Transcripts For CSPAN3 University Of Chicago - Nuclear Weapo

All right. Good evening, everyone. Thank you for coming. Welcome. I my name is Amanda Woodword and im the dean of the division of social sciences here at the university of chicago. Im just delighted to be here with this group of faculty for this event. This evening is continuing a yearlong series of events at the university of chicago commemorating the 75th anniversary of the first controlled selfsustaining Nuclear Chain reaction which happened just over there. Over the past five months, there have been events across campus xh commemorating the breakthrough and exploring the experiments long term impact, and the events have presented u opportunities to engage scientists, artists and policy makers and the public around a set of events that grew from that original event 75 years ago. This evenings discussion im particularly delighted because it brings in social science in just the way it should be. Our panelists will be introduced in a moment. Each is a scholar and International Relations and National Security, and they will offer different viewpoints on military decisions, the role of nuclear arms and the formation of alliances and aids and obb sta obstacles to proliferation. This is sponsored by my division, the division of social sciences, and also by the International Center for social research at the university of chicagos institute of politics and also the project of Energy Threat threats. I want to thank those organizations for they support. Want it to present our moderator Steve Edwards to introduce the panelists when he comes up. Now, steve is currently Vice President and chief content officer at wbz and he is an awardwinning journalist and program host. He has covered everything that politics to u culture, and he has appeared in the bloomberg, and pbs and numerous public radio stations for example. From 2012 to 2017, steve was the executive director at the university of chicagos institute of politics. In that role, he oversaw all programming and operational duties including acclaimed the public and civic engagements and my favorite the ax files in partnership with former president ial adviser david axelr axelrod. And so he is not a university of chicago alum, but he got his political doctorate at amherst college, and so will you please welcome me in joining Steve Edwards. Dean, thank you so much for that introduction. It is anb honor to be back here university with all of you at such an important time for this conversation and not only because of the history that we are commemorating over the course of this year, thinking about 75 yees after the dawn of the Nuclear Age Began right here steps from where we are, but also the present realities in the geopolitics today, and many of us watched very closely the announcement just a few days ago last week when our sister p publication here at the university, the bolt of the atomic science moved the hands closest to the hands of midnight, and the closest they have been in 60 years. So i am eagerer to r hear what the panelists have to remark on the safer and more dangerous world main the todays nuclear community. We have a distinguished panel. And i will begin by introducing them each in order and this we will have each one of them talk for about five minutes the bring insights into the question from their research. We will then move to questions among us and then your questions for each of them as we go forth. So let me begin with bob. Robert pap is a professor of split cal Science University of chicago specializing in International Security affairs. His publications include cutting the fuse, how to stop the terrorism fighting to win and why sanctions do not work and the strategy of suicide bombers and many, many more. He is a frequent contributor and analyst to a variety of news outlets. He taught at dartmouth college, and taught air power strategy for the school of advanced air power studies for threer years and received his ph. D. From the university of chicago and graduated summa cum laude from the university of pittsburgh, and also, drirector on the causs of politics and polarity. And next to him is a professor in the department of Political Science here in university of chicago and affiliate of the Pearson Institute of the stu the day of gle ball conflicts. He studies International Relations with the focus on International Security and authorf two books the economics of war and organizing dem k democracy. He has authored or coauthored numerous journals and featured in news outlet wills as well. Received his ph. D. From the university of michigan and masters in Economic School in london and a p. A. From university of miami, and before he was a professor of Political Science at rutgers and also taught in the Political Science department at the ohio university. And next to him is houston carson from the university of chicago where he specializes in security and intelligence and their relationship to International Relations theory and International Security and global governance. At the core of the projects is an interest and understanding of how the government selectively reveal and conceal what they do and the juncture that it brings between the front stage and the backstage of the International Politics. The forth coming book is going to analyze Covert Military intervention and the role of the states war, and also will, he has works of concerning open secrets and Sensitive Information and International Organizations and the theories of war all of which are going to be in play here tonight. He graduated with a ph. D. In Political Science are from the university the university of ohio, and also studied at princeton and George Washington university and the Woodrow Wilson center in washington, d. C. Next to him is paul stannilan who is the faculty chair on the committee of International Relations, and he chairs the committee on policy and programs. His research focuses on violent political programs, and concentrated in south asia, and his books have received several awards and published widely in academic journals. And next to paul, is professor e cohen who received her ph. D. From the university of south carolina, and her teaching are why at the center of international politic, and she is broadly are interested in how the foreign institutions affect the foreign leaders and a leaders propensity for nuclear proliferation, and she explores the reasons that they choose to expand their Nuclear Programs with insight currently, and most recently named one of the seven freshest perspectives on nuclear a politics by the bulletin. And we are excited to have our scientists with us tonight. We will start from are the far end with professor pape. The floor is yours. Thank you, all, and dean woodward and it is so nice to have the faculty and the young i. R. Faculty commenting on the effects of Nuclear Weapons here at the university of chicago and im delighted to be part of it. Nuclear weapons inspire tremendous fear not just among the ekts pexperts, but widely f public at large and for good reason. When researching why japan surrendered, i had to wade through gory details of hiroshima and nagasaki in where two Nuclear Bombs killed mill yons of people in less than one minute. Aed on theday, the Nuclear Weapons are more strong, and no wonder the thought evokes fear. Paradoxically though, however, Nuclear Weapons are a powerful force for peace. The century before the coming of nuclear with weapons from 1850 to 1945 was the classic era ra of great power politics with nuke rouse major wars among the great powers of the day. These wars were hugely destructive. In world war i, over 20 Million People died. World war ii was worse. Over 50 Million People died. But since 1945, great power wars have come to a dead stop. The United States, china, germany, britain, france, the soviet union now russia have had their thauroubles and waged pro w wars, but none of them have fought a shooting war against each other a major one in almost 75 years. Now, what is the cause of this long great power peace . Is it the democratic piece . The idea that democracies dont fight each other . No, china and are russia are not mature democracies. Our International Politics in general, are they now so peaceful that we no longer have Serious International crises with each other . No. From berlin to taiwan to ukraine today, major powers have experienced numerous crises that one might think h would escalate to sustained conventional combat between the militaries, but none have in 75 years. Now, a although other factors matter, Nuclear Weapons have probably done more than any other to vastly lower the risk of great power war. The existence of Nuclear Weapons do does not stop crises, but it serves as a powerful deterrent on the escalation of those crises. Why . Because the very fear that makes us anxious about Nuclear Weapons also serves as a braeak on the outbreak of major power war. This fear is so great that even a whiff of nuclear gunpowder often provokes tremendous pressures to deescalate a crisis. Consider last summer. President trump went through a series of tweets and other moves that seps shally played a game of Nuclear Chicken with north e korea. The game of chicken, and you know. It is famous from are tthe movi when two daring teenagers drive towards each other daring each other to swerve. That is what President Trump did last summer and this is why the threat of nuclear war has grown under the Trump Administration. What has happened since . North korea, south korea and ch china, and the United States have taken steps to change the game. Instead of bombing north korea, we are talking about the north korean athletes at the olympics in seoul. So as with numerous major power crises since 1945, a crisis among nucleararmed adversaries is generating tremendous pressure to dam penn the risks ra rather than escalate them. Does it mean that all of the worry has been for nothing and the peaceful effects of Nuclear Weapons are so strong that we with should all just go home . Alas, no. The true danger related to Nuclear Weapons is strategic miscalculation especially in the crisis, and that is that in the erlle willy stages of the crisis, individual political leaders will overplay their hands, bomb facilities with conventional weapons ooblivious no the possibilities of accident al or inadvertent Nuclear Escalation. This is where an informed public debate like to might is important. To u call attention to alternative pathways to resolve tensions. Today, no need is greater than with north korea. It is imperative to end the game occurring over the last few months but in a powerful way. We should use the Winter Olympics to stop playing the game of chicken and to deescalate on both sides. The best way to do that is to say, okay, you say that we are a threat, but we are going to deescalate if you deescalate. We should be heading towards a straight forward deal. We should deescalate the military exercises that the United