Good afternoon, everyone. Id like the call this subcommittee meeting on the emerging threats and capabilities to order. Ill start with the Opening Statement, and then we will have an Opening Statement from you, and move on to the witnesseses. Thank you, gentlemen for being here. The subcommittee on merging threats and capabilities made to d today to receive testimony on the department of defenses efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction and we welcome assistant secretary for defense of Homeland Defense and Global Security, deputy rapuano, and Joseph Osterman who is the deputy officer of socome, and thank them for appearing before us today. This hearing is coming at a troubling increase in the proliferation of wmds by rogue states and terrorist organizations that pose a direct and growing threat to the National Security. While we are familiar with and concerned by the growing size and capabilities of north Koreas Nuclear program, we should be mindful of the efforts to expand the chemical and the biological weapons capabilities. The Washington Post reported in december that north korea is moving steadily to acquire the ses en shall machinery that could be potentially used for the advanced bio Weapons Program for factories by the ton, to lab s for specific development. And there are other agent tas are used in iraq and syria. After the fall of the physical caliphate, we must be aware of the potential of the Technical Knowledge to spread. Additionally, there are syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad as he used chemical weapons against his own people. These show the global threat, and the need for a e global strategy to combat the threat. I noticed that the recent d. O. D. Counter strategy report was released in june of 2014. As i have laid out the scope and the complexity of the problem has only increased since that time. This requires the d. O. D. To reassess the strategy and ensure that we are postured appropriately in terms of organization, authorities and capabilities to most effectively confront this threat. From preventing the development of new wmd threats and mitiga mitigating existing one s s to responding in the event of a wmd incident. Like no the witnesses to provide the subcommittee with the candid assessment of how they view the wmd threat and as well as providing recommendation on the current approach that may be warranted. Additionally while it may be preferenced it is to deal with the threat before it reaches our shores. We must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to the wmd event in the homeland. I note that while dod is not necessarily the lead organization for the Homeland Response mission, id, in particular, the National Guard place a key role in the unique support to civil authorities like the federal Emergency Management authority and local author i tis. We would appreciate a update on the d. O. D. Planning and fulfi fulfillment of the Vital Mission of defending an attack on the homeland. Lastly, one year since the unified Campaign Plan has identified socome with the respon responsibility for the d. O. D. s mission which includes drafting a new plan and establishing intelligence priorities and encountering global d. O. D. Operations. General osterman, we look for you for the the update of what they have done to combat this vulnerability, and any steps that have been taken and any challenges for cocom to execute this Important Mission. We thank you for being here this afternoon, and we look forward to the testimony on this important topic. I call on the Ranking Member to make his opens statement. One of the when all else fails. Improvise. Okay. Okay. Hows that [ laughter ] let me start over. Let me begin by thinking that senat senator ernst for holding this committee, and i look forward to working with you again this year to examine key drafting of the fiscal year 2019 and National Defense authorization act, and the department of defense is a wide array of measures to control the spread of wmd ranging from nonproliferation programs that help the International Norms and expert controls to other efforts that are designed to stop the development of wmds by noncooperative methods. Part of your responsibility is the oversight of these methods and i am looking forward to understanding how they are achieving the objectives and what challenges they may be encountering. The u. S. Official commander of socon has been providing this training for over 20 years. And you equip those tasked with rendering wmds should they fall into the wrong hands. And as combat and command they have been synchronized with the global commands and operations for countering wmds. I hope that the witnesses will share their candid views of how to handle these critical responsibilities and retaining the focus on encountering extremist and violent groups. As we know the special Operations Forces are a finite resource, and it is important to report sufficient ready innocence the nofail wmd missions. I look forward to hearing the testimony of both of you. Thank you. Okay. Well go ahead to start with the witness testimony, and the s secretary, ra rapuano, we will start with you. Thank you, members of the committee, i am pleased to be here to testify about the departments efforts to counter chemical, raid logical and Nuclear Threats both at home and abroad. The United States faces a range of complex and multi dimensional pbr and other challenges. Over the past year the north korean regime has increased the dangerous and provocative behavior