Transcripts For CSPAN3 Middle East Policy Council Discussion On U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations 20240714

Jamal khashoggi, the civil war in yemen and Irans Nuclear program. All right. Good morning, everyone. I am gina, the vice chairwoman of the board of the middle east policy council. Im pleased to welcome you to this, our 97th quarterly capitol hill conference. Our topic today is the United States Saudi Arabian relationship. Over the last 40 years, many of us have observed and supported this relationship from deepening our counterterrorism operation to championing womens rights. The challenge on each side has been to reconcile close, effective cooperation on National Security issues while remaining faithful to two very different value systems. Under the current leadership of both countries, these tensions have been brought into sharp focus. The nature of our military cooperation, human rights violations, addressing regional bad actors and more demand attention and likely change. These issues are ripe for informed dispassionate review and we are fortunate to have an experienced group of panelists today to delve into the factors that play affecting the u. S. Approach to saudi arabia, our relationship and its future. However, before i turn to todays program, i would like to say a few word about the middle east policy council. The council was established in 1981 for the purpose of promoting dialogue and education concerning the United States and the countries of the middle east. We have three flagship programs. Our quarterly capitol hill conference, such as todays event, our quarterly journal, middle east policy, which enjoys a strong reputation among those with an interest in middle Eastern Affairs and can be found in 15,000 libraries worldwide. And i think very importantly our education outreach program. Teach mid east. It provides Educational Resources for the middle east, targeted mainly toward secondary schools to students and teachers. Please visit us on our website. Www. Mepc. Org and our teach mid east program at www. Teachmideast. Org. This program is being live streamed on our website. So im pleased to welcome all of you who have joined us online. The conference proceedings will be posted in video and transcript form on our website, as will a recap of the discussion. An edited transcript of the program will be published in the next issue of our journal middle east policy. Let me now briefly introduce our panelists. We will begin the program with mr. Tom litman, an adjunct collar with the middle east institute and the former middle east bureau chief of the Washington Post. Our next speaker will be ms. Dana stroll, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for near east policy and a former professional staff member for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome. And finally, my longterm colleague and friend, ambassador gerald firestein, Senior Vice President and president of gulf Affairs Programs at the middle east institute. Jerry is also a former Principal Assistant deputy secretary and former ambassador to yemen. Id like to thank all of you for joining us today. The program will begin with each panelist delivering brief opening remarks, and this will be followed by a discussion session, which will be moderated by my colleague, the executive director of the middle east policy council. Note that we have followed our usual practice of placing index cards on all of the seats. Please use these to write down any questions you have as the speakers are speaking and then hold up the card. Our staff will collect them during the presentations and give them to the doctor so that he can consolidate the questions for the discussion period. And with that id like to turn the podium over to tom. Thank you. Thank you very much, gina. Thanks to the mid east policy council for organizing this event and inviting me to participate in it. Its now 43 years since i first went to saudi arabia. And, you know, in the days when the best hotel didnt even have telephones in the rooms, before it was really a fully developed country in a material sense. And even then it was very difficult to understand the nature of this peculiar relationship between the United States and saudi arabia, which had come together in the days when they were really at opposi opposite poles of civilization. So what i thought i would do is talk a little bit about the relationship, as im sure you all know if youre interested enough to be here, can be traced back to the time of the 1940s, really the 1930s when an American Oil Company got the first oil concession. Then in the 1940s, two countries forged their first strategic and security relationship when the king gave permission for the United States to build a Strategic Air base because the United States was fighting a twofront war. That elevated the relationship to another level, and under truman we sent in a team of specialists to create the saudi arabia monetary authority. So by that time we had we sort of had the peninsula blanketed, so to speak. But all through the time since this relationship has been beset by furious disagreements, anger and policy differences that you might think would have left some kind of permanent damage. And they began im going to enumerate them because some of them are better known than others. They began, of course, when president truman recognized israel the most it was created and other arab leaders wrote to king abdulazeez. The saudis were furious because the United States refused to back them in their dispute with britain a piece of land with saudi arabia, oman and the uea come together. He didnt want to choose between friends so he didnt. The saudis couldnt understand that. 1954, a littleknown episode the new king gave a contract to a gentleman named Aristotle Onassis that would have ended the monopoly on the oil industry. Eisenhower personally gave the order to make sure that contract never went into effect. I know about this episode because its the subject of my most recent book, which im happy to say is excerpted in this issue of middle east policy. Thank you for come. Great book. You should all buy multiple cops. Then, of course, came the oil embargo of 73 74. When you read kissingers telephone transcripts, he referred to the arabs as a bunch of savages. Which will give you an idea of the esteem after all, he was even kissinger when he finally went to saudi arabia received a gift from the king which was a bound copy of the protocols of the elders of zion, which is not the thing i would give a jew every day of the week, but in 1979, the saudis made jimmy carter very unhappy by not only refusing not only not endorsing but refusing to accept the egypt israel peace treaty. And the last time i was in baghdad was the time in the spring of 79 when all the arab Foreign Ministers got together and threw egypt out of the arab league. As much effort as jimmy carter had put in on courting the saudis, it wasnt enough. In 1988 came the peculiar episode in which the United States discovered by accident that the saudis had acquired nuclearcapable chinese missiles, which they would not let us inspect. That, i mean, the first thing that happened was richard armitage, some of you may remember, told the saudis that they had managed to put themselves right at the top of israels target list, where they had not been. That episode took some doing to unravel. Then, of course, there was 9 11. 15 of the 19 please, dont ask me about 15 of the 19. Ive answered that question every day for, like, 15 years. In 2003, when the United States invaded iraq over saudi objections, you had the famous remarks in which King Abdullah referred to it as an illegal occupation. And then came the Nuclear Agreement with iran. Which made the saudis very unhappy. Not so much because of the contents of the agreement itself, but because it spooked them. They thought we were trying to forge some kind of equitable relationship with the iranians, which they could not understand. And then, of course, came the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Now, in the whole history of this relationship, there has never been a time when the Strategic Planning or the relationship in any sense was put in jeopardy or threatened by human rights issues of any kind or the fate of any individual. Every year the state department excoriates saudi arabia in its annual report on human rights around the world and it never makes any difference in terms of policy. Even jimmy carter, who made human rights the foundation of his Foreign Policy, went to saudi arabia and was deferential to the point of obsequious because he wanted something from them. They didnt deliver, mainly the endorsement of sadats initiative, but thats how its always been, one side wants something from the other. So now the question is, what happens if donald trump is not reelected . I can imagine, lets say joe biden or amy klobuchar, who are pragmatists and centrists, holding their noses and continuing to do security business with saudi arabia. But its hard to imagine Elizabeth Warren or Pete Buttigieg or cory booker or some of the others doing business as usual. Endorsing the arms sales, you know, inviting the saudi princes to the white house. Security cooperation, i think, will continue regardless of what happens in this country. But otherwise its possible and maybe even likely that there be quite a change, especially in the visuals and atmospherics. And one reason is as youve seen in the votes on jasta a couple of years ago and on yemen, there has never been a popular constituency for saudi arabia in the United States. Very few peoples grandparents came from saudi arabia. And theres a reason why there is no congressional saudi caucus. There is a tajikistan caucus but not saudi arabia. And thats because there is no Political Risk for anybody in congress in coming out and taking a vote thats hostile to or opposed to saudi arabia. There is nothing to lose. And now you have a situation where we dont need the oil. We dont have military bases there. Unless you have major defense contractors in your district, you have nothing to lose by coming out against the saudis. So i think now for the first time really since 1945, its possible to envision an evolution of the relationship in which at long last saudi arabia will be treated like any other country. Thank you. [ applause ] good morning, everybody. So im going to build off some of though comments and talk about the u. S. saudi relationship both in the context of the congressional debate and then take it a little bit more broadly and ask some fundamental pose some fundamental policy questions for those of you who are engaged in either framing the Foreign Policy debates for your bosses on the hill, outside the hill, talking about these issues. So you all should know that i just wrapped up last year several years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the middle east staffer. And so had a front row seat to a lot of the debates about saudi arabia and the u. S. saudi relationship as a lot of these votes were taking place here on the hill. I would characterize the current state and debate of the u. S. saudi relationship