Transcripts For CSPAN3 Nuclear Posture Review 20180212 : vim

Cspan. Next, a forum on recently unveiled Nuclear Posture review by the Trump Administration. Leading off, remarks by defense undersecretary of policy, David Trachtenberg, followed by discussion with Nuclear Policy specialists. Live coverage due to start shortly. I am mike oh hanlin with the Foreign Policy program. Happy to have you to discuss the Trump Administration Nuclear Posture review, came out february 2nd, following earlier National Security strategy of december and National Defense strategy of january. So the administration is doing a nice job keeping its clock work running smoothly. Prior to unveiling the budget request. Thrilled to have David Trachtenberg beginning the discussion today. He has one of the longer titles, but one of the more important titles in the pentagon. Principal deputy undersecretary for defense policy, a job jim miller also had. We will talk about that in the panel that follows with jim and others. For now, i want to introduce david who has been one of the administrations most important authors and voices on conceptualization, framing and writing of this document thats now available and all of you can access as youre aware on the net. About 70 page document, longer than the unclassified version of National Defense strategy. Has a lot of elaboration of Trump Administration thinking on a number of issues. We will hear about that today. David will give short remarks, then field some questions and then swap out a little before 11 00 mark for the panel discussion. Then i will moderate and introduce panelists when we get to that point. Let me say a couple more things about david. This is his second or third, fourth time in government. He was an important figure in the bush administration, working on interNational Security policy, which means he was thinking about relations with nato, other allies, thinking about their Nuclear Posture review of the early 2000s that he was contributor for. He hales by california, studies at georgetown, involved in a number of jobs in washington as mentioned earlier, including recently with short waiver consulting, job he held before joining the Trump Administration last summer when he was confirmed by the u. S. Senate for this job. Without further adieu, welcome mr. David trachtenberg. [ applause ] thank you very much. Thank you, michael. Pleasure to be here at brookings. Very much appreciate the invitation. Good to see so many people out here on such a dreary morning. Thank you for making the trek out here to participate in this. It is really good to be here. It has been awhile since i have been here. Always appreciate the opportunity to come back. One correction i would note to michaels very generous introduction, that is my title which was indeed Principal Deputy undersecretary of defense for policy has now been changed, it has been shortened by one word, thanks to National Defense authorization act which was signed into law a couple months ago or so. The word principal has now been dropped from all deputy undersecretary titles because theres only one deputy undersecretary. So now i have a better chance of fitting my title on a business card. So as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, again, it is my pleasure to be here and to talk about this very critical, very critical issue, the Nuclear Posture review. As you all know, each post cold war president has early in his first term conducted a review of u. S. Nuclear policy posture and programs. President trumps first National Security president ial memorandum issued one week into the administration directed secretary mattis to undertake the fourth such review of u. S. Nuclear policy. The aim of the review was to ensure the United States Nuclear Deterrence is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies. Department of defense conducted this review along with the departments of state and energy and in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture review establishes department of defenses priority as maintaining a safe and Effective Nuclear arsenal that can effectively contribute to four key goals, deterring nuclear and nonNuclear Attack, assuring allies and partners, achieving u. S. Objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against an uncertain future. The npr also emphasizes that u. S. Nuclear policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals. Now these roles are consistent with past priorities of u. S. Nuclear policy. Indeed the 2018 npr maintains longstanding Nuclear Policies adopted by democratic and republican administrations. For example, new npr recognizes the need for the nuclear triad, and sustains the previous administrations plan for modernizing the aging u. S. Nuclear triad of land based, sea based, air breathing delivery platforms as well as supporting Nuclear Infrastructure and command and control. Consistent with the 2010 npr conducted by the prior administration, the 2018 npr declares the United States would only consider using Nuclear Weapons in extreme circumstances to defend u. S. Vital interests. In addition, the npr also reaffirms u. S. Commitment to arms control and nonproliferation by maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty, and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence is critical to their security and promotes Nuclear Nonproliferation by checking their need to acquire their own Nuclear Weapons. Now each of the previous nprs has rightly emphasized that u. S. Nuclear policy must be responsive to the threat environment of its time. The 2018 npr addresses the reality that while the cold war has been over for decades, a much more challenging Nuclear Threat environment has developed since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture issue. This is the reality that confronted the new administration when it began its Nuclear Posture review. Accordingly, the 2018 npr is grounded in a realistic assessment of the contemporary security environment. One that recognizes a return of great power of competition and the increasing weapons and doctrines of adversaries. For example, since 2010 the russian leadership has made repeated explplicit threats to u. S. Nato allies and others, brandishing russian Nuclear Weapons in a way we really had not seen since the height of the cold war. Russia is actively modernizing and expanding strategic and nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and doing so in continuing violation of a landmark 1987 intermediate range Nuclear Forces or inf treaty. Like russia, china is pursuing expansionist moves at the expense of its neighbors, including key u. S. Allies, and doing so also through the threat of force. China also continues to expand its Nuclear Capabilities in both quantity and quality. Since 2010, china has announced the development of or fielded new icbms and theater range Ballistic Missiles, a sea launch Ballistic Missile, a new Ballistic Missile submarine and new strategic bomber. Chinas intentional act of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its Nuclear Modernization serves only to magnify uncertainty about its future intent. Also since 2010, north korea rapidly increased the pace of its Nuclear Testing and of theater, intercontinental and submarine launch Ballistic Missiles. At the same time, north korea has repeatedly made explicit Nuclear Threats to the United States and our allies in the region. While Irans Nuclear future remains uncertain, its malign activities and aspirations in the middle east are not. In contrast to these developments in the past decade, the United States has built no new types of Nuclear Weapons or Delivery Systems other than the f35 for the past two decades. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrence with extension programs, keeping systems and platforms beyond, decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of Defense Ash Carter rightly observed that if theres an arms race under way, the United States clearly is not a participant. It is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the numbers of Nuclear Weapons in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 npr, prospects for great Power Military confrontation have expanded, while both russia and china increased the number of their Nuclear Weapons programs. The intentional strength in u. S. Nuclear policies did not lead the rest of the world to follow the same path. This is not a unique conclusion reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. The u. S. National Intelligence Council recognized this great difference in the u. S. And russian approaches to Nuclear Weapons back in 2012, concluding, quote, Nuclear Ambitions in the u. S. And russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions, reducing the role of Nuclear Weapons in u. S. Security strategy is a u. S. Objective, while russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of Nuclear Weapons in its security strategy. End quote. The 2018 npr responds to this increasingly challenging threat environment not by changing longstanding tenets of u. S. Policy that have bipartisan support but by emphasizing the maintenance of those capabilities needed to effectively deter war in the current environment. It also seeks to clarify u. S. Policies to help remove the potential for mistaken calculation by potential adversaries that limited Nuclear First use threats or escalation, and provide them with any possible useful military advantage. Correcting the potential for such calculations is now a key to maintaining the deterrence of nuclear war. In this regard, i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 npr. Quantification of Nuclear Policy and recommended supplements to deterrence capabilities, all of which have been subject to considerable news accounts and what i would consider to be considerable mischaracterizations inch of the public commentary. First, let me say that 2018 npr returns deterrents of Nuclear Attack against us, allies and partners is a top priority of Nuclear Policy. Given the security environment and changes in that environment that i have highlighted, this is a prudent, realistic, i would argue necessary change. Second, to strengthen deterrents of nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attacks, the 2018 npr clarifies u. S. Declaratory policy regarding Nuclear Weapons. Doing so does not expand circumstances for nuclear use or lower the Nuclear Threshold as some commentators suggested. Rather, while maintaining a measure of ambiguity, it provides some clarification regarding what might constitute an extreme circumstance that could lead to u. S. Consideration of possible nuclear response. This clarification enhances deterrence and raises the Nuclear Threshold by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. As potential adversary nonNuclear Capabilities become more and more lethal, u. S. Policy must make clear attacks that have catastrophic effects on the American People and our allies must also be deterred. Finally, in addition to prioritizing deterrence, adding clarity to extreme circumstances, the 2018 npr also recommends two Nuclear Programs to strengthen u. S. Capabilities to deter attacks and to assure allies. First, the modification of a small number of existing submarine launched Ballistic Missiles to include a low yield option. Second is the pursuit of nuclear sea launched Cruise Missile. Despite the awesome capabilities of our existing nuclear triad, russias actions indicate that moscow may hold the mistaken belief that its numerous and diverse nonstrategic Nuclear Arsenal provides useful options for limited first use Nuclear Threats or employment. We believe the two supplements to the u. S. Arsenal presented in the npr are important to help correct this misperception and convince russia and any other potential adversary that the United States and its allies will not be coerced by the threat of limited Nuclear First use. The other point i make is neither of these capabilities, these two supplemental capabilities is a new capability. The low yield option for submarine launched Ballistic Missiles involves relatively minor modification to an existing war head, and the sea launched Cruise Missile is a capability that the United States possessed for decades until recently. In addition, neither of these capabilities will require underground Nuclear Testing, and both are compliant with all u. S. Treaty obligations. These capabilities are intended to strengthen the deterrence of war and assurance of allies, thereby helping ensure that Nuclear Weapons are not employed or proliferated. We must recognize that effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversary calculations, regarding use of Nuclear Force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. We must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats, behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended by the 2018 npr are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use and to do so with minimal changes to the u. S. Nuclear posture. We believe the policy announced in the npr is a reasonable response to changes in the current security environment. Let me be clear. The goal of our recommendations, the goal of recommendations contained in the 2018 npr is to deter war, not to fight one. Modernization of the u. S. Nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored Defense Strategies with flexible capabilities and clarification on the role of Nuclear Weapons all send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries, while also reassuring our allies. Finally, the 2018 npr helped ensure