Transcripts For CSPAN3 Building An All-Volunteer Force After

This is about an hour. So, this is the final panel before our keynote address, and it is the second section looking at the ways in which the military as an institution and military leaders attempted to confront the crisis that most of us have agreed actually did occur following the tet offensive in the vietnam war, the u. S. War in vietnam. I am beth bailey. Ill be moderating this. And sitting next to me is richard hunt, who has written the definitive biography of melvin laird. Next to him is bob griffith, who is the worlds expert on the creation of the allvolunteer force, and next to him is jennifer middlestat, who has written a really wonderful book called the military welfare state. And i wrote a book called Americas Army creating the allvolunteer force, so im at least qualified to be asking questions up here. And there is no way that im going to match greg in my suavity as moderator, but ill do my best. So, as i was trying to draft the questions, which i then circulated for comments, i fountain myself in a kind of odd position because the premise of this panel actually, to my mind, is somewhat contested. I think that every one of us sitting up here would agree that there is no one factor that explains why the United States ended conscription in 197 a3 an moved to an allvolunteer force, but at the same time, were sitting here as a panel that directly ties the move of an avf of the militarys attempts to manage the problems of manpower and morale in vietnam. So the presumption is that weve answered the question simply by sitting here. I would argue that the suggested link is both misleading and fruitful, and im not sure what the rest of the panelists think, so im going to ask them. And i want to ask each of them to respond to this question. There will be some other questions that are a little bit more individual. Maybe well start down at the end with meredith sorry, jennifer first. There are too few women in here. Im going to call you all by the same name. I apologize. Thats all right. Are we supposed to use the mic even though okay. Thanks. Well, first of all, thank you, beth, for putting this panel together. Im so delighted to be here, and im especially delighted to be here with my copanelists. From whom ive learned a great deal. Including you. Right . All of us, its a great panel. So, yeah, i agree with you. I when i saw the question, which was whether or not these problems in morale and discipline sort of played a causal role in creating the allvolunteer force, i also thought, wow, thats a kind of problematic question. I think while there is no one cause, i i think pretty definitively we can say that the answer is no, actually. I mean, just based on the timing of the evidence of the increase in discipline and the increase in problems with morale, we can time that with the onset of the sort of clear policy consensus for the avf, which begins, what, threequarters of the way or so through the end of 68 when all the president ial candidates announce that they will be ending the draft. Quite simply, there isnt yet evident a huge morale or discipline problem in vietnam, so its certainly not a causal factor. I think that it has come to be understood that way, and theres a way in which the story of the avf has been written as one that answered the problems of morale and indiscipline that became evident in the vietnam war. Maybe we can talk a little bit more about why and how that happens. But i dont think that theres any causal role here, and we can talk about what some of the other causes are for the avf, but i dont think its a causal role. Will it influence the shape of the avf . Yes. Will it influence the story we tell about the avf and vietnam . Yes, but its not a causal role. Thanks, jennifer. Im going to disagree slightly. I do see a causal role because the morale issues and the indiscipline issues that weve been discussing today were already showing up in the army as a whole. And the armys leadership was concerned about that and trying to figure out one of the best ways to deal with it. But i would point out, bernie rosker, who wrote a very good history of the end of the end of the draft and the beginning of the allvolunteer force identified five reasons. First, the norm throughout American History has been a volunteer army. We only had draft armies in world war i. Im not going to talk about the civil war. In world war i, world war ii and for a brief period after world war ii encompassing the korean war. But historically, americans have been very suspicious of a standing army, a Large Standing Army in particular, and then they the other another reason was that by the by the 60s, the size of the eligible population for conscription was so large that they couldnt draft everybody. In fact, the issue became who serves when all cannot serve . And there were so many deferments added and exemptions added to the law that by that by that time there were more reasons not to serve than a person wouldnt have to serve than theyd have to serve. And that people increasingly began to realize what the inequity was there. Third, there was a body of thought that legitimatized not serving, and that was mainly led by milton freedman, the economist, and several folks both in government and outside of government who said that there was no legitimacy to serving to conscription for service. That another issue was that the war obviously was increasingly unpopular. Theres no doubt about that. And in that sense, its a that becomes one of the proximate causes of finally, i think ive only said four, but ill ill skip one of them. Finally, the army itself had lost confidence in the draft. They were they were having increasing problems with the draft. And with the problems of of draftees serving in the force. They were looking for ways to manage manpower absent the draft. Ill stop there. Okay. Im going to sort of maybe sit on the fence a little bit. My my focus is was looking at in my book on laird, it was just laird as secretary of defense, it wasnt his whole life. The issue of the ending the draft and with nixon and with laird i think was a political one. Laird came into the position of secretary of defense. Former politician. Understands the war is incredibly unpopular. Is looking ahead about, well, the wars going to end