and continued to test nuclear and Ballistic Missiles in violation of the United Nations council resolution. We have seen the increased use of Islamic State of iraq and syria and clearly against the norm of their use. And more broadly, the increased advanced and use of these expertise and materials to be used for peaceful and military purposes heighten the risk that adversaries can more easily seek or acquire wmd. It was never more than a difficult person than to acquire the expertise necessary to use wmd or use materials in intentional attacks. The speed and volume and coverage of the International Travel means that naturally occurring pathogens of security concerns can spread worldwide indeed. And so potentially having the same catastrophic consequences of the deliberate biological attack. These diverse threats require multi faceted approaches to keep up with and adapt to the current thre threats of mitigating further risks. The Intelligence Community and the department of state, and the d. O. D. And the department of justice all played critical roles in detecting the threats and preventing attacks on the homeland and working with foreign partners to stop or suppress efforts. And the domestic and the overseas activities and working closely with the allies and the partners to counter the wide range of threats that exist today. Close cooperation with the other u. S. Departments and agencies and allies and partners is crucial since d. O. D. Must prioritize capabilities and efforts to minimize the risks and activities that are best executed by the department. They do it by using a layered approach to mitigating the threats at the source, and preventing them with reaching the homeland and when necessary responding militarily, and the departments strategic approach for the wmd focus is three lines of effort. Preventing the acquisition of the wmd and retaining and reducing wmd threats and when necessary to respond to and mitigating the kons kwns of the use. For example to prevent the transmit of materials to and from north korea, the department worked closely with intraagency partter ins to encourage the states to impede or stop elicit shipment with the efforts to build capacity and understanding of the norms and obligations through the Proliferation Security Initiatives and we engaged with the partners through the Reduction Program or the ctr program to decan tekt, security or eliminate those pathogens of concern. Despite the best efforts at prevention, we must be prepared to contain and reduce those threats once they develop. And the d. O. D. Is postured to preve prevent these threats. The government is also to deter ed adversaries and make sure that the actors who possess w. M. D. Do not use them against the United States or the allies and patter ins and for example, d. O. D. Continues to support the stateled partners to work the international lies and partners to hold the assad regime responsible for using chemical weapons. We are concerned about ongoing use report, and make sure that the president has all of the options available to respond if necessary. In addition, to contain and reduce the threat from isis, the u. S. And the Coalition Partners continue to exploit the opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt their wmd networks. Ultimately though should the deterrence or the efforts to contain and reduce the threats fail, and an adversary attacks the United States or our allies, the department of defenses top military priority is to respond and prevent future attacks. This may require u. S. Forces to operate in a contaminated environment which is critical that we safeguard the force and ensure that u. S. Personnel can sustain effective operations in the event of war or other contingencies, and this is why d. O. D. , wos closely with the allies and partners to assure that we are prepared to respond to an eincident overseas. In asia, the d. O. D. Is working with the key allies in korea and japan to ensure that the forces are remaining available to respond from anything that may arise on or from the peninsula. And partners are used to enhance the capability to respond to and mitigatet the effects of a cbrn incident. In addition to responding to events overseas, the d. O. D. Must ensure that we are ready to support the federal response to domestic cbrn incident at home. While most of those begin and end locality, events such as wmd attack would require support from neighboring jurisdictions, State Governments and as necessary, the federal government. The d. O. D. s role to assist the federal and State Government with local response when necessary is an important one. The d. O. D. Has developed a wide range of cnbr capabilities, and employ the capabilities to be used to use the civil resources in the aftermath of the cbnr incident and while a large Scale Nuclear and biological attack is something that we hope will never okccur, we cannot wait fo that threat to be imminent to enact, and so the complexity requires a whole government approach, and strong unity of effort. I work closely with the joint staff and the Combatant Commanders and the d. O. D. Components to ensure that the department utilizes the leverage and uses the authorities and resources and capabilities of the nation. U. S. Special Operations Command in the new role as coordinating authority of this focus has brought new enthusiasm no the role, and ensuring that the combat and command are taking a transregional approach to counter the challenges and to have the capability and capacity and plans to operationalize cnbr efforts. In closing, we must anticipate that the adversaries will continue to evolve and increasingly effective methods to pursue, or develop the cbrn weapons. The diversity of the challenges makes it imperative that the d. O. D. Is rigorous in priorities the efforts and work closely with the u. S. Departments and agencies and international departme departments to continue to confront the threats by wmd threats at home and abroad. As the challenges continue to emerge, your continued support for their part and the efforts described today are critical to our ability to understand and anticipate and mitigate the threats. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and i look forward to your questions. Thank you very much, secretarygeneral. Rank member ernsst and others on the committee, it is a honor the represent the director rapuanos office to stress the importance of countering the wmd threat. The testimony in the full senate committee, general thomas outlined the usocom for the new role of the change of january 2017. We are proud to report significant strides and increased communication, and information sharing and operational koo aal coordinati o other allies and those working in this space. Socom has years and decades of experience to support these tasks. The role of coordinating authority as directed by the unified command has the scope of special Operations Forces specific roles to the planning of department of defense counter wmd effort and support of the other combatant commands and the Department Priorities and as directed other u. S. Agencies. As other missionaries and coordinating authorities are established, this is going to enable a more strategic approach, and enhanced integration of the Department Plans and intelligence and priorities. Since the lead responsibility of this mission set from the u. S. Strategic command and the establishment of the socoms coordinating authority we have foc focused on three areas of major effort. And first, we are going a major Campaign Plan with coordination of the geographic combatant command commands. It takes a transregional perspective and emphasizes preventing new wmd development in existing programs and precluding aspiring actors from attaining the ta wmd. And we have a Baseline Assessment to determine the combatant and command and capabilities and capacity. It has identified shortfalls and when needed, the future capability of development and resource allocation. Thir third, we are increasing the understanding of operating environment by enhancing integration of intelligence, planning and assessments. To this end, we have established a counter wmd Fusion Center dedicated to coordinating information flow and planning, fusing intelligence and operations, and providing the wmd community of action that is a single point of contact from the wmd capability. While much progress has been made, your tremendous amount of work has been to fully finalize and implement the efforts. We look forward to collaborating closely with the office of secretary of defense and the joint staff and Defense Threat Reduction Agency and other combatant commands and the rest of the counter wmd committee. Thank you nfor the subcommittees continued support for the mission, a tnd the servicemen a our families. Thank you. Outstanding. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. We will open with questions and we will do those in fiveminute iter rations, and should we be joined by other member s of ts subcommittee, we will allow their questions as well. I would like to start with you mr. Rapuano, which wmd threat concerns you most at the stage based on the work within the department and the insight across our inner agencies. Thank you, senator. I think it depends upon the filter that you look through, if you are looking at the near term, primarily north korea the primary focus of the department, a combination of the destabilizing behaviors and very aggressive Testing Programs behaviors and very aggressive Testing Program for their icbms, aggressive statements about their nuclear Weapons Program and capabilities give cause for a great concern and weve got a lot of efforts focused on that. I think that we also put a lot of concern in terms of that evolving capability beyond the primary russiachina focus which you are well familiar with from the mpr and the National Defense strategy is iran. That they are developing missile and weapons capabilities in count count countervention of u. N. Secu resolutions and finally, developments that create growing concern over time is Bio Technology just the Rapid Advances and ubiquitous availability of Bio Technology today. Things that you can buy on the web now and essentially do a paint by members instruction where the province of nobel prizewinning scientists only decades ago, and that really levels the Playing Field for any actor looking to develop Bio Technology, biological agents and engineered agents that can present a real threat. Certainly, and thank you. You mentioned north korea, of course, the Nuclear Tests and weve all followed that with great interest, but something that we just dont talk about a lot, but was pointed out in the Washington Post and i mentioned it in my remarks is north korea acquiring different mechanical pieces that potentially could allow them to develop chemical or biological weapons. Has that been a focus, as well of the agency . Yes. We and the rest of the Interagency Community have significant concerns about north korean chemical and biological prog