Wenqing ngoei said that the United States was successful in the regional strategy. This is about 90 minutes. All right. Everyone, i would like to call us all to order. Good afternoon. And welcome to this afternoons session of the washington history seminar historical perspectives on international and national affairs. Im eric arnesen of George Washington university and im the cochair of this seminar along with Christian Ostermann who represents the Wilson Center. As you may see, we have cspan taping here today so we would like to welcome those of you who are watching on your computers or on your Television Screens and suggest that you visit the website to learn more about the Seminar Series and upcoming speakers here at the Wilson Center. The washington history seminar is a collaborative effort of two organizations. The Woodrow Wilson international for scholars and history and Public Policy program and the american Historical Associations National history center. We are in the ninth year of programming. Approaching our big decade long celebration that will come next year. We meet weekly mostly on monday afternoons during the academic year. The seminar wants to thank a number of institutions that helped to make this seminar possible. In particular, the Lepage Center for history in the Public Interest and the George WashingtonUniversity Department of history. Wed like to thank a number of anonymous donors whose contributions literally make possible sessions such as this one. And should you yourselves be so inclined to join the ranks of anonymous or not so anonymous donors we would certainly welcome that. Details about how to do so can be found on the back of the flyer that you may have picked up or outside of the door of this seminar. Behind the scenes a number of folks worked very hard to make this seminar possible. And i would like to extend thanks as usual to jeff reagor the assistant director of the National History center. The Public Program and our two interns from the Wilson Center, kyle nichols and su young kim. Thank you for your efforts in helping us to pull this off. I would like to welcome dane kennedy the director of the National History center and roger lewis. The founding director of the washington history center. Before we begin, id like to ask everyone take out this device that you know you have in your bag and turn it to silent or vibrate so it doesnt go off in an inauspicious moment as the devices tend to do on a regular basis. All right. All of that said, its my pleasure to introduce todays speaker. Wenqing ngoei is assistant professor of history at the technological university. He completed his ph. D. At Northwestern University and did postdoctoral work at northwestern and university. His book, arc of containment britain, the United States and anticommunism in Southeast Asia is due to be published or rather released by Cornell University press perhaps some time next month. And this book as you will see will argue that british decolonization intertwined with anticommunism shaped u. S. Policy in the wider region and hes published essays in diplomatic history in 2017 and a prize winning essay on the domino theory that appeared in the pages of the journal of american east asian relations back in 2004. At and with that, we will hear about the arc of containment. Thank you very much. Warm greetings to everybody from the tropics. Thank you to the Wilson Center for the opportunity to share my work with you. Its a great honor to be here, thanks to christian, eric, the people behind the scenes. Chuck crouse, jeff, and amanda perry who is not here. Thanks for helping to make this happen. Today ill be presenting from my book arc of containment. It will be out in may or april or may with Cornell Press and also i should say this its available for 50 of the retail price at this time while stocks last up to the 1st of april. Now, the books goal is to recast the history of u. S. Empire in southeast and east asia from world war ii through the end of American Intervention in vietnam. It does so by tracing how british neo colonial strategies combined with anticommunist across southeast and came together to the china and the chinese diaspora. Now about the cover, what is it about . You see the cover of british helicopter and its deploying what appeared to be troops to the borneo territories the border with indonesia. This happens with the confrontation of 1963 to 1966 and the significance of this will become clear. Now, let me start off by also saying that my book is a response to whats been the dominant story of u. S. Foreign relations with Southeast Asia. This picture will be familiar to many of us because they capture the story of the dominant story. You see the fall of saigon, the decline of america and final ily abandoned by the humiliated, fleeing superpower. And theres south vietnamese, that are fleeing atop the and theyre pushing off ships in order to make way for more evacuees that are coming on the choppers. The states of Southeast Asia were seen as a teetering dominance. So this came crashing down in april of 1975, it was preceded by cambodia. It was followed by laos. Major historical studies of u. S. Foreign relations focused on this illfaced intervention of the United States in vietnam. Accordingly they generalized that u. S. Failure in vietnam is emblematic of the wider region. You have a general collapse of western imperialism thats supposed to have