Thank you all for coming today and staying for the full day and for this final panel. Im brian catoulus for the center for American Progress. Every day it seems like president Trumps National security approach seems like a daily train wreck across the board and on iran, in particular, it feels like a train wreck. But lets be clear. We are where we are today on iran by no accident. What President Trump is implementing right now is an approach which is erratic, its confused but its the product of a very concerted effort to undermine what i thought was important work under the Obama Administration. Many people in the room were part of that inside the government or outside. And we have a great panel which john has introduced and im not going to go through the bios and things like that. What were going to do today is have a bit of a conversation for a few minutes, talking about where are we and where do we go from here. Thats the main thrust, but then were going to draw you in. Theres so much expertise and its such an important issue. 2020 has started with i think a very negative, and in fact frightening note for most folks, and the centers for American Progress for years has been at the core of this. Many years ago, we released a strategy called contain and engage, and i think i saw joe here earlier, and an drink gr grotto, were authors of that. As larry said, these ideas were templates. These were ideas that offered thoughts about where to go, and i think in some ways, this informed where things went in a constructive way. But what were going to do today is assess the category 5 hurricane that were experiencing right now, try to gauge where were going to be a year from now, if we can, and talk about where do we go from here. Let me first start with anne from from rand. Lets start where we should start with iran in the region and the implications of whats happened, not just in the past week or ten days but of the trump strategy. Take us through that, and well talk about how we got here with policy, and where do we go from here. Sglf thank you for having me, and for this timely conversation. So because, i guess, weve had basically one new cycle per hour since the beginning of 2020, i thought i would start with a bit of an overview of what is going on domestically in iran as we speak, a lot going on, and then talk a little bit about the renal, and because thats region, and because thats not enough, wrap it up with the Nuclear Issue. In november, in iran, there were a lot of protests. People in the United States were wondering if the regime was about to collapse any second. The regime was very effective and efficient in tracking down and more so than it had been in the past. Over the course of 72 hours, they shot down the internet, killed several hundred people, and essentially managed to get the protests under control. Then, of course the president allowed, authorized the killing of soleimani, and it seemed like everything changed overnight where people in iran were no longer protesting corruption, mismanagement, incompetence from their own government, and they had turned their attention to supporting and rallying around and essentially protesting the u. S. Action and decision to kill soleimani. So the conversation changed massively, and of course then the irgc came out and took responsibility, kind of shockingly, its not something they typically do. Theyre not an organization that is known for accountability, taking responsibility, and they did that for a change, saying that, you know, they had down the airliner accidentally, and they tried to take responsibility for that, and tha that of course started the protests all over again, and have been ongoing since. They have been going on for three days. This as were all wondering, whats going on in iran. What do we make of it. How does it feed into u. S. Policy. As a political scientist, and someone whos been alive over the past few years, and has watched public oven kind of go up and down in this rnt ccountr think its really important we recognize how fragile and how unpredictable and unreliable Public Opinion can be and to hold two ideas in our heads that it is possible for the iranian people at the same time be frustrated with their government, believe it is incompetent, corruption, and it has put them where they are today, while at the same time, wanting to prevent a conflict with the United States just bearing in mind that for the majority of iranians today, iran iraq war is not something they read about in the history books. Its something they grew up with, their families have experienced. For them, the concept of a conflict with a superior adversary is essentially reminding them of their cities getting bombed and people having to go down to shelters to make sure they dont end up dead. So you know, they can have these two ideas at the same time. They can be opposed and frustrated to their own government but they can also want to make sure that things dont escalate and show unity and rally mind their government in the face of a foreign add verify adversary. In my view, something the administration is not doing well enough and something to bear in mind, its fine to wish for the regimes collapse and hope for a liberal democracy in iran, that is fantastic, and not to plan for it. Not to make policy based on this notion that the regime is about to collapse this year or even in a decade, and we should be really thinking about our National Security and interests and put those at the forefront, rather than hoping for something to happen. So that brings me actually to the question of the region and the maximum Pressure Campaign, and how thats been playing out. I think if were generous with the administrations maximum Pressure Campaign, we can say that it has had some tactical successes here and there. For