Transcripts For CSPAN3 Hudson Institute Discussion On Nuclea

Endeavor. Thank you. Secretary remarks by secretary of state mike pompeo on the attack of two oil tankers in the persian gulf, the secretary speaking at the state department, in washington, d. C. We take you back now to the Hudson Institute on Nuclear Weapons. The discussion in progress. What i think is important about that episode and really is at the core of the arms control plos fy of the administration is that even though weve shown our willingness to withdraw from the treaty, if one of the things that is very important that we want to talk about today, and going forward, is we have not withdrawn from the process of arms control. The president s made that very clear. My boss, bosses, secretary pompeo has made that very clear. And we look forward to engaging both russia and china robustly. With open minds. But also with open eyes. To be very cleareyed about where were at. And what we want to accomplish going forward. So the president has asserted arms control to be effective, effectively contribute to National Security, all parties must faithfully implement their obligations. That gets to the trust piece. As james mentioned, you must have willing partners across from the table. Who intend on engaging both russia and china, in good faith. Were confident that we can achieve an outcome that advances the National Security of the United States. I want to talk a little bit about the state departments role here. Just a little bit about what our bureau does. People readily know and talk about, and im sure everybody in this room about rageagans trus but verify comments in 198 in reykjavik. It was in 1982, where he outlined four key tenets of the arms control regime that i think are important today as they were in 1982. Just run through them real quick. Number one, compliance with the provisions of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success and therefore to National Security. That effectively verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect and deter possible violations of an agreement and provide time warning threats to our National Security. Verification is necessary to assure the confidence of the congress and the public at large. That the specific arms control measures are compatible with our security and for effective arms control, the government needs to be organized to prepare, and to prepare for all speaks of arms control monitoring and verification and compliance issues in a systematic, orderly and timely fashion. That was from november 1982, and i actually brought it with me. I carry these things around. And i think every one of those points, the last one, what tim does at the National Security council, based on the president s guidance, based on my bosss guidance, my guidance, to rebustly achieve an arms control outcome that is in the interest of the american people. As we all know, 37 years later, a lot has changed. As james and john ashley pointed out, our competitors are aggressively modernizing. What we do at the state department has to evolve as well. Verification capabilities must evolve. This is some of the work that we do at the state department, with our partners at the ditra and department of energy and National Labs and some other partners that we have to sort of quietly methodically professionally continue to develop verification mechanisms that ra critical as i outlined that really underpin an arms control agreement. And as technology has changed, we continue to invest and look at the next family of verification technologies, we do it quietly, but it is absolutely critical to the work, for policy makers and negotiators to know exactly what we can and cant verify. So i think that is important, again, some of the key historical underpinnings for arms control and where were going, going forward. With that, i think ill stop, and we will kind of turn it back over to rebecca. Thank you very much for those very beneficial remarks. The first question i have that is on my mind is that as we approach the possibility of either extending the new start treaty or perhaps negotiating another treaty, the question that i continue to have, and many others have is clearly, today, we have heard that there are some other things that the russians are doing that are just outside of the bounds of new stark. Theyre tactical or Theater Nuclear weapons, and some of the other things that theyre doing that perhaps arent in the spirit of the treaty but are still in compliance with the treaty. Does the new stark treaty though insufficient provide us greater transparency, its useful for trust building, verification, to at least, the strategic element of the russias nuclear program, or does it hamstring the United States disproportionately in a way that perhaps it would be fruitful to negotiate a different treaty . Ill turn that over to tim first, if anybody else would like to comment on that. I think from our perspective, the new star treaty is a discussion and a decision the president will make at some point next year. I think from his perspective, given everything we heard from general ashley, what we need to focus on is the comprehensive nuclear threat, and general ashley spent a lot of time talking in some details, some for the first time, on the full scope of the russian and chinese programs, and so for example, i think general ashley talked a little bit about the up to 2,000 Nonstrategic Nuclear weapons the russians have. We dont have as much insight into those capabilities as we would like. Precisely because russia has refused to talk about those things. In the context of arms control. So we have limited verification. We have limited inspections. And so theres a significant question with respect to whether or not the russians are interested in extending new stark, they have these contrivances that they have hurled against and the Prior Administration on how we converted our Ballistic Missile submarines an heavy bombers, so we got to establish whether or not the russians are interested in extending the treaty. But i think the higher priority is to look at the totality of the russia and the chinese program, because we have so much time left on the clock for new start, and figure out, can we get to an arms control agreement that covers more of the systems that threaten, that threaten the United States, and not just the systems that russia, that russia for example