States and south korea have been conducting annually every year for years to practice conquering every inch of north korea in exchange for north korea deescalating nuclear and missile tests, starting at the olympic, and lets put this deal square squarely on the table, and truly change the game of Nuclear Chicken into a game of mutual deescalation, and use the fear of Nuclear Weapons as a thing of the past. Thank you. Thank you, all for being here tonight. This is obviously a very important topic, and im excited to be up here so, theres two consta constants in the International Politics since 1949. The first one is the presence of Nuclear Weapon, and ra really, that started before 1949. The second is the nato, and as it happens, they are intimately tied together. As natos first secretarygeneral famously remarked, to keep the purpose of nato is to keep the american is for the center of nato since the beginning, and it is indeed why nato refers to itself as a nuclear alliance. From the stationing of b29 bombers in england during the late 1940s ap and 1950s and each which was equipped with the bomb to the forward deployment of the Nuclear Forces and americancontrolled Nuclear Forces in germany, turkey and the today in belgian, netherlands and other american allies, but keeping the American Nuclear force, and americancontrolled Nuclear Forces on the continent has again been foundational and fundamental to natos operation which leads directly into second purpose, keeping the russian nukes deterred. The idea is that by keeping the american nukes deployed in europe, it makes it that much less likely that russia would want to attempt coercion oo eitherer by threatening a Nuclear Strike or even threatening with conventional strike, because the reality is if the u. S. Nukes are safely stored away in a silo in south dakota, the russians would say, they wont use them, but they have them, but maybe we can coerce, but if they are on the front line, it is a lodgic of ue them or lose them. And the russians fearing that logic would be more likely to be deterred. Then finally, when it comes to keeping german nukes denied, the reality is that is a condition for germany to even enter nato in the 1950s. They had to not possess their own Nuclear Weapons. Throughout the cold war, that the remained the issue, and became even more important with the ending of the colder war. In fact, many, main many ways, why nato was not less important with the collapse of the berlin wall bucks more important. In order for the germany to reunify, they had to agree not to acquire Nuclear Weapons and signed on by the other major powers in europe, the United States, england, france and russia, and the way to do that was to make sure that the unified germany remained part of nato. That mission was then expand pod the rest of Eastern Europe, and the fear being that if these countries were to acquire a n e Nuclear Weapon to deter a threat from possibly russian, and to bring them into nato, to offer them the protection of the nuclear umbrella, and this is going to tie into the idea that dr. Price kahn is going to be talk about in a little bit. So in short, nato is a nuclear alliance, and in many ways, nato is going to exemplify the rule of Nuclear Weapons in the world over the past 60 or 70 years. And the core of natos mission, indeed main the most recent nat strategic document, they say that as long as there is Nuclear Weapons in the world, nato will have remain a Nuclear Power. Further, as long as there are Nuclear Weapons in the world, there is going to be a nato. Thank you very much. Thank you, professor. Now, moving to you. Thank you, dean woodward and fellow panelist, i am pleased to be here. I am struck by the comments of you paul, because i feel like we should be handing them out at the door. So i want to give a slight dlif frent focus and look at the threat that the Nuclear Weapons pose as much as the promise they provide. In Nuclear Weapons it is fundamentally a technology and w wonderful innovation. And here we have a site that is revered as symbolic of energy are renewal, and to look at that Incredible Technology to facilitate home laland and miliy purposes, but on the other hand, it raises critical questions of how do we respond to the fact that we could have buyers remorse to develop a technology that in the current state threatens the species, the thumn race . My comments will focus on how the United States and the world have managed technology. I want to focus on the global architecture that has been designed to control a Nuclear Technology and the Amanda Woodword<\/a> and im the dean of the division of social sciences here at the university of chicago. Im just delighted to be here with this group of faculty for this event. This evening is continuing a yearlong series of events at the university of chicago commemorating the 75th anniversary of the first controlled selfsustaining Nuclear Chain<\/a> reaction which happened just over there. Over the past five months, there have been events across campus xh commemorating the breakthrough and exploring the experiments long term impact, and the events have presented u opportunities to engage scientists, artists and policy makers and the public around a set of events that grew from that original event 75 years ago. This evenings discussion im particularly delighted because it brings in social science in just the way it should be. Our panelists will be introduced in a moment. Each is a scholar and International Relations<\/a> and National Security<\/a>, and they will offer different viewpoints on military decisions, the role of nuclear arms and the formation of alliances and aids and obb sta obstacles to proliferation. This is sponsored by my division, the division of social sciences, and also by the International Center<\/a> for social research at the university of chicagos institute of politics and also the project of Energy Threat<\/a> threats. I want to thank those organizations for they support. Want it to present our moderator Steve Edwards<\/a> to introduce the panelists when he comes up. Now, steve is currently Vice President<\/a> and chief content officer at wbz and he is an awardwinning journalist and program host. He has covered everything that politics to u culture, and he has appeared in the bloomberg, and pbs and numerous public radio stations for example. From 2012 to 2017, steve was the executive director at the university of chicagos institute of politics. In that role, he oversaw all programming and operational duties including acclaimed the public and civic engagements and my favorite the ax files in partnership with former president ial adviser david axelr axelrod. And so he is not a university of chicago alum, but he got his political doctorate at amherst college, and so will you please welcome me in joining Steve Edwards<\/a>. Dean, thank you so much for that introduction. It is anb honor to be back here university with all of you at such an important time for this conversation and not only because of the history that we are commemorating over the course of this year, thinking about 75 yees after the dawn of the Nuclear Age Began<\/a> right here steps from where we are, but also the present realities in the geopolitics today, and many of us watched very closely the announcement just a few days ago last week when our sister p publication here at the university, the bolt of the atomic science moved the hands closest to the hands of midnight, and the closest they have been in 60 years. So i am eagerer to r hear what the panelists have to remark on the safer and more dangerous world main the todays nuclear community. We have a distinguished panel. And i will begin by introducing them each in order and this we will have each one of them talk for about five minutes the bring insights into the question from their research. We will then move to questions among us and then your questions for each of them as we go forth. So let me begin with bob. Robert pap is a professor of split cal Science University<\/a> of chicago specializing in International Security<\/a> affairs. His publications include cutting the fuse, how to stop the terrorism fighting to win and why sanctions do not work and the strategy of suicide bombers and many, many more. He is a frequent contributor and analyst to a variety of news outlets. He taught at dartmouth college, and taught air power strategy for the school of advanced air power studies for threer years and received his ph. D. From the university of chicago and graduated summa cum laude from the university of pittsburgh, and also, drirector on the causs of politics and polarity. And next to him is a professor in the department of Political Science<\/a> here in university of chicago and affiliate of the Pearson Institute<\/a> of the stu the day of gle ball conflicts. He studies International Relations<\/a> with the focus on International Security<\/a> and authorf two books the economics of war and organizing dem k democracy. He has authored or coauthored numerous journals and featured in news outlet wills as well. Received his ph. D. From the university of michigan and masters in Economic School<\/a> in london and a p. A. From university of miami, and before he was a professor of Political Science<\/a> at rutgers and also taught in the Political Science<\/a> department at the ohio university. And next to him is houston carson from the university of chicago where he specializes in security and intelligence and their relationship to International Relations<\/a> theory and International Security<\/a> and global governance. At the core of the projects is an interest and understanding of how the government selectively reveal and conceal what they do and the juncture that it brings between the front stage and the backstage of the International Politics<\/a>. The forth coming book is going to analyze Covert Military<\/a> intervention and the role of the states war, and also will, he has works of concerning open secrets and Sensitive Information<\/a> and International Organizations<\/a> and the theories of war all of which are going to be in play here tonight. He graduated with a ph. D. In Political Science<\/a> are from the university the university of ohio, and also studied at princeton and George Washington<\/a> university and the Woodrow Wilson<\/a> center in washington, d. C. Next to him is paul stannilan who is the faculty chair on the committee of International Relations<\/a>, and he chairs the committee on policy and programs. His research focuses on violent political programs, and concentrated in south asia, and his books have received several awards and published widely in academic journals. And next to paul, is professor e cohen who received her ph. D. From the university of south carolina, and her teaching are why at the center of international politic, and she is broadly are interested in how the foreign institutions affect the foreign leaders and a leaders propensity for nuclear proliferation, and she explores the