our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about Nuclear Reductions without a robust, ongoing u. S. Nuclear modernization program. Indeed, russian leaders have said as much. As secretary mattis recently testified, russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics that face that expansive effort are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for future arms agreements. The 2018 Nuclear Posture review is one of several important reinforcing u. S. National security documents meant to guide u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, u. S. Nuclear weapons are the bedrock of american and allied security. As colin gray has said, Nuclear Weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world. After the slaughter of two world wars, they have prevented large scale great power conflict for more than seven decades. In an era of renewed great power competition, adversaries, allies, and the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review by the Trump Administration<\/a>. Leading off, remarks by defense undersecretary of policy, David Trachtenberg<\/a>, followed by discussion with Nuclear Policy<\/a> specialists. Live coverage due to start shortly. I am mike oh hanlin with the Foreign Policy<\/a> program. Happy to have you to discuss the Trump Administration<\/a> Nuclear Posture<\/a> review, came out february 2nd, following earlier National Security<\/a> strategy of december and National Defense<\/a> strategy of january. So the administration is doing a nice job keeping its clock work running smoothly. Prior to unveiling the budget request. Thrilled to have David Trachtenberg<\/a> beginning the discussion today. He has one of the longer titles, but one of the more important titles in the pentagon. Principal deputy undersecretary for defense policy, a job jim miller also had. We will talk about that in the panel that follows with jim and others. For now, i want to introduce david who has been one of the administrations most important authors and voices on conceptualization, framing and writing of this document thats now available and all of you can access as youre aware on the net. About 70 page document, longer than the unclassified version of National Defense<\/a> strategy. Has a lot of elaboration of Trump Administration<\/a> thinking on a number of issues. We will hear about that today. David will give short remarks, then field some questions and then swap out a little before 11 00 mark for the panel discussion. Then i will moderate and introduce panelists when we get to that point. Let me say a couple more things about david. This is his second or third, fourth time in government. He was an important figure in the bush administration, working on interNational Security<\/a> policy, which means he was thinking about relations with nato, other allies, thinking about their Nuclear Posture<\/a> review of the early 2000s that he was contributor for. He hales by california, studies at georgetown, involved in a number of jobs in washington as mentioned earlier, including recently with short waiver consulting, job he held before joining the Trump Administration<\/a> last summer when he was confirmed by the u. S. Senate for this job. Without further adieu, welcome mr. David trachtenberg. [ applause ] thank you very much. Thank you, michael. Pleasure to be here at brookings. Very much appreciate the invitation. Good to see so many people out here on such a dreary morning. Thank you for making the trek out here to participate in this. It is really good to be here. It has been awhile since i have been here. Always appreciate the opportunity to come back. One correction i would note to michaels very generous introduction, that is my title which was indeed Principal Deputy<\/a> undersecretary of defense for policy has now been changed, it has been shortened by one word, thanks to National Defense<\/a> authorization act which was signed into law a couple months ago or so. The word principal has now been dropped from all deputy undersecretary titles because theres only one deputy undersecretary. So now i have a better chance of fitting my title on a business card. So as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, again, it is my pleasure to be here and to talk about this very critical, very critical issue, the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. As you all know, each post cold war president has early in his first term conducted a review of u. S. Nuclear policy posture and programs. President trumps first National Security<\/a> president ial memorandum issued one week into the administration directed secretary mattis to undertake the fourth such review of u. S. Nuclear policy. The aim of the review was to ensure the United States<\/a> Nuclear Deterrence<\/a> is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies. Department of defense conducted this review along with the departments of state and energy and in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review establishes department of defenses priority as maintaining a safe and Effective Nuclear<\/a> arsenal that can effectively contribute to four key goals, deterring nuclear and nonNuclear Attack<\/a>, assuring allies and partners, achieving u. S. Objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against an uncertain future. The npr also emphasizes that u. S. Nuclear policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals. Now these roles are consistent with past priorities of u. S. Nuclear policy. Indeed the 2018 npr maintains longstanding Nuclear Policies<\/a> adopted by democratic and republican administrations. For example, new npr recognizes the need for the nuclear triad, and sustains the previous administrations plan for modernizing the aging u. S. Nuclear triad of land based, sea based, air breathing delivery platforms as well as supporting Nuclear Infrastructure<\/a> and command and control. Consistent with the 2010 npr conducted by the prior administration, the 2018 npr declares the United States<\/a> would only consider using Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in extreme circumstances to defend u. S. Vital interests. In addition, the npr also reaffirms u. S. Commitment to arms control and nonproliferation by maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> treaty, and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence is critical to their security and promotes Nuclear Nonproliferation<\/a> by checking their need to acquire their own Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Now each of the previous nprs has rightly emphasized that u. S. Nuclear policy must be responsive to the threat environment of its time. The 2018 npr addresses the reality that while the cold war has been over for decades, a much more challenging Nuclear Threat<\/a> environment has developed since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture<\/a> issue. This is the reality that confronted the new administration when it began its Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. Accordingly, the 2018 npr is grounded in a realistic assessment of the contemporary security environment. One that recognizes a return of great power of competition and the increasing weapons and doctrines of adversaries. For example, since 2010 the russian leadership has made repeated explplicit threats to u. S. Nato allies and others, brandishing russian Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in a way we really had not seen since the height of the cold war. Russia is actively modernizing and expanding strategic and nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and doing so in continuing violation of a landmark 1987 intermediate range Nuclear Forces<\/a> or inf treaty. Like russia, china is pursuing expansionist moves at the expense of its neighbors, including key u. S. Allies, and doing so also through the threat of force. China also continues to expand its Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> in both quantity and quality. Since 2010, china has announced the development of or fielded new icbms and theater range Ballistic Missile<\/a>s, a sea launch Ballistic Missile<\/a>, a new Ballistic Missile<\/a> submarine and new strategic bomber. Chinas intentional act of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its Nuclear Modernization<\/a> serves only to magnify uncertainty about its future intent. Also since 2010, north korea rapidly increased the pace of its Nuclear Testing<\/a> and of theater, intercontinental and submarine launch Ballistic Missile<\/a>s. At the same time, north korea has repeatedly made explicit Nuclear Threat<\/a>s to the United States<\/a> and our allies in the region. While Irans Nuclear<\/a> future remains uncertain, its malign activities and aspirations in the middle east are not. In contrast to these developments in the past decade, the United States<\/a> has built no new types of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> or Delivery Systems<\/a> other than the f35 for the past two decades. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrence<\/a> with extension programs, keeping systems and platforms beyond, decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of Defense Ash Carter<\/a> rightly observed that if theres an arms race under way, the United States<\/a> clearly is not a participant. It is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the numbers of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 npr, prospects for great Power Military<\/a> confrontation have expanded, while both russia and china increased the number of their Nuclear Weapons<\/a> programs. The intentional strength in u. S. Nuclear policies did not lead the rest of the world to follow the same path. This is not a unique conclusion reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. The u. S. National Intelligence Council<\/a> recognized this great difference in the u. S. And russian approaches to Nuclear Weapons<\/a> back in 2012, concluding, quote, Nuclear Ambitions<\/a> in the u. S. And russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions, reducing the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in u. S. Security strategy is a u. S. Objective, while russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in its security strategy. End quote. The 2018 npr responds to this increasingly challenging threat environment not by changing longstanding tenets of u. S. Policy that have bipartisan support but by emphasizing the maintenance of those capabilities needed to effectively deter war in the current environment. It also seeks to clarify u. S. Policies to help remove the potential for mistaken calculation by potential adversaries that limited Nuclear First<\/a> use threats or escalation, and provide them with any possible useful military advantage. Correcting the potential for such calculations is now a key to maintaining the deterrence of nuclear war. In this regard, i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 npr. Quantification of Nuclear Policy<\/a> and recommended supplements to deterrence capabilities, all of which have been subject to considerable news accounts and what i would consider to be considerable mischaracterizations inch of the public commentary. First, let me say that 2018 npr returns deterrents of Nuclear Attack<\/a> against us, allies and partners is a top priority of Nuclear Policy<\/a>. Given the security environment and changes in that environment that i have highlighted, this is a prudent, realistic, i would argue necessary change. Second, to strengthen deterrents of nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attacks, the 2018 npr clarifies u. S. Declaratory policy regarding Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Doing so does not expand circumstances for nuclear use or lower the Nuclear Threshold<\/a> as some commentators suggested. Rather, while maintaining a measure of ambiguity, it provides some clarification regarding what might constitute an extreme circumstance that could lead to u. S. Consideration of possible nuclear response. This clarification enhances deterrence and raises the Nuclear Threshold<\/a> by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. As potential adversary nonNuclear Capabilities<\/a> become more and more lethal, u. S. Policy must make clear attacks that have catastrophic effects on the American People<\/a> and our allies must also be deterred. Finally, in addition to prioritizing deterrence, adding clarity to extreme circumstances, the 2018 npr also recommends two Nuclear Programs<\/a> to strengthen u. S. Capabilities to deter attacks and to assure allies. First, the modification of a small number of existing submarine launched Ballistic Missile<\/a>s to include a low yield option. Second is the pursuit of nuclear sea launched Cruise Missile<\/a>. Despite the awesome capabilities of our existing nuclear triad, russias actions indicate that moscow may hold the mistaken belief that its numerous and diverse nonstrategic Nuclear Arsenal<\/a> provides useful options for limited first use Nuclear Threat<\/a>s or employment. We believe the two supplements to the u. S. Arsenal presented in the npr are important to help correct this misperception and convince russia and any other potential adversary that the United States<\/a> and its allies will not be coerced by the threat of limited Nuclear First<\/a> use. The other point i make is neither of these capabilities, these two supplemental capabilities is a new capability. The low yield option for submarine launched Ballistic Missile<\/a>s involves relatively minor modification to an existing war head, and the