wants to talk about. And acknowledging that china would just as soon not be in this discussion. Thats not necessarily the end of the story, right . We get to say whats in our National Security interest. Is there anything else to add . I would say one point, as tim alluded to, the president will make a decision, there is time to come to this determination, whether to extend or not, the treaty is not expiring until february 2021. And then i have to ask this, too, because i know that this is something that critics will say, it kind of sounds like a poison pill, to try to get the chinese interested in an arms control agreement, because in order to be interested in an arms control agreement, you have to be incentivized because you had at a disadvantage, but if you look at what the chinese have, their massive missile force, and i say advantage because you might think no, because they have so many fewer longrange nuclear capabilities, but their missile capabilities, there is a missile gap who what the United States have in the region and what the chinese have so can you talk about how you are incentivizing the chinese to participate in an arms control agreement with the russians and the United States . I think from our perspective, we look at the chinese words and if the chinese are truthful about their objectives, if theyre interested in a minimum deterrent policy, if they truly have a no first use policy, if theyre interested in being a responsible global stake holder, then they will be interested in talking to us about arms control. Were headed into the next npt revcon, there is the consistent tensions on article six. If theyre interested in being a responsible global stake holder, they should be interested in talking to us about an arms control regime that serves our interest, simply because of the bulk of the chinese arsenal is not currently directed at us, it is only directed at our deployed forces and allies and treaty allies and it doesnt strike me as a compelling reason not to bring them to the table. What i would like to do, because weve got about 30 minutes here. And i will go ahead and take some time to ask more questions as well mixed in. But if you do have questions, if you think about them now, im going to bundle them so if you could say your name and where youre from and then ask your question very briefly, concisely, and then ill take a couple more and put them together and then allow the pam to have that conversation. I do want to ask another one. We spent a lot of time, i think it was very interesting, that the director talked about how we think that what the russians and the chinese are doing in terms of testing, thinking about testing is inconsistent with the United States understanding of zero yield and the director can only say so much about that understandably. But im wondering though from a policy perspective, so many of the United States constraints arent even from, did weve unilaterally put them on ourselves, testing being one of them and clearly the russians and chinese seem not to have that same desire or feel compelled to actually put that unilateral testing on themselves. Can you talk about that, from a policy perspective, and how that is affecting the way you think about this, about the chinese and the russians, how they view nuclear testing, and their unwillingness to come to a point where they come to the same understanding and definition of zero yield . So i heard a comment earlier, reading a statement from Russian Foreign minister lavrov about russian adherence to the zero yield standard, i think we could also find a couple of those where he said russia was in compliance with the inf treaty. So perhaps it is not the most authoritative statement. I think with respect to what russia and likely china are doing, it may come down to a simple question of how do they understand their obligations . Do they agree with the United States that theyre not permitted to conduct any tests that create nuclear yield . If so, to general ashleys point, that raises questions whether or not theyre in compliance with that. If they on the other hand believe that the ctbt allows them certain libelality with respect to these kind of issues, maybe they think theyre in compliance with the treaty. I think general ashley was clear, that we believe russia has taken actions to improve its Nuclear Weapons capeables that run counter or contrary to his own staples regarding the scope of his obligations under the treaty and so, you know, russian and likely chinese actions speak for themselves. Additional comments on that point . Okay great. With that, yes, please say your name and organization and your question. And then we will take a couple more with it. Patrick malone, a National Security reporter with the center for Public Integrity and had is for dr. Dinanno specifically. Whats the state departments perspective on whether russia has simply capabilities for a yield test or whether it has actually conducted them . If there is another question, well take that. Yes, sir. Hi, harrison kraim wer national journal. You mentioned briefly that you believe china if they want to act as a responsible global power will be interested in arms control conversations but i was hoping you could get a little bit more into detail about what the United States is able to actually offer to bring them to the table . And if we have one more. Yes, sir, and we will go ahead. My name is young jim from voice of america, and relating to russia and china and north korea, and north korea shot a ballistic shortrange Ballistic Missile and many experts actually assume it is, the newest weapon, and if so, although there is some speculation that it is a copy cat, still, it may presume that there is some loophole in the arms control area, and i was wondering that this kind of development of russia and china, how would that affect the proliferation to other nations like north korea. Thank you. And we will just take those three. And then if any of the panelists want to tackle those. In what order. We can take the first, the first one, on whether or not we think that they are testing, or if the russians, or if theyre behaving in such a way that it is possible that they would be able to, even if they arent now. I think that was put to, do you want to talk about that . Yes, sure. I just wanted to say quickly, i think general ashley talked about, believed that the russians are probably