reasons that they choose to expand their Nuclear Programs<\/a> with insight currently, and most recently named one of the seven freshest perspectives on nuclear a politics by the bulletin. And we are excited to have our scientists with us tonight. We will start from are the far end with professor pape. The floor is yours. Thank you, all, and dean woodward and it is so nice to have the faculty and the young i. R. Faculty commenting on the effects of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> here at the university of chicago and im delighted to be part of it. Nuclear weapons inspire tremendous fear not just among the ekts pexperts, but widely f public at large and for good reason. When researching why japan surrendered, i had to wade through gory details of hiroshima and nagasaki in where two Nuclear Bombs<\/a> killed mill yons of people in less than one minute. Aed on theday, the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are more strong, and no wonder the thought evokes fear. Paradoxically though, however, Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are a powerful force for peace. The century before the coming of nuclear with weapons from 1850 to 1945 was the classic era ra of great power politics with nuke rouse major wars among the great powers of the day. These wars were hugely destructive. In world war i, over 20 Million People<\/a> died. World war ii was worse. Over 50 Million People<\/a> died. But since 1945, great power wars have come to a dead stop. The United States<\/a>, china, germany, britain, france, the soviet union now russia have had their thauroubles and waged pro w wars, but none of them have fought a shooting war against each other a major one in almost 75 years. Now, what is the cause of this long great power peace . Is it the democratic piece . The idea that democracies dont fight each other . No, china and are russia are not mature democracies. Our International Politics<\/a> in general, are they now so peaceful that we no longer have Serious International<\/a> crises with each other . No. From berlin to taiwan to ukraine today, major powers have experienced numerous crises that one might think h would escalate to sustained conventional combat between the militaries, but none have in 75 years. Now, a although other factors matter, Nuclear Weapons<\/a> have probably done more than any other to vastly lower the risk of great power war. The existence of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> do does not stop crises, but it serves as a powerful deterrent on the escalation of those crises. Why . Because the very fear that makes us anxious about Nuclear Weapons<\/a> also serves as a braeak on the outbreak of major power war. This fear is so great that even a whiff of nuclear gunpowder often provokes tremendous pressures to deescalate a crisis. Consider last summer. President trump went through a series of tweets and other moves that seps shally played a game of Nuclear Chicken<\/a> with north e korea. The game of chicken, and you know. It is famous from are tthe movi when two daring teenagers drive towards each other daring each other to swerve. That is what President Trump<\/a> did last summer and this is why the threat of nuclear war has grown under the Trump Administration<\/a>. What has happened since . North korea, south korea and ch china, and the United States<\/a> have taken steps to change the game. Instead of bombing north korea, we are talking about the north korean athletes at the olympics in seoul. So as with numerous major power crises since 1945, a crisis among nucleararmed adversaries is generating tremendous pressure to dam penn the risks ra rather than escalate them. Does it mean that all of the worry has been for nothing and the peaceful effects of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are so strong that we with should all just go home . Alas, no. The true danger related to Nuclear Weapons<\/a> is strategic miscalculation especially in the crisis, and that is that in the erlle willy stages of the crisis, individual political leaders will overplay their hands, bomb facilities with conventional weapons ooblivious no the possibilities of accident al or inadvertent Nuclear Escalation<\/a>. This is where an informed public debate like to might is important. To u call attention to alternative pathways to resolve tensions. Today, no need is greater than with north korea. It is imperative to end the game occurring over the last few months but in a powerful way. We should use the Winter Olympics<\/a> to stop playing the game of chicken and to deescalate on both sides. The best way to do that is to say, okay, you say that we are a threat, but we are going to deescalate if you deescalate. We should be heading towards a straight forward deal. We should deescalate the military exercises that the United States<\/a> and south korea have been conducting annually every year for years to practice conquering every inch of north korea in exchange for north korea deescalating nuclear and missile tests, starting at the olympic, and lets put this deal square squarely on the table, and truly change the game of Nuclear Chicken<\/a> into a game of mutual deescalation, and use the fear of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> as a thing of the past. Thank you. Thank you, all for being here tonight. This is obviously a very important topic, and im excited to be up here so, theres two consta constants in the International Politics<\/a> since 1949. The first one is the presence of Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, and ra really, that started before 1949. The second is the nato, and as it happens, they are intimately tied together. As natos first secretarygeneral famously remarked, to keep the purpose of nato is to keep the american is for the center of nato since the beginning, and it is indeed why nato refers to itself as a nuclear alliance. From the stationing of b29 bombers in england during the late 1940s ap and 1950s and each which was equipped with the bomb to the forward deployment of the Nuclear Forces<\/a> and americancontrolled Nuclear Forces<\/a> in germany, turkey and the today in belgian, netherlands and other american allies, but keeping the American Nuclear<\/a> force, and americancontrolled Nuclear Forces<\/a> on the continent has again been foundational and fundamental to natos operation which leads directly into second purpose, keeping the russian nukes deterred. The idea is that by keeping the american nukes deployed in europe, it makes it that much less likely that russia would want to attempt coercion oo eitherer by threatening a Nuclear Strike<\/a> or even threatening with conventional strike, because the reality is if the u. S. Nukes are safely stored away in a silo in south dakota, the russians would say, they wont use them, but they have them, but maybe we can coerce, but if they are on the front line, it is a lodgic of ue them or lose them. And the russians fearing that logic would be more likely to be deterred. Then finally, when it comes to keeping german nukes denied, the reality is that is a condition for germany to even enter nato in the 1950s. They had to not possess their own Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Throughout the cold war, that the remained the issue, and became even more important with the ending of the colder war. In fact, many, main many ways, why nato was not less important with the collapse of the berlin wall bucks more important. In order for the germany to reunify, they had to agree not to acquire Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and signed on by the other major powers in europe, the United States<\/a>, england, france and russia, and the way to do that was to make sure that the unified germany remained part of nato. That mission was then expand pod the rest of Eastern Europe<\/a>, and the fear being that if these countries were to acquire a n e Nuclear Weapon<\/a> to deter a threat from possibly russian, and to bring them into nato, to offer them the protection of the nuclear umbrella, and this is going to tie into the idea that dr. Price kahn is going to be talk about in a little bit. So in short, nato is a nuclear alliance, and in many ways, nato is going to exemplify the rule of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in the world over the past 60 or 70 years. And the core of natos mission, indeed main the most recent nat strategic document, they say that as long as there is Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in the world, nato will have remain a Nuclear Power<\/a>. Further, as long as there are Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in the world, there is going to be a nato. Thank you very much. Thank you, professor. Now, moving to you. Thank you, dean woodward and fellow panelist, i am pleased to be here. I am struck by the comments of you paul, because i feel like we should be handing them out at the door. So i want to give a slight dlif frent focus and look at the threat that the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> pose as much as the promise they provide. In Nuclear Weapons<\/a> it is fundamentally a technology and w wonderful innovation. And here we have a site that is revered as symbolic of energy are renewal, and to look at that Incredible Technology<\/a> to facilitate home laland and miliy purposes, but on the other hand, it raises critical questions of how do we respond to the fact that we could have buyers remorse to develop a technology that in the current state threatens the species, the thumn race . My comments will focus on how the United States<\/a> and the world have managed technology. I want to focus on the global architecture that has been designed to control a Nuclear Technology<\/a> and the Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> regime. The core parts are twofold. One is the mpt and the Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> agreement. The grand bargain is that the grand Nuclear States<\/a> including the United States<\/a> were granted a monopoly, the most powerful weapon ever developed was allowed to be in the hands of a handful of countries. And so in turn for swearing against using the technology, they would be Given Technology<\/a> for purposes such as radiation, Nuclear Applications<\/a> and Nuclear Power<\/a> as well as a promise from the states that had the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> that they would eventually disarm. And it is truly to me remains an incredible bargain that the one hand the most Destructive Technology<\/a> was to be in some states and not others, and in the eyes of others, india being a very important one, a kind of the nuclear apartheid, you can have it, but others cant in which the vast majority of the world said, no, we wont develop this technology. The second core piece of the nonproliferation regime is the International Atomic<\/a> energy age agency. It helps some Nuclear States<\/a> to access is civilian purposes, and use