sea launched Cruise Missile<\/a> is a capability that the United States<\/a> possessed for decades until recently. In addition, neither of these capabilities will require underground Nuclear Testing<\/a>, and both are compliant with all u. S. Treaty obligations. These capabilities are intended to strengthen the deterrence of war and assurance of allies, thereby helping ensure that Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are not employed or proliferated. We must recognize that effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversary calculations, regarding use of Nuclear Force<\/a> to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. We must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats, behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended by the 2018 npr are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use and to do so with minimal changes to the u. S. Nuclear posture. We believe the policy announced in the npr is a reasonable response to changes in the current security environment. Let me be clear. The goal of our recommendations, the goal of recommendations contained in the 2018 npr is to deter war, not to fight one. Modernization of the u. S. Nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored Defense Strategies<\/a> with flexible capabilities and clarification on the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> all send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries, while also reassuring our allies. Finally, the 2018 npr helped ensure our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about Nuclear Reductions<\/a> without a robust, ongoing u. S. Nuclear modernization program. Indeed, russian leaders have said as much. As secretary mattis recently testified, russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics that face that expansive effort are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for future arms agreements. The 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review is one of several important reinforcing u. S. National security documents meant to guide u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, u. S. Nuclear weapons are the bedrock of american and allied security. As colin gray has said, Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are a regrettable necessity in the real world. After the slaughter of two world wars, they have prevented large scale great power conflict for more than seven decades. In an era of renewed great power competition, adversaries, allies, and the American People<\/a> should know that the United States<\/a> has the will and flexible resilient Nuclear Forces<\/a> needed to protect the peace. Before turning things back over to michael and the panel for discussion, let me again take this opportunity to thank Brookings Institution<\/a> for the opportunity to come here today, to briefly present the departments work and to engage in an informed discussion on these issues that are tremendously vital to our nations security. I appreciate your being here and your attention and i look forward to your questions and insights. Thank you all very much. Questions. Comments, suggestions. Recommendations. Yes, sir. If you are going to get involved in low yield with an x change, how do you figure youre going to prevent it from escalating to more conventional size Nuclear Weapons<\/a> . I dont think of it in terms of getting involved in an exchange at all. The way we look at this again is what we are trying to do is we are trying to prevent an exchange, not engage in one. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to think about how do we do that in a world that has changed dramatically since the last npr was done and reflects developments by russia and other states that tend to suggest increased reliance on Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, and the possibility that Nuclear Weapons<\/a> even in a limited way might have some degree of political or military utility. So recommendations that we are proposing to include a low yield Ballistic Missile<\/a> and sea launch Nuclear Armed<\/a> Cruise Missile<\/a> are intended not to engage or not to fight a nuclear war, not to even suggest that one could be fought in a way that is limited, however one wants to define the term limited, but are designed to try to convince adversaries and potential opponents that they should not feel that they have some exploitable advantage by using the capability for which the United States<\/a> has no counter. So the very purpose of what we are doing is war prevention, not war fighting. I understand the characterizations, many suggest that what we are looking to do is engage in precisely the kind of limited strikes that your question suggests. I suggest looking at it differently. What were trying to do is prevent an opponent from believing that such a course of action is actually useful or beneficial. Flexible Nuclear Capabilities<\/a>, tailored to specific circumstances makes the most sense for deterrence and for assurance. Obviously no two states are alike. We have multiple threats we are trying to deter, and to do that may take flexible capabilities. In some cases, certain types of military capabilities may be sufficient for deterrence, in other cases opponents may see them as less efficient. So what we are trying to do is ensure that there is a necessary flexibility and resilience and robustness in terms of capabilities we have at our disposal in order to deter, dissuade opponents from believing they have any kind of military advantage that they believe they can use either to initiate conflict or escalate conflict. Thats the entire purpose of the recommendations that you find in the 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. Thank you. I would like to know your concern that enhancing Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> can be seen as contradiction to commitment you mention of nonproliferation agreement and can also promote an arms race. I would answer this way. First of all, i dont see it as a contradiction whatsoever. In fact, i mentioned our extended deterrence, that we extend to over two dozen plus allies overseas. I would argue our Nuclear Arsenal<\/a>, the arsenal we have that serves that extended deterrent function is quite possibly the most successful nonproliferation tool we have had in our tool kit literally for decades because it has dissuaded friends and allies from feeling the need to develop or acquire Nuclear Weapons<\/a> of their own. From nonproliferation standpoint, the Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> we have i think very much support u. S. Nonproliferation objectives. In terms of the question about an arms race, i have seen that commentary as well a number of times. I go back to the statement that i read from former secretary of Defense Ash Carter<\/a>. Theres an arms race. The United States<\/a> is not participating. In fact, the United States<\/a> hasnt been participating for quite some time. If you look at the details of what the Russian Federation<\/a> has been doing in terms of its own Nuclear Modernization<\/a> program, if you look at Russian Military<\/a> doctrine, if you look at the exercise, Strategic Force<\/a> exercises that russia has conducted, a number of which really have been unrivalled since days of the cold war, number of which involved the exercise of their strategic Nuclear Forces<\/a> and in fact simulated use, first use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. If you look at all of the systems that the russians have been engaged in modernizing in recent years, it is difficult for me to understand how what we are proposing to do in this Nuclear Posture<\/a> review in terms of maintaining the efficacy of the existing triad and developing two supplemental i believe modest capabilities that i mentioned, in any way, shape or form, holds an arms race. Were not looking at what russia is doing weapon for weapon, what theyre doing to build up thousands of nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons<\/a> that the russians have in their arsenal. Again, what were trying to do is were trying to convince potential adversaries, whether it be russia, china, north korea, whomever, that there is no benefit to them of pursuing a course of action which could lead, which might lead to their actual use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> first or in some kind of socalled limited way. We want to make absolutely certain the cost to an opponent, to an aggressor of any nuclear use far outweigh any perceived benefits they might think would accrue to them. That is the essence of what we have recommended in this npr. Again, i would argue it is relatively consistent with the traditional u. S. Nuclear policies as they have evolved over many decades. Again, i think theres much more continuity to this particular npr and its conclusions and recommendations, visavis prior nprs, than differences. Theres a lot of continuity there. And that continuity has been occasionally overlooked. Thank you. I come from a country under the relationship with the United States<\/a>, new zealand, decided our security were better if we were not nuclear. So we withdrew from that Nuclear Deterrents<\/a> relationship. Now signed a new treaty on prohibition of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Would you be supportive of other allies to decide for National Interest<\/a> more secure not to be a Nuclear Alliance<\/a> and signing the treaty on prohibition of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> . Of course, it is up to individual states and allies to decide what approach they want to take. I will tell you we have had similar discussions and debates in nato context for many years. Nato remains a Nuclear Alliance<\/a>. I dont see that changing. Theres general recognition among allies that Nuclear Deterrence<\/a> remains important. Theres also recognition that because of some of the changes that i alluded to that have taken place in the world environment in recent years, the issue of preventing Nuclear Conflict<\/a> has taken on growing importance. And role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in doing that is also generally recognized by allies. I dont want to obviously speak for what other countries should or shouldnt do, but i think it is clear not only to the United States<\/a> but it is clear to u. S. Allies abroad as well, many of whom share our threat perceptions and understanding of some of the dangers that we see posed by others and share our recognition that it is critically important, perhaps more so now than ever before to make sure we have the wherewithal and capabilities and resolve to ensure that potential adversaries do not miscalculate, do not believe they have some kind of advantage that is exploitable, that they can take advantage of. Again, i think thats in the sort of mainstream of u. S. Nuclear tradition. I dont see anything odd or unusual about that. But again, whether we like Nuclear Weapons<\/a> or dont, we may all wish we lived in a World Without<\/a> them, but we also have to recognize reality, and reality is Nuclear Weapons<\/a> do exist. Some states have gone in a direction quite opposite the direction that the United States<\/a> has gone in terms of size of its Nuclear Arsenal<\/a> and its attention, focus on Nuclear Weapons<\/a> as part of its National Security<\/a> strategy. Thats a quieting development in my view, one we need to be forthright in confronting, straightforward. Yes, sir. I appreciate your presentation. Thank you for it. And i have learned a lot from it. I wonder whether your approach may in fact run afoul of some of the very things you warned other people about, particularly thinking about how other countries will view our strategy. When we decide to build new nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, why will that not appear to russia and to other countries to be a ratification of their new strategy of escalation to deescalate, an acceptance of limited nuclear war. And why is it that the administration decided to focus only or predominantly upon Nuclear Responses<\/a> to a possible limited Nuclear Attack<\/a> rather than looking to the area of conventional response in which we have such an overwhelming superiority. Remembering of course that in the old days when we thought the russians had conventional superiority, we were ones that believed in first strike. Let me say this. There is nothing in the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review that assumes an Automatic Nuclear<\/a> response to any particular contingency. Theres an element of strategic ambiguity which does not rule out our ability to respond in other ways as well, in ways of our choosing appropriately to the nature of the threat that we face. That could be response with conventional arms, could be some other type of response. Theres nothing in the npr that says United States<\/a> under this or that circumstance will respond with Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Theres no you point about other types of response. Certainly valid, and not negated by anything in the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. Why is the focus of this review on Nuclear Weapons<\/a> . Because it is a Nuclear Posture<\/a> review, and the tasking was to review u. S. Nuclear posture. So that of course is what the review did. In terms of possible reactions of russia, china and other states, i have no doubt that anything that the United States<\/a> does or proposes to do would likely generate negative reactions on the part of those that would prefer the United States<\/a> not to