engaged in a sort of testing, and i would defer back to what tims comments were, and i think the broader context of the testing discussion is consistent with the way were approaching our other treaties. To mention it in his opening remarks. Treaties, agreements when one party is in compliance or two parties in compliance and one is not, that is unilateral restraint, and i think with general ashley, talked about this morning, and james may want to weigh in on this, is that this is an advantage that our, these competitor states, russia and china, are using to seek strategic advantage over the United States. So i think you have to look at the totality of violations, if you would, or behavior that is indicative of the intentions to gain an advantage over their adversaries, nations engaged in agreements with arms control to their national advantage, and they will do so, until that they are challenged, and can only, again, i think tim mentioned it, you cant have an agreement, unless there is a willing partner, almost exactly what the president said, to sit across from the table, and have trust, it is really underpinning of how the approach of arms control. So thats how i would answer that question. Tim, did you want to i think it has been a better principle of President Trump and this administration that you cant have the United States held to a standard alone. Thats unilateralism. If russia and china are going to conduct activity of a type, the question must be asked, is the United States not also allowed to conduct that kind of activity. But the idea that the United States would be held to a different standard from other nations, i cant conceive of anybody who would rationally think that that is useful. Especially when you have general ashley talked about these activities may very well relate to, for example, russian vertical proliferation. The second question i think was directed, inducements how to bring china to the table. Again, i think it is a question of matching words and deeds. If china truly does believe that they only need a minimum detern, if they truly believe that they have a no first use policy, if they truly do not want to engage in an arms race, this is an opportunity for them to demonstrate that to the world. So they will be given that opportunity. And i think thats the extent of what i will say in this venue. And then the third i didnt necessarily follow the question on the third one. I think the question was short range Ballistic Missiles. The proliferation concerns, if you, now that were seeing that the north koreans, solid field short range Ballistic Missile looks like and the standard copy cat. Any comments on, from a policy perspective, what were tracking on that . Ill just point to the statements made by the state Department Spokesman yesterday as to the compliance with various nonproliferation regimes in the north korean tests. I would just say, just from my own perspective, it is in violation of u. N. Security council resolutions, unambiguously. And i have, if i may, real quick, because i really wanted to get this, kind of think through this a little bit, Missile Defense, tim, you mentioned that the russians have a National Missile defense program, and we often spend a lot of time thinking about the u. S. Missile defense program, President Trump has said were not going to have constraints on Missile Defense, to president obamas credit, he said were not going to have constraints on Missile Defense. In response to what our adversaries our appeared competitors object to, but we, it is not often in the conversation, but twhat the rus actually do with Missile Defense. They continually object to what the United States does. But can you talk about what the Russians National Missile Defense Program Looks Like . Or how, just even in sort of open source, you know, obviously, but the sort of what we know about it, and how it is different in nature, and kind, to the kinds of Missile Defense programs that we utilize . So for example, and ill probably, james is far smart ber this than i am, we know for example the russian capability surrounding moscow. I mentioned 68 armed intercepters. Obviously we dont Deploy Nuclear capable Missile Defense. So, but that is a choice the russians have made. At the same time, they criticize our Hudson Institute<\/a> on Nuclear Weapons<\/a>. The discussion in progress. What i think is important about that episode and really is at the core of the arms control plos fy of the administration is that even though weve shown our willingness to withdraw from the treaty, if one of the things that is very important that we want to talk about today, and going forward, is we have not withdrawn from the process of arms control. The president s made that very clear. My boss, bosses, secretary pompeo has made that very clear. And we look forward to engaging both russia and china robustly. With open minds. But also with open eyes. To be very cleareyed about where were at. And what we want to accomplish going forward. So the president has asserted arms control to be effective, effectively contribute to National Security<\/a>, all parties must faithfully implement their obligations. That gets to the trust piece. As james mentioned, you must have willing partners across from the table. Who intend on engaging both russia and china, in good faith. Were confident that we can achieve an outcome that advances the National Security<\/a> of the United States<\/a>. I want to talk a little bit about the state departments role here. Just a little bit about what our bureau does. People readily know and talk about, and im sure everybody in this room about rageagans trus but verify comments in 198 in reykjavik. It was in 1982, where he outlined four key tenets of the arms control regime that i think are important today as they were in 1982. Just run through them real quick. Number one, compliance with the provisions of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success and therefore to National Security<\/a>. That effectively verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect and deter possible violations of an agreement and provide time warning threats to our National Security<\/a>. Verification is necessary to assure the confidence of the congress and the public at large. That the specific arms control measures are compatible with our security and for effective arms control, the government needs to be organized