them and benefit, but on the other hand, it keeps the Nuclear Weapon<\/a> state monopoly in effect through the safeguard system to mon for the use of Nuclear Technology<\/a> in the nonNuclear States<\/a> to make sure they are not secretly diverting it for military purposes. My research is focusing on whak mas it effective and noneffective. So let me talk about that. The key challenge of designing a global system in controlling Nuclear Technology<\/a>, and keeping the technology in the hands of a few countries is identifying the cases of covert or hidden military diversion. It is kind of the catandmouse game as you might imagine, and turns out that the ieae is not the best cat, and not given the most powerful resources, and the legal capabilities to the find those a areas. So my research along with Allison Carney<\/a> is focusing on what we believe is untapped source of insight which is intelligence from the governments for their own security purposes, the United States<\/a> will spend billions of dollar dollars over decades to track all kinds of threats, but in large part the Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> friends and sources and methods have to do with the undetect and hidden Nuclear Facilities<\/a> and Procurement Networks<\/a> which is providing vastly more insight than the iaea could ever hope the achieve. And so the willing neness of governments to share this intelligence, because on one hand, north korea has a site in which they are not telling anything about to potentially develop Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, but on the other hand, making it public means it is harder to gather the intelligence five or ten years down the road, because now we know how you figured it out. So what we found out that the International Atomic<\/a> energy age agency has developed teams for receiving the tips for the National Intelligence<\/a> including from the United States<\/a> and acting on the tips to go to look at that site to see what is going on and while not advertising how they got it or from whom, and so it is deserving as a solution to dim r dilemma of sharing the information without giving away the store with intelligence collecting. Good implications for today, and regular news stories about the u. S. Deciding to share or not share information with the iaea with the iranian officials about the deal that was signed under the obama information. But the bad news is that because this information is so insig insightful and interest, it is at source of power. If the United States<\/a> does not want to facilitate the iaea, it does not give the information. So it is selectivity. On the bright side, the glass is half full, and we know more than if we didnt have the group, but those countries that have the intelligence and the resources can choose who to provide it to, and about. And so one of the issues i want to bring to the table is that despite the social sciences on the 75th anniversary of the discovery and the application of this new technology, and the fusion of the new domain, science brings the technology of social and political imply case, butt is not pure science, and what we agree to and create the institutions that share the distribution of the technology and create soebl and political categories to help us to make sense and understand and manage the technology. And the Political Science<\/a> perspective is particularly helpful, because it interjects power when you have information like intelligence and helps you the identify the spread of technology and who has it and what will they do it and when. And i am hoping this is going to shed light on the issue that is vexing to us still today. Thank you for the insights. We the turn to paul stanlin. Thank you to steve, and dean woodward and paul post for putting this together. I will come to this from a different perspective. I study Southeast Asia<\/a>, and so i want to get a handle on the military and the political handling of the nuclearization by looking at south asia, and especially since 1998 which is when basically dualing tests of the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> were performed by india and pakistan. South ashaia and pakistan and d india have been in nuclear competition, and looking at introduction to Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in this environment can provide interesting insight into the cross cutting insights is of nuclear are ep weapons, and are rer than the three tiers torchiere row tiers for Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, i want to talk about the tradeoffs and the mixed results of once you get the introduction of a mutually assured destruction m. A. D. For short. So what do i mean by the mixed record . During the cold war scholars of weapons introduced the stability instability paradox and this is what has characterized south asia. Stability for all of the reasons that professor pape talked about f. There is a nuclear war in south asia, there is going to be enormous loss of life, and the function of the countries as national entities. This is for the cost of Nuclear Escalation<\/a>, and there is a ceiling, assuming no miscalculation of which the conflict is not likely to go, and the policy makers are well aware of the challenges that any kind of nuclear use or Nuclear Escalation<\/a> would are present. That is good news, right. And the bad news is that at the same time the stability of the strategic level has allowed for sustained instability below this kind of the highest level of int interstate competition. So over the past 20 years a continuation of the pattern of the proxy wars and terrorist attacks and the low level ski skirmishes that persist with the instability that could lead to unsettling of the higher stability. So what does it mean . There are scholarly arguments and it is reasonable to suggest that pakistani support for different groups and terrorists has continued to activate indias actions, because they are going to respond to the mum bye attack or the attack on the indian parliament. So there is a creeling that you c c ceiling that you can do without a subtext. And so this is leading to the subtext of a underlying war that is punctuated by sporadic crises after particularly provocative attacks. So on the one with hand, this is potentially stable over time, and from the pakistani perspective, it is good to continue in the proxy wars throughout south asia from 1960, and 1971 and the kcashmere war n the 1940s, but despite the worry of the stalemate, india has start ed to modernize the military, and allow for military strikes that are hopefully, and in their hopes not cross pa pakistans red lines, and lead to Nuclear Escalation<\/a>, and so they are modernizing the forces and coming up with the innovative ways to get around the stalemate, and as india grows, the conventional strength is going to grow relative to pakistan. So india has a growing economy and investing heavily in defense, and pakistan by c contrast is much, much smaller and substantially poorer and has to run much harder just to keep up. So what do we see as the threats to stability. Indian is trying to develop options for limited strikes and trying these out on the live control of cashmere in the last few year, and the government is conducting surgical strikes against pakistan. And they have seen a massive exescalation of the skirmishes and pillory and there is supposed to be a ceasefire, but india is trying to put pressure on pakistan on these redlines of deescalation. And so in the cold war that paul post was talking about, they have a much larger army, and pakistan has gone forward with the battlefield weapon, and if they engage in a limited event, it could trigger escalation, and accidental deployment of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. So what we are seeing is a grim instability, but one in which both factors are trying to manage and ma nnipulate. India trying to escape, and pakistan trying to force control that are intertwined with the battlefield. So this is what i believe is the good news and the bad news. The good news being that there is a stability, but real stability, and the bad news is that the strategic actors who want to get around the stability are searching for innovative ways to face es calating crises and i will leave it here for now, and look forward to questions. Thank you so much. We close out this portion of the conversation with the remarks from page. Wonderful. Good evening, everyone. I am very honored the be with you here tonight, and part of such an amazing group, and what i wanted to do is to just round off the discussion by talking about my research on inducements and how inducements affect the Nuclear Reversal<\/a> process and what that means for the current International Security<\/a> environment. And my Research Finds<\/a> a positive inducements are generally more effectttive than the negative inducements and getting the lead ers to reverse the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> programs and to the roll back the Nuclear Activity<\/a> and to denuclearize once they have achieved the status as a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> state. For tonight, i want to limit my discussion to north korea, but i am happy to talk about any inducements more generally in the q and a. So i am shure that for many of you looking at north korea and the joint storms between the president s, and it is certainly for me minor reasons that seem obvious, so for me, it is not the fear that little rocket man is going to irrationally lob Nuclear Weapons<\/a> from north korea that keeps me up at night, but rather for me comes from the United States<\/a> policy towards north korea, and to put it simply, if the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result, then insanity is the apt description of the u. S. Sanctions policy toward north korea. Professor pape has said it best. Economic sanctions are generally ineffective tool when it comes to the counter proliferation, and this is particularly true in the case of north korea. For reasons that are both institutional and leader centric to kim jong un, and institutionally are, the solutions are ineffective in north korea, because he is not beholden to the population in the same way that a leader of a democracy would be or even in the way that president putin is beholden to oligarchs in russia. If that is not bad enough, the economic sanctions are arguably also are inciting kim jong un to more daring Nuclear Tests<\/a> and shows of strength. So his worst fear is of american interference in north korea, and a big part of the domestic propaganda and just like his father and grandfather before him have been that Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are an essential tool to guard against the american imperialism. So every time that President Trump<\/a> tweets about increasing the economic sanctions or even threateding to use force, he is not only restarting the cycle is of interaction between the