take any action at all, to bolster, improve its Nuclear Deterrent<\/a> capabilities. So it is not surprising to read or hear statements from russian officials, chinese officials, north korean officials, critical of Nuclear Posture<\/a> review, suggesting that Nuclear Posture<\/a> review does precisely the opposite of what it is intended to do. But i think the document itself has to be taken as a whole. And i think the context that is provided within the review itself in terms of our assessment of the overall Nuclear Security<\/a> environment provides a realistic framework and rationale why we came to the conclusions and recommendations we have come to. I realize certainly reasonable people can have reasonable disagreements over this or that specific recommendation or the rationale behind it. Thats, you know, thats what makes debate over this issue so robust. But nevertheless, i encourage everyone, if you havent read the full document, i encourage you to do that. Look at how the security environment is described and assess the conclusions and recommendations of the npr in the context of our assessment, see whether or not it holds together and makes sense as you do that. I think it is a logical approach. I think it is a rational approach, and is tailored to the kinds of 21st century threats we currently confront and are likely to confront in the future. So regardless of what some opponents might suggest, i think we have kind of hit it right in this particular review. I think it is balanced. I think it is consistent with what u. S. Nuclear policy has been by and large for decades. And i think it is appropriately tailored to different threats that we face today. Thanks so much for joining us at brookings today and making the case for the npr. To achieve its ambitious objectives, modernization of the triad, d. O. E. Nuclear complex, command and control systems, kplem supplements, these are expensive, high price tag associated with them. Youre going to need strong bipartisan support in the u. S. Congress, presumably you and other senior officials have engaged in consultation with members of congress to make the case for the npr and to get their support. How have those consultations gone. Are you confident youre going to have the necessary domestic consensus for this ambitious program, and what are the particular challenges . What are the two or three challenges talking points used, what are the challenges you need to confront. Very good question. I would say so far our discussions with folks on the hill and elsewhere, democrats, republicans, i would generally characterize them as overwhelmingly positive. Obviously not everybody supports everything that we proposed here in the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. There are some that believe we go too far, there are others that believe we dont go far enough, which again goes to show you in washington, you cant please everyone all of the time. But i think by and large i have been quite pleased by what i have seen as generally bipartisan support for what we have done and what we are attempting to do with this particular npr. Again, it is not universal, but it is quite substantial i would argue. The Biggest Challenges<\/a> i think are several fold. Number one, explaining the rationale behind what it is were proposing in a way that is understandable. This is of course and everyone here in this room knows it, this is a very esoteric issue. But it is an issue because of that, its also an issue that occasionally lends itself to mischaracterization or misinterpretation. Explaining what we are proposing to do, why we are proposing to do it, in a way that makes sense to multiple audiences i think is a challenge. But is critically important to do, if we are going to not only generate but maintain a level of bipartisan support that is needed to actually carry out the recommendations that we have proposed. The other challenge of course and you alluded to it in your question is the issue of funding. No question that what we are talking about carries a substantial price tag. Just the modernization of our existing triad is not an inexpensive undertaking. Relatively speaking to other things we spend defense dollars on, it is a relatively minor fraction overall of the Defense Budget<\/a>. Maybe three to four percent. Which is rather low if you look at past periods of modernization and recapitalization of the triad. From my perspective it is not so much a question of affordability. We can afford to do what we need to do when we talk about issues as preventing nuclear war. Secretary mattis likes to say we can afford survival. And he is absolutely right. We can afford to do that. We simply need to be able to number one understand that doing so will require time. This is not something that will be done overnight. And it will require a commitment of resources that must be sustained over a period of time to get us to the point where we actually achieved the objectives we set forth. That in itself is reasonably heavy lift. I would argue that as difficult as it was for us to spend the last year sort of constructing the npr in a way that is reflective of the current security environment that, was probably the easy part. Now that wave doeve done it, ty part is over. The hard part is ensuring the recommendations are sustainable and actually carried out in order to accomplish the objectives that we set forth from a policy prescription. So the challenge is just beginning. This is a challenge that will go, last well beyond this administration into the next administration. Again, this is not something that can be done overnight or with the flip of a switch. Ill ask the panel to join me on stage, not taking a break. Well go into that. Join me in thank secretary thank you, everybody for staying with us and our thanks to secretary trachtenberg. I want to introduce the distinguished panel we have up here and go straight into a discussion. Well be here until 12 00. The last half hour or so for you questions. Let me introduce the folks. Well have another round of discussion. Just to my left is madeline creden. She was Principal Deputy<\/a> administrator of the department of energy main arm that works on the Nuclear War Heads<\/a> of our arsenal, the national Nuclear Security<\/a> administration. A lot of issues concerning war head modernization or potential need to beef up the war head complex in case we need to modernize and expand in the future which the npr addresses will be questions i want to pose to the secretary. She was an assistant secretary at the department of defense and on capitol hill. Almost everybody up here has capitol hill experience which is important. Then dr. Jim miller who is under secretary of defense for policy in the Obama Administration<\/a>. Prior to that he was Principal Deputy<\/a> under secretary of defense for policy in the first term when he helped rye the Nuclear Posture<\/a> review of 2010 that we heard referenced several times. That was the previous npr. My opening question for jim and the panel in general is going to be, in fact, how much continuity is there from the 2018 npr and how much change. Well get to that in just a moment. If you read jims bio, youll notice in the farewell speech, that jim was an excellent tennis player at stanford. Jim running me into the wall of the indoor facility. Thats just a personal note that i appreciate the indulgence. Just to jims left is bob einhorn who had a distinguished career in government. Hes doneed a mic writing as well. Hes here with me at brookings. Bob was Hillary Clintons<\/a> main adviser on nonproliferation strategy and worked very hard on issues like north korea and iran as well as arms control treaties more generally in the Obama Administration<\/a>, had been at csis, clinton administration, great distinguished career. He has done many things since the 1980s. James active, a physicist by training. Has done a lot of the most rigorous technical writing on arms control including on broad subjects such as the potential long term hope for complete nuclear disarrangementment but also questions h also questions on building a stabilize armament. I want to hear your comparison of the 2010 npr to this one. Thank you. Michael is a terrific talented player as well as an intellect. Three quick points on the 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review relative to the 2010 review. First is that theres a very strong threat continuity, both with respect to the policy and with respect to the programs. At the policy level, this npr reiterates what the 2010 Nuclear Posture<\/a> had to say about the u. S. Policy towards deployment of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and that is Nuclear Weapons<\/a> would be used only under extreme circumstances that threaten u. S. Interest or interest of our allied partners. This view reiterates the security deterrence that the u. S. Will not use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> against nonNuclear Weapon<\/a> states. And finally this review rejects no first use or sole purpose for Nuclear Weapons<\/a> but makes clear in my view the fundamental role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> is to deter Nuclear Weapons<\/a> use. So at the policy level, a lot of consistency and similarly support of arms control including new start and returning the russians to compliance with the imf treaty. And finally, a reiteratation that the u. S. Will not seek Nuclear Testing<\/a> although this Administration Says<\/a> it will not pursue ratification of that treaty. Testing although this Administration Says<\/a> it will not pursue ratification of that treaty. Then focused on sustaining and modernizing the triads. Real priority on investing in survivable nuclear and command control which is critically important for nuclear stability. And this is very much in madelines area of expertise, continue to invest in the Nuclear Infrastructure<\/a> that ncaa and department of energy is responsible for. All those areas continuity and i think thats fundamentally important. The place where we see the changes in the two weapon systems that david was mentioning, a sea launch Cruise Missile<\/a>. Which i hope will be deployed solely on submarines not on surface ships because of greater survivability. I prefer to come back to those issues. Third point i want to make is this theres important difference and theres no question that the 2010 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review was president obamas Nuclear Posture<\/a> review. He gave the prague speech, secretary gates forwarded it and noted it was implementing mechanism for the prague speech. Theres a question, and well learn over time, i suppose, does this 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> review signed by secretary mattis does it represent the views of president trump. President trumps comments about having a Bigger Nuclear<\/a> button, about bringing fire and fury to bear on north korea in response to any aggression causes one to wonder if thats the case. I hope that is the case. Time will tell. One additional question i think you laid that out clearly and a good frame. But i want to understand one further point. To the extent the Trump Administration<\/a> or secretary mattis, to the extent they do talk about the 2010 npr they do want to emphasize continuity just as you have. In those places where they acknowledge discontinuity, they seem to attribute that throes a difference in world view, obama versus trump, vision of Nuclear Disarmament<\/a> versus big button and they want to say more the world has changed since 2010 and weve seen in particular russias more aggressive behavior. Do you accept that what most has changed is in the interNational Security<\/a> environment rather than the occupant of the white house here in washington . I cant speak to the embodiment of the white house in this review as i noted but the world situation has changed substantiatively relative to 2010. Most notably, north korea has advanced its missile and Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> and i believe thats an important reason to look at bolstering our deterrence posture, the Nuclear Umbrella<\/a>. And second, i also agree that russia has continued to invest very substantially inta tactica Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and its posture associated with them in multiple exercises and its rhetoric has been such that thinking about how to bolster deterrence of russian coercion or attack using Nuclear Weapons<\/a> is appropriately an important focus of this review. And ill just say, im sure well talk about later, the steps that were taken in this review with low yield, slb weapon and with the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> makes good sense given those changes. I have one follow up and then well move on to bob einhorn and then madeleine and james. You mentioned north korea and russia. You didnt mention china explicitly. Ill give you a chance now to speak about china. One striking dimension of the National Security<\/a> strategy, the Trump Administration<\/a> paint russia and china with the similar brush. The npr does that a little bit as well. I see Chinas Nuclear<\/a> behavior much more strained than russia so im concerned about the single brush. I wonder if you want to comment on that question as well . I agree with your assessment. My focus on north korea and russia was intentional. Both advanced their Nuclear Capabilities<\/a> over the last eight years. And in each in its own way is relying significantly on Nuclear Weapons<\/a> not only for deterrence but for coercive capability. China has