to prepare, and to prepare for all speaks of arms control monitoring and verification and compliance issues in a systematic, orderly and timely fashion. That was from november 1982, and i actually brought it with me. I carry these things around. And i think every one of those points, the last one, what tim does at the National Security<\/a> council, based on the president s guidance, based on my bosss guidance, my guidance, to rebustly achieve an arms control outcome that is in the interest of the american people. As we all know, 37 years later, a lot has changed. As james and john ashley pointed out, our competitors are aggressively modernizing. What we do at the state department has to evolve as well. Verification capabilities must evolve. This is some of the work that we do at the state department, with our partners at the ditra and department of energy and National Labs<\/a> and some other partners that we have to sort of quietly methodically professionally continue to develop verification mechanisms that ra critical as i outlined that really underpin an arms control agreement. And as technology has changed, we continue to invest and look at the next family of verification technologies, we do it quietly, but it is absolutely critical to the work, for policy makers and negotiators to know exactly what we can and cant verify. So i think that is important, again, some of the key historical underpinnings for arms control and where were going, going forward. With that, i think ill stop, and we will kind of turn it back over to rebecca. Thank you very much for those very beneficial remarks. The first question i have that is on my mind is that as we approach the possibility of either extending the new start treaty or perhaps negotiating another treaty, the question that i continue to have, and many others have is clearly, today, we have heard that there are some other things that the russians are doing that are just outside of the bounds of new stark. Theyre tactical or Theater Nuclear<\/a> weapons, and some of the other things that theyre doing that perhaps arent in the spirit of the treaty but are still in compliance with the treaty. Does the new stark treaty though insufficient provide us greater transparency, its useful for trust building, verification, to at least, the strategic element of the russias nuclear program, or does it hamstring the United States<\/a> disproportionately in a way that perhaps it would be fruitful to negotiate a different treaty . Ill turn that over to tim first, if anybody else would like to comment on that. I think from our perspective, the new star treaty is a discussion and a decision the president will make at some point next year. I think from his perspective, given everything we heard from general ashley, what we need to focus on is the comprehensive nuclear threat, and general ashley spent a lot of time talking in some details, some for the first time, on the full scope of the russian and chinese programs, and so for example, i think general ashley talked a little bit about the up to 2,000 Nonstrategic Nuclear<\/a> weapons the russians have. We dont have as much insight into those capabilities as we would like. Precisely because russia has refused to talk about those things. In the context of arms control. So we have limited verification. We have limited inspections. And so theres a significant question with respect to whether or not the russians are interested in extending new stark, they have these contrivances that they have hurled against and the Prior Administration<\/a> on how we converted our Ballistic Missile<\/a> submarines an heavy bombers, so we got to establish whether or not the russians are interested in extending the treaty. But i think the higher priority is to look at the totality of the russia and the chinese program, because we have so much time left on the clock for new start, and figure out, can we get to an arms control agreement that covers more of the systems that threaten, that threaten the United States<\/a>, and not just the systems that russia, that russia for example wants to talk about. And acknowledging that china would just as soon not be in this discussion. Thats not necessarily the end of the story, right . We get to say whats in our National Security<\/a> interest. Is there anything else to add . I would say one point, as tim alluded to, the president will make a decision, there is time to come to this determination, whether to extend or not, the treaty is not expiring until february 2021. And then i have to ask this, too, because i know that this is something that critics will say, it kind of sounds like a poison pill, to try to get the chinese interested in an arms control agreement, because in order to be interested in an arms control agreement, you have to be incentivized because you had at a disadvantage, but if you look at what the chinese have, their massive missile force, and i say advantage because you might think no, because they have so many fewer longrange nuclear capabilities, but their missile capabilities, there is a missile gap who what the United States<\/a> have in the region and what the chinese have so can you talk about how you are incentivizing the chinese to participate in an arms control agreement with the russians and the United States<\/a> . I think from our perspective, we look at the chinese words and if the chinese are truthful about their objectives, if theyre interested in a minimum deterrent policy, if they truly have a no first use policy, if theyre interested in being a responsible global stake holder, then they will be interested in talking to us about arms control. Were headed into the next npt revcon, there is the consistent tensions on article six. If theyre interested in being a responsible global stake holder, they should be interested in talking to us about an arms control regime that serves our interest, simply because of the bulk of the chinese arsenal is not currently directed at us, it is only directed at our deployed forces and allies and treaty allies and it doesnt strike me as a compelling reason not to bring them to the table. What i would like to do, because weve got about 30 minutes here. And i will go ahead and take some time to ask more questions as well mixed in. But if you do have questions, if you think about them now, im going to bundle them so if you could say your name and where youre from and then ask your