two countries, but he is actually escalating the tension between them tweet by tweet. So if economic sanctions and threats of force are ineffective and counter productive, what options does the United States<\/a> have in regards to north korea . My Research Suggests<\/a> that a better option would be positive inducements and to offer north korea concessions, and this can take a few forms. It could be lifting of previous economic sanctions or offering much needed aid, working with pyeongchang to build a Sustainable Energy<\/a> program or even to just changing the rhetoric about north korea and the international system. Away from the vile dictatorship that President Trump<\/a> referred to the regime as, but something to keep in mind with the inducements is that it is an incremental process, and denuclearization is not going to be immediately achievable, so coming to the negotiation table with preconditions of denuclearization may not be the best option. But rather what could happen is that the United States<\/a> could offer north korea concessions of a test and if both sides comply and develop a modicum of trust along the way maybe at the wi Winter Olympics<\/a>, perhaps another round of inducements could be offered, but what is clear is that we need a different solution, and for different solution, we need different action, so i am excited to talk to you about what that might be and hear your thoughts on that and with that, i will thank you. Thank you, dr. Cohen, and so much to pick up on here. Im torn to ask poll lsask foll the north korean situation, because it is so present, but what i want the to doin stead is to pull the lenses back, and begin with a macro question, and then come down the to you with the specific questions of the present moment. And professor pape, you made a strong argument for the way any which the existence of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> has ak chactually creat balance of power and dynamic that has led to stable years in large measure. But is this a safer r or more dangerous world because of the Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, and what would the rest of you say in regards to that . I would say, are we better off or in a more dangerous place . Well, i think that professor carson thinks that, you know, professor pape and i are wrong and, hey, nukes for everyone. [ laughter ] are oh, you didnt get yours. And so this is perplexing to scholars that what is peace . It is the absence of conflict, right . But it could be for many reason, because the two sides are u. S. And canada getting along great, and tease each other, but we have good amicable relations or it could be in the case of the u. S. And soviet yunion are the great power conflict that both sides are deterring each other, and naturally fearful of each other. So that is, in that sense, that would be a type of safer world that we would ascribe and not necessarily a happy world or necessarily a world that we would find desirable, but it would be one that you would see as laid out less great power conflict if not the complete absence of it due to the presence of it. Yes, and paul, you used the experience of india and pakistan to the talk about the way in which the world is far less stable of two Nuclear Power<\/a>s and so entering the era of a multilateral world and with the proliferation of nonstate actors, what insight does the India Pakistan<\/a> example provide for the Global Affairs<\/a> if any . To be clear n a sense Southeast Asia<\/a> is much more dangerous, and in the sense that there is not the large conventional wars, and the level of interstate conflict that we saw in 1971, and thousands of soldiers killed in direct fighting, and hundreds of thousands of refugees in the war, but the downside is going to be much larger, right . That is how we think about it, and so it is going to depend on the probability of the estimate is that we will all die at a nuclear holocaust. If you are going to believe that you could build a strong command and control structures that could avoid Nuclear Accidents<\/a> and actor s ths that institutionally robust enough to survive predictable leaders, and if you want to also believe that you can build fairly robust communication between the Nuclear Power<\/a>s to limit the miscalculations and escalations that have not happened since world war ii, you then worry about the organizational accidents or the nukes slipping into the wrong hands or the inadvertent escalation. So then we are in a dangerous world. So it becomes the elements of these risks that are in some ways not directly commensurate with each other, and both part of this calculation are of how you come down on this, right . How well can you manage these . People have different ideas of that. And also, the level of the individual actors and the unpredictability of how individual leaders respond in the face of othreats, and the face of limited information or misinformation as the case may be, and you know, professor carson was talking about sol of the Global Structures<\/a> that have prohibited this, but some of the leaders at play. And so it is really good to have what paul stanley called the pessimists. So u it is good for us to be vigilant, but i would say that what is really behind that . What is going to keep us alert for looking for the good example of that . And so last summer when President Trump<\/a> started through tweets and other things that looked impulsive and kind of scary, it was not just what led to decisions that maybe we need to have constitutionally or not have ways to use Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, right . And so in hawaii, he didnt just soint a false alarm, by it happens. It so happened that it is a grim stability, and not a perfect stability, but we may be able to actually, i kind of like democracy, so i hope that over time democracy can make it a even better peace over time, but i dont think it is going to happen tomorrow or even ten years tomorrow, so i like the idea that as we are trying to make for the better and more stable world Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are generally helpful, but it is the case that i just would say two cheers for Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Okay. Professor . Yes. Number one, fear, itself, is not the guarantee of stability, because you can respond the fear in a number of ways. When i think of the safer and more peaceful world, i think of what has threatened the peaceful ends. So i look at the peaceful or the safer qualities of Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, and none of that is a product of the analogy itself, but it is a product that what professor pape is sort of characterizing today, but there are two things that have contributed to it, strategic stability. One of them is the deterrence, and the mutually destruction of two countries has to be learned. It has not happened. And you dont know or understand the military of the other side is going to be use, you interpret as an attempt to take the out the nuclear facility, and then move it to the next level, right . So what professor stanlin said, i agree that the south asia context is going to underscore that deterrence is the product of year, and decades of development of a stable deterrence of the soviet union in the cold war, and still in the process of being process and replicated for india and pakistan and the other thing that is going hand in hand with the nuclear stabilization is the nonproliferation regime. And bottling up the weapons within a finite number of countries is going to keep the crisis that they are evoked into a reasonable number, and keeps the developed deterrence to what is kind of a nuclear ap par tar and deeply unfair about that, and a condition for the safer world. But as a quick followup for you for anybody who believes in this notion of the genie being out of the bottle. Isnt it inevitable that we are just going to get expansive unlimited proliferation over time, and the technology that exists, and so what is your sense of that, doctor . Certainly. We have nine Nuclear Power<\/a>s now. Is it a matter of time of 10th or 11th and another rogue actor and the Technology Falls<\/a> into the hands of yet another state . I think that you can site both ways, but i dont believe it is a matter of time. But nine of them. Yes, there are nine that have current nuclear, and two have not. So we have known how to build the Nuclear Weapon<\/a>ry for a long time. A student did this as the ph. D. That he could publicly on how to get everything that he could about how the build a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> and able to find all of the technology that he needed, so it is a matter of knowing that the technology exists and proliferation does not, so stthe is a problem. With we have known it since the 1970s, but it is going to bring up a good point, because we have kind of touched on the idea that Nuclear Weapons<\/a> krcreates a wor between the haves and the have nots, and i do think that it partly leads to a more dangerous world. So i can try to play the devils advocate here a little bit. And i do want to give a nod to the bulletin as you mentioned for the First Time Since<\/a> 1953 put the hands of the Doomsday Clock<\/a> to two minutes. This is mot somethiis not somet on a whim, but it is something that they thought through carefully, carefully, and so the reason tas they believe is that the world is more dangerous than it is last year, and than it was 70 years ago has a lot to do with how President Trump<\/a> is responding to north korea and how he is responding to the the jcop with iran, and interactions between the United States<\/a> and russia, and then Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. But part of this is also the public and that we have less belief in institutions, and i think that this is a huge part of why people are fear iing or feeling more fearful. And that is a perfect segue to the comments in your work, professor post. What about that idea, and trump himself is a candidate and early in the presidency questioned the val validity of nato to a large degree, right . So where are we with this . The erosion of the institutions . Well, it is no, i think that it is i was saying that the study of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> is the two constants of american politic, and one is 1949 and complaining about it. Yes. Every president , and every secretary of state, and every secretary of defense has complained about nato and not spending enough, and part of it is why havent we pulled out of nato then, if we are always complaining about it. And what is trumps point . Nato is going to be more than just defense expenditures, and as i was talking about and that it is once you put, and once you are bringing Nuclear Weapons<\/a> into the context, you realize that it is much different and you realize that nato is much more valuable. And it is valuable in the ways that are not necessarily will