Transcripts For CSPAN3 Containment Policy In Southeast Asia

Order. Good afternoon and welcome to this afternoons session of the washington history seminar. Historical perspective on international and national affairs. My name is eric, of George Washington university, and i am the cochair of the seminar, along with christian f. Ostermann who represents the wilson center. As you may see, we have cspan taping here today, so we would like to welcome those of you who are watching on your computers or on your television screens, and suggest that you visit our website to learn more about the Seminar Series and upcoming speakers here at the wilson center. The washington history seminar, is a collaborative effort of two organizations. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars, and the American Historical Association National History center. We are now in our ninth year of programming, approaching our big decadelong celebration that will come next year. We meet weekly, mostly on monday afternoons, during the academic year. The seminar at wants to think a number of institutions that help to make the seminar possible. In particular, the Lepage Center for history and the public interest, and the George Washington University Department of history. We would also like to thank a number of anonymous donors, whose contributions literally make possible, sessions such as this one and should you yourselves be so inclined to join the ranks of anonymous or not so anonymous donors, we would certainly welcome that. Details about how to do so can be found on the back of the flyer you may have picked up or that is outside of the door of the seminar. Behindthescenes, a number of folks worked very hard to make this seminar possible. I would like to extend thanks as usual, to jeff, who is the assistant director of the National History center, and the Public Policy program, and our two interns from the wilson center, kyle nichols, and kim. Thank you very much folks, for all of your efforts in helping us to pull this off. I would also like to welcome dane kennedy, the director of the National History center, and roger lewis, the founding director of the washington history center. Before we begin, i would like to ask everyone, to take out this device, that you know you have in your bag, and turn it to silent or vibrate, so it does not go off in an inauspicious moment, as these devices tend to do on a regular basis. Okay. All of that said, it is my pleasure to introduce todays speaker, wenqing ngoei , he is the assistant professor of history. He completed his phd at northwestern university, in evanston illinois, and did postdoctoral work, at northwestern and yale university. His book, the art of containment , britain, the United States, and anticommunism in Southeast Asia, is due to be released by Cornell University press, perhaps sometime next month. This book as you will see, will argue that british decolonization intertwined with Southeast Asian anticommunism to shape the u. S. Policy in the wider region. He has also published essays and diplomatic history, and 2017 and a prizewinning essay on the domino theory, that appeared in the pages of the journal of american east asian relations back in 2004. With that, we will hear about the art of containment. Thank you very much. Warm greetings to everybody. From the tropics. Thank you to the wilson center, for the opportunity to share my work with you, it is a great honor to be here, thanks to christian, eric, the people behind the scenes. Chuck, jeff, peter. And also, amanda who is not here. Thank you for helping to make this happen. Today i will be presenting for my book, arc of containment britain, the United States, and anticommunism in Southeast Asia , the title is up there. That is the book cover. It will be out in may or april or may with Cornell Press and also, i should say this, it is available for 50 of the retail price at this time while stocks last up to 1 april. The books goal is to recap the history of the u. S. Empire in south east and east asia, from world war ii through the end of the American Intervention in vietnam. It does so by tracing how british new colonial strategies combined with anticommunist nationalism across Southeast Asia, and came together intertwining with preexisting local antipathy to china and the chinese diaspora. It shows how this process ushered the region, from european dominated, colonialism, to the u. S. What is the cover about . You see the cover of a british helicopter, and it is deploying what appears to be troops to the territories, the border with indonesia. This happens during the malaysian indonesian confrontation of 1963 through 1966. As my talk progresses, the significance of this will become clear. Now, let me start off by saying that my book is a response to what has been the dominant story of u. S. Foreign relations, with Southeast Asia. These pictures will be familiar to many of us because they capture that spirit of the dominant story. You see the artificial state of the South Vietnam, the decline of america and it is finally abandoned by humiliated fleeing superpower. You have a north vietnamese tank that is literally gate crashing the party. The South Vietnamese that are fleeing, desperately, atop the cia office and u. S. Personnel, are pushing helicopters off ships in order to make way for more evacuees that are coming on choppers. In the early cold war, u. S. Leaders imagined the states of Southeast Asia as a row of dominoes, all in danger of falling to communism. The