question very briefly, concisely, and then ill take a couple more and put them together and then allow the pam to have that conversation. I do want to ask another one. We spent a lot of time, i think it was very interesting, that the director talked about how we think that what the russians and the chinese are doing in terms of testing, thinking about testing is inconsistent with the United States<\/a> understanding of zero yield and the director can only say so much about that understandably. But im wondering though from a policy perspective, so many of the United States<\/a> constraints arent even from, did weve unilaterally put them on ourselves, testing being one of them and clearly the russians and chinese seem not to have that same desire or feel compelled to actually put that unilateral testing on themselves. Can you talk about that, from a policy perspective, and how that is affecting the way you think about this, about the chinese and the russians, how they view nuclear testing, and their unwillingness to come to a point where they come to the same understanding and definition of zero yield . So i heard a comment earlier, reading a statement from Russian Foreign<\/a> minister lavrov about russian adherence to the zero yield standard, i think we could also find a couple of those where he said russia was in compliance with the inf treaty. So perhaps it is not the most authoritative statement. I think with respect to what russia and likely china are doing, it may come down to a simple question of how do they understand their obligations . Do they agree with the United States<\/a> that theyre not permitted to conduct any tests that create nuclear yield . If so, to general ashleys point, that raises questions whether or not theyre in compliance with that. If they on the other hand believe that the ctbt allows them certain libelality with respect to these kind of issues, maybe they think theyre in compliance with the treaty. I think general ashley was clear, that we believe russia has taken actions to improve its Nuclear Weapons<\/a> capeables that run counter or contrary to his own staples regarding the scope of his obligations under the treaty and so, you know, russian and likely chinese actions speak for themselves. Additional comments on that point . Okay great. With that, yes, please say your name and organization and your question. And then we will take a couple more with it. Patrick malone, a National Security<\/a> reporter with the center for Public Integrity<\/a> and had is for dr. Dinanno specifically. Whats the state departments perspective on whether russia has simply capabilities for a yield test or whether it has actually conducted them . If there is another question, well take that. Yes, sir. Hi, harrison kraim wer national journal. You mentioned briefly that you believe china if they want to act as a responsible global power will be interested in arms control conversations but i was hoping you could get a little bit more into detail about what the United States<\/a> is able to actually offer to bring them to the table . And if we have one more. Yes, sir, and we will go ahead. My name is young jim from voice of america, and relating to russia and china and north korea, and north korea shot a ballistic shortrange Ballistic Missile<\/a> and many experts actually assume it is, the newest weapon, and if so, although there is some speculation that it is a copy cat, still, it may presume that there is some loophole in the arms control area, and i was wondering that this kind of development of russia and china, how would that affect the proliferation to other nations like north korea. Thank you. And we will just take those three. And then if any of the panelists want to tackle those. In what order. We can take the first, the first one, on whether or not we think that they are testing, or if the russians, or if theyre behaving in such a way that it is possible that they would be able to, even if they arent now. I think that was put to, do you want to talk about that . Yes, sure. I just wanted to say quickly, i think general ashley talked about, believed that the russians are probably engaged in a sort of testing, and i would defer back to what tims comments were, and i think the broader context of the testing discussion is consistent with the way were approaching our other treaties. To mention it in his opening remarks. Treaties, agreements when one party is in compliance or two parties in compliance and one is not, that is unilateral restraint, and i think with general ashley, talked about this morning, and james may want to weigh in on this, is that this is an advantage that our, these competitor states, russia and china, are using to seek strategic advantage over the United States<\/a>. So i think you have to look at the totality of violations, if you would, or behavior that is indicative of the intentions to gain an advantage over their adversaries, nations engaged in agreements with arms control to their national advantage, and they will do so, until that they are challenged, and can only, again, i think tim mentioned it, you cant have an agreement, unless there is a willing partner, almost exactly what the president said, to sit across from the table, and have trust, it is really underpinning of how the approach of arms control. So thats how i would answer that question. Tim, did you want to i think it has been a better principle of President Trump<\/a> and this administration that you cant have the United States<\/a> held to a standard alone. Thats unilateralism. If russia and china are going to conduct activity of a type, the question must be asked, is the United States<\/a> not also allowed to conduct that kind of activity. But the idea that the United States<\/a> would be held to a different standard from other nations, i cant conceive of anybody who would rationally think that that is useful. Especially when you have general ashley talked about these activities may very well relate to, for example, russian vertical proliferation. The second question i think was directed, inducements how to bring china to the table. Again, i think it is a question of matching words and deeds. If china truly does believe that they only need a minimum detern, if they truly believe that they have a no first use policy, if they truly do not want to engage in an arms race, this is an opportunity for them to demonstrate that to the world. So