no first use Nuclear Policy<\/a>. I find that relatively credible and i believe their behavior in their modernization programs is consistent with one would expect given their no first use policy for a country that is not just a, to be rising great power sbut but is a great power today. So peoples republic of china leadership can be confident they have a secure second strike capability, is a sensible set of steps from my perspective. It would be surprising to me if a great power took a different approach. Thank you. Bob, let me turn to you and, again, weve been wrestling how much choeng, how much continuity. Youve been thinking about declaratory posture. The sum of both continuity and change like the 2010 nonproliferation, the 2018 npr presence the option for the United States<\/a> to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in response to both nuclear noonnuclear aggression. As jim just pointed out both nprs therefore reject the idea that deterrence of Nuclear Attack<\/a> should be the sole purpose of u. S. Nuclear weapons. So theres some continuity there. Also, and David Trachtenberg<\/a> mentioned this. Like the 2010 npr, the trump npr says the United States<\/a> will only consider the use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in extreme circumstances when the vital interests of the United States<\/a>, its allies and partners are at stake. But theres an important difference here, at least in my view. The 2018 npr defines extreme circumstances more broadly. To include nonnuclear strategic attacks against u. S. Allies, United States<\/a> and u. S. Partners. Now the trump npr doesnt really define nonnuclear strategic attack. It doesnt explain what would make a Nuclear Attack<\/a> strategic. Instead it provides some examples. NonNuclear Attack<\/a>s against civilian population centers, and critical civilian infrastructure against Early Warning<\/a>, command and control, attack assessment capabilities. Now, previously, before the current npr, the u. S. Maintained the option to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in response to massive conventional aggression, to stave a major defeat. Such as warsaw pact over western europe. China conquering taiwan. North korea crossing the dmz and occupying seoul. The u. S. Also preserved the option to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in response to a nonnuclear wmd attack, equivalent to the use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in lethality, such as a truly mass casualty biological weapons attack. These circumstances, in my view, set a very high bar for the u. S. Initiation of the use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. The examples that are provided in the trump npr, i think, lowers the bar. The use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, in my view, would hardly be the most effective proportionate or credible way to respond to, for example, conventional bombing of population centers, conventional or cyber attack against critical infrastructure, such as the electrical grid or kinetic assets. In my view a better way to protect those potential targets is to make them more resilient, redundant or defensible and to threaten to retaliate with more credible but still highly potent nonnuclear means. The Trump Administration<\/a> may believe that declaring a readiness to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in a wide arrange of circumstances will enhance deterrence, but i think such a declaratory mission has a down side. If the United States<\/a> will use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> early in a conflict it may calculate that its better off using Nuclear Weapons<\/a> first. And concerns that the Administration May<\/a> be increasing the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> if this perception were to become widespread in the American Public<\/a> it could undermine the domestic consensus thats required to pursue the recapitalization of the u. S. Deterrent. The Trump Administration<\/a> may have been motivated at least to some extent by a political impulse to adopt a more robust approach to deterrence than its predecessors, but the 2018 npr declaratory process may raise some questions about the administrations Nuclear Intentions<\/a> and might even do so without significantly increasing deterrence. Bob, thank you. One follow up for you. Do you have a sense there were certain scenarios the Administration May<\/a> have had in mind of this sort of nonnuclear strategic variety, that they were really concerned about that we had somehow underappreciated the sweeter, for example High Altitude<\/a> nuclear burst. But the equivalent in a cyber realm that brought down much of our National Electricity<\/a> grid and put us on our heels as a nation for a year or what have you as we try to rebuild the electric it is infrastructure. Was it jones like that or a broader sense of wanting to leave a sharper contrast with predecess predecessors . Im not sure of that, and i think the administration will be under pressure in the weeks and months to come to begin to articulate what kind of scenarios they would consider to be, the kind of nonnuclear strategic attack that could warrant, you know, our consideration of nuclear use. I think some of the scenarios you mentioned are in their minds but clearly the administration is going to be reluctant to be drawn out into specifics. I think it believes that ambiguity enhances deterrence. But i think ambiguity can be confusing and lead some u. S. Adversary to jump to the wrong conclusion that the u. S. Is prepared to initiate nuclear war early in a conventional conflict. I think this is going to be it may be difficult to sell current declaratory policy. I think, fortunately for the administration, issues like the price tag of modernization and the supplements, the low yield sbm are easier to grasp on to in the public debate. Declaratory policy tends to be more abstract, more complicated. So maybe the Administration May<\/a> avoid some very searching questions. But i think, you know, in the kind of strategic community, i think some of these questions about declaratory policy will become very prominent. Thank you. Madeleine, if i can go to you please. I would first like to get your thoughts on explaining to us a little bit about what might be up with these new Nuclear War Head<\/a> concepts teen the extent you want to talk about your understanding of those. So secretary trachtenberg said that the slb, the submarine launch variance is a minor modification to existing war head type. I guess we can guess what that might mean. If you can give us any insight in how you can have a much lower yield war head. Its only a modest modification. And for this cruise war head what kind of time sense are we talking about. It to start with another little twist. Please. In really a bit of the emphasis on this. And thats really the lack of emphasis on nonproliferation, Threat Reduction<\/a>. That was in the 2010 npr. So in terms of tone, although as both jim and bob has said, a lot of the policies are relatively consistent, i think this lack of emphasis on Threat Reduction<\/a> and nonproliferation is telling, and the reason i say that is even though there is good language with respect to staying in new start and both russia and u. S. Have come in to compliance with new start, whats miss cigarette really any commitment to the five year extension which is in new start. I understand the reticence to have any discussion with russia on new treaties. Russia made it clear they are not interested in that. Teen omission of the five year extension is telling. The reason i put all that there is because i think it has it does have some influence on the language that deals with the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> infrastructure at nsa because i think that is much more subtle in this npr but i think in many respects it is much different from the previous npr. So we all know that infrastructure at nsa large part its very old, outdated, it needs replaced and its been a long process to get and difficult and expensive to get some of that infrastructure going in terms of the replacement. What nsa has been doing and this is more to your point is that it has been doing the life extensions on the existing war heads. Okay. So the plan, as i understand it from the npr is to take some number of the war head for the Ballistic Missile<\/a> currently on the submarines, so that w76 is almost finished with the life extension. This was the first big life extension. My understanding is that they will do something to it. I actually dont know exactly what they are going to do to modify it so its not the single high yield and it will have, i think, based on the reading thvg it will have a single low yield. What that actually is, isnt terribly clear. But based on some of the reading its probably not a new war head. But it is a new military purpose. Okay. So theres you got that debate. The second piece is the supplement for the sea launch Cruise Missile<\/a>. So right now tariffs and nsa are developing an air launch Cruise Missile<\/a> and have decided that the war head on that air launched Cruise Missile<\/a> will be the modified w80 which is whats currently on the air launch Cruise Missile<\/a> and, in fact, on the old tlm, the old tomahawk. My guess would be that if this sea lunch Cruise Missile<\/a> goes forward to that the war head on that just like in the past would be the modified w80, which once its gone through life extension would be the w804. The first Production Unit<\/a> for that 804 isnt until 2024. All of this is very much out there in term of timing and that first set of 804s will be for the air launch Cruise Missile<\/a>s. So, again, if thats the way they go, thats not a new war head, but, in fact, sort of a return to an old capability. One more question for you before i go to james who i hope will address this question as well with your physicist background and unclassified background in approach to these questions, you may be more willing to speculate about how you make a whaerd with a much lower yield without much testing work. In any event, madeleine thank you very much. I want to ask you about the ambitious plans to modernize the department of energy that we see in this npr. It seems to me as you point out you were part of an administration that worked very hard as its two predecessors had to sustain the u. S. Nuclear arsenal without testing. That was a concept that was well accepted. Weve been spending close to 10 billion a year on science based stockpile stewardship and refurbishment. We continue to have major weapons labs to oversee that work. A lots of ongoing and didnt need a big injection of federal funding. Now in this 2018 npr a commitment to bummed an infrastructure that could produce up to 80 new war heads a year if necessary. That strikes me as worth focusing on as a separate issue from all things that you were so rigorously focused to in the past. Do you see all that ambitious planning and spending asne as necessary or would you scale it back or not do any of it all together. I think this is exactly what you just described is exactly what i think is a very subtle change in this npr from the last npr. Theres a much more aggressive approach to the nsa infrastructure, and the reason, the rationale for this more aggressive approach is not just to maintain our stockpile through stockpile stewardship but theres a subtle shift here. The npr talks about increasing test readiness. The new npr talks about pets but uses some new language. It talks about 80 pets and before the discussion was 50 to 80. It talks about really pursuing the new statutorily mandated stockpile Responsiveness Program<\/a> in a very aggressive way so that youre having the labs and the plants really do prototyping, almost, doing design, maybe even doing a little metal bending. So youve got a lot of things that are being put in place that and also some of the discussion with regard to hedging that really looks like its laying the foundation for a much larger arsenal down the road. Thats how i would interflet. Whether it becomes that or not, obviously, is something only the future knows. But it certainly seems to be building a more capable infrastructure. Larger arsenal and perhaps also new kind of war heads some day with this hedge language on testing, we wont do it now but maybe some day we might reserve the right to return. Yes. James, among financial we heard some concerns from madeline and bob and jim but you might be the sharpest critic of any of us or at least ill invite you to be that if you wish. Let me address to you the very simple question of what do you find most concerning about the npr as well as anything you want to say that you applaud or support. Let me first weigh into this debate about continuity versus change. I think the government reports are a bit like tshirts. In the real world theres only so many changes you can make. Right . Any tshirt has to have to have two holes for your arm to come out and one hole to come over your head. In the same way theres only so much how you can change a government report. But i think within the range of nprs that one could imagine a government of the United States<\/a> conceivably producing this one is much more changed than continuity. Let me identify four different areas. Firstly is the changes in declaratory policy. Bob has outlined. Let me emphasize just one thing here. The United States<\/a> is now threatening to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in response to attacks that almost would certainly not kill a single human being. Attacks