Good morning class and welcome back to history 3290, modern American Military history. Today, we are going to continue our conversation about the second world war. And, specifically we will look at an aspect of the war through what we call the lens of industrial mobilization. And, industrial mobilization is often understood as the key to allied victories in this ward. It is often said that the allies win because they out produce the axis powers. Im sure many of us have heard this before and perhaps encountered it or read it. But, one of the problems with that line of reasoning is that if it is simply an amount of stuff that produces victory. But at the beginning of this war the axis powers possessed more. So that cannot absolutely establish ultimately the trajectory of allied victory. Because, the allies for a long time are deficient in that quantity of stuff. The other aspect of the material argument, if you will that the allies out reduced and overstated and under simplified. In a almost all literature related to the war is that we have no clear sense of how the stuff is built. Now, there are historians of technology who write about particular kinds of technology. But, most of the discussions of war assume that technology is built. The arrival of Weapons Systems on saline, the aircraft that flight over, or the Landing Craft that arrive on shore. We just assume they are built and we have very little intricate understanding of these processes that would ultimately, as i would ask translate strategic requirements in battlefield weaponry. A much more elaborate process and we have considered. Today, our goal is to look at an aspect of industrial mobilization. Specifically through a case study that i have investigated white extensively in navy, and marine corps archives and other collections. To understand how one particular vehicle, which you see on screen, the amphibian tractor, and how it was built. For the purpose of fighting and winning not only world war ii, but specifically world war ii in the pacific. This is one particular model, and in the backdrop you see a battle lazing away as troops are being conveyed ultimately to japanese held chores on iwo jima. Near the end of the war in the pacific. It is my argument that this amphibian tractor and the little box that it was ultimately presented victory in the pacific. It is the singular vehicle that could actually deliver american troops ashore along many coral fringed islands that the japanese possessed in world war ii. If you could get them ashore, you can fight and win. If you are a soldier or american strategic planner, i want us to examine this particular case study. I would argue the amtrak is the pivot around which allied victory turned in the pacific. We will consider this and to borrow from this notion of the hobbit a little bit, or there and back again. We will look at what we can call from the factory to the front lines. This process whereby folks in the home front, in the Navy Department and the headquarters marine corps would be working in concert with industry to actually build more specific materials. And then, to figure out how it works and to translate those challenges and problems, deficiencies and possibilities into revised Vehicle Designs, revised operational concepts and ultimately, we will see there is a dialogue between the folks at home and the folks overseas. By way of historiography, a term we are already familiar with, but to reiterate briefly for our purposes we could consider historiography the writing of history. And, what i would characterize much of the writing about were to is establishing what we call a tyranny of the Assembly Line. What i mean by that is, we almost always when we see pictures of Assembly Lines assume that is where everything is built. We have seen many pictures like this im sure, where there are Assembly Lines for aircraft being built, heavy bombers for example, or tanks, or in this case Landing Craft on the left of the screen. The buys for presuming that everything that is important in terms of industrial mobilization really happens there on the factory floor. I want to complicate that a bit today. The other part of this historiographical omission, or this lens toward simplification is that we assume that things are built. We see pictures of them and we know they were built. So often, we read war back as inevitable. We read the process of construction as logical, as necessary, and we often assume that things will be billed. The next model will be better than the previous model. It is just obvious it would be that way. But, in reality we will find that in our case study today, there is nothing inevitable whatsoever about the military construction of an amphibian tractor. Nothing whatsoever. In other words, it is up to a variety of factors contingent forces, and what historians like to call agents. Individuals involved in these processes. Lets consider how and where the amtrak would be billed. I have given you a handout already and on the top flight it indicates basically these questions here. These are some of the questions that illuminate this process of what i find we are missing in this story of industrial mobilization. Often, what we overlooked are the people involved in these processes that make critical decisions. To build or not to build, when to build, what to build, as well as the organizations charged with determining such issues as where to build, what to build, and how to build it. One of the Big Questions that start this process is simply who envisioned the strategic requirements . Such as, in the war in the pacific. We all know already that american war planners, especially in the navy and marine corps were long anticipating a war with japan. From the early 20th century. So what do you need in order to accomplish your strategy . What technologies might you require . Whether it be ships or transports or Landing Craft, or in this particular case an amphibian tractor. Who