happy ways, right . Part of it touches on what professor or dr. Cohen was just saying which is that nato institutionalizes the haves and the have nots, right . The whole purpose of it is to say that you are not going to have weapons, a hand is okay, because we are going to have the weapons. We have your back. We have your back, and that why the article 5 is so important to say that yes, we will defend you, but the institutionalization of the haves and the have nots and the i have your back is not the threat of a small state acquiring the weapon, but the threat of the two major powers and the threat and the still perceived threat by russia. This is in many ways going back to the point that dr. Cohen was raising about how theres been very few states that acquired the Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, but the ones who have them, and they are the ones who pose the bigger threat, and that is the reason that the atomic bulletin has moved the clock and not because of the threat of the proliferation, but it is the threat posed by those who have the weapons, and nato is one of the institutional arrangements made to manage that, and the other being the Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> treaty. And to pick up on that from your perspective, Austin Carson<\/a>, you talked earlier about, talking earlier as a group about misinformation, and you have done a lot of work looking at secrecy and transparency, and it is certainly that we can all recognize the risks of not having access to information, and you have advocated for much, much Greater Transparency<\/a> in the International Order<\/a> when it comes to the sharing the information about nuclear proliferation, and Nuclear Technology<\/a>. And what is the tradeoff there, and why is that such a significant piece of this that is missing from the dynamic currently. I will be of two minds of the issue, and i have done some research on the ways in which the more information can be worse sometimes, which we found some historical episodes where if the countries were worried that the countries in the middle east were in the late 1960s and the 1970s knew how sfis kuwaited the Nuclear Arsenal<\/a> time, there would be a rush to the exits to go get their own weapons, so there was a strategic choice by the United States<\/a> at that time to perpeteigperpe perpetua perpetuate, initiate, maintain, along with israel a strategic ambiguity about what israels Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> with r. Theres a sort of downside, but in the work that ive been doing on the iaea, the real tradeoff that we have found is that on the one hand, governments are unwilling because of issues, concerns about sovereignty and control over their physical space and the information that you can derive from that. Theres an unwillingness no g ne some other actor the authority to go verify whether or not you are proliferating or not, or if we got to the world where we dodid do disarmament. On the one hand, they wont let somebody else do it, and then sharing information that they might have about other governments deceiving or using secrecy to evade detection, its very difficult to release that information because as our work has focused on, that makes it harder to collect that information from other targets two years down the road, three years down the road, five years down the road. So there things that have been Institutional Solutions<\/a> that have been experimented with, where the iaea can receive a private briefing, for example, from the french or from the germans or from the u. S. That involves some intelligence, and then acts on that information. They dont tell everyone what they know, who they got it from but they go investigate it. Its a tension thats somewhat unavoidab unavoidable. I think you always going to be operating within a sort of imperfect uncertainty type climate. Whether youre thinking about proliferation or nonproliferation or this idea of disarme disarmament or abolition. Yeah, tell us more about, we havent hat d as much talk abou disarmament and abolition in the postcold war environment. Why not, and what are the prospects for that as you see it, Austin Carson<\/a> . I think, in some ways there has been quite a bit of discussion, theres the global zero campaign, a Nuclear Ban Treaty<\/a> thats been negotiated, and politically, those initiatives arent going to go anywhere until the states that a Nuclear Arsenal<\/a> an had them for de decades behind it. President obama receive add premature nobel peace prize. You know, think the underlying reason is, at least my underlying skepticism of the proposal in spirit in my heart, i want to be an abolitionist, i want to see disarmament someday. But in practice, i think you really have to wrestle with this issue of how do you deal with the bomb in the basement . Or even if there isnt a bomb in the basement, how do you deal with a team of engineers and Research Scientists<\/a> that can over the course of six months or a year in a dedicated Crash Program<\/a> redevelopment that technology . Even if you somehow politically got over the hurdle of getting everybody to commit to it. So if people want to talk about it more, id be happy to engage it, but thats the thing, the Sticking Point<\/a> for me, is to verify disarmament, abolitionists, just a real difficult nut to crack and have to confront it if you want to have a position on it. Yeah, so, i really worry about going too low, and i know that going too high is bad. I want to say is one of the reasons we dont have a whole lot of proliferation, were not in the era of a Nuclear Arms Race<\/a> over the last 30 years. Where it went from one to eight, the numbers, was an era of actual arms racing so as the arms race occurred it tended to feed on itself. Since the cold war, were going the other way and tends to be a general positive. At the same time, to try to really go super low, thats when you can start to design these super slick strategies about how to actually knock out the other sides Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. So if the other side has really only got ten, and this is the India Pakistan<\/a> situation, if they really have these teeny tiny numbers, thats actually probably the most dangerous of all. Better to have 100 or 200 than to have 10. So its either zero or that. Because once youre doing to ten, youre going to get a bunch of smart folks like at the university of chicago had, how can i take out that other guys ten . Theyre going to fool themselves into thinking they can. I actually think theyll be wrong, but theyll think they can do it. Arsenals you believe cannot be taken out by a splendid first strike by an adversaradversary. If youre in a world where you think you have to use them or youre going to lose them, thats a very dangerous world. Start thinking about preemptive use, this is one of the things people worry about north korea, kim jongun thinks were coming for him for regime change. A window where it might become rational to think about nuclear use. In some sense in the ind India Pakistan<\/a> context, in some ways been good because were its now really hard to imagine a brilliant strategy that will kind of knock everything out, right . There are people who made the argument, darryl press, that the u. S. , if it got really lucky and really good, could actually go after chinese Nuclear Facilities<\/a>, right . Once you start thinking about real counterforce targeting, that is to say going after believing you can engage in a first strike to take out Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, i think thats when youre in an incredibly dangerous world. I completely agree with everything bob said. If you got them, you want mediumsized arsenals that are survivable. We certainly had a lot of conversation about deescalation since the cold war and throughout the later phases of it. Not as much public conversations in the most recent years in terms of a Foreign Policy<\/a> debate on the public level, but let me come, actually, to you, you were talking about positive indeucemeindeuc inducements. Then were going to go to questions from you. One of the rejoinders would be isnt that just rewarding bad behavior . Whats your response to not argume argument . Absolutely. I wanted to take a quick second please. To tie this back in to what bob was saying earlier. Professor said that proliferation really ended with the cold war, thats true, but there have been a lot of attempts after the cold war and this is why i think positive inducements are so effective because there have been at least 10 to 12 other states that attempted to build Nuclear Weapons<\/a> programs after the cold war. And i love that argument. Okay. Positive due deucement. So youre just rewarding bad behavior. I think you node to look at it as what is the actual goal . So the United States<\/a> sees itself as this watchdog, and they in previous policy have not wanted to be seen just like you said, to reward bad behavior. And in the 2000s when the Bush Administration<\/a> came into power, thats one of the reasons why talks with north korea fell through, because president bush did not want to be seen like president clinton to be rewarding bad behavior. Basically came up with a policy that was anything but clinton. But i think the question becomes is your ultimate goal to prevent proliferation or is your ultimate goal to not be seen to reward bad behavior . Because of the 35 states that have attempted to gain access to Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, to proliferate, to build Nuclear Weapons<\/a> programs, the majority of those states have actually reversed because of positive inducements and not negative inducements. So lets take your questions. We have a couple microphones. One on that side, i believe. Well bring a microphone around to you and weve got one on this side. So go ahead and put up your hands and well get a microphone oer over to you. Well start in the back and go over here and work our way forward. So, yes, your question for our group. Hi. In the post9 11 pretrump world, there was a lot of focus on the threat from non state actors. Im wuondering if you can speak to whether that threat has actually changed or our focus has changed . Who wants to take that . Ill take one crack. Im a reformed alarmist. In my previous life before i wept went to graduate school, we received funding for a project which was supposed to scare the hell out of europe to get europeans to fund Nuclear Security<\/a> measures due to the risk of nuclear terrorism. So i participated in the creation of a simulation in which a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> was detonated by a terrorist organization in a major european capital. Having gone through that experience, my own personal view having sort of looked at all this and really thought about the probabilities of someone taking a diverting a constructed weapon or developing it on their own, my personal opinion is it is a very, very low possibility