as the most serious crisis in the relationship since september 11th, since 9 11. And whats unique about the debate right now and the focus on saudi arabia is that it includes members on both sides of the aisle, its bipartisan in both chambers, its bicameral. And it is it has its not unique to the Current Administration. There were very fierce debates on u. S. saudi policy in the Previous Administration as well, specifically when then minister of defense well, current minister of defense Mohammed Bin Salman decided to engage in military operations in yemen with very little heads up to washington. And that was the Previous Administration not the current one. If you had to give one sentence to describe what the crux of the debate is right now on the hill and in washington, i think it is, is the u. S. saudi relationship and is saudi arabia more destabilizing in the region than for u. S. Interests or can it be a force for stability . So is it recklessness or not . If you look at some of the language, the findings, the senses of congress and the legislation coming out of both the house and the senate, words like recklessness, destabilizing, instability are used to describe this relationship. Generally u. S. Partners and allies, we create networks of alliances and we use tools like security cooperation, military assistance, economic engagement, trade, scholarships, cultural engagement, et cetera, because we believe that our relationships can contribute to stability, particularly in the middle east. In congress, members of congress for this congress and the past congress have probably taken more Foreign Policy votes that somehow touch the u. S. saudi relationship compared to any other issue. More votes on saudi arabia than israel, bds, iran, et cetera. That is different from several congresses about, but now its about saudi arabia. And thats whether its the vote for the justice against sponsors of terrorism, jasta, many four years ago. That was actually vetoed by president obama and then overridden in the senate. Its a very strong expression about that. Here it was viewed as a domestic issue, but certainly riyadh saw it as a statement about the u. S. saudi relationship and the senate overrode that veto, which takes a strong bipartisan majority, obviously, 67. There have been multiple resolutions of disapproval on arms sales, both offensive and defensive weapons. Thats also not new to this year. Its been going on for years. In both the house and the senate, theres been multiple votes on war powers resolutions. Multiple votes on this issue. There have been votes on amendments to the ndaa, the National Defense authorization act, in both the house and the senate that are specifically about the u. S. saudi relationship, specifically about weapons sales and specifically about u. S. Support to saudiled military operations in yemen. Im not going to talk too much about that because jerrys going to do that. And the latest series of showdowns are about congress attempts to demand some accountability and assessment from the Current Administration about what happened related to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invoked global magnitsky designations and asked for a determination that didnt happen by the by the Trump Administration. And then finally, the most recent showdown was when the an emergency exception under the arms export control act, the aeca, was invoked in order for the administration to move forward on weapons sales to saudi arabia and other Gulf Partners without the saturate turley required congressional review period here on the hill. So some of this is about saudi arabia and a very stark difference in opinion between members of congress and the and the strategic utility of the u. S. saudi relationship. And some of it is about congressional executive purview, where should congress be determining Foreign Policy, and whats in the executive branchs purview to determine . But all of this has been taking place over years. So members of congress are not just taking votes on the u. S. saudi relationship, they are learning about weapons sales, how do they work, what do members of congress get to review, what are offensive systems, defense systems, what are defensive . They are learning the legislation, theyre learning the process, theyre learning about security cooperation, theyre learning about all the other u. S. Programs and policies and colors of money and tools that form the foundation of this relationship and have for a long time. So now they can talk about professional military education. They can talk about students studying in the United States. They can talk about the different kinds of entrepreneurship, economic commercial engagement, et cetera. So members of congress are deeply familiar now, not just with broadly the u. S. saudi relationship, but they are wellversed in the tools, which means when people talk to members of congress about the u. S. saudi relationship, the general talking points on Foreign Policy just dont cut it anymore. They are deeply educated in the details of whats going on in yemen, about the various parties in this conflict. They are deeply educated about how military systems go through a process of approval before theyre sold to any partner. So now were in a situation where its not just about saudi arabia, but there is a debate about how military sales will go forward to the rest of the middle east, the largest purchaser of u. S. Defense equipment. Against all of these votes and all of this education as a result of what was going on in the region, consider what members saw taking place in the region that they ascribe as coming out of riyadh. So there was the military intervention in yemen in 2015. After years of diplomacy, trying to avoid that. There was the blockade of qatar, which was seen as saudiled. There was the detention and for awhile resignation of the lebanese prime minister. There was the roundup of arrests there was arrests and alleged torture at the ritzcarlton of a large somebody didnt like me saying that. Probably the ritz. Of a broad Cross Section of Business Executives and elites. There right after the granting of womens right to drive in saudi arabia, there was the detention and alleged torture of several womens rights activists. There was also the spat with the government of canada over a tweet about human rights. All of these things were taking place in the region and seen driven by saudi arabia at the same time that congress was actively debating and taking votes on different kinds of legislation related to all different aspects of the u. S. saudi relationship and then there was the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and then there were weeks of different messages about what was taking place, and then were was the refusal of the Trump Administration to respond to congressional invocations of law like the global magnitsky act. All of this together has reached, you know, this crisis point. So where are we now . I think theres no doubt or question that saudi government officials and people in riyadh and really across saudi arabia are very much away of the dynamics here in washington. Theyre aware of the debate about the strategic utility of the u. S. saudi relationship moving forward, and there is certainly an eagerness in riyadh to find a way to move forward. So i think the question here for policy makers, whether on the hill or in the executive branch, in the communities of interest around people taking votes and creating policy is, what are we going to do with that desire to move forward . Is the debate about divorcing the saudis and going in another Strategic Direction or is there an opportunity here to move forward in some way . So im just going to briefly touch on the broader geopolitical context. We should be asking ourselves, do we accept the premise of the National Defense strategy, that the next that the current strategic threat environment in which the United States operates are near pure revisionist powers like russia and china that deeply challenge us on a multispectrum of threats or do you ascribe to the premise that still the major threats facing the United States are terrorism and fragile states and instability . In that case, the game is still in the middle east. Whether its russia and china, i mean, there is also obviously asiapacific, and we saw both the Obama Administration try to do their pivot, and theres a lot of talk currently in this administration and also on the hill about disengagement or burdensharing in the middle east, which basically means u. S. Forces should get out and we should shift the burden and have other people put in resources. But the bottom line is whether you ascribe to either of these world views or both, do you need partners and allies to address those threats . And in that context, would we prefer saudi arabia to be in the umbrella with us or not . So, iran policy. Regardless of your views on the jcpoa, there is a potential for u. S. iran confrontation in the middle east right now, and if the blood of u. S. Forces or u. S. Personnel is spilled and we are in a situation where we have to confront militarily, do we want to be working with saudi arabia . Do we need them for airspace access, for basing of forces, for maritime threats . Israel. There is a debate right now on the hill, i think, more in the Democratic Caucus than the republican, about the future of the u. S. Israel relationship, but there is no question that relationships between israel and gulf countries, including saudi arabia, are expanding. Is it in our interest for these countries to be working together . Assistance to syria. The Trump Administration cut off hundreds of millions of dollars in Stabilization Assistance to northeast syria. But the saudis actually stepped in right now. So if its about burdensharing and about the u. S. Government not always being the first entity to be paying assistance dollars, do we want to be talking to riyadh about where they can share the burden . Iraq. One of the key premises of u. S. Policy to iraq, is if we dont give iraqis other options other than iran, the problem will deepen. Despite what i laid out the troubling developments of of riyadh. There has been an opening to integrate iraq into the arab fold. That might be in the u. S. Interest to continue to develop. Finally, my bias, just to be clear, sustainable meaningful change i view as incremental and not necessarily on the headlines and certainly not the stuff of Senior Leader meetings or statements. My eyebrows were raised at an economist article that came out during ramadan about a new Television Series coming out in saudi arabia, and it was the title, and i encourage all of you to look it up. A saudi series hints that change is afoot. Consider the demography of saudi arabia, where a large majority of the population is under the age of 30. Mobile phone usage, 100 . Internet saturation, some of the highest in the middle east. A few other points that i wanted to mention. Vision 2030, which was articulated by Mohammed Bin Salman as transformational project. Even if some of the goals are too lofty, and its not talking about democracy, is is a vision and some policies undergirding that