South Vietnamese domino came crashing down in april 1975, it was preceded by cambodia, it was followed by laos. Forest focusing on this intervention of the United States, in vietnam. Accordingly, they generalize that u. S. Failure in vietnam, is emblematic of u. S. Failure in the wider region. And postcolonial Southeast Asia, therefore you have a general collapse of western imperialism that is supposed to have happened in the face of indigenous nationalism. So what about the broader region . What about the dominoes that did not fall . What about britain . Which one its cold war, and maintained the military institutions in malaysia and singapore, for about two decades after the french withdrew from the region . What about the dominoes that are typically confined to the margins of u. S. Foreign relations history, and the global cold war . Countries like malaysia, countries like singapore. Dont we, and this is crucial, dont we lose the fundamental logic of interconnectedness . In the domino theory . That we confine our attention to the disasters in indonesia. These are the questions that started my research. That took me back to 1954. When president eisenhower would propose the following domino principle, to describe the interconnectedness of Southeast Asia, for many of us, 1954 will probably be an important here. We will find it familiar because that is when the french met terrific defeat to the communist led vietminh. At the beginning of that here, eisenhower and his advisors, got together at that time the french were already surrounded, there was anticipation that the vietminh would strike and there was pressure to commit combat troops. According to the records, eisenhower said with great force, he could not imagine committing u. S. Troops anywhere in Southeast Asia except malaya. Malaya . Well at the time, britain and its local allies, in malaya, were waging a war against the guerrilla fighters of a mostly Ethnic Chinese Malayan Communist Party. London called it an emergency, but eisenhower saw it in a much broader regional term. His inaugural speech in 1953, connected this french war, in indochina to the british struggle in malaya and singapore to the american commitment, and the korean peninsula. Like the vietminh, these guys, the mcp have been the backbone of an antijapanese resistance, during world war ii. Because the chinese population of malaya amounted to almost 30 , there was some level of popularity that these mcp fighters enjoy. American officials looking at malaya, worried that it would become a chinese state. Chinese state. They were to about singapore which was 78 Ethnic Chinese. The singapore affiliate, of the mcp had infiltrated chinese language, middle schools in the island as well as dominated a lot of the trade unions. But, by the mid1950s, in washingtons eyes, the situation in malaya, had improved suddenly. British and malayan forces had gained ground and remained to the border. He aligned itself with the anti communist nationalists in malaya, which the americans admired. By 1957, malaya gained freedom for independence. From britain. It was hidden by a prince. You see them on the screen. Of course in the records he is referred to as the prince. Hopefully, he won his leadership, via the ballot box and was popularly regarded as the father of malaya. Also, he remained very friendly with britain, and started reaching out to the United States. Some of you may know what the malaysian flag looks like. You know it resembles americas old glory. This was by the princes design and his choice. He called it the stripes of glory. Within hours of independence he made a call to america stating that malaya must tie up its fate with democratic world. In 1958, malaya. As well as the cia, in a plot, to top of the leftleaning regime of indonesia. Which is why, when these two met in 1960, you can see they are quite happy. Eisenhower was elected. He was elated when they malayan leader visited the u. S. Eisenhower called up called him one of americas staunchest friends. Highly in the cold war, and in private what he said, was that malaya should pursue the creation of a regional anti communist grouping that would be clearly indigenous. The fact that the United States got involved just like the southeast treaty organization. He said malaya could exert terrific force to combat experience in asia. With his encouragement, he managed to do this by 1961. This was prou. S. Time and as well as the philippines and this was called the association of Southeast Asia. They would lay the foundations, the association of South East Asian nations. That would include singapore as well as indonesia and these three anticommunist members, malaysia, thailand, and the philippines. All of these countries would rule by conservative leads. These would fully support u. S. Intervention in vietnam, during the 60s and 70s, they would pursue increasingly intimate ties, with the superpowers. Supr powers. These were the vital moments of what was a wider prou. S. Trajectory across Southeast Asia. Now, what my book subjects is this story of the wider region is lost if we focus tightlyo on the faith. Whereas a number of scholars judged the u. S. Retreat from vietnam is the end of a shortlived american empire, my book considers dominos that did not fall. This dominos transformed over time and this became an informal empire of america that inclosed the South China Sea and circled china. In fact, it reflects what u. S. Officials had very early on from the out set of the cold war been intending. Saw