determines what is needed . It is dependent on part on what their imagination and creativity is, and what the realm of possibilities are. Another question is involved in what we call opportunity cost. We could reconcile what economists often call opportunity costs. Is awkward as a phrase as opportunity cost is, we also are familiar with the basic premise. That is if you choose to do something, you forgo the opportunity to do Something Else by virtue of being in class today, you are not out snowboarding. And, whether that is a good decision, i cant say. But nonetheless, in military terms i can say that planning for world war ii and in during the war itself, there are a host of decisions made. If you build this, you might not be able to build Something Else. So, we have to figure out who makes those decisions of what to build and when not too. Related to this process of industrial construction, and that the Assembly Line that was a picture of a moment ago. The Assembly Line is invariably what the navy called the prime contractor. That is the final assembly center. The Assembly Line where things are already built in other locations, such as the transmission, the radiator, the brakes, the machine guns are manufactured in other plants. By whom . The contractors. And in the case of the amphibian tractor, there would literally be hundreds of subcontractors for this particular vehicle. And frankly, it is no different for the tank or any variety of tank or aircraft. There is a prime contractor that assembles the things together, ultimately for use eventually. But, there are dozens if not hundreds of subcontractors building the constituent parts and relaying them, usually on rail to the final assembly center. And before the subcontractors even build things, they need Raw Materials. Where do you get the copper, the still . And all of these essential ingredients to manufacture these brake pads, or the boxes, or the steel frame for the amphibian tractor . Where does it come from . Know that ultimately this question of sourcing and supply and the process or steps to build it is a vastly elaborate and intricate system. And how much harder in an era without the conveniences of say, computing technology. People had to make phone calls and right letters. By way of example, the navys bureau of ships, which was the Agency Responsible for building the amphibian tractor, for every week of the war, every week of the war there is a folder, a jacket of more than one inch of written correspondence back and forth between the navy and its ancillary organizations. Between contractors and subcontractors, and all sorts of interested parties. That is for every week of the word. You can imagine this vast sea of communications required to build something in one sense, relatively simple, a vehicle. You would think it would be simple. But, it is being built at the cicely the same time as a host of other more urgent materials and programs are competing for priorities also. You might imagine battleship construction or Aircraft Carrier construction necessitates certain material that the amtrak could make use of. Or aircraft or tanks. Who determines what gets what and in what priority . Those are essential questions we rarely consider. With respect to this notion of procurement, of acquiring things, one of the key terms in this era was bottlenecks. Bottleneck, bottleneck, bottleneck. There are all these chokepoints in which construction could be derailed for want of a nail, you could say. Or for want of a ball bearing or a critical component. If certain points do not receive certain components, that vehicle doesnt get built. Maybe you could complete 90 of it, but if you dont have the other essential components because maybe a factory wasnt able to provide it for want of enough labor, skilled labor, or enough Machine Tools or Raw Materials, or any of those reasons, or all of them this particular contraption might not actually roll off the Assembly Line and reach forces in the field. Those challenges were ones that all of the war services and all of the pieces would have to recognize. Some did it other than others. The United States will do it quite well, as complex as it is. Part of the reason it is able to do it a little better than other countries is because the homeland is not being blasted to smithereens, as in the case of parts of britain, or certainly german, or japan, or russia. The image in the upper right is a small screenshot of correspondence from the chief of the bureau of ships, this agency challenged with Building Navy material, warships and such small things as this tractor. It is informing its constituent parts that basically, ultimately through the machinery corporation, which will be introduced to shortly the contractor is charged with constructing en masse and it will not deliver according to schedule. A problem is a foot and they need to resolve it. Time and time again, this question of bottlenecks appears as contractors were unable to meet the voracious appetites of the Armed Services for various specialized equipment. Another kind of question that is related to the building of a tank or an airplane or a Landing Craft or vehicle, is who determines how is it going to be used . Which structure does it fit . What is the doctrine that animates its use . How do the services, in the case of maybe a marine corps craft, how does the navy understand its use . Are the navy and marine corps relationships going to be formed in ways that you could actually make optimal use of this contraption, rather than have problems that create great inefficiencies and maybe death on the battlefield . There is a host of people at work trying to resolve these questions. How do you train somebody to drive a tank or an airplane, or an amphibian tractor . What does that involve . What kind of manuals do you need . Drivers manuals, if you will . Who takes the pictures of the arrangement of the consul, the dash, where the