and ive got to be responsible for building this the armed forces up, preparing them for after the war. And i think there was also within the American Population a broad group of different groups who were opposing the draft system. There were civil libertarians who didnt like the draft because it was infringing on personal liberties. Antiwar activists, obviously. And people who wanted to reform the draft and make it a much fairer and more equitable. And then as bob mentioned, the free market economists who objected to Compulsory Military Service at wages below market wages. So they were and they turned the out to be a very persuasive group within the Gates Commission, which was set up by nixon in 1969 to study how whether to go to an allvolunteer force. And i think it should be mentioned weve talked about most of the morale issues and that sort of thing this morning, but the vietnam war also exacted a heavy toll on military institutions. The war fighters, the equipment, morale, stocks of supplies. It also had a weakening effect on military alliances. One of the things mcnamara did as secretary of defense to get people into vietnam was to pull out troops and equipment from units in europe serving with nato. So those units were depleted so to build up the forces in vietnam. So, and i think just to reiterate, lairds perspective, and i think nixons too, we want there was a political component to dampening the antiwar protests and ending the draft and moving to an allvolunteer force was a component was an important part of that. Okay. Well, lets yeah. Ask some more questions. Id like to go back to a couple of points, too. Okay. Sure. As richard said, nixon saw this as a political maneuver essentially to put off the antiwar and youth vote, as he referred to it. That he could capture the youth vote by promising to end the draft, that this would be a good thing and he certainly accepted the argument of of freedman and some of his disciples who were wellplaced in the government. One of whom was martin anderson. And who was a disciple of freedman and who became one of his chief counselors and kept the issue in front of nixon and reminded him right after he was elected that he had promised to end the draft and pushed him until he announced that he was going to do so. Just made a comment on what bob said. Nixon followed through on his Campaign Promise and said he was going to cut told laird to come up with a plan, a commission. Laird says, well, its too early to do that. Nixon told him a day later he had a deadline to come up with a commission and the commission had to be finished with this work by may of 1969. So nixon was very serious because i think the political component was very strong with in nixons mind. So the question that i was trying to get to ask was about nixons attitudes about ending the draft. And i still want to ask that question a little bit, for a more focused discussion because its it 1 2 weeks before the president ial election of 1968, and for those of you in the room old enough to remember 1968, it was a period of division and chaos and violence in american society, and nixon goes on National Radio and makes the pledge at the height of the commitment of u. S. Troops to vietnam that hes going to end the draft. I mean, obviously hes not going to end the draft while we still have Ground Combat troops in vietnam, but, you know, this is a big step. And what weve been talking about today so far has been very much about the experiences within vietnam. To some extent its almost as if there is this isolated entity where the wars being fought that isnt connected to the politics domestic or geopolitical, its simply the war itself and the morale of those men and the small number of women who are fighting or who are in vietnam. So to what extent does it make sense for us to talk about what weve been talking about today, morale and manpower in vietnam without thinking more about the domestic pressures that exist . And so can we say a little bit more about what nixons mo motivations where when he looked out at the country . How much was he looking to vietnam . How much was he looking to the domestic politics . I mean, why why after making this brash promise, essentially, he had no signon from anybody that mattered, none of the generals, nobody in the of the of the secretary of defense, nobody signed on, and he moved forward. So id just like to hear a little bit more about what you think what the motivations were. Oh, well, i would agree with my copanelists, that the motivation seems primarily political. From nixons perspective. But i think this also gives us the opportunity to think about just how powerful a role domestic politics plays in this. When we think about how much the army, though it may have been asking about its manning policies and thinking about the draft, really was quite taken by surprise and appalled at the idea that as they were involved in an increasingly difficult war they would also be tasked with coming up with a plan for ending a draft and returning to some kind of volunteer force. Though return is probably not the right word. It actually took on quite a different shape than previous eras in volunteer force. So, you know, i think in multiple ways today weve been having discussions about whats going on in vietnam without appreciating the many different ways that domestic politics were impacting what was happening in theater, and i think this is one of those ways. I mean, the i mean, bob would know better than i did. Most of what i learned and ended up in my book about the armys reaction in particular was, you know, just flat fear at the idea that nixon had made this announcement and now it was a bipartisan consensus with support from the american populous that the draft would have to end when it looked like there was no end in sight, really, for the war. So it really put them in this incredibly difficult position. And it may also i mean, this is one of the things we havent talked about, and id be interested in my copanelists thoughts on this or anybody else from the audience. One of the things that we havent really talked about is the degree to which the decision to end the draft itself plays into the morale and indiscipline problems. I mean, weve been talking about it more in terms of military strategy and whether or not theres a sense