Relations and with the center for strategic studies here in washington, he says that military force against the regime has to be an option and believes that kim jongun will quote, do whatever he can to keep up the Nuclear Capability, his comments are about 45 minutes. applause well thank you very much john i appreciate the kind words of introduction and i want to thank the center for Strategic International studies and the host of todays forum for their invitation to speak, i think this is the ninth or tenth such forum and it is a great opportunity, very timely to discuss very critical issues, i also want to congratulate csis and john and victor cha, for this is also the tenth anniversary of a korea chair at csis, so it marks a decade of contributions that the chairs nonpartisan objective research has made to the Public Policy to debate on korean issues that are so important to the American People and to the korean people, its really been a significant accomplishment for all of us csis. I am delighted to be here today, i am also sure the leadership of north korea is lighted that i am here today in a private capacity. N speak in unvarnished terms about about the grave and growing threat that the north Korean NuclearWeapons Program poses to International Peace and security, lets start with what i think are the main presets of dealing with the north Korean Nuclear weapons threat are. First, it remains unacceptable for north korea to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons, and i dont mean a rhetorical flourish, by a politician, i mean that our policy should be that we do not accept it. We will not accept it. Second, it seems to me clear, that the dprk has not made a strategic decision to give up its Nuclear Weapons, in fact i think the contrary is true. I think the strategic decision that kim jongun is operating through is that he will do whatever he can to keep a deliverable Nuclear Weapons capability and to develop and enhance it, he may try to get really from international sanctions, he may try to get some conditions, but undercurrent circumstances he will never give up their Nuclear Weapons voluntarily this is if you will permit a pressure personal observation, this question that whether there is a should subject decision to give up Nuclear Weapons, is what the libyan model of 2003, 2004 properly understood actually means. At that period, we saw gaddafi make an unambiguous decision that he and libya would be better off without developing Nuclear Weapons. He came to that decision for a variety of reasons, because of the overthrow, of Saddam Hussein by a u. S. Led coalition. The subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein and the seizure of the ship, the bbc china, and its delivery of nuclear components, uranium enrichment components, manufactured by the proliferation network that told him that we knew what he was up to, and at that point, he made the clear decision that he was going to give up Nuclear Weapons. We have seen not only nothing like that from north korea, as i say, we have seen the opposite. And i think its important to understand that the current north korean moratorium on testing of Nuclear Weapons and testing of icbm intercontinental range Ballistic Missiles tells us nothing about north koreas intentions or its strategy as its playing out. One very good, very troubling reason why theres no more testing of Nuclear Weapons to the moment or of long range missiles, is that north korea has in its judgment, for well or ill, finished testing, and can produce Nuclear Warheads and longrange Ballistic Missiles. Thats not an encouraging sign, thats a sign to be worried about. Moreover, the test of shorter range Ballistic Missiles that weve seen in recent months, doesnt give us any reason to think that those are not threatening. Because the capabilities, the technology, things like maneuverability of close range or short range Ballistic Missiles, by definition, can be adopted to longrange Ballistic Missiles. So that indeed the testing thats going on now is not on threatening unless of course you happen to be in south korea, within range of these missiles. But bodes poorly for the defensive capabilities of japan, even the United States when you get to the intercontinental range, now in the past we have been very clear what our expectations were of north korea, both with respect to Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile tests, if you look back to you any Security Council resolution 16 95 adopted on july the 25th 2006 and Security Council resolution is 1718, adopted on october the 14th 2006 after the, in the first instance 16 95 after north korea broke its moratorium on a launched testing Ballistic Missiles from the Korean Peninsula and 1718 after a Nuclear Weapons test, the United States and the Security Council were very clear that i know this because i helped write those resolutions, 16 95 dealt only with missiles, 1718 adult with both and all quote from 1718 just to remind everybody how clear it was and operative paragraph to, the unanimous counsel said, demands that they not conduct any further Nuclear Tests or launch a missile, and they said that it decides showers to spend all activities related to the Missile Program and in this context reestablish its commitments to a moratorium to launch it. North korea today as we speak is violating those resolutions, now i say this not because of a theological commitment, i say it because when the United States having led the fights to get those said we really dont care, other countries can draw conclusion did they dont really care about the sanctions contained in those and other resolutions, so when you ask about consistent behavior from other you have to demonstrate it yourself and when we fail to do that we open ourselves and our policy to failure, remember also what it is that cause the concern in 2006 when north korea broke this moratorium, in 1998 north korea for the first time launched a Ballistic Missile that landed in the Pacific Ocean and east of japan, would needless to say got the attention of people in that country, the moratorium was intended to signify that north korea was behaving in a more responsible fashion, yet the only thing they really gave up was a launch testing, static testing continued, a very important part of Missile Development in all the evidence we have in the Public Domain is that north korea simply shifted its emphasis to cooperation with iran, which was also developing Missile Technology for Nuclear Weapons, so the launched by new korea and the enhancement with iran was actually a clear demonstration of the continued aspiration to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons, so i think right now we are in a classic standoff with north korea, they want a piece of something that we should not be able to give, people will say well what could be heard, what can be loss by negotiation, what about partial agreements, why not have some progress or some indication of something that north korea can do that will allow us to alleviate the sanctions, there are several points to understand here if you believe in you may not, if you believe that it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, first for the would be proliferator, a lifting of sanctions is far more important than it is to the opponent of proliferation to have law, the history with whether it is related to north korea or iran is very clear that the economic kick to the proliferator of getting economic benefits and relief from sanctions is far more beneficial than a marginal reduction in the Nuclear Weapons effort, so from the perspective of the prolifer country, action for action as the North Koreans call it is a way to sustain their authoritarian political system, keep their economy going and still have the benefit of the bulk of their Ballistic Missile and nuclear