussein wasabi in here to talk about how iran is viewing all of these new challenges to the jcpoa. He is middle east security and Nuclear Policy specialist at princeton universitys Woodrow Wilson school. He served as irans ambassador to germany, head of the Foreign Relations committee of Irans National Security council, and spokesman for iran in its Nuclear Negotiations with the e3 from 2003 to 2005. Hes written a number of books on u. S. iran relations. His latest book, iran and the United States, an insiders view on the failed past and the road to peace, was released in may 2014. And hes just come back from several weeks, yeah, in iran. I think he has a very good sense of how iranians are viewing the debate thats going on in this country and in the region and in european capitals. So, let us begin. We have the impression, certainly have gotten the impression from some of the statements that have been coming, particularly from saudi arabia and from the United Arab Emirates that they are very happy about the shift in approach of the United States. They like the Trump Administrations approach to iran. They thought that president obama was much too soft on iran. That he didnt understand the dynamics of the region. Mmhmm. I guess the question is, do these countries, and well talk about the gcc as a whole, is is not monolithic, but lets start with saudi arabia and uae, do they want the jcpoa to continue . Or do they want it to be scrapped . Okay. Let me begin by saying thanks very much for having me. Its great to be here. And great to see old and new friends on this panel. Youre right, first of all, that theres a pretty interesting set of diverse opinions on a range of topics within the gcc. I think the jcpoa is one of the areas, the most contentious International Issues in which you find a relative consensus that is not is not disrupted by the confrontation between the quartet and qatar. In other words, there was a consensus before the standoff began, and the consensus remains now. And the consensus is still there. It includes, i think, saudi arabia and the uae as well as the other four gcc countries. So youre quite right that saudi arabia and the uae in particular and the others also to some extent as well, are happier with the Trump Administrations approach towards iran and its more confrontational attitude, with its willingness to put u. S. Differences with iran both in terms of irans regional policies, specific regional policies and conduct and pattern of behavior, and the disagreements between washington on the longterm goal, the vision of the future for the middle east, to the forefront. Both immediate, chronic issues, so acute issues were being lost, and the longterm chronic issues were both getting locked during this second half of the second term of barack obama under a kind of miasthma of good will coming out of the jcpoa, and thats why they were nervous about it. However, having said that, they did all collectively agree at the 2015 camp david summit with the Obama Administration, the gcc u. S. Summit, to endorse the negotiation, after being very uneasy about them. But they got sufficient reassurances at the time, and they did collectively endorse the negotiation. And then in august of 2016, at the Foreign Ministers meeting which john kerry attended, they endorsed the jcpoa itself. In both cases, this was sincere. And it was based on two understandings. First, that they had received assurances from the United States that were sufficient to assuage their concerns about the jcpoa, and ill talk about those in a second. But also, that they felt that having achieved what they could, they were not going to be able to stop either the negotiations or reverse the agreement itself. And therefore, they would have to, you know, sort of do what they could with the reality rather than take the israeli attitude of actually urging that the whole thing be undone. Now, having said that, their worst fears, and its not just that theyre happier with the Trump Administration. Its also that they were reassured towards the very end of the Obama Administration by what not only what was happening under the jcpoa, which has reassured them, being implemented successfully. And it has not reversed irans progress towards a nuclear weapon, and this is a good thing from their point of view. In other words, the fear this will be ineffective is more or less assuaged. They believe it is being effective. They do not share this view of certain people in the United States that its not effective. They think it is effective. Secondly, the bigger concern, which was that this would be the initial stage in a broader between washington and tehran that would come at their expense, thats very important, the last part. At their expense, with iran receiving a wide range of benefits and green lights and carte blanche. Without having to adjust its policies. Without having to adjust its regional attitude. It did not happen. And the attitudes from the United States towards iran on its regional policies and its missile testing, but especially its regional policies, started toughening before trump took office. You look at