that you can win the war, but what does it also mean to announce that youre going to end the draft but then still be a draftee . Thinking about those impacts incountry in vietnam. The chronology of the process is very interesting, and i think revealing. Before nixon made his speech in october, of 1968, general westmoreland had already read the handwriting on the wall. He ordered a close hold study in the office of the chief of staff on whether and how we could end the draft if he was going to happen anyway. He didnt want to be on the wrong side of the of the decision, and hes been historically the conventional wisdom is that the army was dragged kicking and screaming into the allvolunteer force, and thats just not the case. Theyd already studied it and the staff action officer, jack butler, who did the initial staff staff report reported in december 68 that it could it was feasible if properly resources. And then westmoreland ordered a larger study, a fullscale study called operation provide to look at the whole thing. Following the gates report in the initial report in march of 69, then the d. O. D. Got into action and had its own study, and once the one the report was that report was rendered, the military was more or less ready if once the once the orders were given to start its process. And that i think is very different from what most people understand. I would note a couple of things regarding to follow up with what bob the points bob was making. In 1965 just before the buildup began, d. O. D. Did a study of the draft and one of the recommendations they were thinking about was an allvolunteer force. The that study was put on the shelf because of the buildup in vietnam. In 1968 in october, again, not referring to discipline problems, alfred fit, who was the assistant secretary of defense from reserve affairs initiated a study on his own on how to reduce or eliminate conscription. He stayed in office when laird came in and provided a study to laird. And westmoreland was very very proactive, particularly after the election of nixon, he knew the handwriting was on the wall. He wanted to prepare the army for the future and he didnt want to be the army to be pushed in certain directions. He wanted to try to seize that issue and come up with an army way to approach the problem of ending the draft. So, one thing that we all learned by going through these records is that there was an awful lot of preparation. Sometimes just in case, fingers crossed, we never have to use it preparation, but nonetheless a lot of forward thinking about contingencies. And my question here is, there are many different circumstances in which one could move from a conscription force to an allvolunteer force, and this might have been the most challenging possible moment to do so. Given the failing war in vietnam, given the dramatically decreasing respect of much of the American Population for its military. Given the lack of interest in many young people to serve. So what effect did the war in vietnam in these latter years as the military not only read the writing on the wall but read the direct command that they had to do this and tried to prepare for what the army was going to need, recruiting 20,000 to 30,000 people a month, which is really quite striking when you compare it to the recruiting shortfalls of a fraction of that today. So how did how did the ongoing war in vietnam shape the preparations for an allvolunteer force . I think in a couple of ways. The Gates Commission advocated ending conscription by 30, june, 1971. Laird, nixon and secretary reeser said, no, thats too soon. We are still fighting a war. We just cant stop recruiting people until we have a system in place that works and is and is funded. That was a critical thing, to make sure they got the money from congress to pay for the higher salaries. And that was one of the ways that they thought they were going to make the allvolunteer force succeed. You would make military service more attractive, not just in terms of pay, but eliminate a lot of the onerous duties that, you know, kp and that sort of thing. More freedom in the barracks. And the army studied this this program. At the same time, laird is has the hes pulling people out of vietnam because to save money. So hes you need hes kind of a its kind of a kind of balancing act of cutting the sources in vietnam, as he instituted a policy of lower draft calls because we were pulling troops out. But he didnt want the draft ended until there was an all volunteer system in place that was going to work and had a chance of succeeding, because he realized he was still responsible for making sure theres enough soldiers and sailors and airmen in vietnam to fight the war until the war was ended. Thats right. The armys planning up to that point was they would not start to shift to a zero draft posture until the war was over. But laird and nixon accelerated that timetable so there was to be no further drafts by 1973, two years earlier than the army was planning for. That put them on a crash process. One of the things that general westmoreland did in response to that was to create a program manager, if you will, for this high level, highly respected general officer who is going to manage the whole thing outside of the normal procedures, staffing procedures. That general was Lieutenant General George Forsythe who was considered to be something of a maverick and highly respected because he was the one who developed the air mobile concept, took the air mobile Test Division to vietnam, had it reflagged as the first cavalry and was the first commander. He was highly respected for that westmoreland gave him incredible latitude. He had the ability to go directly to westmoreland if he had an issue implementing his plans, and the secretary of the army. His future deputy, Brigadier General bob montague used to play them off one another. If he didnt get the answer he wanted from westmoreland, he went to reesers office and convinced him. More often than not got his way. Between the two of them, they created the office, special assistance for the modern volunteer army, which in turn created a test bed, voluntary ar army, volar. They came up with the process of what forsythe called 172 jim dandy 670 jim dandy things they were going to experiment with throughout the army. Thlt included low co