Good afternoon, everyone. Im melissa dalton, a senior fellow in the Deputy Director of the National Security program here at csis. Thank you so much for joining us today for the second portion of our rollout event for the oversight and accountability and security secretary assistant seeking return on investment report. Following the terrific remarks from representative smith this morning, we have gathered an Interagency Panel from several important notes of the vast Security SectorAssistance Community to enlighten us on some of the great work that they are doing behind the scenes on this on this enterprise. I did want to spend a few minutes at the outset noting the coauthors and great work and contributions of csis staff that worked on this project over the last nine months. My coauthors hijab shaw, Rebecca Hughes and Shannon Green contributed mightily to the successful outcome of this project. And none of this would have been possible without the tremendous engagement and support of Key Stakeholders throughout the ssa community, several of which are in the audience today. So thank you so much for all of your contributions and insights as we brought this together. Our goal in the study was to take stock of this moment in time in u. S. National security and Defense Strategy where clearly in the 21st century the United States cannot meet really any security challenge comprehensively without working by, with and through allies and partners and with the overlay of the recent National Security strategy and Defense Strategy i think that its clear despite some of the potential tensions within America First policy agenda, that the United States still is relying quite heavily on allies and partners to meet Common Security goals. But at the same time there are political realities, budgetary realities, many of which representative smith spoke to in the first part of this event. That put some constraints around the ability of the United States to leverage its ssa relationships, and given the budgetary realities under which were operating. And so in the course of our study we wanted to evaluate some of the key mechanisms that the United States uses to provide oversight and accountability for its ssa programming to include the lehi laws, monitoring and evaluation and some of the conditionality arrangements, but also to look at Defense Institution building as a way that the United States seeks to inculcate good practices in its Security Partner relationships around the globe. We evaluated is it strengths and weaknesses of each of these mechanisms, but then also tried to take a step back and look more holistically to examine in the executive and legislative branch wanted to take a more holistic approach to oversight and accountability given the important of ssa as a tool of u. S. Craft and strategy going forward. What might such a framework look like, and what are some of the key recommendations that both the executive and the legislative branches need to undertake in order to implement such a holistic approach . We hope that some of those findings and religiouscommendate useful to practitioners and policymakers. Youll find them out on the tables and online. Without further ado, i want to turn to some of our key colleagues here who have joined us from the state department and the department of defense. Starting with mr. Rafael carland, the managing director for policy. Rafael, you know, the United States state department is undertaking a review of its role and some of the efficiencies that might be gained in term of its resourcing, and in the context of that, i understand, has been undertaking reviews particularly of ssa tools as well as stabilization tools. In that process, id be curious to hear your thoughts on what sort of innovations and best practices the state department has identified for ssa in that context. Please. Sure, thank you very much. And thank you so much for organizing this, and i appreciate the report as well. And then, of course, just by way of introduction, the office of foreign assistance that we do overseas and coordinates the 30 billion or so in foreign assistance at the state department and usa manage every year, and we look across all these accounts of which its object 30 billion a year, a quarter to a third of any given year is secretary assistance. It plays a really important role, Security Sector assistance in how the state department looks at all of its other assistants in the Foreign Policy its trying to get done. That is the most exciting thing were having an opportunity to do is looking back over the last 20 years or so. Weve had a lot of experience at using tools that were propped and designed for a different generation, and now getting a chance to really think and look across the tools. It used to be we would go to partners and it was a very steady state peacetime driven peace, whereas were more often than not in terms of conflict. That drives some interesting conversations. Theres a good question, i think discussion for the state department which is particularly important, is the primacy of the political in a lot of these dynamics, that sometimes the Security Sector assistance and with the dynamics of accountability we need to follow here in washington for very good reasons, they can run up against what are some of the dynamics in the country of what these our partners, the dynamics going on, we cant allow our systems to be too the provision of how many people you train, how many pieces of equipment you pass out. I think all three of our agencies have experienced that very keenly in a couple countries, but globally as well over the last decade or so. Thats finally bubbling up from peoples field experience to where greg and i are working a lot on some of the 333 authorities. Theres