Mobilization, military health affairs, for structure, equal opportunity and marketing among others, which is more striking hes found time in his schedule to come here and talk to us today and were very grateful for that. A 1980 graduate, policy john f. Kept from Harvard University and phd from policy from rand graduate school. During his 30 year army career he served as a special weapons officer in germany within the United States and korea and he spent ten years as an associate professor of economics at west point where he also was the director of the u. S. Armys office of manpower and analysis advising Senior Army Leaders on Office Retention and marketing. My favorite piece of this introduction is that he created the Award Winning stateoftheart Americas Army game which served as a Key Recruiting tool for the service as well as the virtual army experience. Im expecting that you should all ask him questions about that aft after. Excuse me. Among his military awards and decorations, service medal, legion of merit and four Meritorious Service medals. Please welcome dr. Wardynski. [ applause ] well, it is afternoon. Good afternoon, everybody. Its terrific to be here. On behalf of secretary of the army mark esper, i bring you greetings. Chief of staff of the army, i bring you greetings. Myself, i thank those of you who have served for your service and the rest of you for your attention. This afternoon what i wanted to do was touch on some of the points that were brought up in the last session. Perhaps add a little more background and color to them and talk about perhaps the flip side in a way, which is how would the United States or could the United States ever go back to a draft army. Ill lead to you a quick conclusion. I doubt it. The draft army ended in 1973. In 69 as youve been told, the National Commission on all volunteer army was formed. A gentleman who then became secretary of defense gates and others were studying this issue. One of the Commission Members took note that a volunteer army would be okay, could probably work during periods of peace but in a period of conflict and stress upon the army, likely would not work. That was an academic point until a day in september of 2001. That day i had been on a flight out of newark airport. Next to me was a flight that took off and crashed in pennsylvania. I didnt know those folks were on that plane. But by the time i landed in huntsville, alabama, i knew the United States was in some kind of difficulty. My mom called me. When i got to burger king to get breakfast, the plane had just landed. I didnt know it but all planes are being grounded. She said im so glad i got ahold of you. Im glad youre still alive. Okay. My mom doesnt call every day, so it was a little unusual. I said, why wouldnt i be alive. She said, well, we thought you were in the pentagon today, and we thought you might have been in that plane attack on the pentagon, which i didnt know about. The plane, indeed, did hit the pentagon and killed my boss, Lieutenant General in charge of army personnel. If i had been in the pentagon that day, i might have been in that area but i wasnt. I had been sent to huntsville by g3 of the army. General larry ellis to study what could be done about patriot missiles and getting them onto c130 aircraft and something more mobile. If the patriot folks had done a little more homework after 9 11, they could have had anything the United States would give them. Their defense became a key concern. I never dreamt next time i went to the pentagon id say air defense weapons in the parking lot. I was to take a training at west point, where i was director of economic and manpower analysis. I was going down to meet the gentleman with the job i have now, brown, assistant secretary of army for manpower and reserve affairs. If youre not familiar with the secretary of the army, you have the secretary. Hes an overall control of the army. We have civilian control of the army, chief of staff. Senior military officer is his military assistant and his military adviser. The secretary has several assistants, civil works, Acquisition Technology and logistics, finances, comptroller, general counsel, installations. And then the portfolio and 60 of the armys budget, all things human to include training, operations, mobilization. I was there to see mr. Brown on the topic of the all volunteer army. The United States by that time clearly was in a war. We were still figuring out who we were at war with but there was a pretty good indication it was going to be a serious undertaking. Mr. Brown wanted me to come down to talk to him about how we might hold volunteer army together for an undetermined period of time. I went into his office. My office is sort of where that pole is today. His office was in a different part of the pentagon. The g1s office was there. In a space like the one i occupy today, i went in and it was him and a person i quickly thought was a crazy woman. She was a political appointee as was he, so he couldnt get rid of her, i guess. She was berating him about the need to immediately institute a draft and why wasnt he already beginning mobilization and calling for selective service. He finally heard what she had to say. She left the room and looked at me i kind of looked at him quizzically, where did she come from. He looked at me and said, so what are we going to do. At that point forward the outfit i ran and greg my comrade in arms worried about probably 80 of our time was how do we hold the volunteer army together for an indeterminate period of war, which will stretch very close to its limits. We spent a good bit of time worrying about that. Men of the tools we turn to were not that novel and they were tools a gentleman you may know of had turned to early on in about 1979. That was general maxwell thurman. Mad max, as they called him, is a little known individual but one the volunteer army has been