against the space elements. Those attacks could be extremely consequential. Im not playing down their significance. I think threatening to respond with Nuclear Weapons<\/a> to those is dangerous and incredible. Secondly, this document does not make any attempt to reassure russia about the survivability of its Nuclear Force<\/a>. For decades the United States<\/a> has been willing to say whatever incredibly serious political disagreement ws we have with russia, we accept, you know we are in a relationship of mutual deterrence with russia and not try to undermine russias Nuclear Arsenal<\/a>. This document does not do that. Thirdly, for practical intents and purposes this document takes arms control off the table. It pays lip service to arms control, doesnt completely exclude the possibility of doing it, but its lip service. There is no serious constructive arms control agenda laid out. Fourthly theres this issue of new capabilities. Which quite rightly, you know, the frame of this npr in my opinion rightly has concerns about russia and russian first use. The issue here, though, is i think our fundamental problem is not with russias willingness to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> first. We dont have a no first use declaratory policy. We reserve the right to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> first if we were losing a large scale conventional war. The problem we have with russia is its combination of conventional superiority around the vortex coupled with threats of first use. Its those two things together. Russia may overtake the Baltic States<\/a> because nato is weak there and then use Nuclear Threat<\/a>s to deter nato from taking back natos territory. When you frame the problem in the way ive just done that the root cause of the sprproblem is conventional weakness around the vortex, the solution is lets become less weak. I dont mean we should bring hundreds of troops around the vortex and much russia. But conventional deterrence fails when the other side believes it can execute a rapid and bloodless fate lesless fac acceompli. It would take two weeks of effort and tens of hundreds of thousands of casualties rather than two days and hundreds of casualties, i think would enhance our deterrence posture around the vortex much, much more than two different types of Nuclear War Heads<\/a> would. There are real additional dangers and costs associated with these new war heads. The big idea i want to get across here is the problem of addressing the Security Problems<\/a> in a Nuclear Posture<\/a> review, is you never end up looking for Nuclear Solutions<\/a> to that. To my mind theres a Real Security<\/a> threat from russia out there and i dont play that down in any way. But i do think that our fundamental response to that is much more effective in the nonnuclear domain than in the nuclear domain. Outstanding. Heres what i would like to do. In ten minute well get to your questions. Ill put on my old cbo hat. I want to look at some of the budget numbers for the modernization strategy and then work down the row one more time for anyone to offer any additional comments either in regard to that or in regard to what they heard from each other. Well do that fairly quickly and then get to you. Let me off terrify following. We saw in this document and weve seen, i think, in other Trump Administration<\/a> statements over recent months the constant reiteration of Nuclear Modernization<\/a> as being the top priority which was also the Obama Administration<\/a>s view and often the comments you would hear from Obama Administration<\/a> official, i remember once we had admiral richardson here and i challenged him in a friendly if that was the right way to think about nuclear modern saigs and he said it must be because our submarines are getting old philanthropy ohio class is getting close. They are not safe any more. What i want to propose we look more critically at the overall estimated price tag and i want to suggest we may need priorityize. Right now there are five as i define them five big categories of nuclear modern consolidation in Trump Administration<\/a> plan. Mostly consistent with Obama Administration<\/a> plans. There is the replacemen of the ssbm forks Ballistic Missile<\/a> arms nuclear submarines, the ohio class becoming a columbia class. Theres the b21 bomb terrify raider being built. And that among all these capabilities has dual purpose. Theres the desire to replace the minute man icbm force. Its been around for a long time already theres questions how much longer it can effect. The Nuclear Command<\/a> and control being seen as vulnerable to cyber attack, to Nuclear Attack<\/a>, just getting old itself. Then finally the whole department of energy, Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, infrastructure question. I want to put forth the simple point first of all that im not persuaded by the math that i see in the npr. It claims this entire agenda will never lead to a higher percentage of the Defense Budget<\/a> for Nuclear Modernization<\/a> than about 6. 5 . I think thats very low estimate. When i do the math i come up with a numberers 12k4r0 and that doesnt even include madeleines domain of the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> activity of the department of energy which are when you add up clean up, close to another 20 billion. This is real money. Right now theres a little bit of giddiness in washington, the Defense Budget<\/a> is fully funded robustly across aldo mains. I dont think thats likely the case. We need to start to prioritize and at least have a debate which of these five areas of modernization are most important. To my mind there are three that are clearly more important than the other two. Thats my own judgment. Others may disagree on this panel or among all of you or elsewhere in town but i think clearly we do need to replace the nuclear arm submarines. They are getting old. They are not going safe for our sailors that much longer. They are already pushing 40 year service lives which is the longest we ever operateed a submarine in the United States<\/a>. I fully support you can debate the numbers and specific details fully support replacing the ohio class with the columbia class. Also the most survivable strategic system. Carrying the bulk of our strategic war heads. Thank you. I support the b21 raider because its useful for conventional war fighting. Its one of our asymmetric fighting. We only have two in the b2 force. It will require substantially more long range stealth for that. The argument for the b21 is dual capability of that platform and im glad to see at least at the moment robutly being funded. Nuclear command and control, and with jim miller here i could have mentioned his affiliation with the defense Science Board<\/a>. A year ago the defense Science Board<\/a> put out a report i lose sleep over because it talks about how we couldnt vouch for the Cyber Resilience<\/a> of any of our nuclear systems. Didnt go so far to say they are vulnerable to be taken down tomorrow by hackers but theres questions about all of them. We need a decade to remedy. To the extent we cant vouch for the integrity of our Nuclear Command<\/a> and control thats got to be seen as a top tier problem. Doa we heard doubts about ambitious planning. On the icbm force i think we can delay it, the way gao has examined by finding a way to shrink it somewhat so is missiles become a repository of test missiles because theres a certain amount of test flights you have to do per year. Do a combination of refurbishmen of the minute man force and down sizing can you buy another five, ten, 15 years before you replace it. If resource get tight we need have these kind of option in mind. Thats my little sermon for the day. Without further ado, theres a lot on the table already. Ill ask my colleagues up here to offer any further thoughts they would like before we get into a discussion and just work down the row. One thing you forgot is also the f35. It has an Important Role<\/a> in terms of being dual capable aircraft for delivery of the nonstrategic war heads. Like the bomber it has two important missions. Its part of this mix. And as you mentioned, and probably one more you forgot at some point we have to come back around and do something with the d5 which is the missile thats on the columbia class and will transition or on the ohio class and will transition to the columbia class. At some point it has to go through a life extension. And then in addition to all of the physical infrastructure, nsa, theres also the physical struck are the at dod which is also not discussed very much in the npr. Other than, i think theres a very quick mention of the modernization of the silos themselves for the minutemen three minutemen four. And then the other large problem out there is you also have a people infrastructure that really has to be paid attention to. As we transition from a period of time from the cold war when there was testing with some of these war heads to a period of time where weve gone weve made the hand off for the most part from folks who had testing experience to is si the scientid engineers and next transition is when they hand off to that next generation. To do that we also have to have a significant investment in long term science and engineering for stockpile stewardship and thats not very well laid out in the npr as well. Then finally as we get rid of the 40 to 60 of these Old Buildings<\/a> across both the dod and nsa complex you have to pay to get rid of them and thats another big unpaid bill. Im in agreement with you some of these rough estimates, 1. 3 trillion, all of us are pretty low. Jim. Michael, i agree with your concern about the cost associated with the Nuclear Programs<\/a>. At the same time i fundamentally agree with secretary mattis said as david para phrased which means we can afford survival. We cant afford to invest in National Security<\/a> that we need. Our Nuclear Deterrent<\/a> forms a Nuclear Umbrella<\/a> for key allies and partners around the world. To me if its 7 , 10 , thats an acceptable price. Doesnt mean that any Nuclear Program<\/a> let alone all of them should get a free ride. You probably remember secretary gates when he was secretary did a hard scrub both of the columbia class ssbn and of the b21. At one point the program was schedule. It took a year and half to come back with new recommendations that was more Cost Effective<\/a>. Both within programs and across programs we need be asking those questions. My own view is that although the department has concluded so far that the most Cost Effective<\/a> way to go forward with an icbm leg is to modernize. Youre right if one takes down the overall size of the force from the 400 deployed today to a somewhat smaller number one can buy time. Ill say my own recommendation is not going to save is a lot of money because i believe the most Important Role<\/a> of the icbm leg of the triad is to hedge against any further problem with the leg of the submarine. A Hedge Program<\/a> that includes some research and development on potential mobile options for future icbm makes more sense than putting a whole bunch in the near term. Bob . Having a sustainable deterrent requires very broad domestic support. This npr, the trump npr builds on what president obama did. President obama actually had a very robust modernization program. And the Trump Administration<\/a> follows that. Where Trump Administration<\/a> departs, where its less continuity than change, in some areas that, i think will raise questions about the ability to sustain that national consensus. The idea of new nuclear systems, declaratory policy that suggests that the u. S. Is prepared to use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in a wide arrange of circumstances. I think these will create challenges for building that kind of national consensus. And i think its important that the administration do more to build that broad support, including a number of panelists suing gefggested in the area of control. Simply agreeing what the russians proposed which is a five year extension of new start. Dave trachtenberg talked about this earlier and the administration, you know, will have to try to keep this consensus together, but it will be a challenge with the current npr. Thank you. Finally, james. So as some of you may know, a predecisional draft leaked in the Huffington Post<\/a> a few weeks ago. Can you compare the original draft to the published version. The most interesting change was in the letter from secretary mattis at the beginning. And in the draft it said that Nuclear Modernization<\/a> was quote the top priority of the department of defense and in the final version it is a top priority of the department of defense. And you dont need to observe government, which i havent, to understand that the difference between the top priority and a top priority is a very significant difference. And the fact that this change was made in the letter from the secretary of defense himself i dont know who made the change but i would have a guess it was the secretary of defense himself who made the change given it was in the letter that was signed by him. If im right about that, i have no idea if i am or not, that suggests to me that your assumption, you know, that there will have to be tradeoffs made in the Nuclear Budget<\/a> is right. If there are tradeoffs made i agree with mike with where those should be made. Let me say one thing about Nuclear Command<\/a> and control. For me its kind of balmy to be looking at a third and fourth low yield nuclear option, and thats what the low yield