a lot of exciting opportunities going on there. Its linked by congress has given us this authority, theyve linked it with formal concurrence processes between the department of defense and the department of state. Rather than focusing on this sign off process, our two agencies engaged in a longer process, backing this up in years, planning ahead of time, trying to think about what were doing in these countries. Thats an exciting place to be, and well see where we can take it. Great. And turning next to mr. Greg pollock, whos the acting Deputy Assistant secretary for Security Cooperation and has a storied career as a civil servant, both in the department of defense, and also some time in the department of the treasury. Greg, has rafael mentioned, d. O. D. And the fy17 got handed the gift that keeps on giving of security collaboration reform, and would love to hear from you in terms of how implementation is going on section 3333, the joint planning that rafael mentioned between state and duty and in that first year of execution, and looking ahead, what are some of the key areas of focus for fy19 . Sure, thank you very much, melissa, both for having me here today and for including me and my team in your Research Process that culminates in the reported to. Thanks for all of csiss work on that, and thanks to my colleagues up there for the daytoday team work thats achieving some real results pursuant to the fy17 ndaa reforms. I often joke with colleagues in the security operation enterprise, were like the dog that caught the car. We knew there was a need for reform. Over 120 different authorities related to Security Cooperation going into 17. Those have been largely consolidated down on the Defense Department side. Its only a handful of authorities now, preeminent among them the section 333 Global Training and equip authority that rafael mentioned. This is a sizable pot of money that were trying to achieve real Strategic Effects with, consistent with the national Defense Strategy. In terms of ways were changes, were having to adopt our culture internal to the department of defense. Its a wide reaching effort that touches really every combat and command, all of the services. So maintaining that network, and creating a partnership across those echelons is really central to my daytoday work. I think weve had some real success in setting up those mechanisms and some transparency, some real trust across the entire enterprise. But we have to be honest that there are winners and losers here. And this is a real global competition now for priorities. And the national Defense Strategy ascribes specific priorities that will inform the way we invest in Security Cooperation partnerships. And i should say that you mentioned that i had previously worked at the treasury department. I did a brief stint once upon a time at the state department. So i deeply value what they bring to the conversation, a role they play out on the front lines. I was just in Southeast Asia last week, and spending a lot of time with our country teams there, getting their perspectives to inform our investments in Security Cooperation, and that region specifically. So we have a few different mechanisms, both kind of informal conversations between rafael and i. We also have now an assistant secretary level, Security Sector assistance steering board. We also have an emerging effort related to the quah drainial assistance review that was legislatively mandated. These forces are driving state and d. O. D. In closer and closer collaboration. We still have a little bit of ways to go, i think. The state department is still operating off foreign assistance act of 1961. Theres probably room to modernize their authorities to create greater complimentary between the works our departments are doing. Theres still an exciting moment here where we can be sure to situate Security Cooperation in the wider framework of our Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy. Thats a fun place to be. Great. General fletcher, i want to bring you into the conversation, Brigadier GeneralAntonio Fletcher is the director of j 5 strategy policy and plans at u. S. Southern command, and has a storied 30year career in the u. S. Army. General fletcher, from a combat and command perspective, you know, from an operational perspective, please speak about the value of ssa activities, and also how you see that evolving as the combat and commanders provide recommendations to the section 333 process. Well, first to csis and the entire team, thanks for the opportunity to come and kind of speak to you guys today, secondly i was promised there would be no hard questions. Hopefully theyre all very easy and something im able to respond coherently back to your question. On the question of from the perspective of how we see this, theres three pillars our strategy tries to build itself around. With the understanding that first it is a longterm investment that were making. I think too often, where theres forced risk to smubmission, thee may be shortterm decisions we take a long look, longterm approach to engages in. Aor. We built our theater engagement strategy around something that we think resonates with the entire aor that we operate in. Its built around counter and threat networks, that resonates with every country we ingauge with, primarily because its not just around a list of commodity, where theres drugs, gangs, whether its any elicit pastway, theyre all connected, that resonates with the countries we work with day in and day out. Additionally were working to make it more resilient when it comes to rapidly responding to hum humanitarian assistance. And lastly, because of a shared values, shared culture in the western hemisphere, we think that continuing to be the partner of