they will be given that opportunity. And i think thats the extent of what i will say in this venue. And then the third i didnt necessarily follow the question on the third one. I think the question was short range Ballistic Missile<\/a>s. The proliferation concerns, if you, now that were seeing that the north koreans, solid field short range Ballistic Missile<\/a> looks like and the standard copy cat. Any comments on, from a policy perspective, what were tracking on that . Ill just point to the statements made by the state Department Spokesman<\/a> yesterday as to the compliance with various nonproliferation regimes in the north korean tests. I would just say, just from my own perspective, it is in violation of u. N. Security council resolutions, unambiguously. And i have, if i may, real quick, because i really wanted to get this, kind of think through this a little bit, Missile Defense<\/a>, tim, you mentioned that the russians have a National Missile<\/a> defense program, and we often spend a lot of time thinking about the u. S. Missile defense program, President Trump<\/a> has said were not going to have constraints on Missile Defense<\/a>, to president obamas credit, he said were not going to have constraints on Missile Defense<\/a>. In response to what our adversaries our appeared competitors object to, but we, it is not often in the conversation, but twhat the rus actually do with Missile Defense<\/a>. They continually object to what the United States<\/a> does. But can you talk about what the Russians National<\/a> Missile Defense<\/a> Program Looks Like<\/a> . Or how, just even in sort of open source, you know, obviously, but the sort of what we know about it, and how it is different in nature, and kind, to the kinds of Missile Defense<\/a> programs that we utilize . So for example, and ill probably, james is far smart ber this than i am, we know for example the russian capability surrounding moscow. I mentioned 68 armed intercepters. Obviously we dont Deploy Nuclear<\/a> capable Missile Defense<\/a>. So, but that is a choice the russians have made. At the same time, they criticize our Missile Defense<\/a>. They talk very openly about their interests in pursuing s400 and s500 capability that han antiMissile Defense<\/a> capability. And there does appear to be a double standard but President Trump<\/a> has been very clear that he is not interested in negotiating u. S. Missile defenses. He sees them as effectively delinked from offensive nuclear arms control. I would add to that, that you know, the russians, it is not that they dont like Missile Defense<\/a>, they dont like our Missile Defense<\/a>, right, because theyve had this system around moscow, nuclear tipped interceptors for quite some time and theyre in the process of modernizing it. I would also add that prc is also interested in Missile Defense<\/a> and they have some systems that they are working on and this is noted in the most recent military Defense Department<\/a> report and it is a double standard to critique our Missile Defense<\/a> which by the way is directed at rogue states and the threats that they pose. And then sticking with the Missile Defense<\/a> topic for just a moment, i did, i have noted that the Trump Administration<\/a>s Missile Defense<\/a> review is the document that lays out the strategy for our country and Missile Defense<\/a>, and it was supposed to follow the other documents as we now think about great power competition. And it does talk about the chinese and Russian Missile<\/a> programs, and their Missile Defense<\/a> programs, to a certain extent. And that the United States<\/a> now has to consider defending against some of what they have. But it was really light on specifics in the Missile Defense<\/a> review. And if you can look at the budget, there is a lot of continuity with the Previous Administration<\/a> in contrast to President Trump<\/a>s remarks during the rollout that hey were going to move into a Missile Defense<\/a> policy that we will no longer only selfstrain and only hand the the rogue threat, so can you talk about some of the ways that we are thinking about Missile Defense<\/a>, as something that is stabilizing, that empowers and emboldens diplomacy, that helps deterrents, especially as we think about the chinese and Russian Nuclear<\/a> missile program. So Missile Defense<\/a> review is rolled out a couple of months ago. And it does go into some specifics about what were doing now and what were investigating. I mean it focuses, essentially on defending the homeland, as a first priority, and our existing Missile Defense<\/a>s, fort greeley and vandenberg and our design with the rogue threat in mind. We are also very determined to protect allies and our forces abroad, in the regional context, particularly when we think about the russian and prc antiaccess area of denial capabilities. So there is a lot of work being done there, in the european theater, for example, with our nato allies. And then a third piece is talking about advanced technologies. As we look into the future. And there, the mbr talks about some promising technologies, with respect to for example bruce phase intercept, with respect to lasers and so on, which are being studied, very thoroughly, the mbr actually has a list of about a dozen tasks, tasks within it, that are being looked at right now. And most of them are on a sixmonth deadline and will be completed by the end of the year. So the mdr does look at the current threat environment, and also looks forward to the evolving threat environment. And again, for our Missile Defense<\/a>s that are at fort greeley and geared against the rogue threat posed by north korea, and potentially iran, and then we consider russia and china in the regional context, and then we rely on our Strategic Nuclear<\/a> deterrence, with respect to their large offensive arsenals. It would just, thank so much, sir, it would just seem to me, that the budget then should be significantly higher and i dont expect anyone here to disagree with the current president s budget, but if we actually are going to, in a timely manner, really ramp up our Missile Defense<\/a>, to handle things like the hyper sonic threat from children, that we are going to need new interceptor and a Space Sensor Layer<\/a> that we can see and track and which was the Nuclear Defense<\/a> agencys unfounded priority. And one note on that. What happened the previous two