Transcripts For CSPAN3 Iran Hostage Crisis - 40 Years Later

CSPAN3 Iran Hostage Crisis - 40 Years Later July 13, 2024

Iran hostage crisis. On november 4, 1979, 52 american diplomats and citizens were taken hostage by a crowd of iranian students who stormed the u. S. Embassy, the combination of worsening relations between this country and iran in the wake of the iranian revolution in february 1979. Even though the crisis ended with the release of the 20, 1981,n january after an incredible ordeal that lasted some 444 days, it has had a lasting influence on the relationship between the two countries. Images of iranian students breaching the u. S. Embassy, shouting antiamerican slogans, detaining Embassy Officials and burning the american flag, traumatized a nation and a presidency. They live on in popular consciousness here with such movies as the 2012 movie argo and they continue to weigh on the public discourse. Here today, we want to explore the Lasting Impact of the hostage crisis a bit further, and we have convened a panel of distinguished experts which will be moderated by my colleague. Im very pleased that our expert, that the distinguished guests have accepted our invitation. Todays event is being organized by the Centers History and Public Policy program. The Program Seeks to provide meaningful Historical Context two through Public Policy issues and debate as a Global Leader in uncovering and publicizing documentation through its awardwinning digital archive, easily accessible to all of ought digitalor chive. Org. Youll see the front page there. It works with a network to build next Generation Research capacity, foster dialogue on New Historical sources and perspectives, and to push for greater archival access and transparency. We have recently launched a new initiative on exploring and documenting the contemporary International History of the middle east through genuine local and regional sources and perspectives. Someday we hope to analyze and discuss episodes such as the one well be focusing on today based on iranian and other archives in the region. Let me also say that the middle east program has graciously agreed to cosponsor todays session. I want to thank our speakers and my colleague for moderating. Unfortunately, john, an eyewitness to the hostage ordeal, who agreed to be and here really wanted to be here, had to cancel at the last moment for a health emergency. We are, of course, sending our best wishes to john for a speedy recovery. Im grateful for my team for the recognition of this event. Two of our talented program interns, and especially my colleague on the history program, ken burns, who took the lead putting this together and who spearheads our middle east initiative. Well introduce our speakers, so let me briefly introduce her, not that she needs an introduction to this group. Shes the founding director of the middle east program, now Public Policy fellow at the wilson center. In iran she worked as a journalist, an academic and on womens issues. She directs a complex of several museums and Cultural Centers before joining the wilson center, she taught persian language at princeton. Shes the author of reconstructed lives, women and iranians islamic revolution, and my prison, my home, one womans story of iran based on her own ordeal in iran, on months of imprisonment in prison in 2007. Let me also add shes an amazing colleague and dear friend who we at the center have been fortunate to have around. She is a institution. Shes a sought after expert on iran and ive learned a lot from her as a scholar, public intellectual as Program Manager and institution builder, and as a moderator who combines grace with draconian discipline, and im looking at our panelists, so thank you for sharing this event. The floor is yours. Thank you very much. Its an honor to be here with such a distinguished panel. I think some of us in this room remember 1979. I must confess when i saw the pictures of these students climbing up the gate of the American Embassy in tehran so shortly after the revolution, i thought they have gone completely crazy. What a thing to do, you know, and i thought, ok, theyll go in and theyll go out, and that would be it. And i believe there was an interview he gave recently, he said that he thought that the students were there to just demonstrate, and so he volunteered to go out and talk to them, and so he walked out, they locked the door behind him, and the next thing he knows, he was blindfolded and he was taken by the students. His counterpart, you know, not his counterpart, but the student who designed the whole plan gave an interview just a couple of days ago, and he said that he thought this would be a 48hour affair, and it will end, and they would send a message to america, and that was that. But it wasnt. As christian said, it lasted 444 days and just one day people of tehran, iran, heard that the hostages were put in mi ni buses, sent to the airport, and left the country and freed. To make sense of all this, this happening, we have a very distinguished panel. He we will gett, a historical background of what happened that day and during that year. He is, as was mentioned, the Deputy Director of research, the National Security archive. He is currently the director of the u. S. Iran relation project, which studies controversially events through multinational and multiarchival corporation. He was a Public Policy scholar at the wilson center, and hes the author of irancontra, reagan scandal, and unchecked abuse of president ial power. Hes a senior fellow and director of the brookings intelligence project and the senior fellow at the center of middle east policy here served under the last four president s to shape u. S. Policies and middle east, and additionally he has advised nato and Foreign Government on similar issues. He has a number of books, so i picked and choose to mention one. And hes the