happened in the face of indigenous nationalism. What about the broader region, what about the dominos that did not fall . What about britain which won the cold war battle and maintained the military institutions in malaysia and singapore for about two decades after the french withdrew from the region. Indeed, what about the dominos that are typically consigned to the margins of u. S. Foreign relations history and a global countries like malaysia, countries like singapore. Dont we this is crucial, dont we lose the fundamental logic of interconnectedness in the domino theory if we can confine our attention to the disasters in indonesia. These are the questions that animated my research. And that took me back to 1954. When president eisenhower would propose the falling domino principle in Southeast Asia. 1954 would probably be an important year, well find it familiar because thats when the french met terrific defeat to the communist led viet minh. Eisenhower and his advisers got together at that time the french were already surrounded. The viet minh would strike and there was pressure on eisenhower to commit combat troops. According to the records eisenhower said, quote, with great force he could not imagine committing u. S. Troops anywhere in Southeast Asia except malay ya. Well at the time they were waging a war against the guerrilla fighters of a Malayan Communist Party. London called it an emergency but eisenhower saw it in a much broader regional term. His speech connected this french war in indochina to the british struggle in malayan and singapore to the korean peninsula. Like the viet minh, the mcp had been the backbone of an antijapanese resistance during world war ii. Because the chinese population of what what ya was 40 , there was a level of popularity that these mcp fighters enjoyed. American officials looking at malay ya worried it would become a chinese state. And they worry too about singapore which was 78 Ethnic Chinese. In fact, the singapore affiliate had infiltrated chinese language, middle schools in the island as well as dominated a lot of the trade unions. By the mid 1950s in washingtons eyes the situation in malay ya had gained ground against the mcp and sent the remains to the thai border. Britain shrudely aligned itself with the anticommunist nationali nationalists. And by 1957, malay ya gained their freedom from britain and it was headed by a fervently prince. Hes referred to as the prince. Helpfully, he won the leadership via the ballot box and he was popularly regarded as the father of malaya. He started to reach out to the United States. Some of you may know what the flag looks like and it resembles americas old glory. This was by design and his choice. He called it the stripes of glory. Within hours of independence he made a broadcast to america stating that malaya must tie up with the democratic world and then they rendered assistance to the british Assistance Services in a plot to topple the left leaning regime in indonesia. Which is why when they met in 1916, you can see theyre quite happy. Eisenhower was elated. Of he was elated when the malayan visited the United States. He was a staunch defender of freedom. And in private what he said was malaya should pursue the creation of a regional anticommunist grouping that would be clearly indig indigenous just like the treaty of the organization. He said that they could exert terrific force to expand the communist influence in asia and with the encouragement he managed to do this by 1961. He formed precisely such a group with pro u. S. Thailand as well as the philippines and this was called the association of Southeast Asia. Asa would lay the foundation for the Southeast Asian nations and that would include singapore and the three anticommunist members, malaysia, thailand and the philippines. All of the countries were ruled by conservative anticommunist elites and these would fully support u. S. Intervention in vietnam. During the 60s and 70s they would tie up with the superpower and this is a wider pro u. S. Trajectory, one that would ensconce the peoples as well as the resources in the u. S. Orbit by the height of the vietnam war. Now what my book suggests that this story of the wider regions lost if we focused tightly on the fate of indochina. The failure in korea is important without being central. And a number of scholars judged that the u. S. s humiliating retreat is the end of an empire, my book considers the dominos that did not fall. These dominos transformed over time into studies for u. S. Predominance in the region and this became an informal empire for america. The countries of clients and the create they created a new arc that enclosed the South China Sea and circled china. Thats why the book is called the arc of containment. It reflects what u. S. Officials had very early on from the outside of the cold war had been intending. The architect of nato saw asia as being part of a great crescent that connected japan to india. The creation of malaysia, all right, the peninsula of malaysia, Singapore Island and the borneo territories they believed that the creation of malaysia would complete a wide anticommunist arc around the china sea. And nixon fantasized about going around the rim of china stretching from japan to india. This is the arc of containment but what is the base of this, what was the base of them pyre of this empire of former dominance . What was the connecting