of happening. Non state actors in terms of a resir jeuir gent group of coup different matter. The rhetoric of a mushroom cloud, a nuclear 9 11, seemed to not take into account the complexity of the engineering required to make a functioning fission, let alone, fusion weapon, and the practicalities of getting that somewhere and detonating it. Its not a Big Red Button<\/a> if you just take the button and take the weapon, youre good to go. All right. So, paul and bob. Yeah. Another aspect to it, it kind of builds on this, how complex it is to actually detonate one of these. A lot of times these nonstate actors dont know what theyre dealing with. When i was working on my book for the economics of war, one of the aspent spenspects i looked black market for Nuclear Material<\/a> and turned out the cia did all sorts of sting operations especially in Eastern Europe<\/a> following the cold war. What they found is a lot of t e times be in prague, this back alley, meet this guy, say, hey, i got fissal material, not is not going to work. It may actually be fissal material but in such a state of d disrepair because they didnt know how to handle it, kind of going back to professor carsons point. Theyd arrest the guy, of course, because he was try to prolifera proliferate. That highlights another reason why this became less of a concern, this was another aspect of where its just very difficult for non state actors to actually ahandle these materials. Bob, this is your wheelhouse. Yeah, theyre both right. Let me just add two points. Number one, its almost never going to be in the interest of any state thats got a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> to give it to a non state actor for fear theyre going to turn around and nuke them right back. Thats why the idea that Saddam Hussein<\/a> was going to go handing these off to folks even if he got them, which he didnt, but more important point i want to make, thats a little different here, is a failed state. One of the things that weve been forgetting about is for 30 years weve been predicting north korea is going to be a failed state. Weve been putting economic sanctions on them to make them be a failed state. Now they have 30 to 60 Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Do we really want pyongyang to collapse as an entity so those 30 to 60 weapons now are floating free, first through north korea, then god knows where theyre going to be, because its now going to be this really dangerous situation where we dont know. So im extremely concerned about these policies that look at first blush like we should be tough on those actors, for near that we might get our wish. We might actually break north korea in pieces and then discover that we cant occupy it fast enough to get all 60 of those weapons. Lets go to this side. Question . My question is that with, for instance, israel being able to keep their Nuclear Program<\/a> secret and under wraps for quite a long time, officially, as far as i know, theres no no country has a comprehensive antiNuclear Weapon<\/a> Defense System<\/a> like the sdi in the 80s. What do you think the chances that a program like that is possessed by one of the Nuclear Power<\/a>s and is being kept under wraps . And if so, what do you think the effect of that could be . Ill just so i think that it is a possibility that we may discover a way to shoot down a Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, and were trying very hard. The United States<\/a>, in particular, has put its foot down for now about 20 years in trying to do just that. Its not impossible. But the problem that we face is that the other side thats trying to get a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> that we would try to shoot down has an enormous advantage, so its not like they need to match us dollar for dollar. There are so many ways to slip a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> in, if north say, north korea really wanted to. And i dont want to scare you, but the truth is, they dont need a missile, you know . Theres a whole lot of shipping containers that we never look at. They dont need to respond this week, this month, or even this year to a provocation. They can real rate ttaliate two years down the road. The whole idea of making the dome, so to speak, perfectly invi invulnerable, this misleads the public into thinking this would really be a perfectly safe situation. I just dont believe i think its going to be very difficult to do, and if even if we didnt, its not going to stop all these other ways. The only thing i would add to that is keep in mind, with Nuclear Weapons<\/a> even if you have a Missile Defense<\/a> shield, whats terrible about Nuclear Weapons<\/a> is it just takes one, right . Might stop 10, might stop 20. Takes one to get through. One missed strike. Thats one of the fears well, we could take this out. They may be right, they might say, well be 95 krengt. You know, it will work 95 . The problem is that 5 , you just need one and especially in a situation like the korean peninsula, where just one getting through could be de devastating. Lets take another question on this. We have a hand all the way in the back. Happy to bring the microphone toward the front if folks have questions on this side. Thank you. I wanted to in sense ask the same question but from the opposite angle. There are those who argue that missile Defense System<\/a>s not only are imperfect but actually greatly raise the possibility of catastrophe by making Nuclear Power<\/a>s more confident and sort of removing the specter of destruction. What do you think of that view of missile Defense System<\/a>s . Who wants that, paul . I think its conceivable that that would be the case. In my knowledge, there are no powers that are actually highly confident. You could worry about a moral hazard in which an actor saysvy a p ifect shield, im invulnerable, i can act on whatever i want and you get yourself into a war. Everybody at this point knows this is an extremely imperfect tool, right . So the issues that paul and bob raise i think are still very present. Theres just no perfect defense to that, right . Even a low probability of a catastrophic event by the way, just as a quick sidebar, the Goodman Theater<\/a> is currently staging blinddate, a World Premiere<\/a> play set in the 85 december meeting, first summit between reagan and gorbachev and its a fascinating in some cases fictional account of this. Sdi figures quite prominently as does diplomacy. If youre interested in a dramatic interpretation of these origin stories, that would be an opportunity for you to do so. Well take a hand here and go back there. Yes. Question on jpmorgan chase. Last year toward the end of the year put the sole survivor clause into their bylaws that in the event of some Nuclear Attack<\/a> that the remaining board member could take action on behalf of the entire board without legal liability. I and as i understand, thats language from the 1950s that yeah. Suddenly reappeared. Any thoughts on comments on that . Well, i think what it shows is, again, youre seeing since the Trump Administration<\/a> has come into office, and its not literally just since then, but candidate trump was also talking quite cavalierly about Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, publicly saying, well, why cant we use them . And things like that. And i think what thats done is its triggered in the public fear even among people that just dont know that much about the details of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. They know that they were bad and thats good enough. And so i think, sir, what youre seeing is some of those pressures coming in. That as the public is becoming afraid, that actually is a dampening effect on the negative thing happening. Is it perfect . No. I think thats really what youre seeing as fear. Other hands . We have a hand over here then we have several on this side. Back here. So we can bring one up to this corner then weve got two here. So my question concerns what you all think about the dangers of sort of increased time having passed since the cold war, and public as well as governmental ignorance of kind of the effects of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and or, you know, distance from the duckandcover era which gets at the point that was just made, sort of that people who dont really know about Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are now not only coming of age, but as we see with the president coming into office in certain areas. So i read that that was also part of the rationale for moving the hands forward. I was just wondering what you all ought about that, like, the degradation of knowledge as an increase in the danger. Yeah. Thats a great question. Who wants to take that . You want to paige . I think that was a great point. I would first say that i think its great that everyone is here. I think this is a huge thing. Part of this is people are more interested in the kardashians than they are in this. So the fact that were having an intelligent discussion about what Nuclear Weapons<\/a> mean in this current era is wonderful. Because i do think its a huge problem and i think its a huge problem that the Public Perception<\/a> and the public trust in institutions is declining, and it has reactively declined since President Trump<\/a> came to office and i would agree with you that thats one of the reasons that the bulletin set the hands of the clock back. Paul . Ill play devils advocate a little bit here, okay . Donald trump is not a spring chicken, right . He was around during the cold war, right . He did duck and cover, he lived in new york city which would be wiped out like that when the balloon went up. Like, he doesnt even have that excuse, right . [ laughter ] so i think theres an interesting question here, right . Which is at the mass level, maybe we dont know as much as we used to about Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, though i would not overexaggerate how much people actually understood about throw weights and, you know, pill packages and stuff during the cold war. The more interesting question in a sense is the elite level. Has there been continuity in the expertise to maintain a secure arsenal, one that is effective, do the things we want in to do, above all, not do it the things we dont want it to do, right . Above all, not do it the things we dont want it to do, right . Y above all, not do it the things we dont want it to do, right . Above all, not do it the things we dont want it to do, right . Y above all, not do it the things we dont want it to do, right . There are news reports that pop up about unfortunate accidents and people fired for incompetence. I think those that keep our accidentally being shot off into space are number one institutions we should be paying attention to. I hope well keep in mind Nuclear Weapons<\/a> as maybe being an exception to that dismissal. Lets go to bob then austin. A friend of mine at notre dame, mike dash, did a very fascinating study. He got 500 people who had Senate Confirmation<\/a> for being in National Security<\/a> positions, state department, defense department, et cetera, and asked them a very simple set of questions. What was the most important thing you learned at university . And the numberone thing, 80 of them, they all scattered on a bunch of little things, but 80 of them said Nuclear Deterrence<\/a> theory. Now, ill take our classes, okay . Dean woodward, support us. Thats really striking. 