under that vision for economic and social change and Economic Diversification away from oil potentially more stabilizing over the medium to long term . Consider the muslim world league, the secretary general mohammad el isa wrote an article in the Washington Post why muslims should remember the holocaust. He working on reforming the saudi educational system. While were having a debate here about the u. S. saudi relationship, there are changes taking place in saudi arabia, and i think there is a question for us in frames this as how much are we going to punish the saudis for what happened . And can we take a step back and use some of the pressure and awareness that this relationship may need to go in a different direction to open up new opportunities . I think there are many saudi officials that are eager to have that conversation. There is a new saudi ambassador in washington, d. C. Who is who is eager to have that conversation. So i think there is a fundamental question here about whether or not we want to work on this relationship. Whether it needs to be updated. Transitioned for 21st century challenges. Thats a question that i think we can explore. The question is, do we want to explore it in cooperation or not . [ applause ] can i remind you that if youve got questions, write them down and raise your hand so our staff can come and collect them . Thank you. I want to first thank thank gina and rich for inviting us to come here today and participate in this in this conversation. And to demonstrate again that for those of us who are recovering Foreign Service officers there is life after after the state department. Which is good. And also to thank tom and dana for their remarks. And i think that we just saw in danas presentation why she was when she was at sfrc the best the best staffer ever for those of us who found our way up to the hill from time to time. I want to start, you know, this is a this is a conversation about the u. S. saudi relationship. And i wanted to begin by stressing that this is not about the u. S. Relationship with Mohammed Bin Salman. And one of the things that struck me over the last couple of years is that weve lost sight of the fact that there is a relationship with a whole country out there, that as tom as said, stretches back for nearly 90 years and has been based on shared shared interests, shared perspectives, shared policies over a number of years, and not here to defend Mohammed Bin Salman, not here to try to explain what was going through his mind about Jamal Khashoggi, who many of us in this room knew and considered a friend. So we need to think about the broader relationship. And one of the narratives here in washington that i found really striking over this last almost year now since khashoggis murder is the extent to which we have conflated a number of different aspects of saudi policy, of u. S. Of u. S. Perspectives on saudi arabia, of u. S. Relations with saudi arabia in ways that i think are unhelpful for the interests of both countries. And primarily to make point that i think this conflation is particularly egregious when it comes to how this city and this congress perceives the saudi intervention in yemen. And i think as tom said, the relationship that weve had with saudi arabia has had its ups and downs over the years. I think that you could probably make the same point about just about every country in the world. We have over the years found reason to work very closely with the saudis. And a number of us were involved in the in the intervention in afghanistan in the 1980s where saudi arabia was a critical partner in helping to implement the u. S. Policy objective of driving the former soviet union out of afghanistan. They were principal funders, financiers of a great deal of the activities. They helped facilitate through their intelligence agencies through the prince of turkey and his organization working very closely with u. S. Intelligence community to achieve what was perceived at the time to be a critical u. S. National security objective. Today we Work Together on iran. We have worked together on iran since 1979. And, again, largely share the same objectives in terms of iranian behavior in the region, iranian threats to Regional Security and stability. But as tom said quite correctly, it hasnt always been a positive relationship. Weve had our differences over israelipalestini israeli Israeli Palestinian issues where we have had to manage those differences and provide stability to a relationship that was troubled. Yemen fits into that pattern of up and down up and down relationships with the saudis over the years. And i think that the yemenis often have observed, not always positively, that the United States has tended over the years to see yemen policy, to see our interests in yemen largely through saudi saudi perceptions, through saudi eyes. And thats not a wrong position that theyve that theyve taken. Our support for saudi policy in yemen goes back to the 1960s when the Kennedy Administration worked with the saudis in support of the the monarchy in in yemen, primarily because the saudis perceived pan arabism as a greater threat to the stability of their rule saudi arabia and the other gulf monarchies to be greater than support for the shia theocracy that had ruled yemen for many, many years. In the 1980s, the United States is saudi arabia worked together to support the north yemen government, the yemen arab republic at that time, and established a trilateral military assistance program. The u. S. Providing military support to the north Yemen Military that was paid for by the saudi government. And that was primarily because of the concerns about the threat to the saudi stability opposed by the Peoples Democratic republic of yemen, south yemen at that time. And so that continued for a number of years. We provided f5s. We provided other kinds of military support until the saudis and the yemenis broke in 1990 91 over saddam husseins invasion of kuwait. And then the two governments, saudi arabia and the United States broken. We supported the saudi decision to expel yemeni workers in 1990 91, to cut off assistance, but when south yemen had tried to break off again and form another government in 1994, having merged north and south yemen in 1990, the u. S. And saudi arabia found themselves on different sides of the of the issue. The United States supported the government in the north and the saudis provided assistance to the south. And supported the the break off of the country and the resumption of separate north and south yemen governments. After a period of years, though, we came back again together in 2011 and 2012, where the United States and saudi arabia worked very closely as part of a larger International Coalition that included all of the perm five countries of the u. N. Security council as well as the gcc and a number of the european governments to work on a political transition document that eventually was completed and became the gcc transition agreement. And we worked together very closely after that on the implementation of that document from from the time that it was signed in 2011 until the houthis disrupted it in 2014. And let me just make the point that, in fact, had it not been for the intervention of King Abdullah personally in late 2011, its unlikely that the agreement would have been signed and we probably would have ended up in this civil conflict that were experiencing now in yemen several years before it actually broke out. After the agreement was signed, after president hadi was elected or selected as the transition president in 2012, saudi interest in yemen declined. They became less involved in the political transition, perhaps in part because it was uncomfortable for them to promote democratic transition in yemen. It was not something that they were familiar with. And so so the u. S. And our western partners took the lead. But the saudis continued to play an important part in providing economic assistance, in providing Development Assistance, working very closely with the world bank and the imf and with the west on ways of ensuring that Development Assistance in yemen continued to flow and continued to meet the requirements of development in that country. So this was the status up until 2014. We remained in very close touch with the saudis. We continued to work with them to share views and objectives, to engage with them on the concerns that we both felt as we saw that that some of the issues within yemen, the dysfunctionality of the transition government, the efforts to undermine the transition, some of the unrest that the houthis were manifesting in the north. As those issues continued to emerge, the u. S. And saudi arabia maintained a very close dialogue, very positive dialogue, and that reached a peak in late 2014 early 2015 as the situation in yemen continued to deteriorate. Danas remark that we had very little notice of the saudi decision to intervene is correct, but i would make point that the saudis did inform us. And this is a reflection of a larger change in the nature of the u. S. saudi relationship, in the nature of the u. S. Relationship more broadly with our with our gulf allies and partners. And that is that as as the perception has developed that the u. S. Interest in the region is fading, partially because of the negotiations on the iran nuclear deal, partially because of the statements by president obama as well as the policies at this current time of president trump, that they saw a declining u. S. Interest and came to the conclusion, not incorrectly, that they needed to take more responsibility themselves for protecting their own interests, for pursuing their own objectives, and so prior to their decision to intervene, the saudis did come to washington. They did talk to the white house and to the state department and others to inform rather than to request permission to intervene in in yemen. And, again, to make point that at the time they made the decision, one, they didnt anticipate and we certainly didnt anticipate that the situation would drag on for four years. And, secondly, their intent at that time was to stabilize. The situation. That they believed at the time that they were going to security the stability of the hadi government, perhaps relocate it to aiden because of the houthi occupation of sanaa, but it was not their intent to go beyond what what was already agreed to in the transition agreement, that their intention was to stabilize a situation and allow the political transition to reach its conclusion. It obviously hasnt worked out that way. But but heres another point where where i have some concerns or disagreement with the way the narrative plays out in washington. Two issues. One, there is an inclination in washington to look at the conflict in yemen as a conflict between saudi arabia and yemen. And somehow to see the houthis as the element that is defending yemeni sovereignty against saudi aggression. This is absolutely incorrect. The reality is that whats happening in yemen is a civil conflict. Its a conflict that goes back, its roots 40 or 50 years. Its a conflict that has erupted in violence periodically throughout that that 50 or 60year period. And