the last statement from u. S. Gcc joint meeting in i think it was in november or october of 2016. The word terrorism reappeared. Iran supported terrorism. That was gone for the middle part of the second obama term. In american statements, jointly with the gcc toward iran. It was back, and it was back because the United States was making no progress in going further with iran on other issues, as the supreme ruler kept saying, he wasnt interested in discussing them. In other words, the worst fears of the gulf countries about what the jcpoa might be heralding on other fronts did not materialize. In addition to that, i think its sort of important to note that the jcpoa, while it does address concerns that gulf states have about irans emergence as a Nuclear Power and all the impact it could have on their other concerns as was discussed by the ambassadors here, in other words, the point that ambassador osullivan made, right up front and clearly, which is on any problem they have, its much more difficult to deal with a nuclear iran than a nonnuclear iran. Thats obvious and simply true, so thats a good thing. But the big concern, unlike the United States and perhaps europe, and certainly unlike israel, the gulf states concerns about irans policies were never primarily about its nuclear agenda. What they have been most concerned about is the spread of iranian influence and hegemony inside the arab world, not simply into areas where there are welcoming shia majorities that have longstanding ties with iran like lebanon and parts of iraq, but beyond that. Into places like syria, which are a sunni majority and where it is not possible to argue as some people have that this is all just a leveling out of the region and everything is taking its natural shape and all that is absurd if you look at the iranian hezbollah rule in syria, you cant possibly defend that kind of argument. And that process has intensified. Iran is not only strengthening its position in various places. Iraq is shakier than it was but very powerful. But it seems like the possibility of a permanent iranian controlled land bridge to lebanon and the mediterranean through parts of syria beyond the ability of even assad or any regime in damascus to approve or disapprove of, but its simply controlled by iran, is a real possibility. A gamechanging one, a remarkable transformation. So these kind of concerns, i think, remain upper most in mind. Because of that, let me just answer your question very, very briefly. What they want visavis the jcpoa, is for it to be rigoro rigorously enforced. Thats the word they used and the word that the Trump Administration was using until recently. Rigorously enforced. I think they did it. I think they need to hold iranians to their agreement, and then use all other forms of leverage, including robust nonnuclear sanctions and confronting them in all kinds of different ways with regards to maritime security, with regard to arm shipments and other forms of support from iran and from hezbollah to the houthis with regard to irans malign, malignant role in syria. And a range of other issues that we can discuss. Missile development too. Let me just quickly, to follow up, so a crisis between the United States and iran, which would be precipitated by the u. S. Walking out of the jcpoa, thats not something they would welcome . Theyre content with the poor state of relations as they exist now . Well, i dont thats not the right way to put it. But i think their concerns would not be primarily addressed in any constructive way from their point of view, as i understand it, by a walking away from a jcpoa which is being properly implemented. From their point of view, that would be a net negative because what it would mean is that a restriction on iran would be lost. Leverage on iran would be surrendered, and iranian hardliners will have pocketed this reality. They will have done away with the International Sanctions regime under obama and had their, you know, had their obligations under the jcpoa removed under trump, all for nothing. All gaining the arab states nothing at all. And in fact, removing their leverage. This, to them, i think, does not seem like in the negative. Now, just a little caveat. If you were to broaden the aperture and say overall do they want a more confrontational attitude toward iran, i would say yes. But does a blow up over the jcpoa get them closer to where they want to be . As far as i can tell, the answer is no, and they dont think so. The word content is an interesting one. It was used in the recent evaluation. Good paper on saudi arabias potential Nuclear Ambitions for the Nuclear Institute for science and interNational Security. It basically said that they dont have any, but they might if iran went back to an aggressive nuclear program, and they used the word content, regarding the attitude toward the jcpoa, and i think thats right. Okay. Qadeer, turkey and iran have a very different sort of relationship. Theyre not always on the same page regionally, but we do remember that turkey and brazil tried to negotiate a nuclear deal with iran when a u. S. Effort fell apart in 2009. Lately, they