Southeast Asia as part of a great crescent that connected japan to india. The peninsula of malaysia, the singapore islands, they believed the creation of malaysia would create a wide anticommunist ark around the South China Sea. The administration saw as it a great ark and nixon fantasized about a long belt of u. S. Allies that went around the rim of china stretching from japan to india. This is the contapement. But what was the base of this empire of formal dominos . What was the connecting tissue for British Colonialism to mesh with u. S. Core objective for Southeast Asia. Now in looking at the dominos that surround indo china i argue the connecting tissue was preexisting local antipathy to china. Throughout the colonial era of Southeast Asia european powers tend to reflect indigenous resentment away from their themselves. Even though many had long settled in the region, many had intermarried in countries like thailand, malaysia and the philippines. And for the europeans and americans theres been a long history. And the brief supremacy of japan during world war ii which you can see the middle with the propaganda posters, in fact that was an interlude in the much longer history of treating the chinese as the yellow peril. Whether its threatening white civilization via integration in the top left corner or threatening Southeast Asia via communist expansion. Crucially what the americans, the british and many conservative Southeast Asia elites believed is that china even when it was ruled by the nationalists and especially so when it was dominated by the Chinese Communist party, they believed china would use its networks to expand its influence. So u. S. And british policy makers often expressed concern the chinese had undermined loyals to quote the mother country, something both officials on both sides of the atlantic used. The british called them a chinese problem in imperial, a state within a state. And the u. S. Often used the phrase chinese penetration to refer to the problem. Ive published work on this and argued the very basis of the domino theory, the logic of interconnectedness comes from angloamerican in the region through its million strong fifth column. In varying degrees it fueled and local conservative elites tended to weaponize a widespread distrust of their chinese populations. The resentment of Ethnic Chinese economic success although to be very clear not all of them were prosperous and also the belief some fight serve personal goals. Melding this sentiment during the cold war became the elites path to power. So we turn first to the story British Colonialism in malaya. The Prime Minister of malaya as well as the head. Some details about malaya, i alluded them earlier. The mcp was 95 Ethnic Chinese. The affinity there could not really be denied even though many of the Ethnic Chinese in malaya, there was a sense this group in some ways could represent them especially in a malay dominated political system. The malay population temded to be especially antagonistic. Also malaya was the single largest producer of rubber and tin. So for britain it was the biggest earner and made america its largest customer. For the british the question was how to do decolonization of america so it could extend british appearance in america. Caught sponsor local west friendly leaders. Ushered them to the head of the independent regime, guaranteed alignment with the former colonial ruler. Cultivating elites, main taking massive bases, crafting trade treaties to link the economies to each other. One journalist much later called this dependent independence. Now how did this come to pass in malaya . Between 1940s and 1950s what Malcolm Mcdonald did with the rest of the British Colonial authorities was remind the anticolonists if you dont get a durable multiracial accord going that turns on the malayan communists we will never give you independence. So the impetus for malayans who were an tignisting towards the chinese, there was a great impetus to get together. Came together to create the alliance. Whats ironic about the Alliance Political party is he created the malayan Chinese Association, pure Ethnic Chinese. No others from different races would join this party. The organization headed by the tanku, no others could join the party. And the alliance created by these two parties fought for interracial unity. Interracial unity while keeping their parties racially pure. But this produced the Multiracial Coalition that appeared to be durable in the 1950s that made the british confident enough to release malaya and give it its independence. Whats critical here. In the midst of doing all this they whipped up antichinese sentiment in an anticommunist package. Quite a large number of malayans and singaporeians owned radios. If you have patriotic love for malaya then you especially chinese in malaya would turn against your ethnic fellows in the malayan property. Did all this work, this propaganda . Malays in the civil war had started to complain joining the efforts. They said dont trust these guys, right the commist party had also begun to complain saying all these chinese who joined in the fight against us are traitors against the cause. He was able to get pretty much all the political grass roots leaders to line up behind him and take on an anticommunist stance. One of the biggest things that he said was that to be a good chinese is to be a good malayan and join in this anticommunist campaign. It was possible for the Multiracial Coalition to go ahead and destroy es