Stints in. For those of you that are attending this very event for the second time. Many apologies and it was not as you may have assumed our speakers agenda i cause that cancellation but an exploding manhole but we are paying our bills at the Stanton Center and back at business and very pleased to be welcoming doctor chris ford back to the stage. Chris for those of you in the no and the assistant secretary of state for enough security for International Security and nonproliferation. He talked about Nuclear Security yes laughs chris is going to give a few remarks and will be time for us to ask some clarifying questions but with that chris, welcome back to stance in. Big applause thanks, brian. Its great to be back here. I applaud your persistence after last time, and rescheduling this after the explosion. It sounds so dark. Its i could not that bad. Those of you who been around washington that long i have remember there was a series of exploding manholes in georgetown back in the 90s. And for keeping at it and thanks for all of you who were willing to come back notwithstanding all the rescheduling. Its been nearly ten years since the last Nuclear Security summit was held in washington, d. C. There were three more after that, and they brought many World Leaders together to declare their support for improving security practices. We all know that. While my own view, some of the object is declared at the outset of the process were more ambitious than fax would justify but the summit deeply about the role and drawing attention to the challenges of Nuclear Security. Participating countries were encouraged to come up with or to cite up to gift baskets as they were called up promised Nuclear Security improvements. The meetings did elicit some important pledges to address Nuclear Security challenges. But a decade after president obama made his promise in 2009, to secure to secure all vulnerable material around the world, a decade later all too much remain still to be done. Where the summits played a valuable role in they must not forget about Nuclear Security. It is a challenge, i would, argue to institutionalize, and regulars, Nuclear Security. To make, good Nuclear Security, and, in the, sense as i suggested, that it becomes ordinary. And habitual. Enter national, tool, states and, stakeholders. In the same, way that everything, is to any individual human. Where the summits played a valuable role in jump starting the tensions to these, in other words, we must do together the work of making sound nuclear into a habit rather than a pledgement in a world in which terrorists do seek to acquire materials, Nuclear Security is too important not to be scrutinized. And a summit akin to a new years resolution, if you will, that so many people make in order to lose weight and get in shape, that kind of thing. Promises that may catalyze one to go to the gym and eat right and work out every once in a while and then fade back to the status quo. In the Nuclear Arena we need something more akin to a longterm health program. We need a new normal that establishes healthy patterns that can and that will be sustained indefinitely. To be sure, the daytoday, routinized promise keeping ensuring nuclear best practices and institutionalizing these practices worldwide is not easy. It lacks the intuitive draw of clashy summit promise making and theres far to go before such practices are routine everywhere, but bringing that outcome about is or should be, i would argue is the core of our Nuclear Agenda. And one of the ways, the nfcg. Improving Nuclear Security worldwide and gather notes and encourage each other and coordinate their own Sovereign National efforts to promote effective steps forward ill admit even among the members, progress is lower than one might have hoped in Generating Energy that the challenges require, but theres a good deal going on and were proud of it. As can sometimes happen in such well intentioned International Groups there is sometimes too much assumption that simply being there demonstrates a commitment to the cause and too little meaningful action. And theyre making limited progress against the toxic interests or antagonism that still exists in in some quarters, that hinder security practices and can threaten the cooperative nuclear sharing, depends upon the reassurances that are provided by good security. But we have, as ive indicated, seen signs of progress. Thanks in part to, i believe, Contact Group interventions and consciousness raising from likeminded states, theyve gradually increased the regular budget for Nuclear Security. The agency continues to increase the profile and activities levels of its Nuclear Security work as suggested in the 2013 evolution of its office of Nuclear Security to a division of Nuclear Security. Theyve made a modest, but significant step forward in 2018 with adoption of a Nuclear Security resolution. That it continues to the positive nuclear activities. Thank the language of 2019, in it, signaling that Nuclear Technology sharing is getting more sustained attention than before. The iaea a looking at ways that compliment and reinforce the agencys ongoing work on Nuclear Safety and Technical Cooperation program as well. This new focus is making sure that tc efforts are not derailed in the way that they would lead to unauthorized access. The Contact Group released a statement of collective commitments related to Nuclear Security. This document, which is now available on the nscg website is not a concensus negotiated lowest common denominator that we usually see nor is it a summary of group deliberations. Instead its an informal food for thought statement designed to pull useful strands of thinking together in a constructive way to help move channel forward more effectively. Im proud of the role the United States has played in bringing them together and helping to lead the group in this respect and hope this will indeed prove useful with constructive thoughts how states can have more thoughts within the nscg and broadly. Focus in about the paper. Many of you may have seen it, it available on the website and our commitment to a great deal of a great many things, i should say, that are important and hopefully can contribute to a National Agenda in this respect. To begin with it reiterates our commitment to the principles that the circular of 899 sent around that founded nfcg. Making it clear that the principles are at the core of where the group is coming from and makes clear that good Nuclear Security is required in order to prevent Nuclear Proliferation and in order to ensure the maintenance of a Strong Foundation for sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of Nuclear Technology. Now, that latter statement, i would argue is particularly important because it highlights the way in which, rather than competing with each other, Nuclear Security and Nuclear Technology sharing actually go hand in hand. Specifically, Nuclear Security improvements are a crucial enabler for benefitting the pieces of Nuclear Technology worldwide because they help form the Foundation Upon which rests the global system of Technology Sharing that has provided untold benefits to all human kind in which we intend to help preserveand which we intend to help preserve for many years to come. The quote from the paper. It probably seems to you like it does to me basic common sense and it would be difficult to imagine the continuation or expansion of today as worldwide sharing of the benefits of nuclear know how. Without confidence that Nuclear Technology and materials would be reliable kept out of the hands of unauthorized persons