example, if we take the administrations word at face value, you know, brian hook says this quite frequently, secretary pompeo has alluded to this. Iran may have less cash to be spending to nonstate groups in syria, lebanon, and iraq, and thats that good thing, right. But to me, the point of the maximum Pressure Campaign, again, if we take the administrations own stated objectives at face value is not to have some tactical successes here and there, its to seek a fundamental change in behavior along the 12 points that secretary pompeo has laid out. And there i think it is quite clear today that as of right now, that has been essentially a failure, that iran has not changed its behavior, in fact, it has doubled down on a lot of behavior that we find so problematic, and it has pushed the envelope in a way that it hadnt in recent years, and it has done so very visually. You know, the fact that you had the strikes against bases in iraq, directly trying to target u. S. Interests and presence in iraq is something that i think we can attribute to how, to the cycle of escalation that has brought us to where we are today. Were seeing a similar situation with the nuclear file. Iran of course announced last week in the middle of all this that it was taking the 5th and theyve said final step to dial down compliance with the jcpoa. We dont really know what that entails quite yet, and contrast to some of the previous steps that they had announced which were very practical, quite concrete. This time around, this was more of a political statement. They said that they were going to see themselves as no longer bound by the limits that were imposed under enrichment program, but they havent said exactly what theyre going to do next. We have to stay tuned and see how that plays out. What actions they actually take concretely, concretely,ny, and at least from my perspective, and a u. S. National security perspective its good news theyre continuing to work with the ieaa, not doing anything to dial down the access of the agency, and inspectors to iranian facilities and the Nuclear Program but certainly in the next few months, we will find out what they intend to do, the europeans having triggered the dispute resolution mechanism today may add more to their c l calculus, and lead them to take more action. Here too, we have seen iran doubling down and pushing the envelope on the Nuclear Program rather than scaling it back as the administration had hoped, so, you know, in general, you asked me to sort of give you my assessment. Its quite bleak. I think weve actually taken quite a few steps backwards instead of taking steps forward in terms of changing all the behavior and actions and policies that we find so troubling with iran. The risks are increased, the outcomes are close to nil. I want to turn to bill because you were of course involved with burns that led to the jcpoa ultimately. From a policy perspective, how did we get here . I mean, i think we all understand it, but then where do we go from here next, and later on in the conversation, as hard as it will be, well try to imagine where we might be in a year, but if you were advising today, how do you reel things back and get things back on track, what would you do . I think most people, first of all, that was just a phenomenal lay down and incredibly efficient as well in capturing the totality of this, so i wont go in detail through how we got here. I will just make an observation which is that the maximum Pressure Campaign three residentical is about producing the deal, the pressure is the point because the administrations view is that as long as theyre putting pressure on iran, something good is going to happen. Maybe just maybe the regime will collapse. But even if it doesnt collapse, maybe theyll come out with their hands up and agree to the 12 points or something close to them. If they dont come out and put their hands up and accept the 12 points, at least were squeezing them in ways that weaken them, distract them, make their lives more difficult both in the region and at home. So as far as the administration is concerned, leave aside their stated objective of the better deal and look at their actual objective. They feel like this is working. Theyve just got iran in a world in which its feeling pressure, feeling squeezed. Now, i think they also believe that a free iran is just around the corner, which is a dangerous assumption for them to be making right now. But thats basically the reason that we are where we are, because the Trump Administration essentially said we can impose all of this pressure and i think what they forgot was that iran wasnt just going to fold. It had cards to play too. And it had three cards. Moving the Nuclear Program forward, attacking shipping and Oil Infrastructure in the gulf, and then making life worse for the United States in terms of its presence across the region. It was the third of those and the attack, the proxy attack that killed American Contractor that led to the Soleimani Killing, but even if we set the Soleimani Killing aside, iran still has those three tools and still over the course of the coming months is likely to exercise those tools in various ways, to keep moving its program forward. To keep threatening at least the supply of energy through the gulf even if they dont take further action and to keep putting pressure on the u. S. Presence in iraq and other places. Now, the europeans came out today and basically said we see where youre going, especially on this Nuclear Issue, and we dont like it, so were triggering the dispute resolution mechanism under the jcpoa. I think theyre doing so not to kill the jcpoa but rather to try to deter iran, and to get iran back into some modest form of compliance. So its very difficult to predict where we will be on january 