years, is there were, you know, congressional plusups and a lot of capacity efforts, with respect to the groundbased intercepters that boosted the budget. And that accounts for what this years budget looks like. And i would also add, with respect to advanced technologies, they normally cost less, at the outset, but depending on their viability, and there are a lot of factors that go into determining what type of technologies might bear fruit, we would expect tos they budget requests to increase in the coming years. Yes, sir. Because this is nuclear testing, it is an important issue, and there may be some confusion about whats being asserted here, i would just like to take one minute and ask you, this panel, to clarify it. First, for mr. Morrison, can you say what efforts have been made it try to work out any of these concerns diplomatically with the russians . Have you made an effort . Have you proposed transparency measures of any kind . Second, do you agree with what i heard your state department colleague say, that the russians are not merely making preparations to carry out experiments or tests of a nonzero yield, but have actually done so . And for the Defense Department<\/a> representative, if United States<\/a> did not get russia and china to agree to limit themselves to sub critical tests and you seem to have concerns that theyre not, from a Defense Department<\/a> perspective, would you want the ability to match what theyre doing . Should the United States<\/a> engage in its own low yield tests, or is that unnecessary . Given the extentive stockpiled Stewardship Program<\/a> we already have. I will take one more question then, so that we can bundle those two for the sake of time. This is for mr. Morrison. The administration has been in intense discussions over extending new start. And weve heard that you believe that there is time in which to negotiate with the russians. A lot of experts say there isnt. That these negotiations on extending new starts should actually have begun. What will the administration decide, if it comes down to this choice . Extending new start, and preserving what has been an extensive monitoring, inspection and verification regime that both sides are able to conduct, or allowing new start to expire, and losing on the ground, onsite, monitoring, and inspection, and do you believe the United States<\/a> National Technical<\/a> means can make up the loss of that intelligence . Well take the first one. Did you want to go ahead . With respect to the first question, im not going to conduct diplomacy in public. So any discussions that we have been having with any of these countries, im going to keep those in diplomatic channels. I think our assessment is very clear. Again, that russia has taken actions to improve its Nuclear Weapons<\/a> capables that would run contrary to its own staples. So actions. Not preparations. Actions. And in china, the manner in which it is expanding its Nuclear Weapons<\/a> program, were highly skeptical it could do that without activities that would call under question its own adherence to the cbtb. Activities that so i dont work in the stripes, i will stay away from classified information, but i think that the statements speak for themselves. I think there is another question, maybe for james. Yes, so the question was, whether we desired to test, or in view of a needs test, we have confidence in the existing capables of our Nuclear Arsenal<\/a> now through the stockpile of stewardship prac. With respect to our modeling ap our simulation, with that said, we can keep a vigilant eye on that program. And you know, if we have to reconsider at some future point the desirability of testing or make a recommendation thereto, we will. But at this point, we have complete confidence in the Nuclear Arsenal<\/a>. So the second question, im not going to presuppose what decision the president will make. I think again his direction is pretty clear, that we, he is interested in looking at the totality of russian and chinese programs, i dont think he thinks it is advantageous to continue to defer the difficult questions, some of which for example were posed by the senate in 2010, that tactical Nuclear Weapons<\/a> must be a part of future arms control. I dont think, i dont think he is interested in continuing to defer those matters just because theyre hard or just because the russians may not want to talk about them. We shouldnt presuppose that the russians are interested in extending the treaty. If they were, they wouldnt wou creating false narratives about u. S. Compliance with the treaty. They wouldnt be challenging the approach that the Obama Administration<\/a> and Trump Administration<\/a> have taken with respect to converting our submarines and heavy bombers. So those false linkages that the russians are creating suggest perhaps an unwillingness on their part. But from our perspective, if the treaty is enforced until 2021, the president believes we have time to pursue more effective arms control for the american people. I want to press down a little bit on this, because i think it would benefit some of our viewers who are watching from home to when we talk about the fact that the russians potentially outnumber the u. S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons<\/a> 101, why is that significant . Why is it that the United States<\/a> is has tabled that and moved forward with negotiations for the longrange strategic Weapons Systems<\/a> . But why have we gotten to the point where we say this is no longer acceptable and why is it that the russians have those, and what is that theyre holding at risk that makes these things so significant and then i guess my point then is, are we perhaps creating a false distinction between tactical and strategic . Because some of these Weapons Systems<\/a>, though perhaps tactical in nature, do have strategic implications. So ill start on that one. You know, the russian the russian tactical or Nonstrategic Nuclear<\/a> weapons, they are based on a wide variety of different platforms. Right . Some of which Lieutenant General<\/a> ashley mentioned in the previous hour. Were talking about surface surface surface to surface. Were talking about artillery shells, were talking about t e torpedoes, debt charges and so on and nuclear intercepters. And the challenge is that in the european theater, those warheads, those delivery systems, combined with rather