this is only the latest manifestation of a conflict that has never been resolved among the yemenis. The saudi intervention is is quite aside from that. And then the other point is that one needs to distinguish between the issues that drove saudi the saudi decision to intervene versus their implementation of their decision. And here again i would say that while i believe that the saudi decision to intervene was based on real and legitimate concerns that they had, this is not to suggest that their implementation is not a fit subject for criticism. It absolutely is. Some of the saudi some of the saudi efforts have have been tragic, abominable and completely incompetent and incoherent. So so its not to say that, you know, because we understand why the saudis intervened, therefore, we must understand how they intervened. Thats not thats not the case. In my view, the saudis have three legitimate concerns about about the nature of the conflict. One is, of course, as weve seen increasingly over these past months, the security of their southern border. And i would say that the that the saudis in in particular see an existential threat from a houthi presence on their on their southern border in the same way that they perceive that the israelis face a threat from hezbollah on their northern border. And that is something that is completely unacceptable to saudi arabia. The second is the presence of the irgc and hezbollah in in yemen supporting the houthis. And, again, to clarify a point, because sometimes youll see arguments that, in fact, the the iranian intervention, the irgc presence are a response to the saudi intervention. I can say that even when i was still in sanaa in 2012, several years before the situation deteriorated, the iranians were already involved in providing weapons and sending irgc personnel to the houthis to provide training and to improvise houthi to receive elements not only for military training but also shia religion. The second element of saudi concern is this presence of irgc and hezbollah, trainers and assistants inside yemen. The third element of saudi concern, of course, is the nature of the government. That is that the saudis want to see a government that they can work with. This does not mean they are opposed to a houthi presence in the government. I have been with senior saudi officials when they have said explicitly that they are not opposed to houthi participation in the government. But houthi participation is a political entity and not as a p para military, hezbollahlike entity. This war has dragged on for several years. We, of course, have supported, as the saudis and other Coalition Partners have supported, the idea of a u. N. Negotiated resolution. Its not clear that we have come any closer to that resolution at this point, in my view, primarily because neither side have we seen a decision that they can achieve more at the negotiating table than the battlefield. Neither side feels as they they have been defeated. Neither side feels as though momentum has shifted to the other. Therefore, neither side feels compelled at this point to find a political solution. To wrap up, i would make just a couple of final points. One, of course, what were all seeing now is the decision on the part of the emirates to withdraw their military forces from the the aspect of their presence in yemen that is related to the houthi campaign, keeping in mind that the emirates has two strictly separate objectives in the region. One is to support the saudis and their coalition activities. The other is a ct mission. The emiratis have been clear to say they intend to continue their efforts on the ct side. Its only in relation to the houthis that they are withdrawing. They make several points in explanation of their decision. One is that they believe that they have trained a sufficient number of yemen personnel so the yemen can take them on. There are several thousand sudanese troops in yemen who are participating in that military campaign. Second point that they make is that given the rise in tension with iran that they believe that they needed their forces back in uae, particularly their Patriot Air Defense systems in order to guard against a potential conflict with iran. Thats their explanation. This has serious implications for the saudis, of course. Because the emiratis have been the ones who have been leading the Ground Campaign over these past several years. The saudis have been primarily involved in the air campaign. Whether the saudi will be able to fill the vacuum that would be left by an emirati withdrawal remains to be seen. But i would say in conclusion on that point that because of what i see as a saudi perception of existential threat from yemen, i do believe that they will carry on their campaign regardless of what the emiratis do and frankly speaking, regardless what the u. S. Government does. There are many people who think the saudis cannot carry on their military campaign without u. S. Support. I think thats absolutely false. The saudis, if you believe that you are facing an existential threat, you will continue your efforts regardless of what the larger international circumstance is. The final question i think dana left a number of questions on the table as she finished her remarks. Let me leave another question on the table. The United States and saudi arabia have worked together, particularly since the 1950s, for the last 70 years or so as two countries that shared basic a basic perspective on the region, basic policy goals and objectives, basic National Security views. Both countries over the years have been primarily status quo forces. We have believed in protecting the security and stability of the region and to maintain the status quo. What weve seen over these last couple of years with the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman and what dana laid out is that saudi arabia, perhaps, is no longer a status quo force in the region, that Mohammed Bin Salman, for whatever reason, has adopted a disruptive position visavis key elements of regional policy. But the other aspect of that is that the United States also under the Trump Administration has also become disruptive. Its hard to argue that trump policy is in support of Regional Security and stability. So the question now is if both the United States and saudi arabia have become Disruptive Forces in the region, are we being disruptive in a way that allows us to Work Together, or are we on a path that is going to take us on divergent paths over these coming years. Is the future of the United States and Saudi Partnership sustainable . Ill stop there. [ applause ] first, thank you to the panel. Ill start with one or two questions of mine, come to all the questions from the audience. We heard about disagreements that weve had with the saudis over the decades, and weve heard about a basic kind of security cooperation, an Economic Cooperation over the over the decades as well. So i think the question that dana left us with at the end really was about Going Forward. Does the saudi military cooperation with us, Economic Cooperation with us, generally speaking trying to make sure there is oil at a reasonable price available to everybody in the market, their counterterrorism cooperation with us, their intelligence cooperation with us, does it outweigh the current disagreements we have with them, and should we be Going Forward with them to deal with current strategic challenges that we have from russia, china, iran and others. Tom, you know, i could actually read something that you wrote some years ago and ask you if you still feel that way, and if everybody would basically agree. But id have to find it first. No, here it is. The overriding consideration for strategic and economic reasons, neither country wants to break with the other. You can have arguments and criticism, but the overriding need of the two countries for each other will require that those differences be managed even if they continue to exist. Is that where we are . How do the three of you feel about that general proposition that we need to find a way to go forward with them to tackle the challenges that we face in the region . If i may, ill respond to that. Every year in late february or early march, the commander of centcom, u. S. Central command, who is responsible for all u. S. Military activities throughout the middle east and asia, submits a report to congress on the Strategic Issues and arrangements and alliances throughout the region. And if you read that report, he does a general statement and a country by country assessment. And it becomes clear that saudi arabia is not the most important country for the security interests and policies that the United States is pursuing in that region. That is to say, saudis are much more dependant on us. Their military capabilities remain questionable, and we dont have big military commitments or presence in saudi arabia. The United States has troops everywhere, but really not in saudi arabia. The naval headquarters in bahrain, we have a big air base in qatar, we have troops in kuwait, we have troops in djibouti. If you combine the fact that we could conduct our Strategic Policies in the region, other than terrorism, seems to me, without saudi arabia and the fact that the Energy Picture has changed completely over the past ten years, i think you could make a case that you could now deal with saudi arabia on an issuebyissue basis without having to pursue some overall handholding framework of the kind that weve had in the past. Keep your eye on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Dana, you raised the question at the end. Where do you stand on it . So im going to react to two things i just heard. One is could we move away from the overall framework of holding hands, of holding the saudis hands in pursuit of our security interests . I would generally say that other than israel, that is sort of how our relationships with countries in the middle east work. If you go to these governments and you ask them to articulate exactly how you get to a political settlement for syria, exactly what does a powersharing agreement in sama look like, exactly how should we address the threat from iran, its hard to get them to articulate a very specific policy, a strategy and then the tools to get there. In general, a lot of governments in the region are looking to others to articulate what that ends, ways, means is, and they can either listen to us and we can suggest ways to solve the problems in the region, or they can listen to others, moscow, for example. My view is it would be better for us to be leading and articulating that vision and working with countries when our interests align to achieve whatever that vision or strategy is. We dont have relationships because theyre good for others. We have relationships because theyre good for us, because its in line with our interests. So, if our interests are that we view russian presence and activities in the region as inherently destabilizing, then we should probably be working on shoring up partners and allies that can work to limit that presence and those activities in the region. That doesnt mean you have to agree on every issue. That