slicker, the sea launch Cruise Missile<\/a> are, they are the third and fourth lower options. When we acknowledge we have a vulnerable command and control system on which everything depends. The fundamental challenge, i think, with congressmmmand and or joint use. The High Frequency<\/a> satellites, communication satellites are used, would be used to transmit execution orders to Nuclear Force<\/a>, they used by special operators, used by ground forces, used by naval forces. The other side may have an incentive to attack those in a war to undermine our conventional war fighting ability. That would have huge implications for our command and control system. As an analyst in a think tank i can come up with ideas for rectifying this problem cheaply. Every time analysts and think tanks come up with cheap ideas they are implemented in practice. So easy to implement these ideas in practice. My sense is in the current security environment, particularly in the face was developments in antisatellite weapons and cyber weapons, actually building a resilient and redundant command and krol center has a potential to be an extraordinarily expensive prospect. To my mind thats the single biggest priority we as a nation face when it comes to Nuclear Force<\/a> at the moment. Okay. Lets go to all of you. Wait for a microphone and well start with three questions. No one mentioned disarmament. So nonNuclear Weapons<\/a> states say the treaty has two legs. The npr explicitly rejects disarmament in the context of the treaty. Thank you. Lets see who is go to the woman in the red shirt and then come over here for the gentleman on the far aisle. And then back to the panel. Susan burke. As a veteran of low level nonproliferation negotiations, this is a hard sell to the international community, but there else seems to be real focus on low yield as if thats somehow better, and i just would like some sort of comment on that. Ive seen, you know, low yelled as a hiroshimatype bomb. Do we know what were talking about there . Is this somehow better and i think thats a discussion thats going on, on social media and so forth is what exactly is meant. Thank you. Then over here, please. Thank you very much. My name is raphael from the brazilian embassy. We have heard a lot on the rationale on the npr regarding other Nuclear Powers<\/a> or American Allies<\/a> but i would like to hear, please, some comments on the impact on npr on other countries and on the future of the nonproliferation regime. And trying to understand the Nuclear Power<\/a> countries are upping their bet on Nuclear Arsenal<\/a>. What does this message convey to other countries. And lastly, regarding the stability, its explicit in the npr that United States<\/a> will not pursue its ratification. What do you think is the future of this structure that we have from 20 years and is not in force. Thank you very much. Great. We got a couple of questions on war head related issues and a couple of questions on broader disarmament strategy. I would ask madeline to begin, whatever question you wish. Let me talk a little bit about the ctcb and how it relates to our commitment to article vi. One good think about this new npr is that it does it does commit to continuing the moratorium which is good. I dont think it was a surprise that theres no interest in seeking ctp ratification from this administration but to me the thing that was most important and which has been swirling for a while is that theres a stated commitment to the ctpo and International Monitoring<\/a> system. That is hugely important in terms of making sure that the foundational abilities to monitor testing will remain in place and will continue to grow. Theres also a comment in there about the support the iaea as well. In many respects that tempers what is frankly something that was expected in terms much not seeking ratification. The two other big issues on article vi get back to change on emphasis on this npr and lack of significant focus on further reductions, or really working to achieve zero, and, you know wmore emphasis on securing Nuclear Materials<\/a> and making sure others dont with any terrorists or other development of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. So, im concerned about this. But i think from usa perspective, the most important thing we can do is get that attention the new start treaty. Let me start by strongly agreeing madeline about extending the new start treaty and that should be an easy straightforward decision for the Trump Administration<\/a> and should be a priority. The United States<\/a> has benefitted not only from reductions we would have in russian Strategic Force<\/a> without a treaty but from the data exchanges that october on an ongoing basis. It significantly reduces the propsect for worse Case Planning<\/a> and on both military sides. On the question of disarmament, and its worth noting this npr does say the administration continues the long term goal of a World Without<\/a> Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, what it says is that goal looks further away not closer than it did. I took it as a positive it still included that goal, and what does concern me and bob einhorn articulated this well is the subtle appearance of the expansion of the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in u. S. Strategy. Its below the top line, its not the fundamental points of declaratory policy but does appear that there are elements of an expansion in attempting to deter additional attacks relative to what certainly the 2010 Nuclear Posture<\/a> believed or asserted. Thats important but the bigger deal again, to me is not the difference between the 2018 Nuclear Posture<\/a> view and 2010 its whether the 2018 posture review reflects the vu s the vi president of the United States<\/a>. On question of the yields, of the low yield sblm war head in particular, no question in my mind it will end up being much larger than largest u. S. Conventional weapon. So the u. S. Is modernizing the socalled massive ordinance penetrator, the mop, 30,000 pound weapon. Were talking about, i would guess at the lower yields that they would contemplate something thats hundreds of times more, has more explosive potential than the largest conventional weapon that we have, and if thats the case i certainly dont see that it reduces the Nuclear Threshold<\/a>. It may be a more credible response to nuclear use and to the extent this Nuclear Posture<\/a> view focus on that role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, the fundamental purpose ever Nuclear Weapons<\/a> to deter nuclear use ever others goes in the right direction to the extent that in any way expands that role relative to where it has been in the past i think it goes in the wrong direction. Thanks. Bob. There was a question about the International Response<\/a> to the npr. I think it will be mixed, i think. Many u. S. Allies and partners around the world will like the npr. The idea of enhancing extended deterrence, you know, countering possible russian interest in initiating the use of limited use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, i think our baltic allies, Eastern European<\/a> allies and northeast asian allies will find a lot to like in this npr. Japan is an interesting case. Japan is the only country thats been the victim of Nuclear Attack<\/a> and has been a strong propossible then of Nuclear Disarmament<\/a>. The day after the npr was issued the japanese Prime Minister<\/a> came out with a very strong statement of support for the npr. The japanese relied heavily on the nuclear tomahawk, the nuclear sea lunch Cruise Missile<\/a> and were upset when it was retired. I think they will be very happy with the resurrection of this capability. The South Koreans<\/a> also will see a lot to like. Many other nonNuclear Weapon<\/a> states wont be happy with it. They will be at least relieved that the administration retained the negative security assurance, the assurance the United States<\/a> will not use Nuclear Weapons<\/a> against nonNuclear Weapons<\/a> states in compliance with nonproliferation obligations. They will be relieved by that but there will be concern about the implication that the u. S. May be increasing the role of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> in its strategy. The nonallied has been unhappy. It wont change. That it will give stronger support for the nuclear ban movement but i dont think it will fundamentally affect the prospects for a proliferation. Countries dont pursue Nuclear Weapons<\/a> because they dont believe that having them is essential to their National Security<\/a>. I dont think this will change that very much. Let me tackle both questions that brought dismarmament into the fray. The npr does reject the ban treaty as did the Bahama Administration<\/a> before it as any u. S. Administration would have done. It does endorse is long term goal of a World Without<\/a> Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. I think that was not a foregone conclusion that that statement would be in the npr. However theres a big difference between Trumps Administration<\/a> on disarmament and interests predecess predecessor. The logic of the Obama Administration<\/a>, and let me say this with some modesty, the three people to my right were involved and i wasnt. But when obama in prague renewed the u. S. Commitment in a World Without<\/a> Nuclear Weapons<\/a> my interpretation of what that strategy was is building upon the argument made by many nonNuclear Weapon<\/a> states if you want us to do more you have to do more on disarmamen. The Obama Administration<\/a> was trying to catalyze a coalition to work on nonproliferation. The Obama Administration<\/a> fought the u. S. Gave up Nuclear Weapons<\/a> north korea would do so as well. It was that the practical towards we need deal with nonproliferation. The more Widespread Adoption<\/a> of enhanced iaea safe guards. The more rigorous enforcement of export control, sanctioning countries that break the rulings. Doing that required a political quid pro quo between disarmament and nonproliferation. Let me talk about implementing that practice. The first is efforts to abolish Nuclear Weapons<\/a> can be led by the u. S. But cant to be done by the u. S. Solely. The Obama Administration<\/a> was absolutely willing to continue negotiations with further reductions with russia. The russians had no interest in doing so. China wont even enter into a serious dialogue with the u. S. About Nuclear Weapons<\/a> and further reductions. Other barriers to disarmament here in the snus absolutely. Are there barriers in other countries . Yes. And secondly, i was really disappointed by the reception among many reception of the pr speech. Not one single head of state, somebody of an equivalent stature of obama, stood up and welcomed that speech and pledged to work with him. Not one. Standing up alone opposed to in the security counsel. So, you know, its not my job to tell nonNuclear Weapon<\/a> states how to respond to the mpr. I would love to hear more from nonNuclear Weapon<\/a> states, but all i would say is, you know, if in the future administration you want the u. S. To take disarmorment more seriously, the more theres public support made by efforts of the u. S. President on disarmerment, the more that that kind of effort is endorsed and welcomed by other states, the more chance there is to make it sustainable. Well do one more round in a s second. First, two clarifying or additional points. You heard us reference the prague speech. This was president obamas april 2009 speech early in the presidency, really articulating the vision of a Nuclear Free World<\/a> at a time it seemed conceivable we could make near term progress. Towards that, obama did not have a utopian view it would happen fast and questioned in the speech whether it would happen in our lifetime, but a thinkable concept back then, and thats why people referred back to it for those of you who may not follow the stuff quite as much as some of us do, and secondly, my personal speculation on the low yield warhead, without having been read in to have the security clearances on this subject that would enable me to know the real answer and not be able to say it, so ill give potential wrong answer, but i will say it, and this is based on a lot whats come out over the years from what we know about Nuclear Weapons<\/a> design, writings from others that i try to devour over my career, and i think the simplest way to understand this. You know that modern american Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are essentially two stage. They are thermonuclear hydrogen bombs. The first detonation, in spirit like a nagasaki bomb goes off to create the necessary temperature and pressure to then ignite Hydrogen Fuel<\/a> in the secondary. You need a Small Nuclear<\/a> burst to make a big one. Simplest way to take a weapon from a big yield weapon and turn into a small yield is get rid of the secondary or contaminate the Hydrogen Fuel<\/a> that will not ignite as much. I dont claim to speculate about this, but how much you can dial down the yield of that secondary sort of as you wish, without particular new design or testing, but i do think its fairly predictable you could simply eliminate the secondary or render it inert in one way or another and wind up with yields that are probably somewhat smaller and jim was hitting at this with the way he talk about scaling up from the moab factor by hundreds, probably in the one kiloton range is what you could fairly confidently produce as a readily available weapon out of this kind of approach. Thats just my hopefully