20th, 2021. Its hard to predict where we will be on january 20th, 2020. And a lot of us have made predictions, some of which have born out, and others which havent quite born out, but just for the sake of argument, lets assume that the jcpoa is terminal but not entirely blown up. It exists on life support, basically a year from now, that theres instability in the region but not outright war. And democratic president is elected and comes into office. I think that there are two fundamental projects that need to be undertaken simultaneously, and theyre connected to one another. The first is figuring out how you reestablish Nuclear Diplomacy in a way that isnt just going straight back into the jcpoa, calling it a day and walking away but is reentering an arrangement with the iranians on the nuclear file that also seeks to secure longer term guarantees with respect to Nuclear Restrictions. And sequencing that diplomacy at a moment when the iranians will be heading into their own president ial election later that spring will be very complicated and it will require deep consultations with our allies and partners who will have their own ideas for what to do about it, and then the second is how to think about the regional file in connection with the nuclear file. In the Obama Administration, we essentially said were going to do the Nuclear Issue and then not tie our hands one way or the other in terms of our ability to deal with irans regional activities. The trump argument is you have to do this all together as a single negotiation. I dont think the trump argument makes a whole lot of sense. The United States sitting across the table with iran, and negotiating the role in iraq or syria or lebanon, doesnt actually compute, like how do we work that out. That requires a regional negotiation that the United States can participate in or underwrite or play a role in and that should be connected to but on a parallel track from the nuclear file, and coming up with a way to sequence and engage conversations among the regional actors about what a longterm deescalation looks like at the same time that were executing a nuclear play. That is immensely complicated but i think necessary for whoever the next president is, ill and just close by saying i dont know whether to see a Silver Lining in the cloud that the saudis and the em remirates have looked at that period of instability, and put out feelers across the gulf to say hey, maybe we should find a different way forward here. That may or may not be the case a year from now, but i think we have to try to take advantage of the fact that there seems to have been a sobering up to a certain extent of the various players in the region about what a longer term outcome might look like, and we should lean into that, and not immediately assume that there is no possibility. There is no space for regional diplomacy, and i would just say, we shouldnt hold the nuclear file hostage to regional diplomacy, but nor should we see them as completely distinct. We have to some how see the text between the two and how you get into the specifics of that will be one of the big pieces of business Going Forward. Thanks, jake. Arian gave us a great picture of where we are now with iran and the region, and jake started us down the path of how we got theory, and where we go from here. I want to hit the pause button because this is an important issue i want to ask you about, and its one thats still very present right now in the congress, and its related to not just soleimani strike but strikes all around the world. As you know, you know, theres a big debate that were having in this country, and many in the room here take part in it with their expertise and thoughts and a lot of our colleagues do about who has the authority to go to war, and its a debate within our system here, in our democracy, but its also got International Legal implications. So i thought wed hit pause and say where are we on that debate. Where do you see sort of the action in congress, how do you see importantly also the International Dimension of how the United States has been conducting strikes like these, like the one against soleimani, but then if not too ambitious, more broadly, where are we in terms of constraining executive and you sat on it on the other side as the deputy National Security adviser and someone who served in the administration, and you were on the hill before too. So give us your thoughts on that, simple topic. Yeah, exactly. In two minutes or less. Right, exactly. All right. Well, let me start with the International Legal piece because i think thats worthwhile and it really connects in many represents to the policy pictures of both aryan and jake have identified. From a u. S. Perspective, the way we have interpreted International Law prvovides a basis for taking a, like the action against soleimani, only in three really circumstances. One is when you have a Un Security Council resolution that actually allows for that action, authorizes it, or in selfdefense or collective selfdefense. Right . And ill come back to that in a moment. Or when you have the consent of the country in which you are operating and the action that youre taking is otherwise lawful. Right, we know that number three is not an option here because iraq was very clear about the fact that they did not provide consent for this action, right, so we end up coming back to the second criteria, the sort of selfdefense, right, and recognizing that there are a lot of conflicting statements that have come out of the Administration Since the strike. It did seem at least at first as if they were claiming they were acting on an imminent threat in that circumstance, and under International Law the United States has taken the view that you can in fact take action against an imminent threat under