author of kings and president S Saudi Arabia and the u. S. Since f. D. R. I was so intrigued by the title, i read the book and its fantastic. I recommend it. Finally susan maloney, the susan maloney, i always refer to her as, because shes the top expert on iran. I think not only in this town, but in the country, and i have watched her career from day one, so therefore, i think i can say whatever i want to say. And shes the Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow in the Brookings Center of middle east policy and Energy Security and climate initiative. She had served on the secretary of state policy planning staff, and directed the task force on u. S. Policy towards iran at the council of foreign relation. She is the author of Iran Political economies since the revolution and iran reconsidered the nuclear deal and the quest for a new moderation. When i saw the word moderation, i thought wishful thinking. Ok, lets start with you. I have some thanks and an apology. The thanks are to the organizers for including me. And my apology is to all of you for not being john. I had a reminder of the effect this might have in the elevator when a person whos here in the room and heard in the elevator me saying that john was out because of surgery, she said john isnt going to be here. So i hope you dont all feel that way, but obviously i cant fill his shoes, but i can provide some historical background on the really fascinating and important episode. Ill do this in three small lightning fast chunks. The historical background, the approximate causes, and also just run through some of the dates of that event that happened during this crisis. I also brought some artifacts, some declassified documents as christian requested, and im always happy to oblige. These may help illustrate some of what im going to talk about. And i will just say before we start that im sure we all feel the same way that aside from john, the person who we most miss here is bill miller who played a part in these events and was always the strong supporter of certainly our project at the National Security archive on iran. With that, let me start with the historical background. There are three main things that i want to mention. The first is you have to go back to 1953 to understand the motivation. That is not as straight forward a proposition as you might think. In the good old days, it used to be widely accepted that the c. I. A. And the british were largely responsible for the coup against muhammad, but there have been some challenges to that thesis of late, that basically posit the c. I. A. Had virtually nothing to do with the actual overthrow, that it was really iranians by themselves. I have some problems with that, but i think dont need to get into the specifics to recognize that what is important for our purposes is the awareness that iranians believed that the United States was involved, and in fact, there is very clear evidence that i dont think anybody disputes that at least the u. S. Had the intention to overthrow. Theres absolutely no question of that, and i do have one item that has always been compelling to me. It is a cable from the u. S. Ambassador in baghdad on the 17th of august, the day after the shah fled iran after the first attempt at the coup failed. And the part that ive highlighted here says the sha fled to baghdad and has to meet with the ambassador, and the ambassador writes, i found shah warned from three sleepless nights, but with no, repeat no, bitterness towards americans who had urged and planned action. I suggested for his prestige in iran he never indicate that any foreigner had had a part in recent events. He agreed. So that to me is fairly compelling, but anyway, the point is iranians have believed for many, many years now that the u. S. Was centrally involved and that was a big part of the motivation. The second event is the 25year reign of the shah that followed his reinstatement by the u. S. And iranian forces. This was the period where all the damage was done. This was where the shah increasingly alienated the population, accrued greater and greater power to himself, became essentially a dictator, witnessed wide spread corruption and so on, all of which iranians came to resent more and more, and many of them believed, as we know, that the u. S. Was the hidden hand behind all of this, even though scholarship shows that the relationship between the shah and the u. S. Was much more complicated than that. The third event was the revolution itself and the prd that followed the 10 months or so after the departure of the shah in january of 1979 and the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini who would eventually be the Leading Light of the Islamic Republic of iran. The point here is that that event was not something that could be readily predicted at the beginning of the revolution. It was uncertain how events would unfold. Iran was in a chaotic state. There was all kinds of strife, ethnic political and otherwise, the kurds, leftist, others were all pushing and shoving, and it was a very violent and unsettled time. And this, i think, played in as well very much to the thinking of the people behind the hostage seizure who wanted to do something to advance their cause. So what were the approximate causes . I would point to three. The first is one that is not readily remembered, and that was a resolution passed by congress in may of 1979 sponsored by jacob javits of new york, which called iran to account for all the executions that were being perpetrated and generally the terrible treatment they were goiven their citizens, including jews. Why is this important . Because khomeini thought it was important. He himself took great exception to this and railed against it publicly, not failing to mention that this was a Jewish Center who was leading the charge, again,as the United States was interfering in irans internal