means you can disagree on issues. You can raise the issues that are in our interest to raise and at the same time work within areas of cooperation. The original question was or one of the comments you made is, neither country seems to want to break, a divorce. I would say the United States doesnt have one policy. Theres a policy that is articulated by the Trump Administration, which at least here in a bipartisan way on the hill and in washington, seems to be the perception that theres no questioning, theres no airing of grievances, theres no expression of concerns about specific policies. Were all in and we dont question and we dont challenge. And here there isnt one unified american voice on what the future is. Theres an active debate and its taking place in public. So everyone understands what the debate is here. Without the saudi relationship, a lot of other partners and allies are looking at this debate and questioning whether or not the United States is going to be there over the medium to longterm in a fully strategically relevant way. I think we can do both with the saudis. I think we can elevate human rights concerns, reform concerns. We can continue to engage in the issues that are of concern to us. We can demand accountability and transparency for khashoggi, for example. If you go back and read the transcripts of secretary pompeos interviews this week on the margins of the International Religious freedom forum, over and over and over he talks about freedoms, religious freedoms, political freedoms, et cetera. And not once do countries in the middle east like saudi arabia get mentioned, but iran got mentioned a lot. These are opportunities where american officials can say, hey, were going to be raising these issues, but we can still work with you to address concerns in your legitimate security interests and also in ours. I dont think that the United States has an interest or we benefit from having a yemeni hezbollah on their border. Even if were a net exporter of oil, that doesnt mean that we dont have some dependancy of what the global price of oil is, what insurance rates or ships and tankers cant go through the straits. That is a problem for us. So, to me, loud and clear, theres enough pressure and enough leverage here that an opportunity has presented itself, and we can either walk away from that opportunity or engage to try to shift and make clear that certain behaviors will no longer be accepted. Gerry . Im going to give a very precise it depends answer. I think it depends on a number of factors that i think that both tom and dana touched on. One is, there is, again, a theory here in washington in the United States that we no longer need Energy Supplies from the regi region, that somehow or another, the United States is Energy Independent and what happens in the gulf or venezuela or whatever has no impact on u. S. Energy supplies. This is wrong on a number of aspects. One, of course, is that the United States, even though it may be a net exporter of energy, in fact still imports about 5 Million Barrels of oil every day. Therefore, we are still in the energy markets. And even though gasoline that comes out of the pump and into your car all looks the same, the fact of the matter is that oil is not all the same. Oil is not fungible and therefore the kind of oil that comes out of the wells in saudi arabia is, in fact, critical for the u. S. And for the Worlds Energy requirements. And to go back to danas very correct point, regardless of what u. S. Requirements are, as long as we have some interest in and some obligation to mainta maintaining Global Economic stability, the fact of the matter is that what happens in saudi arabia is going to be critically important for the United States for many years to come. So the basic underpinnings of why we have this relationship with a country, which is in many ways as divergent from u. S. Perspectives and history as is humanly possible, nevertheless that is a relationship that has been critical to us for many years and will continue to be critical. But having said all that, the other aspect of this is that, you know, tom talked about the fact that there is no constituency in the u. S. For saudi arabia. This has always been true. It was true when i was working on these issues back in the 90s. There has never been a wellspring of support for saudi arabia, either here on capitol hill or more broadly in american society. We have worked together because weve seen it in our interests and not because we felt any emotional commitment. What weve seen over the last couple of years is, in fact, the political aspect of relations between the United States and saudi have become more intense than ever, in part because of the very open alignment of the saudi leadership where the Trump Administration in ways that democrats have found to be very problematic. So the saudi u. S. Relationship has become a debating point here on capitol hill and more broadly in society in a way that even in the bad days, even after 9 11, even after some of the other areas where weve diverged, is more intense, more difficult, more emotional. And, therefore, where you can see that in response, in reaction to what people have perceived as a current relationship and the Trump Administrations unwillingness to challenge saudi arabia, unwillingness to raise some of these issues, this has become something that potentially down the road, particularly if theres a change in the administration in 2020 could be extremely problematic for the relationship and how you go forward. I think tom also made the point that a number of the candidates on the democratic side in this election will take a very contrary position on the u. S. saudi relationship as compared to the Trump Administration. Then the last point that i would make is an awful lot of it depends on Mohammed Bin Salman and how we go forward. Again, to go back to the point i tried to make in the beginning, and that is, even though we have this broadbased relationship with saudi arabia, which is founded in shared economic security, political interests and has been for many years, the tendency right now is to look at it through the optic of Mohammed Bin Salman and do we agree with Mohammed Bin Salman, do we think that Mohammed Bin Salman is a monster whos murdered Jamal Khashoggi and locked up innocent people or maybe only semi guilty people without trial, who imprisons Civil Society activists and civil libertarians and others, or is he someone whos a modernizer who we can work with. Yes, he has made his mistakes. This is the other side of the argument. Hes made some missteps, but he someone that we can deal with. Or do you look at it more broadly that this is a relationship that goes beyond simply the leadership . Do we just simply say, yes, Mohammed Bin Salman is a problem, but the nature of the relationship is more important than just the nature of the leader and we can work around that in some way. Those are questions, i think, that are going to be answered. My guess is theyre going to be part of the president ial campaign over the next year. And i think that the answer is going to come out at the end of that campaign. I think tom had something. I want to add something as briefly as i can. Both of my colleagues here on the panel have made the point that saudi arabia remains a critical part of the Global Energy supply even if we dont import much oil from saudi arabia anymore. The biggest single domestic management problem within saudi arabia, in fact, is a shortage of energy. The saudis are consuming an ever escalating amount of their oil they produce domestically to satisfy the insatiable demand for electricity in a country that desal nates all water for human consumption and household use. I have seen projections from economists and consultants that show that the trajectory between saudi export capability and saudi demand will cross as soon as 2035. And thats like, you know, the day after tomorrow in strategic terms. Then what happens to this picture . This is what is propelling the saudis in their quest for nuclear energy. And we will have tough decisions to make about whether to meet that demand because it can change the whole rest of this picture. I mean, right now the saudis consume about 3 Million Barrels a day of their own oil and export about 7 Million Barrels a day. They prefer to export because its revenue. Of course. Theyd like to have an alternative for their own domestic need so im sure theyre going to bring some technology to resolve that issue. Nuclear will be one of them. Ive got one more question, then im going to go to the audience. We have talked about the way we see the relationship, the way we might need their cooperation and the way we have objections to certain behaviors of theirs. But to flip it over just for a minute, and tom, you went through a list of some disagreements. Id like to start with the egypt israel disagreement because they had hoped that carter was going to succeed in getting something more comprehensive that would resolve the palestinian issue, in fact, it led to a lot more settlement in the west bank. Lets skip over some things and come to 2003 when King Abdullah asked us not to invade iraq, that it was going to destabilize the region. We invaded iraq anyway and it led iran into iraq, which changed the u. S. Strategic landscape for saudi arabia. It brought an adversary right into its northern border. They wanted us to intervene more strenuously in syria because, as in the case of yemen, iran was already in syria early in the civil war before saudi arabia ever intervened. And they wanted our assistance and the Obama Administration was too reticent to get involved. Again, you have much more iranian influence in syria than you did before. You already know how much they have in lebanon. And gerry pointed out that iran was supporting the houthis. And then someone asked, are they a status quo power or are they a disrupter . Ive heard there that they dont know if they can rely on us anymore, and make good judgments about our policies in the region and to help them contain and even roll back iran. So how do we factor that into our Decision Making about Going Forward with them . I mean, is it possible that a debacle in yemen is in part because we have called them free riders . We have told them to take matters into their own hands. We have said were going to pivot to asia. And they decided they needed to take matters into their own hands. If, lets say, we were to reduce our engagement and our support for them in yemen, who would benefit from that . How would that affect the outcome of whats going on in yemen . Lets get there, because then that leads into a lot of questions about how do we work with them Going Forward . And those are from the audience. What have we done that has led to the situation . Anybody can go first. If i go first, thanks tommy, youve led us down the rabbit hole. Those are all good questions. I would say there are two aspects. Theres no dowd that in both riyadh and abu dhabi you have Leadership Today that has made a decision that they are going to be more assertive, that they are going to do more to pursue what their goals and objectives are, that they