seem to be on the same page when it comes to kurdish issues. Still some disagreements perhaps over the fate of the assad regime. What is the attitude in turkey toward the jcpoa, and how are they regarding this rather significant change in tone from washington toward the deal . Thank you, barbara, for inviting me to this discussion. I think its a very important one. I would say that broadly, turkey doesnt quite like any kind of insertion of any new layer of instability to the region. It doesnt work for turkey when you have militarization of crises, conflicts, because thats not where turkey feels more strong. Thats just a broad point. But uncertainty and instability seems to be the ongoing theme in the region. And once you feel like isis appears to be set back, you have the referendum for independence. You have, while syrian conflict seems to be winding down, you have the efforts to create autonomous area which is a problem for turkey. Similarly, gulf crisis, again, pops almost out of nowhere. So these kind of elements of uncertainty and instability is a problem. So if the Trump Administration is definitely looking to confront iran regionally, as was talked about. I think turkey should have some of those concerns, regional concerns about irans activities. But theyre on the same side regarding qatar . No, exactly. For different reasons, but is the Trump Administration going to confront iran regionally with or without the agreement . Right . That seems to be the question. So if they abandon the agreement without a clear policy, thats going to create new problems for the regional powers. Under this kind of pressure and threats by the administration, iran seems to be kind of reaching out to turkey in particular, but others as well in the region. But this wont be easy because of syria, what happened in syria with turkey and iran found themselves at opposite ends of a conflict. But as i said, turkey is concerned for the extent that its called iranian expansionism. It is a serious problem for turkey, but the nuclear deal itself does not, whether that is canceled is a concern to see how that broader policy is going to develop. If you remember in 2010, turkey, as you mentioned, actually, turkey was involved in a nonpermanent member as the u. N. Security council to try to find a middle ground between the west and iran, and even tehran, which ended up hurting turkeys relationship with the u. S. In particular, because the u. S. Wasnt happy about that deal. I wont go into details, but we had a whole debate for about six to nine months, Something Like that, about turkey turning east, leaving the west, et cetera. That ended sharply with turkeys stationing of the nato radars in the eastern part of turkey. That shows actually turkey was just as concerned about iranian capabilities, missiles and others, like the west, but it was trying to find a diplomatic solution. And it argued at that point the sanctions would lead to military action, which would lead to war. Again, that element of instability was not in turkeys favor. With the arab spring and just skipping very fast to syria, when syrian uprising turned into a conflict and eventually a regional proxy war, turkey and iran found themselves at opposite ends. And there, again, there was an element of uncertainty in the sense that we didnt know what the u. S. Wanted to do exactly. And u. S. Policy was reduced to counterterrorism over time. Im not criticizing it. Im just observing it. So that, turkey kept seeking leadership from washington which never came. And then you find now turkey negotiating, trying to negotiate with russia and iran through the process. So on the ground, theyre quite supporting the opposite groups. And they have very different aims in syria, but at the same time, theyre keeping their diplomatic track alive. Both for turkey to protect its narrow, relatively narrow interests in northern syria, but also to find a solution and end the conflict in syria. One more example, the gulf crisis, as i mentioned at the beginning, there is a serious disconnect between the president and the National Security team that was just too obvious. And these mixed signals a very worrisome for Regional Policy in general, but turkey as well. And turkey had a very strong relationship with qatar, but it also has strong relations with saudis. So it tried to find a middle ground and tried to negotiate that initial lift included turkeys space to be removed from qatar, so what you found turkey doing, trying to they also met the iranians. Right . They tried to negotiate. So turkey, you find once again, trying to eliminate that element of uncertainty to calm down the crisis. And at the same time, again, you have mixed signals on that nonclear policy from washington on this. Last thing, today, this krg referendum is being held. Iran is strongly opposed to it, turkey is opposed to it, the u. S. Officially is opposed to it. Many in the region doubt that. They think theyre playing some sort of game, but im just stating that. Im not arguing for it. It is causing quite a lot of anxiety in the region. For a different reason, for iran and a different reason for tur