80 said that was the numberone thing they got out of college. Thats pretty important because that speaks to what were talking about. Yes, theres general worries about degradation, but the fact of the matter is, the place where this is kept is in universities because were the folks who do a lot of the education of future leaders. Yeah. Thats a great point. Lets take two last questions. Oh, yeah, austin, i forgot. Just two quick points. Sorry. Leaplease, please. First theres a fine line between healthy alarm and alarmism. Im not sure we want to go back to the early 50s duck and cover under your desk and youll be okay. Defenses on the lakefronts of chicago. Exactly. Right. Just keep that in perspective. Secondly, the thing that does actually really worry me is some lurch thats come o research thats come out in the last five, ten years, indicates a weakening of norm against nuclear use in the mass public, that is asking people in h the american public, is it okay under certain scenarios for us to use a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> against north ykorea . Really disturbing number of people saying thats okay, they killed 20,000 of our soldiers, we can go ahead and nuke them. If theres one thing i hope isnt eroding is a healthy understanding of what exactly the consequences of using Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are because that has not changed and really important given we have the arsenal and can choose to use it. Lets take one last one on this side if we can. Im an unreformed alarmist. Think about north korea. When we developed a nuclear bomb, it took a huge economy, 10 of our electricity was used for it, now a poor country like north korea can have a Nuclear Weapon<\/a>, getting from different sources. Can you talk a little bit about why north korea was able to get it and shouldnt be afraid, everybody else was able to get it . One part of it. Second part of the question is fear is a motivating factor. If kim jongun is afraid for his regime and himself, wont that motivate him to drop the bomb . A quick point to put a really good question in context, north koreas economy last year is estimated at 20 billion. Chicago economy last year was 600 billion. South koreas economy last year was 2 trillion. To put your point in sharp reli relief. Why is north korea able to do that . Because theyre one of the most vulnerable states on the planet. For decades, year after year the United States<\/a> and south korea who have many, many times the size of the gnp and technological advantage, we practice exercises. Were about to do this again in march. Thats why id like to stop that. Where were going to conquer every inch of north korea and tell the chinese, just make sure you stay out for another couple weeks, got two more acres to go. So that over decades and decades can get even the 204th poorest country on the planet to put the resources in to develop a Nuclear Weapon<\/a>. We have simply have to stop conquering countries. Its just not a good idea. Let me close just by asking one question of all of you, have you go down, if we could, and bob, well start with you and come back all the way down toward my end. That is, if you were to advise the u. S. Government, regardless of administration, on the top two priorities to keep in mind for our own Nuclear Security<\/a> and global Nuclear Security<\/a>, what would it be . What are the two things the number one thing would be the health of the north korean economy. So i really worry about the health of the north korean economy. I like the i think paige and i have a deal, i dont know if we can get it so i think weve got the sort of the outlines. It the real answer i would give to your question about why isnt it just rewarding bad behavior . No. I want to support them from becoming a failed state. So number one is the health of the north korean economy, and number two is not to abandon the nuclear deal with iran without a better deal already in place. Right. Paul post . So, first and foremost would be the main thing i would want to do for any president or administration, which is to help them understand the value of nato. Obviously. That its essential, its not a relic of the cold war. Its essential for maintaining europe as not becoming a state that indeed, a lot of the states who guy ave up their nucr weapons in the cold war were the states some of whom came into na nato. Nato is essential. Its not about how much money they spend. Creating incentives for nuclear stability. In term two, yeah, i agree, theres a need to rethink. I want to go back and emphasize what dr. Cone said, which is insanity is doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results, right . And i think that weve seen that whether its invasion as the ultimate form of anythinegativ e induceme inducement, right, to sanctions that this is not an effective policy for preventing proliferation. And so i think that just to more generalize from your north korea point is this idea of, you know, really using, offering goodies, nato being one example of that, offering goodies as a way of preventing prolive ragtion. I think thats the main policy. Austin carson . Number one, i would recommend that we redouble our support for the International Atomic<\/a> Energy Agency<\/a> and find creative ways to allow that actor to do the heavy lifting, to figure out whats going on web a khen a country i suspected of developing technology and make sure the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> technology stays in a relatively finite number of hands, we might one day think about doing something more where it. Number two, this is going to sound a little bit weird, when i think asht tbout the Trump Administration<\/a>, scenarios about a war with north korea, i recommend to each individual person in the bureaucracy to remember there are noble forms of bureaucratic disobedience. If President Trump<\/a> orders any kind of limited strike, let alone a Nuclear Strike<\/a> against no north korea, a bunch of human being have to implement that order and need to be ready to push back using any professional means necessary to advise against that and not implement it if they think it truly is a disastrous decision. I think thats the one thing that gives me a little bit of peace of mind, there are many ways for bureaucratic disobedience if we get in that situation. I agree with all of this. One, we havent talked much about china and the rise of china. The big challenge over the next 50 years is going to be the western pacific, the rise of china. So i want to think about, i think we need to think really hard about ways of building robust conventional deterrents in the western pacific, supporting allies as we choose, building credible turn postures that reduce as much as possible prospects of inadvertent Nuclear Escalation<\/a>. Right . Worry about what happens when you get a taiwan contingency or some other limited war in east asia. One a what are the pathways of Nuclear Escalation<\/a> . My wheelhouse is thinking about the problem obvious basically pakistani loose Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, right . I dont think this is as big a problem as some people said. Its not a trivial one. Especially when you get battlefield deployment of tactical Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. In war, plans never survive first contact. You worry about radical actors taking advantage of crisis situations to grab a now deployed Nuclear Weapon<\/a> and kind of running off with it. Thats the one scenario which i worry about nonstate actors and Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Paige . Im echoing in a lot of ways but firstly i would say we need to maintain alliances so extended deterrents is the number one thing the United States<\/a> has. South korea actually salt Nuclear Weapons<\/a> even after they were under our umbrella because we didnt have a credible commitment to them. I think we need to keep that in mind now and make sure were credible to our alliances just as paul said. Im going to echo not abandoning the jcpoa. I think this is incredibly important for a lot of reasons, but is a big one is the perception that it gives to other countries and to potential new proliferators like saudi arabia. Paige pricecone, paul, Austin Carson<\/a>, paul poast, bob pape, thank you for a timely and insightful conversation. We gained a lot from it and appreciate you convening all of it for us. My thanks also to the vision of social sciences, chicago project on security and threats, and the institute of politics. Thank you, all, so much for being here. We look forward to continuing the conversation as we close out today. Please give the panelists a warm round of applause. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, steve. Thank you very much, steve. Thank you. Cspans history series, landmark cases, returns with a look at 12 new Supreme Court<\/a> cases. Each week historians and experts join us to discuss the constitutional issues and personal stories behind these significant Supreme Court<\/a> decisions. Beginning monday, february 26th, live at 9 00 p. M. Eastern, and to help you better understand each case, we have a companion guide written by veteran Supreme Court<\/a> journalist tony mauro, landmark cases volume 2. The book costs 8. 95 plus shipping and handling. To get your copy, go to cspan. Org landmarkcases. Last night in a close game, the nfls Philadelphia Eagles<\/a> defeated the new England Patriots<\/a> in the super bowl. Lawmakers in washington, d. C. , are sharing their reactions on twitter today. Congressman dwight evans whose district includes most of philadelphia mentioned massachusetts lawmaker seth moulton and joe kennedy saying hope the both of you are feeling well enough to come into work today. Congressman evans bet congressman moulton if the patriots won and clam chowder in the eagles won. Illinois representative dan lipinskigratulated jake elliott on the win. Congressman rodney davis from illinois called the coin toss by a world war ii medal of honor sip recipient an awesome moment during super bowl lii. Last novemberrecipient an aweso during super bowl lii. Last november author and historian allen guelzo shared his thoughts on nfl players kneeling in protest during the national anthem. It runs about an hour and 15 minutes. Good evening. Thank you, all, for being here. Im going to put my glasses on. I only wear them when i want to see. 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