tissue in malaya and singapore to mesh across the region as well as u. S. Objectives for Southeast Asia . In looking at the dominos that surrounded indochina, i argue that the connecting tissue was preexisting local antipathy to a china and the chinese diaspora. Throughout Southeast Asia, the european powers tended to deflect indigenous resentment away from themselves. They were menacing foreigners even though many had long settled in the region. Many had intermarried in malaysia and the philippines and for the europeans and the americans theres been a long history of antichinese prejudice which i wont go into here. As a result of that, the fact is that the brief supremacy of japan during world war ii as you can see in the middle with the propaganda posters with the much maligned octopus, it was treating the chinese as the yellow peril. Whether its threatening via immigration, the top left corner or threatening Southeast Asia via communist extension. Crucially what the americans, the british and many conservative elites believed is that china that even when it was ruled by the Chinese Nationalists, especially so when it was dominated by the Chinese Communist party, they believed that china would use the diya sporic networks to expand the influence. The chinese diasporas numbered 10 million. So british and u. S. Policymakers often expressed their concern that the chinese were underlying loyalties to the mother country. This is something that both officials on both sides of the atlantic used. The british called them a chinese problem, and imperial. The u. S. Often used the phrase chinese penetration to refer to the problem. I published work on this. They argued the logic of interconnectedness comes from through its diaspora. This antichinese prejudice fueled the consolidation of power for Southeast Asias national communists. Local conservative elites tended to weaponize a widespread distrust of the chinese populations. The resentment of Ethnic Chinese economic success, even though not all of them were prosperous. Also the belief that Ethnic Chinese might serve subversive cause. Knowing the antichinese sentiment with anticommunism during the cold war became the elites path to power. So we turn first to the story of ian malaya. You have pictures of Malcolm Mcdonald on the far left, he was the uk commissioner general for east asia. Next to him is the founder of the malayanchinese association. Next to him is the Prime Minister of malaya and the head of the United Malays National organization. And finally you have a wounded fighter. Some details about malaya. The Ethnic Chinese and malaya made up 40 of the population and the mcp was 95 Ethnic Chinese. The affinity there, could not really be denied even though many of the chinese Ethnic Chinese in malaya were not full communist. There was a sense this group in some ways could represent them. Especially in a malay dominated political system. The malay population tended to be antagonistic to the chinese. The mcp went on a reprisal campaign against many of the malays, accusing them of collaborating with the japanese. Also, malaya was the single largest producer of rubber. It made america its largest customer. For the british, the question was how to do the decolonization of malaya so that it could extend British Imperial presence in the country and defeat the mcp. The answer is what is termed nation building colonialism. Reordered colony. Caught, sponsored local westfriendly leaders. Usher them to the head of the independent regime. Guarantee alignment with the former colonial ruler. U. S. Policy in the philippines was similar. Cultivating elites, maintaining massive basis, crafting trade treaties. One journalist called this dependent independence. Now how did this come to pass in malaya . Between the late 1940s to the 1950s, what Malcolm Mcdonald did with the rest of the British Colonial authorities was remind the local nationalists who were anticommunist, if you do not get a durable, multiracial accord going that turns on the malayan communists, we will never give you independence. So the impetus for malays who were ann ttagonistic to chineses to get together. The political elites to get together. There was a great impetus to do so. Malcolm mcdonald encouraged it at that time. He was not yet knighted. You can guess what he was knighted for. He came together with the group to create the alliance. Whats ironic about the Alliance Political party is it was created the Malayan Chinese Association, pure Ethnic Chinese, no others from different races would join this party. The United Malays National organization, also pure malay. No others could join the party. And the alliance created by these two parties fought for interracial unity. Interracial unity while keeping their parties racially pure. This produced a Multiracial Coalition that appeared to be durable in the 1950s. That made the british confident enough to release malaya and give it its independence. Whats critical here is in the midst of doing all this, they whipped up antichinese sentiment in an anticommunist package. Malcolm mcdonald took to the airways because radio malaya was popular in the peninsula as well as singapore. Historians have shown a large number of malayans and singaporsingapor singaporians own radios. Malcolm mcdonald would be visiting people by the radio to say there was a Malayan Communist Party of chinese who are tyrants who would link up with the