choice within aor is something that resonates. We build upon, based on a long history, and we build our strategy around those core fundamentals going forward. And then we take a look at the successes and the failures weve had and try to, you know, obviously work to improve going forward. The best vignette that i personally have been a part of within our aor is when it comes to our dealings and relationship with the country of colombia. I initially started out as a young captain. I was assigned or tasked to run a selection in course for special forces. For about two years coming off that assignment, i was given an opportunity to work with the colombian military. We started that program in 2002. I was happy to say that, you know, it had a rough start. But really trained some phenomenal operators within colombia. Less than five years later that same unit was fundamental to actually addressing many of the concerns they had with the reducing several members of key leadership, and part of the effort of repatriating three americans. To where i am now, two of the general officers that are part of the colombian military, once again, a longterm approach, things that resonate, a shared culture, shared value systems when it comes to building a professional force. And every engagement we have down there, we use those kind of four fundamentals to teach them about what a professional military looks like. We build it around human rights, shared value, shared culture. Were slowly developing a core. If you look at the military and d. O. D. , really its our core that sets us apart from most militaries around the world. Going forward, the human rights and the nco, obviously gender integration, all of our counterparts understanding that if you want to leverage and maximize the full breadth of the talent thats out there, you have to have that as a key component of how you address and how you go forward as a military. Lastly, after we get through talking human rights, nco development. Integration, we know if you mirror what the u. S. Army does well, were joint in our approach to everything, air force, marines, navy, coast card. We work with our interagency partners, it takes a complete team to be effective. We built our strategy around that. We think it will going forward. Thats great. A lot of innovations and best practices, i think, exemplified by the south com example. To tease out this longer term perspective that you take to your ssa relationships, you know, back to the policy level in looking globally in other aors where theres that shortterm longterm tension that plays out operationally, and how you conceive of a longerterm ssa approach when there are those imperatives, particularly from a counterterrorism perspective, but now with the overlay also of competitiveness with china and russia, and how ssa is going to be a tool in those types of settings. Greg and rafael, could you speak to how state and d. O. D. Are planning to approach navigating those shortterm longterm tradeoffs in this joint planning process that youre developing . Sure, yeah, ill take a first crack at it, and rafael will correct the record as appropriate. Yeah, so thats really the beauty of these new authorities is it allows us to have flexibility, to Fund Priorities both shortterm and longterm across geography and do main. We domain. Were out there looking at the big picture, trying to make National Security interests, thats an important point to emphasize. The security environment will evolve. But our interests wont evolve, and we hope that we can depend upon the partnership of both our current allies, and more and more sort of partners that were investing in out there, whether its in eastern europe, on the margins of russia, or in Southeast Asia, in east asia, these are our allies and partners that weve been there with, we want to have there with us, should there be a contingency. And we want to ensure that were interoperable. And that we have the understanding of how our respective military cultures intersect. At the same time, weve got some near term threats. As you mentioned, as much as maybe the phrase gwot is a thing of the past now, the concerns around terrorism are still very real. Thankfully less so in the south comaor in the most part. We need to work with our partners to ensure they have the resources they need to work by, with and through partners to deal with instability and terrorism as well. This is the challenge year in year out, how do we ensure that were thoughtful about our investments, both flowing resources to partners in the fight today, but also investing in partners that we want to count on for the long haul, particularly with respect to some of the near peer competitors out there. I would just add on to the group, i think one fundamental difference that the policy change has driven in the way in which we approach the sector assistance, is that it has increased time horizons for planning. A lot of our guys used get hyperfocused on year to year engagement. The changes now have forced us to take a multiyear approach to engagement and activities that we want to do with the intent of building that capability. Theres no longer just a engagement, hoping to get degree of influence out of that, but building toward a capability of tieing lack into a line of effort that builds upon the strategy youre trying to accomplish in the aor. The policy changes, we understand them, but it has forced us to build into security corporations, reformat, change timeline in order to meet needs, and its forced us to think more broadly how we approach it, and i think for the better. Yeah, i would echo all of the other comments ive heard. The one thing we always have to do is be realistic between the long term and the short term. We will continue