living off since he commanded recruiting command all that time ago. Even to this day. At that point, as a Previous Panel discussed, the apparently was struggling. The period of the 70s, i was a cadet at west point. Mayor at west point wasnt particularly high. Class of 72 wasnten maked. It was the first time in the academys history they could not fill a corps of cadets. They fired admission. Topics on long hair, tended to be a long haired bunch. Officers had short hair. It had more to do with getting a date, i think, than anything else. But it was a curious time in our history. At that point, there is a lot of concern about the volunteer army. Theres concern about the Armed Forces Qualification scores soldiers were exhibiting and the quality of the force, as you have discussed. The army was not particularly happy with the way things are going. General thurman was sent out to recruiting command, which at that time was in chicago at fort sheridan. Close to america, in the middle of a big city. His mission was to make the all volunteer army work. He brought in at that time the best minds he could find, and there were a lot of them. The army at that time was very much in the vein of a thing called ppbs, programming, planning, execution system secretary had brought on board and bludgeoned the army with in early days. The army coming to grips formed Operations Research to deal with quantitative analysis in matters of budget and they brought these same folks in to deal with matters of recruiting analysis. So these fine officers began the work of studying america, studying the armys needs down to the level of occupation, skills required in those occupations, intelligence levels and so forth and then trying to map that against what they could draw out of america. In the early days it was a struggle, even for general thurman. Some random reason, he requested an officer from west point to come in to join his team and listen about it. As his team was concluding their plan of action, this officer from west point, a fellow named tom fagan said, you dont know what youre doing. It is not a command and control environment, it is a market. You must go in the labor markets of the United States of america and compete. You must recruit. So as bernie said, its not really a volunteer army, it is a recruited army. The army must compete in labor markets to draw in the youth of america who face any number of other alternative uses of their team to join the military and serve. From that point, general thur n thurman, who was a bit of a pistol, said you work for me. He created office of manpower and analysis at west point, which is where all the army economists were because they taught cadets economics. At the same time he created rand royal, armys project at the rand corporation. He was a big blofr in competing analysis. He even had them do competing analysis on all manner of problems dealing with recruiting. From that point forward analytic pieces began to fall into place. They studied advertising. They studied things like jingles, army college fund, the bonus programs put into place. Any number of incentives. Ultimately you know the history, things began to turn around. I would say by 1983 the volunteer army was performing quite well in terms of meeting the needs of america, which it had a volunteer army and the needs of the army and that it had a good supply of Young Americans who were willing to serve on trms that merms that m armys needs and had the attributes the army called for. That really set the army in a trajectory that has brought us to today at a point in which when i conclude my remarks, i would argue were very close to 1983 again in terms of a very big change in direction of the United States army with regard to how were going to operate within the volunteer army. But ill hold that just for a few moments. The last panel really was a great precursor. They have already told you things were going to say again but help a little more structure to think about how the army operates today and maybe get to my premise it would be very difficult to bring a draft back. First there on the left you can see the structure of the army. We call that the total force. Its the guard, the reserve, and the active component. The reserve is very closely linked to the active army in that the chief of staff, secretary and i, have a great deal of control over it and how its funded, how its structured and all of that. But then youve got the 54 other armies that comprise the National Guard. They typically belong to the gm governors but secretaries exert Strong Authority with regard to doctrine, equipment, training, funding and so forth. But until federalized they are under control of the governors. You can see at the time of vietnam this was a total army about 2. 1 million. The active component was very large relative to that, 1. 5 million. When you look at the army today, its really quite a bit smaller. About a man total army, active is the minority not the majority. The active is about 478,000 soldiers by the end of this year with the guard being the next biggest component and then the reserves. Each of those serve a different function. Guard being very heavy in combat formations, reserve more and specialty things, a lot of medicine in there, things like that. But as you can see, the army total, the active is not that large. As you can imagine, that means active requires the ongoing collaboration and participation of the other two components. Its not an accident. Melvin laird at the end of vietnam for a variety of reasons to include most likely political reasons, measures of national will, concluded it would not be a good thing again to send the army to war without bringing online the rest of the population. The army had put attacks on the young. Im a bit of a friedman guy myself as an economist and leveled attacks on the young for a short period of its history. The long