will coordinate and cooperate with the United States as possible, but that the United States will not have a veto over their decisions. And i think that that is an attribute of several factors, not just one. I think on one level its a fact that you have younger leadership in both of those capitals who believe that their fathers, their predecessors were too beholden to the United States, who were too willing to accept u. S. Leadership without necessarily achieving some of their own objectives. I think its not only about the United States. I think it also is an aspect of the way they operate within the arab world, in the arab league, for example, where theyre less likely to accept egyptian leadership in setting Foreign Policy for the arab world and more inclined to assert their own leadership . You cant question the fact that they can read the same magazine articles that we can read. When the president of the United States is giving an interview in the atlantic when hes talking about these countries as free riders, when hes saying quite explicitly that they need to learn how to share the region with iran, when hes saying other things that are quite contrary to what their own analysis of their interest is, theyre going to, theyre going to make decisions based on that understanding. And so all of these things have added up. You know, talk about the desire to pivot to asia, all of these aspects from contributed to a decision on their end that they are going to pursue their agendas themselves. And again, i mean, if you look at the position of the Trump Administration, as i think several of us have made the point, the Trump Administration has not changed its position that, in fact, these countries need to take on more of the responsibility themselves. For us, it means that we wont always like what the decisions are that they make. We may disagree with them. But if you tell people, you know, to grow up and, you know, be adults, well, you know, adults make decisions that are based on their own perspective. Therefore, we cant have it both ways. We cant expect that these governments are going to follow our leadership without question and at the same time tell them that they need to take the responsibility themselves. And thats a situation that were in and i dont see it changing. Since all three panelists are to my left, please, rich, ambassador shmerer, stanley, let me know when you have a comment because im sort of looking this way. Tom, you want to Say Something . Dana . I want to make a few comments in reaction to what was laid out. First of all, in terms of how riyadh might be looking at the United States and our own reliability, think about how they might view us and the serious swings in the pendulum of Foreign Policy across the last several administrations, from the invasion of iraq to debates about Foreign Policy and the u. S. Role in the middle east under the Obama Administration, and not just comments in the atlantic but the Nuclear Agreement, how washington reacted to arab spring developments in multiple countries, in this administration Foreign Policy by tweet. In terms of how we may be viewed in the region, if i were staffing any of the governments in the region, i would say, dont rely on the americans because theyre not consistent and they change their policy with every administration. So it is in our interest to cooperate with them when we can, but we also need to hedge our bets and we see that hedging behavior right now. We see all sorts of both military, security, trade, economic agreements with a lot of other governments. Secondly, how to understand saudi actions, particularly in yemen. So we need to see how they have executed their operations in yemen, contextualize it in decades of education, military training exercises that weve been conducting with them both in huge regional contexts, Gulf Cooperation Council training. We have tried for decades across administrations, consistently republican and democratic administrations. In the clinton administration, they were called the strategic cooperation forum, Gulf Cooperation Council, Ballistic Missile defense, et cetera, et cetera. In the Obama Administration, in the bush administration, we had the gulf security dialogues. In the Obama Administration, it was the camp david summits, right . And now we have the middle east security alliance. All versions of the same notion that we can work with these militaries and then beyond the military realm to coordinate to address shared interests. So this is part of burden sharing. While everyone references the obama interview in the atlantic, think about the much more crude way this is discussed in the Current Administration. These guys are made of money, theyll just pay for everything, why should we be paying for everything. When were feeling nice, we call it burden sharing. Then much more crude ways of weve paid enough, americans are done, somebody else should pay. The region is very aware of the debate that were having here in the United States about what the u. S. Role in the world should be. And in that debate, the far right and the far left actually sound pretty similar, right . Authorization of the use of force, why should u. S. Forces be doing this, why should the american taxpayer be paying for these things, i dont understand what our engagement in the world gets us. Its a public debate. They can read it in our tweets, in our magazines, in what will be published of this decision. So theyre listening and watching us. In terms of syria and cooperation, i think we need to understand how the Obama Administration was thinking about the various conflicts that arose in the middle east during their administration as very much in the experience of the iraq war. Did we pick the right partners, can we really shape a political outcome based on serious military investment. And the conclusion of the Obama Administration was no, so we have to be very humble in our approach to these conflicts and what we can realistically achieve. Now the saudis are having a similar thing in yemen. Its hard to get these disparate groups to the table to potentially discuss anything that could be stabilizing over the longterm. If we want to talk about burden sharing and if we want to continue shaping and training these militaries in a way that is more consistent with our values and norms about how military operations should be prosecuted, burden sharing doesnt mean we train you, go ahead and go. It means continue engagement. That is the choice that the United States has to make. We may not disagree on everything, militaries make mistakes. Theres a serious challenge in the prosecution of the Saudi Military Campaign in yemen. Are our interests better served in walking away or engaging shape Going Forward . When he arrived in saudi arabia as a u. S. Ambassador in 1989, he found that the relationship had sort of stagnated or atrophied to a great extent because we americans took it for granted. Saudi arabia had been the most stable country in the middle east for 80 years, was always there in spite of all the differences we had. We could count on certain aspects of saudi arabia as an entity to respond in certain ways to things that would happen. Im not confident that we know that about saudi arabia today. By all accounts, i mean, heres where i differ a little bit from you gerry in saying this is not about the relationship with Mohammed Bin Salman. Hes all there is. It used to be that there were multiple centers of power in saudi arabia where you could get to the king through this prince or that prince. It was always prince bandar. Now by all accounts, Mohammed Bin Salman has neutralized every other center of power in saudi arabia. So in addition to wanting to know whos going to be the next president of the United States, i want to know what happens next year or the year after that or the day after tomorrow when king salman dies and Mohammed Bin Salman becoming the sing of saudi arabia, which will happen. Tell me whos his crown prince. Tell me what he does to assuage the grievances of every other branch of the family and see what kind of country were working with now and how its different than the country weve worked with for all these decades. If i could just add to that very quickly, i think that you just put your finger on a critical issue, which is, you know, yes, when people are looking at trying to analyze the direction that the saudis are headed in right now, you see this effort on the part of mohammed to eliminate any discordant voices, to basically put all of the strings of policy and power into his hands. His brother is a Deputy Defense minister. Hes eliminated many of the potential adversaries in the senior ranks of the family. But the question is, and i think this is going to be perhaps determinative is is this going to be sustainable over time or is the family going to assert some greater control and some greater leverage. My guess is youre not going to know the answer to that question until the day comes where he is trying to become the king. And i think thats when this is going to sort out. Well, some of the questions from the audience are maybe i could combine one or two. A few of them have to do with how important is the military to military relationship with the saudis in terms of deterring, containing or rolling back iran in the region . How should we be encouraging a saudi israeli relationship as part of an effort to deal with iran . I would add to that, how can we use our military and economic and political relationship with them and our leverage with them to help resolve the conflict in yemen . What is the way out there that we can help them with . And finally, to come to a different question from the audience, it is how do we use our relationship with them to encourage change inside the king dom . How important is the military relationship . Can we use it to resolve some of the problems that we have and washington is concerned about, such as yemen . And can we use our relationship to bring about change that we would like to see in the kingdom . Yeah. I mean, is that important . Is that something we should encourage, the saudi israeli relationship . Id like to address that one particularly, if i may. Imagine yourself locked in a worldwide struggle with a rival power for supremacy in islam, which is how the saudis see themselves with those shia infidels that are running iran. I dont believe you win that struggle and ingratiate yourself with the muslim masses by getting into bed with israel. And it may well be that there are aspects of semi clandestine cooperation between saudi arabia and israel based on Mutual Perceptions of certain threats. But the idea that we would encourage the saudis to enter into any kind of overt partnership with israel i think is out of the question. I think the king is with you on that. I dont think anybody is encouraging an overt saudi israel relationship, but theres no question that under the table theres all sorts of contacts across multiple sectors. Some of this started out as a shared threat perception that iran is the main driver of instability in the region, and the israelis and the saudis agree on that. Look at the bahrain economic conference for an Economic Vision for the west bank and maybe gaza. Regardless of views on how effective that conference was, it took place in bahrain. I cant imagine that it would have taken place there without saudi consent or a nod, right . Theres all sorts of public reporting about various tools for monitoring social Media Contacts between saudi officials and israeli officials, which may not actually be in the u. S. Interest and we should probably be looking at that, staffers here for members of congress. It is already happening. If you actually talk to certain israelis, they say the most exciting developments taking place in the middle east are in the gulf, that the young people in the gulf are dynamic and entrepreneurial and interesting, and we need to be paying attention to it. So its happening. How to encourage change in the kingdom. Well, i think the lesson of the United States is, if we point fingers at a government in the middle east and say, you should take this kind of change and this kind of plan because its in your interest, it doesnt work, right . First of all, acknowledging the changes that are already underway and taking place and find out how we can encourage that. Do you know the size of the Scholarship Program . We bring 10,000. King abdullah. 