aggressive statements by senior russian officials against the backdrop of russian behavior in recent years, is you know, poses considerable challenge to the United States<\/a> and our nato allies. And in the context of one particular system, the ssc8, the violation of the inf, you know, nato stands very united in its pinning the blame on the Russian Federation<\/a> for the almost certain demise of the tre treaty coming up in august. And the reason that particular system is of military significance is because its a landbased system that can be maneuvered, can be they can try to hide it. And makes it difficult to track. And that landbased system thus has some advantages over some other air or seabased systems. So, again, looking back, stepping back and looking at the kind of the broad sweep of these theaterrange systems, we are concerned about what they their military impact and also sort of any political coercive leverage that the russians may think they have. And thats the reason we have been so insistent on holding the russians to account with respect to their violations of the inf treaty and also why the United States<\/a> is also going to look at some conventional systems going forward. And this will be some time away, but we are going to look at how best to offset the growth of russian systems in the theater context. But u. S. Systems under consideration now are i would emphasize, are conventional in nature. You could argue that while we capture the systems that are capable of ranging the United States<\/a> so why bother . Were only talking about thousands of Nuclear Weapons<\/a> that can target our allies and our deployed forces. Thats obviously not the approach that the Trump Administration<\/a> is taking. But just when i went to law school, they talked to us about legal constructions. He sort of create a reality. What sense does it make to let a russian launched submarine missile that can go from a plat form but not to launch one that can arrange conis. We limit submarine launch bli Ballistic Missile<\/a>s, but excluded russian sea launch missiles. That just doesnt continue to make sense. And we watched the russians exploit those loopholes. And then in the china context, it would seem to me that theres this constant refrain that because the chinese dont have the numbers that the russians have in icbms, for instance, that simply not does not pose the same degree of a threat to the United States<\/a> or u. S. Interests, but if you could speak to that, i would just say, if you look at the one thing one of the statements was that the chinese tests in whatever given time frame, recent time frame, was more than the entire planet put together in terms of the number of missile tests. And that the type and the nature of the missile arsenal that they have developed can push the United States<\/a> out of thein dough pacific so that it prevents the United States<\/a> from obvioushavin ability to uphold its commitments to allies and the United States<\/a> though, again, perhaps not in the classical sense of a strategic weapons system, they do have strategic implications. If anybody wants to just make one comment. Just a minu james mentioned in context to the european theater. The chinese missile buildup, most dynamic and dramatic Missile Development<\/a> Deployment Program<\/a> on earth from some testimony the Armed Services<\/a> Committee Earlier<\/a> this year. And we heard that those systems are dualcapable. That james alludes to. So these present tremendous challenges. Short, intermediate missile systems. Theyre dualcapable. And, again, its part of the extended deterrence thats critical to our alliances in that region. So great. Time for a very quick brief one. Patrick . [ inaudible question ]. Chinas search for information superiority, and how that raises the risk even further along the lines of what youre talking about. Because there is so much focus onnin fama advertised warfare, and from tactical to the strategic level. Im wondering how that cross cuts these capabilities that are worrisome as well. So i would say from a Defense Department<\/a> perspective, we are we were watching this very closely. They are, as your question suggests, making significant investments in the information sphere. They do talk about informationized warfare, as part of their doctrine. So this in conjunction with the other conventional and Nuclear Developments<\/a> is something that we are tracking and we are watching we are watching very closely. And ill leave it at that. With that, would you please join me in thanking our panelists . [ applause ] tonight, here on cspan3, starting at 8 00 eastern, the Senate Agriculture<\/a> committee looks into Global Markets<\/a> available to u. S. Farmers and ranchers. At 11 00 eastern, the American Constitution Society<\/a> for law and policies convention, with conversations on Senate Republican<\/a> efforts to confirm as many judges as possible while they control the senate. Hawaii senator mazie hirono delivered the keynote address. And at 1 00 eastern, the Congressional Black Caucus<\/a> and actress taraji p. Henson, boast kno best known for foxs tv drama empire, Discusses Mental Health<\/a> and suicide risk among black teenagers. Thats prime time tonight here on cspan3. Most of us when we think of Winston Churchill<\/a>, we think of the older man, sending young men into war. But no one knew better and few knew as well the realities of war. The terror and the devastation. And he said to his mother after his second war, you know, the raw comes through. You cant guild it. He absolutely knew the disaster that war was. Sunday night on q a, historian Candace Millard<\/a> talks about the military career of Winston Churchill<\/a> in her book hero of the empire, the making of Winston Churchill<\/a>. He ends up going on the day it fell to the british, and he takes over the prison and he frees the men who have been his fellow prisoners. He puts in the prison his former jailers, and he watches as the boar flag is torn down and the union jack is hoisted in its place. Sunday night at 8 00 eastern, on cspans q a. Action owes reports the cost of all but one of the 49 top selling drugs have increased over a sixyear period. With the median increase of 76 . The News Organization<\/a> looked into ideas by administration and congressional leaders on how to lower Prescription Drug<\/a> costs. 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