gauges are . Such simple things as photographing and building Operations Manuals is part of this process of industrial mobilization. Because, if you dont have trained crews, they dont know how to work these things. And so, from the minutia of such things as a manual to the greater complexity of building and mass, all of these questions come into bear when we are considering industrial mobilization. And of course, if there are problems, who resolves them, and at what pace . Can they be resolved . Are they decisions that need to be made at the highest level . Are they made at lower levels . Who is responsible . All of these questions surface in the arena of mobilization. So, thinking about that lets take a big picture approach and we will consider first a series of requirements, and then we will work into a series of what we can call production challenges or the production puzzle and we will examine certain things in what we call deployment. Starting first with requirements. The big picture, part of the puzzle is that ultimately, the u. S. Navy and marine corps identified that they would have to cross the Pacific Ocean in event of war with japan. The expectation as we have identified in previous classes was that the American Service fleet would engage the Japanese Navy and hopefully destroy it. Of course, we call that workplan orange, ultimately. Part and parcel to this big picture of crossing the pacific is something the u. S. Marine corps studied intensely and this is the problem of basing for structure. How do you defend basis . Like midway, the philippines when you expect the Japanese Forces are probably going to conquer them . How do you defend them . The marines studied this problem of advanced base defense for the early part of the 20th century, especially up to the teens. Then, they really start to reorient towards what we call amphibian assaults. Not simply defending your own base, which you probably lost, but fighting to get it back to conquer new territory. That process of Amphibious Assault is a critical one that the marines will elaborate on. We talked about a pivotal figure in the early 1920s. But one of the critical problems was, how do you get your forces to shore . From chip to shore . With combat power, i might add. We are not talking about a leisure cruise or a pleasure cruise. You have to fight your way to shore in the age of the machine gun. And the british had already discovered in world war i the problems with confronting a heavily fortified beach. In this particular case, a battle called gallipoli led the british to discover to their display dismay that rowboats dont work well in the age of the machinegun. Well into the 1930s, the marine corp. Pretty much has rowboats. Realizing that the technology that they possessed would not permit them to actually accomplish their mission. This was a glaring source of concern to all of the marines studying these problems in the pacific in the early 20th century. I have focused a little inset here of an cluster of islands. In the bottom left corner is a little tiny island. This little tiny island would prove absolutely important for the testing of Amphibious Assault techniques and to the progression of American Forces across the pacific. In anticipation of that, how do you cross the coral reef at low tide, if there is a low tide . You have both that are going to run afoul of the coral. And the coral will probably in many places is 400800 yards wide. Can you imagine the challenge of finding that you have to climb out of a Landing Craft onto a coral reef which will still have some water on it with ocean currents. And having to lumber across the coral reef, dropped into the lagoon, which might actually be around eight feet deep, right off the reef. Dropped into that with the pack and rifle . And somehow managed to hold your breath while you are waiting ashore. And as you wade ashore with the water as it is receding, you are getting shot at by machine guns, by mortars and other kinds of weaponry. It is a recipe for disaster. And so, aware of this tactical challenge, to cross coral reefs the marines tried to study this problem. The challenge for them was that they were unable to convince the navy that this was a problem. So, we will see how that works. We could post this question, how would the navy and marine corps reconcile their opportunity cost and the resource constraints to meet these requirements . For mechanized Amphibious Assault . After world war i concluded, we talked about the washington conference and how the u. S. Navy was restricted by treaty regulations or prohibitions on how big the surface could really be. In the midst of that budget terribly austere environment, while the navy is appreciating how much is evaporating out of their hands in terms of worship tonnage, the marine corps was approached by an industrial designer is highlighted in another class, named walter christie. He built this amphibian tank on his own dime with the hopes of securing work contracts. There, you see a marine testing it in the caribbean in the early 1920s. The marine corps would have loved to buy one, but for want of a nail, for want of a dollar. The navy at this precise moment was not inclined to spend any money whatsoever on the marine corps, especially on an innovative, unproven box, ultimately. So, the marines had to tear down this opportunity to build what they thought might actually provide them the means of defense, as well as to create the firepower to roll their forces ashore. They had great forces for it. Note, they were not building it themselves. The industrial designer on his own dime had come up with it. But, the navy would rather die ships build ships like the arizona. You better. In that era, very much marine corps appropriations, budgetary programs, and new types of programs were subjected to ultimately navy wims. Just like walter christie, another industrial designer, an innovator who is actually not looking to mak