50,000 students a year are coming to u. S. Universities. Theyre getting exposed to american style education. I mean, they go back home. Thats a way of encouraging change. So it doesnt have to be articulating a specific program for reform and saying, this is what you should do. But my point also when i mentioned that soap opera that was shown in saudi arabia during ramadan, theres change already underway, right . And we need to its not necessarily making the headlines, and thats okay. And secondly, if there are firm views about specific things taking place that are ant thet cal to our interests or destabilizing, we should raise it. A good example is the detained civil rights activists. We should raise it and be very direct, we think these people should be immediately let out of prison. The relationship. How important is it for what we want to accomplish . For example, the Global Coalition to defeat isis. We created the architecture and militaries like the saudis plugged into it. Then we can say we have a reasonable coalition whos united with us in addressing a shaired shared threat. Theres maritime coalitions in International Waterways where working with partner navys, this is our interest to be regionalized, nationalized, globalized. In that, i think the military relationship is important. If we care about israels military edge, russia doesnt care and china doesnt care when they sell weapons to the saudis. So thats another question for us. Do we have an interest in continuing to make sure that the saudi military is buying u. S. And not others, not just for defense industry. Theres a whole host of strategic reasons why. Those are a couple of reasons why i think the relationship remains important. Im going to leave the yemen resolution to gerry. Yeah. I think that weve checked the box on the saudi israel thing. Theres no reason to talk about it. On the mill mill thing, nobodys mentioned but one of the interesting developments of the last few days is the announcement by the administration that theyve sent 500 u. S. Military personnel to saudi arabia. And if i am not mistaken, thats the first time weve had Ground Forces in saudi arabia since the first gulf war, since shortly thereafter when we withdrew everybody. So i think thats quite significant. The reality is, again, if the United States remains committed to providing security and defense in the gulf region, if we continue to see iran as a principal adversary, potential adversary in the region, then you cannot achieve your military objectives without support from saudi arabia, you know, either in terms of access to their facilities. You made several points earlier on about air space, about some of these other things. The reality is that without saudi arabia, the other gcc states will be extremely reluctant to go forward. They look at saudi arabia as the anchor for security in the region and they will take their cues from the position that the saudis take. So the israel relationship is important. Its going to continue to be important. In terms of the question about the way forward on yemen, its hard. I think dana and i agree on this point. That is that theres no utility in our using our military support for saudi arabia as a stick to beat the saudis and to somehow think this is going to compel them to make decisions about the conflict in yemen that theyre not willing to make. It wont. What it will do is undermine our mill mill relationship with them. It will introduce a new component of conflict, of friction between our societies without accomplishing anything in particular. I would point out that when you talk about i mean, dana again made the good point that the saudis and the other gulf states are hedging their bets in the region right now, looking at the lack of certainty in terms of what u. S. Policy is. If you want to talk about the s400 system that the turks have just acquired, saudi arabia has also negotiated with russia about the possible purchase of s400 even though they already have the patriot system. You know, if we continue to signal unreliability in terms of our military relationship with them, then the saudis certainly have the resources to look elsewhere and there are plenty of other governments that are willing to provide that support. Now, does that translate into some ability on our part to help influence the direction of a resolution in yemen . But i go back to the point that i made earlier on. That is that the principle reason that we dont have a political resolution of the conflict in yemen, which i believe that the saudis and emiratis and other cultures would welcome is not because the saudis are unwilling to pursue that or empower the u. N. To pursue it. Its because neither party, domestic party inside of yemen has yet come to the decision that theyre better off making a deal than they are continuing this conflict. There are a lot of reasons for that. Both in terms of their vision of, you know, the potential for a military victory. Youve got a war economy where you have an awful lot of people who are making an awful lot of money by allowing this conflict to continue. The conflict is really not binary. Its multipolar. Youve got a number of different elements in trying to get everybody on the same page in order to resolve this thing is tough. And so, again, my own sense is that the solution to the problem is not between saudi arabia and yemen. Its within yemen and its going to be on Martin Griffiths to try to figure out how to get all the yemenis together. My expectation is the saudis will welcome it and cooperate. Im going to be a little con trainer contrarian, gerry, on yemen. In fact, i think its really tr. In fact, i think its really important, the statement that members of congress, not only democratic, have been making about our participation, our support of the prosecution of the conflict in yemen is important and can have an impact on getting people to the table. I think it certainly was taken into account with the uae decision to change the nature of their engagement. I think that the point you made earlier about that balance getting people to the table, the lack of support from the United States, military support, changes that balance. Certainly there are many whove argued that we gave them support in that conflict to balance their distress with us having an agreement with iran. So when we pulled out of the agreement with iran, there was an opportunity to reduce or eliminate that support as well, but we are still there. They are adults, as you said. They make their own decisions about what their existential challenges are, where their priorities are. But that does not mean that they are existential priorities for us. So we have to think about it in that way. Is the cost of the humanitarian disaster in yemen, the possible war crimes in yemen that we have a connection to at this point, the incompetent or poor prosecution of the conflict from the saudi side worth it to us as the United States. I think our voices need to continue a very lively debate on this issue. I think us coming out in a different place sooner rather than later is a reasonable thing for the United States to do and i do not think, as you say, if its an existential challenge for the saudis, their border, that is not going to materially change the nature of our relationship. Dana, you mentioned change within saudi arabia coming. I will say having been there from the early 2000s, that there were really interesting, challenging ramadan serials. They talked about 9 11 and the nature of saudi arabia and a wonderful episode had a 7yearold boy driving his mother to the hospital. So a discussion about women driving is happening in 2002 and 2003 and 2004, and we are in 2019 finally. But my profound belief and understanding from my time in saudi arabia with regard to change and reaching fundamental rights is not an issue of driving or having access to Public Events where men and women can be together. Absolutely important, of course. I would argue further that it is a matter of access to the Justice System for women in saudi arabia. The issue of having to use an agent for carrying out your business, carrying out your public life, that these issues are still yet to be sufficiently addressed and that those are the things that are going to make a difference in womens lives and in saudi lives. And ill leave it at that. Well, yeah. These dovetail with questions from the audience. But again, one of the things that is causing so much consternation in the United States is the way that war is being prosecuted unsuccessfully and with collateral damage. So is there something we can do to help them improve this performance and avoid that and get a satisfactory outcome there . I mean, i will provide an anecdote from a trip that i took there in 2016, early 2016, with our late president who was a former ambassador there. We had a meeting with about eight saudi generals and they said, we need more precision guided weapons to avoid killing civilians. They didnt say, we want to kill civilians. They said we need more precision guided weapons to avoid killing civilians. So that leads back to can we use our relationship with them to improve their performance and get a better outcome in yemen . Let me just say, again, i think, you know, part of the problem and i think that you and gina have touched on, i mean, part of the problem that i have engaged because of what they consider to be and i agree with them what they consider to be a direct threat to their National Security. You cannot talk about how to stop this conflict as long as youre only willing to talk about the actions of one side, and, again it is not the side that started this conflict. So unless youre going to talk about the houthis. Unless youre going to talk about iran, that are equally responsible for the tragedy that has that many yemenis have witnessed over these past three years, youre not talking about Real Solutions to the conflict. And