affairs, and he made a cause celebre out of this. Charlie nass, who was at the time the acting d. C. M. At the embassy in tehran said that the endically spelled of any of his hopes for improvement of the situation, and he shortly thereafter left and was replaced by bruce langen. Much better known as a cause of the takeover was the admission of the shah to the United States for medical treatment in october of 1979, and before that time, bruce was appreciate werent in a cable that he wrote to washington in response to a query in july, so a couple of months ahead of time, in response to a query, what did i think it would mean if the u. S. Admitted the shah. He gave some background, and he said subject to this reservation, i conclude that for the shah to take up residence in the u. S. In the immediate future by which i mean the next two or three months would continue as before fore seriously prejudicial our interests and to the security of americans in iran. This was exactly how things worked out, and he was not alone in saying that. Virtually every iran expert, certainly in the state department, warned of this. But along about october 20, the word came down from the white house that the president had approved, this was a note on october 20 to the president , but then theres handwriting on the bottom that said the president called late saturday evening with approval. That didnt immediately cause the takeover. It took a little while longer, and then the final event that seemed to break the camels back was the infamous meeting between him and. And this was an event that he acknowledged he urged. He suggested strongly that he meet with him because of the lack of highlevel contacts before that time, between americans and iranians. Others thought this would be a really good idea. I dont know that he believes that they would be the one to meet with him. I think he thought David Newsome might be the person more appropriate. Be that as it may, it was made headlines around the world, and that appeared to be what set off the students following the line. Those are the three causes i would draw attention to, and i think i got a few more minutes. Then i will go through, as was requested earlier, and give just a couple of the key dates that are good to keep in mind, so november 4 is the day that the students stormed the gates. Theyd been planning this for a couple of weeks. After apparently rejecting the idea of storming the soviet embassy, which none other than he was behind, so he lost out on that. One of the results was a great deal of highly classified material was captured, the Agency Officials and others tried to burn and shred materials. The materials they shredded, the iranians managed to , amazingly, reconstruct in many cases, and then sold them at a little book stall at the gate of the embassy. These materials are actually incredibly fascinating and important for understanding all kinds of aspects of policy. Day or two after this happens, they offer emissaries to go to iran to negotiate the hostage release. Its someone who is known to have associations with iranian dissidents and bill miller, who had been tapped to be eventually the ambassador, replacing bill sullivan, but that never came about. November 6, the government collapses while the clark Miller Mission is still heading to turkey. They end up staying in turkey because they cant get access to tehran, and its a great story of how they tried to push their agenda no matter what. The Carter Administration immediately moves into action. The special coordination committee, a subset of Council Starts to meet, and weve got a lot of records declassified at the Carter Library, virtually every meeting is recorded there, and its a fascinating account of the evolution of thinking. A couple of items that i have that relate to that that just gives insight into what the top levels of the administration were thinking include this december 1979 report from brzezinski to the president where he offers his opinion about socalled difficult choices than iran, and he says at one point we need to consider military actions, which contribute to his downfall, meaning the downfall, and thats the release of hostages of obtaining the other objective, his downfall, i have set up a very small, tightly held group to see whether we can make this happen, etc. , at the end of it, carter writes in his handwriting, he says we need to list everything that khomeini would not want to see occur and which would not incite condemnation of u. S. By other nations. Now this is a little extreme what he was proposing. And in fact, there is an even more remarkable document that was available in the Carter Library , have not seen anything like this. Its from brzezinski to carter, and its entitled black room report. And my theory is that this small group, the small tightly held group that he mentions is what this black room is. And he starts off saying we have been examining the situation in iran from the standpoint of influencing the course of political developments. Goes on to list some thoughts, and he says are we prepared to accept a commitment to destabilize the situation in iran and try to replace the leadership . Carter writes in the margin, not yet. It goes on to suggest some other things that are very similar, and carter again, as is wont to do, made some handwritten notes at the end. He says be extremely cautious about u. S. Action for now. But assess options within c. I. A. Let them give me analysis of all potential anti khomeini elements. So again, this is extreme. The s. E. C. Was considering all kinds of things from dealing with student visas, freezing assets, mounting a blockade, all kinds of things are being considered. Obviously, just because its written doesnt mean that was going to happen, but it certainly is interesting that it was on the table. A couple of

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