history of the United States, i think there has been about 30, 40 years of drafts. The normal course of affairs, we did not have a draft. When we did have a draft and towards the end of vietnam, the draft was falling on such a small share of americas youth, Something Like four man Young Americans in an age group, 17, 18, 19, so forth, even application to americas youth, no longer universal levee on the young. A very uneven tax on just a few. That was the army of the United States and it was not a good thing to send the army to war without a Firm Commitment of the country it ought to go to war. A war that would require some significant level of effort would therefore require some significant mobilization of the reserves. That would therefore bring political will to bear early and not later on. Perhaps could have raised some questions that folks here today have talked about in terms of 1965 and what was thought and known in those years versus future engagements that the army might participate in. So that was people. This money. I deal a lot with money in the pentagon. My oversight is about 100 million, which is a lot of money. As you can see here on the left was the distribution of that pie h 25 billion was a lot of money in the 60s. Gives you an idea for inflation. 182 billion today. You can see where that money goes. The black is Everything Else the army is doing, the color pies are the human parts of the army. You can see back in the 69 timeframe, guard and reserve were very small pieces of the puzzle with the active component being about a third of total Army Spending. Today the human component is about a third of Army Spending but the active component is down to 27 and guard and reserve are much more significant. That tells you a lot. If you follow the money in any organization, it will tell you what they value. We highly value dat guard and reserve because they make a very significant component of the total source and a great component of our ability to wage w war. Can you see the growth there. Its quite stark, order of 5 or 4 in terms of magnitude. The other thing to recognize, the army is about half the size it was. Its allocation of resources to the human component, now the volunteer component is about the same. That gives you an idea of a shift in resources that had to take place at the soldier level to make the volunteer army work. The last panel touched on that as well. Folks worrying about the commitment of resources it would take to draw Young Americans in without taxing them, drafting them, an get them to come in as volunteers and get them to serve willingly. Another thing to note is that the United States in small ways and large has been at war a good bit of the time the volunteer army has been in existence. From the left, the right is years from north to south is total Army Strength. Can you see even as Army Strength was coming down the number of engagements were going up. Some were not particularly long in duration and didnt require significant formations from the army, grenade ark, libya, panampanam grenada, libya, some were quick and others enduring. As you notice, after the Army Strength came down at the end of vietnam and then at the end of the cold war, it never really moved very much. The blue is fairly level, green and red are fairly level of the army has been able to wage war by relying, in large measure, on the guard and reserve without resorting to a call up of a draft. Thats a pretty significant thing for many reasons. One, its been able to leafy americas commitment to these engagements. Another is for about 50 years the army has been able to define service in the army. During vietnam those terms of service were much different than they are today. Draft hes made up about 60 of folks entering the army in any given year. They came in on two years of service. To do a draft for much longer term of service would prove politically and otherwise difficult to do. Today we have no one enter two years of service, it boils down to 3 1 2 years. Part of what allowed us to do that, we have a volunteer army. We can bring resources to bear to induce americans to enter for three plus training, four, five, six years of service. About half are coming in on three plus training, 20, 30 on four. Another 20 on five, and the remainder on sixyear enlistments. We pay bonuses commensurate with those levels. Our combat folks tend to be in the shorter terms. Our specialists tend to be in the longer terms, whether cyber security, communications, those sorts of folks. 50 years of doing that really shapes the way the army thinks about how it should fight. If you have to bring in people for two year terms of service, think about what you can do in terms of preparing them for war, training, organizing them into the armys formations, having those formations organize and train as units. Have those units train as part of larger formations would be very, very limited. With the terms of service we have today, weve configured the army to fight at levels of operations not thought of in vietnam. Night and day, night vision just coming in during vietnam. Nighttime operations were n s w up heard of are not the norm. Today the army says it owns the night. Our preferred operating environment is one in which we have the advantage. Against many enemies, the night is a preferred area of operation. To do that obviously takes a great deal of training and collaboration across teams. To build an army like that requires certain inducements. This chart gets at that. The yellow line in real dollar terms, 2019 dollars. What was soldier pay back in 69 timeframe and what is soldier pay today. They would be e2. Thats a private thats just a private, right . Thats a private and two years of service. Can you see pay is twice what it was then. Thats the yellow. If you look at the other, the orange bars and gray bars, they have really grown. Thats some of the things youve