programs. There is a world out there that is ready to fall sucker to that argument, even now we see governments, particularly south korea watching north korea test missiles but providing food aid because the north ryan say that harvest has been bad an Economic Conditions have been difficult. It is been too difficult for them to buy food for their people but not launch Ballistic Missiles, those people that succumb to that line of argument, this is something that we can apply both to iran and north korea, there is a second element as, well that is the element of time, to time for a weapon state is not a factor, the more time that goes by that benefits the delivery because it takes time to overcome the technological difficulties inherent in a program, so when we say well, we are in no rush for negotiations, we are in no rush for a resolution of this, we are saying to north korea and iran, take your time, keep going, you have more time to plan test, to produce and deploy these capabilities, time works against those and a relaxed attitude to time is a benefit to the likes of north korea and iran. And then finally, this applies specifically to these circumstances in the peninsula for about a year and a half the United States and south korea have not had what some would call wargames, we have not had a large scale military training exercises, i will leave it to the pentagon to describe what we have been doing but i think you are all familiar what we have all been talking about, it is inevitable that land exercises are not taking place, readiness can come into question, a failure to be military prepared results and a weekend structure of deterrence, i am not gonna make any assertions here today about the level of american and south korean readiness on the peninsula but someday, weather from the department of defense or from congressional investigation, we are goody here judgments about military readiness and i think that this is something that should be a priority both for americans and for South Koreans, now there are other issues here, i dont think are adequately addressed, not only should be concerned with north koreas own Weapons Technology but to the on going danger that north korea will sell Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile technology or active missiles themselves to other proliferating states, that is a risk of a Nuclear Capable north korea, whether north korea itself is a threat and its immediate region, now i also believe that there is only one country in the world that can stop Nuclear Proliferation and we are in it, we can use half that is for sure but if the United States fails in this mission there is no other state or combination of states and now International Organization and can be a substitutes. If we fail Nuclear Proliferation succeeds, now let me just read to you a quotation from winston churchill, he made this department, it applies to them from north korea churchill said describing germany of course, he said when the situation was manageable it was neglected and now that it is thoroughly out of hand we applied to lay the nominees the then wouldve had a cure, there is nothing new and this story, it is as old as the books and it falls into the long catalog of the fruitlessness of experience and unusually of mankind, and willingness to actual action would be effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of council until emergency comes, until self preservation strikes its gong, these are the features which constitute the analysts repetition of history, now lets hope that their pessimism is not one out in the case of north korea, there are things we should look to and have serious discussions about, one is the possibility, limited though it may be, of regime change in north korea, second, we should look at and discuss and china, we should have done a long ago, aiming for the reunification under a free elected government like that in south korea. Third if you believe any may not that it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, at some Point Military force has to be an option, now this is the most controversial subject in many people say it is just unimaginable, unimaginable that you would use military force, so let me quote to you the words of the chairman of the joint chief of staff and he has done an outstanding job, he said this to the seminar and the summer of 2018 on this question of what is unimaginable, he told his counterparts both friend and foe, it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to north Koreas Nuclear capability, what is unimaginable to me is allowing the capability to allow Nuclear Weapons to arrive and colorado, my job would be to develop this to make sure doesnt happen. I think the general was completely correct, now if you dont like those options there are others to that ensue when north korea keeps Nuclear Weapons, the dprk can become the walmart or the amazon of Nuclear Weapons or you can have more Nuclear Weapon states in asia, like japan, like south korea. So these are questions that need to focus our attention, not can we get another summit with kim jongun or what the state of staff level negotiations are to achieve a commitment from north korea, it was never on our. Now before a close i want to take one minute on the subject of u. S. Japan south korea relations, this is also not a happy subject for discussion of the moment, it is well below the radar screen here in the United States which is a big mistake for our country and not paying more attention to it, i am almost without words to describe how distressed i am that these tensions between south korea and japan have ground to the point where they currently are, i believe that over the past period of time, that american passive itty on this point has been a mistake, im not saying that the United States should engage between public mediation, it would be a mistake and not underestimating how serious the issues between south korea and japan are, ive heard out about them on both sides and i understand their logic and their emotions, i think of the United States does not operate here, we face a very serious deterioration of Alliance Capabilities and precisely the wrong time, we see at this point the hope system of alliances that weve had the reassure, u. S. Japan and india these are all signs of progress, so to see south korea and japan moving in the opposite direction from the u. S. Point of view is extraordinary the troubling, this is something that if the other disputes that happened soon have been made clear that the south korean decision to disband the information agreement, they have really now brought to an acute point because this has a palpable impact on american ability to i put this down for something that requires urgent attention, all of these concerns and everything that we can say about chinas growing international threat, militarily, politically, economically point to significant risks and dangers in around korea, i think there should be burden sharing on issues like military base costs as we are now discussing analogous lee in the nato context, but this is not the time for u. S. Disengagement, it is a time for more u. S. Involvement and leadership, on the Korean Peninsula, in asia and world wide, more not less, thank you very much. Well, thank you, ambassador bolton. That was wonderful. Wonderful remarks on the korea issue and more broadly about well thank you ambassador that was some wonderful remarks on the creation and more broadly, my name is victor and im a professor here at Georgetown University and i wanna welcome everyone, i hope he will stay with us because we have kenow remarks by, my role here is to facilitate with bolton as well as ask you some questions from the audience we have collected in advance, so might challenges a youve answered all the questions already that i had in mind, let m