singling out the saudis and saying, well, if we stop selling them weapons, that will force them to the table. But again, thats a presumption on your part that the reason that there isnt a political solution is because the saudis somehow are preventing it. And that, again, is something that i would take issue with. I dont think that the saudis are preventing a solution. I think, again, that the that the issues are domestic issues inside of yemen, and that the reasons that theres not been a solution is because neither side feels compelled to achieve a solution. And that applies to the houthis as well as to the government, and i would also point out that, you know, unscr 2216, which the United States supported and which was the United States was one of the original sponsors of says very clearly that the position of the international community, that includes us, is support for the legitimate government of yemen, and is that the ha tee government. Whether we agree with it or disagree with it now, that is what the United Nations Security Council said, which we voted for and that is still the official position of the United States. I believe correctly we should continue to support a resolut n resolution, negotiated by the United Nations that would allow for the resumption of the gcc transition document that was signed and agreed in 2011 and that would bring everybody back to a political process inside of yemen. But, you know, beating on the saudis isnt going to get you there, and i think that, you know, in order to achieve, in order to represent a correct way forward, we need at least to look at the reality of the situation and not simply to pursue, you know, shadows in playd playd pla platos cave. We dont have too much time. There are other topics. Can you make that fast . In the two inform years after the saudis began intervening, i heard five different senior saudi officials and the military adviser to Mohammed Bin Salman articulate five different strategic objectives of the campaign in the yemen and force the u. N. Resolution, restore the legitimate government, prevent the existence of an an ark kick state like libya. I would submit, if you cannot articulate the strategic reason for waging the war, you cant define victory, and thats part of their problem. They dont know what theyre fighting for. But i would i would take issue with that, tom. I mean, because none of those none of those points that you just made is contradictory. Yes, all of those elements are there. U. N. Security Council Resolution 2216 has all of those elements in it, so yes, they might articulate them differently, but theyre all of the same piece. All right, so the second batch of questions from the audience, you know comes back to the whole question of how do we use our relationship to bring about positive change in saudi arabia . I already brought that up once, but we should come back to it. There are a few questions here about whether bin salman and mbs can use their relationship with the bandar wing of the house to improve our relations and to encourage positive change inside the kingdom on questions like male guardianship and women who are detained and how to get accountability over the Jamal Khashoggi matter. Weve talked a little about, you know, too much about yemen, but how do we now use our relationship to get the change wed like to see inside the kingdom, and has anybody seen evidence that inside the kingdom theres a willingness to talk to us about this and a willingness to listen and work with us on these issues . Rich would like to Say Something. During the hold on a second. Then i want to make okay. All right. During the truman administration, the state department circulated to all diplomatic posts in arab countries a long statement about our policy in saudi arabia, and it said that we are not there to tell them how to run their country. We are there for economic and strategic reasons that are important to us. Were not there to tell them they shouldnt behead people or that women should be allowed to go uncovered or anything. Its none of our business. I believe that that policy recognized the fact that the saudis are not amenable tutelage from us. They dont have School Shootings and fentanyl overdoses, and they dont want to hear about that stuff from us, and our policy is has served us well. Its not our business the way the saudis organize and run their country, and we should not attempt to use our influence on that because it only gets their back up. As president bush and condi rice found out with their democracy initiative. Rich wanted to comment. I think one point that we havent delved into which i think is important to the topic at hand today is that we do have a new saudi ambassador in washington. Our topic today is the u. S. saudi arabia relationship, and it comes in the context of having a recent, very disruptive event affect that relationship, which was the murder of skJamal Khashoggi, which has reverberated very strongly here in washington. As an optimist and someone who spent eight years living in saudi arabia and six years as a diplomat there, im optimistic that this the new ambassador, who the middle east policy council had the opportunity to host at an event last year, whos very articulate. She was speaking about youth developments in saudi arabia, i think she will come has come with good advice on how to turn kind of the rhetoric that we saw in the immediate post period following the murder of khashoggi, so i would like to think that what well see from her is an understanding that the u. S. Does expect of its partners like saudi arabia, that they will abide by certain kinds of behaviors, which i think was not understood previously. I think well see a toning down of the rhetoric that we had seen in some from some of the postkhashoggi period, and the opportunity for diplomats, and gina, as i have served as diplomats in saudi arabia. Saudi arabia has very good diplomats who have served here. I think its important to keep in mind that the relationship does need to be repaired to a certain extent, and i think were fortunate to have a new ambassador who i think has come well prepared and has the right temperament to help repair that relationship. So i wanted to make sure that that point was made in you know, in addition to all the policy discussion that weve had. I think the diplomatic and the government to government relationship needs to be improved, and im optimistic that with the arrival of a new ambassador, were going to see improvement in that relationship. So im going to take the counter veiling view to tom here. Its not about the United States dictating to other countries what they do inside their countries, but if events or decisions made inside a country affects the United States, then we do need to raise it. So i dont think its in our interest for saudi arabia to be in a group of countries that assassinate dissidents abroad. The other governments that do that are russia and north korea. Its not in our interests. There is a reason to raise it, and if you then extend this out and say, well, its not the business of the United States what takes place in other countries, then what kind of jungle rules are we talking about . Were having a debate right now in our own country about whether or not the system of alliances and normative behavior is in our interests to reinforce, right . If you take that, extend that logic out, should we not attempt to prevent Bashar Al Assad from gassing his own people or droppidrop barrel bombs on his own people . Should we not work with other countries when theres mass of political dissidence, which makes those countries more unstable, opens the door to more maligned actors which makes our ability to be partners with those countries more difficult because theyre laying the gr t groundwork for perpetual instability. In terms of the ability of the United States to make saudi arabia change, no, thats not what were talking about, but where theres change already happening that i think is areas for cooperation, we can find ways to partner and foster that. And i do want to go back to the question of is there any way for us to make the saudis better in yemen . So the crux of the issue here in congress has been intentionality versus capability. Are the saudis intentionally destroying civilian infrastructure and exacerbating the worlds worst humanitarian crisis, or is it a matter of not knowing how to use their precision guided munitions, based on where you come out on that debate determines whether or not you think theres an opportunity for us to work with them. Our military is a learning organization. We have civilian blood on our hands in many of the battles and military conflicts were engaged in, including in iraq and afghanistan, but we have a system of accountability. We have congressional oversight, and our military is a learning organization, and by no means is the American Military perfect either. The question is is there leadership within saudi arabia that wants to improve the conduct of their military operations, and are the americans going to shape that . Right now i think theres still an open question here in congress as to whether they are a learning organization and whether or not its a question of intentionality versus capability, and then finally, weve been working for years with them to improve their operations, and i think the frustration youre hearing and the crisis in the relationship here in congress is after all of these years of seeking to improve the operations of the saudi military, it doesnt appear here that theres been improvement. We have about one minute. Is there anyone who has a final comment . Well, youll find the video of this event on our website by the end of the day. If you want to watch it. Youll find the transcript in the next issue of the journal at the end of september, and i think it will be on the cspan archives as well, so you can revisit this discussion, and im sure we will, too. Thank you very much to the panel and thank you to everyone for coming. Lets make America Great again, all right . Live now to the annual National Conservative student conference. For remarks shortly from texas senator ted cruz, its hosted by the young americas foundation, and this is live coverage on cspan3. I always get a round of applause but i can tell you guys, senator cruz is in the house right now. But i do want another round of applause for mark tramel. He is is a great patriot that helps students like you on campuses, and he does not get the recognition he deserves. So give him a round of applause, and here at young americas foundation, we always like to acknowledge our great patriots. Where is devin majors . Are you in the house . Yes, stand up right here. Anytime someone jumps on this stage like that and starts leading everyone in the National Anthem weve got to reward that. Were going to get you one of our Vineyard Vines ties. You deserve it, so thank you so much. I appreciate you. I cant sing like that. Let me tell you, okay . So im going to yield the stage for just a minute. Were going to get senator cruz micd up. Well be back with you in just a couple of minutes, guys. Thanks so much. For those of you who dont know