such as terrorists. Nevertheless, there are still some people who dont see good Nuclear Security practices as an enabler, instead worrying that where they exist in some kind of tension with the global enterprise. Thankfully this is wrong and im proud that the commitment paper makes it clear that there is not a tension here, but rather, a strong complementary. But the paper doesnt just voice this important insight how security reinforces sharing, its a number of practical themes and emphasis and points it out, points of focus for us where they can be more. Stresses which will be an adequate nuclear and regulatory frame work. Pointing out also the countries can play an Important Role in assisting each other as appropriate, in developing and maintaining Capacity Building. It makes clear that states that strengthen, excuse me, should strengthen their own legal and Regulatory Framework by promoting addherence to and such as the convention on the physical convention of Nuclear Material and International Convention for the acts of Nuclear Terrorism. As well as universal implementation of resolution 1540 which seeks to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction for goods and know how and relative transfers between states are appropriately regulated. The importance of all states improving their own National Security practices, such as through protecting against insider and cyber threats. Strengthening the security of forces, ensuring the preparedness and coordinating with support centers and assuring best practices. And this expands the Nuclear Security efforts as well encouraging this work in its regard and stressing that the agency must undertake this agency must undertake this work with vig gar and promoting activities with the resources and political and Institutional Support and encouragement that they need in order to succeed. And the budget for Nuclear Security and corps activities and new donors with the Funding Sources within the funding base. The paper advocates for close coordination between the tc program and nuclear support plans. Noting again the Critical Role of security as an enabler, sharing the benefits of peaceful uses of technology. In our view, this paper is a valuable way forward to help guide all of our collective approaches here and useful. I encourage people to read it and spread awareness of the points that it raises. Were trying to use this as a stepping stone for our own engagement with other partners in this and like minded states in the Nuclear SecurityContact Group can and will do likewise. In practical terms, the work that were doing at the state department, for example, in addition to working bilaterally with our partners, we have a great deal of engagement with the Capacity Building that was referenced in the paper itself. Our office of Nuclear Energy safety and security, for example, leads efforts to develop and implement policies and diplomatic strategies related to Nuclear Security such as cochairing u. S. Coordination bodies focused on Nuclear Security and this Group Supports our engagement with the Contact Group and serves as the departments lead on interagency physical protection, assessment teams charged with u. S. Obligated moves abroad and efforts of that sort. Our office of multilateral and Security Affairs implement in the offices, excuse me the efforts of the iaeas division as i mentioned before. To minimize risks associated with vulnerable material. Our weapons of mass destruction Terrorism Office against it, rather than for it, provides a focal point for our work against terrorists, providing nuclear or Radioactive Material outside of regulatory control, including those lost during the breakup of the soviet union. The wmpt office manages our role as the cochair of the 89 member Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism. Which is one of the bright spots of the u. S. Russian cooperation. And the cochair with the russians and we recently are going to have a new iteration of that cochairmanship that started up last year and thats a quite effective cooperation, i must say. So, we work with the Nuclear ForensicsInternational Technical working group to identify best practices and Nuclear Forensics, and u. N. Office on drugs and crimes. These are how we engage on these issues and through our office of export control cooperation we do a great deal of Capacity Building assistance to help countries bring up best practices in ways that complement these goals, very effectively as well as in our office of cooperative reduction. Thats just a sampler of the ways that the departments engage in these questions. But let me finish up in terms of drawing out where we see the conceptual challenges as we look ahead at the future. If you were to ask me what i think the main challenges are as we try to move from the era of promise making to this era of what i think of as institutionalized promise keeping, normalizing best practices, i might point to what some might pithely say two camps. Some may fall short for adequate security. For one reason or another they cant get the standards. They might not be aware of the need for good Nuclear Security in some particular context or might not be aware of what best practices actually entail. The second cant relates to possible failures of education or capacity such as where despite good intentions, a government may not know how to strengthen Nuclear Security in its country in order to come up to appropriately high standards or perhaps lacks the resources or capabilities necessary to do so, thats the second cant. The third cant relates to governmental brand width and such as where a government may not be able to address Nuclear Security properly because relevant leaders or personnel are preoccupied with some other pressing channing or threat in their context. As a practical matter its not easy to solve the challenges provided by the three cants. But much of it anyway that we engage in in the bureau as well as the department of energy and the Nuclear Regulatory commission, not to mention in the iaea as well, and most handles these particular problems and theyve got a pretty good track record working with countries to improve things, where it comes to the cants. And what i describe as the wont. Some countries choose to deemphasize Nuclear Security or perhaps even hostile to it. The first potential wont relates to the perceived costs of economic interest such as where parties convince themselves proper security measures will unduly increase expense. And the capabilities that they wish to acquire. The attitude may tempt them to cut corners, sometimes potentially quite dangerously. Similarly, a supplier may see security as a needless cost that could be cut to the sales or market share. All such thinking i would argue is shortsighted such as with Nuclear Safety, if you are truly worried about cost, the worst possible outcome would be to face a Dangerous Nuclear incident resulting from ones own negligence. All the same it can be a problem. Thats the first wont. The second wont is more of pathology of outlook, if you will. Believe it or not, as i indicated before. Some countries may still resist Nuclear Security measures because they feel that a focus on security is perhaps some kind of a western imperialist imposition or some such. At best, i think such a contention is simply silly. At worst, such positions might in fact smack of a sort of shameful cultural essentialism or racism as if to apply that common sense can be monopolized by a particular culture and people of the global south are incapable of them. We should resist any such nonsense and rebut it.