informed speculation, not based on classified information or speaking for anybody else on the panel or the npr. By the way, one last thing, a personal note to thank steve piper in the audience today, a person at brookings writing on Nuclear Weapons<\/a> issues over the yees years and will continue to do so from a sunnier perch, in california, which is where we thought hed be, but thats why hes not on the panel. Yes, sir, in the back with the thanks, im jeff price at johns hopkins. First, on the lower yield, i think bob was quoted in defense as talking about primary, so thats unclassified, and my question goes to the crisis stability implications of effectively using a strategic Delivery System<\/a> for a nonstrategic warhead or a mission. Theres a lot of ways to deliver lower yield warhead in a crisis, and some of the questions that arise with the trident in particular is using your end game, second strike capability at the beginning of a limited nuclear confrontation, and theres certain questions that i think the discussion needs to be had about whether thats, you know, the wisdom of that and implications of that in a crisis which is by definition a nuclear crisis. Thank you. One or two more, woman in the back of the room in the aqua shirt, please. Hello, im alesia, a Nuclear Policy<\/a> specialist. I have a quick question, do you see in the future inoperable warhead knowing right now they focus on nonnuclear components, and for jim, you mentioned icbms in the future alternatives, the oao cancelled that option. Can you gauge qualitatively the hunger for a road mobile option knowing, of course; that russia slashed that because it broke as usual. Tha thank you. One more before we finish with the panelists. Here to the fourth row. Please. Erin simpson. You put forward a reduction in the overall size of the icbm force. Do you envision that as part of long term arms control or do that unilaterally . So, in this round, also our concluding statements, we begin with jameis and jim gets the last word because questions were for him. Thanks. Let me just say a couple of talk briefly about the low yield option. Like, i think, id much rather spend money on bolstering the conventional deterrents around the vortex but theres two issues i see with low yield. The first one is you risk giving away the position of the submarine the missile is firing from. Russia is building the consolation of Early Warning<\/a> satellites to detect a missile shortly after launch, which means russia would know where the u. S. Tried to fire from, which presumably is a significant aide to russia in hunting down uss ibms. If its a conflict where Nuclear Weapons<\/a> are used, not just the crisis, but in the nuclear war by that point, i think keeping our most survivorble forces survivorble would be an incredibly high priority for u. S. Decision makers. I think if we were really in a nuclear war, the use of the option would not be attractive for the Decision Makers<\/a> because, you know, theres such a High Percentage<\/a> to survive on the warhead, so the sec issue is the socalled discrimination problem, which is russia could not distinguish between the launch of a low yield trident and high yield. Does that increase the chance that russia would respond with a Nuclear Weapon<\/a> before or multiple high yield Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, even worse, before ours exploded and russia knew it was low yield, if, indeed, it has the capability to determine that rapidly after detonation. This is a very complicated issue that im not going into a huge amount here because time is short. All i would say is theres a proposal about ten years ago called conventional modification. One person in the panel in particular has multiple scars from that experience. All i would say is that was the idea you take Nuclear Warheads<\/a> off and replace with conventional warheads. Congress decided not to hone in on that capability because of the discrimination problem, and that was not even a capability that anyone talked about firing at russia. This was of the issue was using this against iran or north korea, maybe china, no one was arguing using it against russia. The discrimination problem deemed so severe even though we would not be firing this at russia, congress did not provide money for it. I think now we are talking about the low yield capability specifically for the use against russia. I think we have to take this discrimination problem seriously, even if, you know, the question, would russia respond with multiple high yields or as soon as it detected the launch, is not thats a complex question to answer, one im not going to do in five secs. Thank you. Im going to give my time to jim because i want to hear his answers to the questions about discrimination and exposing the location of uss sbns. Great. Madeleine first. Okay, thanks. As hard as it is to modify to have a low yield option, maybe primary yield only, the operational considerations are going to be much, much harder, and james only touched on them, so that is a huge issue with respect to deployment, and ill add out there that right now our d5 missiles have multiple warheads, so when you think about it, are you going to mix with other high yield warheads . The operational issues associated with this are extensive and extraordinarily complex. More so than the complexity of the warhead itself. So let me go to that iw. One of the interesting things about this npr is i im not sure theres any discussion of the obama three plus two strategy. There is a small discussion of inoperable warheads, but kicked it out for the future because under the obama three plus two strategy, the next life extension up for Ballistic Missile<\/a>s was the iw1, and it was going to be a warhead that could be used on an icbm and slbm, and it would look like something that would replace the air force w78 and also the navys 88. The 88 is now the w88, a warhead for the navy, is going through sort of a rehab. Its not a real life extension, but its sort of less than that. They called it alteration, but think of it as extended the life. This is talking life extension on a w78. In my mind, that means we may have walked away from the initial three plus two strategy and retain four for a while rather than going to three. Now, one of the interesting things that i throw out there for general discussion is maybe if there is real seriousness about thinking on long yields, maybe something that could be explored would be an iw down the road that would have variable yields. You know, youre not giving up, if you will, a strategic delivery platform, but maybe you look at something that looks like an iw, with variable yields for the sls and the icbms. Again, way out there, way long term, but i do think that this npr walks away from the iws in any inoperable warheads for any near term thing and probably walked away from the three plus two strategy. Jim, over to you. I have not seen a great clamber in the land for low icbm, and, indeed, im not arguing for that approach. What i do believe is that if you believe that the single most Important Role<\/a> of the icbm in a world where we have large numbers of weapons on the strategic submarine leg, the most Important Role<\/a> of the icbm leg is to serve as a hedge. If that happens 20, 30 years down the road, and i would not expect it to have any real prospect of it happening earlier than that, but could in the time frame, the answer to putting more warheads would not serve strategic stability, so because of that, i think that a better program, even today, would be to go to a light rather than a heavier icbm. The minuteman replacement looks like it would be the same 78,000 pound missile as the minuteman 3. The old icbm was roughly half that weight, giving it less front weight, if you will, less capacity, but sufficient to have a single warhead plus decoys and more attractive candidate for going to road mobile, and to answer, also, erins question on the topic, my recommendation, which also does not been met with, you know, great clamber in the land including the Defense Department<\/a> is go unilaterally to a lighter icbm and employ a couple hundred in silos, to have as necessary and when necessary to retain an icbm leg and have a research and Development Program<\/a> and Demonstration Program<\/a> for road mobile. My guess is that costs about the same as Going Forward<\/a> with 400 icbms and silos over a period of years. The costs would be somewhat later, which is useful, but most importantly, it provides a hedge that we otherwise would not have, and it would be a stabilizing hedge in the event that ssbms became vulnerable, 20, 30 years more down the line. The question of crisis stability, then, that jeff asked. Its a good question. My view is that a low yield warhead on a trident d5 missile is a nuclear and strategic warhead, and that one should not imagine that because something as lower yield, that is going to that that will be known immediately by russia or by anyone else, nor that it means its not a strategic asset, so there will be significant and would be, i believe, significant hurdles, even above the hurdles we should rightly have in the deployment of any Nuclear Weapon<\/a> because its a strategic system, and i think for the my guess is its for that reason that the administration decided they would go forward if a longer range program to have a sea launch Cruise Missile<\/a> thats, again, nuclear tested, i have to say that from my perspective and as a person involved in the obama Nuclear Posture<\/a> review, the reason for eliminating the sea launch Cruise Missile<\/a> nuclear tip at the time was not that it was either destabilizing or inappropriate to have, but that it was at, if not past its end of life, and the question was, at that point in time, eight, ten years ago, was it, should it be a priority investment of the Nuclear Posture<\/a> to reinstate it or are there more important things . At that time by the judgment of the president and joint chiefs, that system was not necessary, and it was not did not fill was not needed to fill the gap in the extended deterrence in particular. That calculation was changed with respect to north korea and russia, and at the same time its a tenyear program so secretary mattis has said it also provides an opportunity for the United States<\/a> to have a Development Program<\/a> that could be part of the negotiations Going Forward<\/a> with russia to, a, stay within imf, and, b, to put its tactical Nuclear Weapons<\/a> on the table for serious negotiations, something the Obama Administration<\/a> attempted and the russians did not agree to pursue. I still believe thats a valuable next step and United States<\/a> should continue to purr p sue extension of new start and pursue negotiations on tactical Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. Fantastic. Thank you, all, for being here, lets thank steve and the panel. [ applause ] the Senate Returns<\/a> today to begin work on an immigration bill focusing on Border Security<\/a> and the daca program. Majority leader mcconnell will introduce a bill that allows any amendments as long as they receive 60 votes. A vote to begin formal debate on the bill is scheduled for today at 5 30 eastern. If approved, debate and votes are expected to continue all week. The house is back tomorrow on their agenda this week is a measure to step up investigation and recovery of u. S. Personnel listed as mia. Also, sanctions against hammas and number of financial bills dealing with mortgage lending, market trading, and Interest Rates<\/a> for consumers. Watch the house live on cspan and the senate live on cspan2. This evening, Justice Ruth Bader<\/a> ginsburg joins the ceo, jeffrey rosen, marking the anniversary to her appointment to the supreme court. Live coverage begins at 6 p. M. Eastern on cspan. Chuck schumer is in kentucky this morning at the university of Louisville Mcconnell Center<\/a> created by mitch mcconnell. The speech is at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan. The president released his face call 2019 budget this morning, and this morning, mic mulvaney testifies about it in front of the senate committee. Treasury secretary Steve Mnuchin<\/a> is on capitol hill wednesday to talk about the budget live at 10 30 eastern. Tonight, on the communicators from the Consumer Electronics<\/a> show in las vegas, Technology Industry<\/a> leaders discuss their latest developments in Artificial Intelligence<\/a>. You can have Artificial Intelligence<\/a> in your music play list or netflix queue, all using Machine Learning<\/a> to see what movies you watch and what music you like to listen to. It can be in your internet email system and filtering out spam. That Automated System<\/a> is not a person there marking things as spam or not, but a computer algorithm using deep learning within a. I. To do that, and on the other end, you can have Artificial Intelligence<\/a> powering selfdriving cars, right . Autonomous driving uses vision and Machine Learning<\/a> to help a car navigate busy street. Watch tonight at 8 00 earn on cspan2. Next, portions of last months u. S. Conference of majors meeting. The opening leads off on the future of the workplace and entrepreneurial investment with aol cofounder, steve case, followed by a session on climate change. Good","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia903100.us.archive.org\/2\/items\/CSPAN3_20180212_150100_Nuclear_Posture_Review\/CSPAN3_20180212_150100_Nuclear_Posture_Review.thumbs\/CSPAN3_20180212_150100_Nuclear_Posture_Review_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240630T12:35:10+00:00"}