Thank you very much for coming. This report, strategy in indopacific. Thanks to the contributors, it has happened. I appreciate your support in the participation today. We with like to thank japan foundation, center for Global Partnership for their support of this. The opinions in the report belong to the authors. Today after i introduce the report and contributors will talk. Now introduction. This is picture i took. The rise of china and its attitude force the United States to address challenge. Vicepresident mike pence spoke at Hudson Institute, very important, and said government approach using political, economic and military tools as well as propaganda to advance its influence and benefit its interest in the United States. Given the United States need to win the competition, cooperation with likeminded countries is key because historically number of Political Partners has been a factor in the geopolitical struggle. For example, in world war i, the winning side comprised 32 countries but losing side was composed of just four. In world war ii, 54 versus 8. During the u. S. Soviet cold war, 54 versus 26. These facts indicate that the number of supporters correlate to the likelihood of winning the competition. Therefore, maintaining the improving collaboration with its allies and likeminded countries will be key for the United States. It is of increasingly importance to identify and understand the perceptions of those cooperating in this region. This is table of contents of this report. This report includes a view studying the United States, the vietnam and singapore, australia, india, british, france, eu, canada and japan. The view from the United States indicate that all countries in the indopacific realize a problem created by rising china. However, there are two different type of opinion about how to tackle the situation with china. The United States, india, australia and japan have chosen a relatively strong stance toward china. The british, france, eu and canada are trying to cooperate with the United States effort. On the other hand, vietnam and singapore are worrying about side effect of the competition. How can affected parties fill this gap . That is my policy recommendation. There are three policy recommendations, security, economy and power. The first one is security. Use test Case Scenario to demonstrate various kind of u. S. Intervention in variety of situations. These are countries like vietnam, singapore or sri lanka are worrying about one situation. If they choose a strong stance toward china, this country are concerned that u. S. And other likeminded countries will not support them enough. The u. S. Should demonstrate best Case Scenario to indicate what kind of intervention the u. S. Might do in various situations. Economy, create a new Economic Development system is not dependent upon china. The u. S. Need to assure its allies and likeminded countries the strong opposition towards china will not stop the Economic Development of those siding with the u. S. The economic structure itself need to change. The u. S. And its allies and likeminded countries should relocate their factories from china and find new markets elsewhere. Transpacific partnership, japan, eu, joint Infrastructure Projects. Using the projects, us allies and likeminded countries need to create new Economic Development system. Third one, power. Accept a new approach that combines security and economics. The problem is caused by the image china is rising power and u. S. Is declining power. However, if the u. S. Side can integrate security and economic effort, it is still very, very powerful. For example, when we talk about safeguarding Energy Supply against Chinese Submarine threat, we could try to build a stronger power, but under the current budget, it is not possible to prepare enough to safeguard extensive communication. From 2000 to 2017, china arrived 44 new submarines. The u. S. Acquired 15. Even though u. S. Is better than chinas, but the number really important. Case in point, india you uae corporation demonstrate this new idea. Set up oil storage in india. This agreement benefit both parties. India can use stored oil in emergency. For the uae, even if tankers cannot go through the strait, uae can sell oil from this storage. This economic effort helps the safeguard communication. U. S. Side can apply this india uae method to deal with china threat. Countries siding with u. S. Could set up Strategic Oil facilities in likeminded countries throughout the indopacific and share storage in peace and in emergency. Not easy to cut this network of oil facilities, it will be hard to threaten or disrupt supply of countries hiding with the u. S. This toughness would assure strong image of u. S. Security system. U. S. Side will win the competition with china. In cooperation with u. S. Allies and likeminded countries, including vietnam, singapore, asean, australia, india, uk, france, canada and japan will be key. Of course, other likeminded countries also would be key. Now is the time. Make America Great leader again. Thank you very much. Introduction has finished. Panel discussion will start. Pacific chair, dr. Patrick croning will lead the discussion. Could you please help me . [ applause ] let me congratulation dr. Magow for an excellent presentation. You can read the report. Theres a lot of material and a lot of breadth to the discussion about the likeminded countries and how they are pursuing security in the indopacific broadly. Im the asia pacific security chair here at Hudson Institute. We have a distinguished panel here to discuss a variety of views. Im going to dig in by offering a few initial comments from a u. S. Perspective, not a u. S. Policy perspective but my own. Let me try to amplify on the larger questions rather than give you talking points here. The first point is simply to say that strategy is something that is an overused word. I overuse it. Its overused in this town. Its not often meant literally in terms of providing a real strategy. There have been questions about the coherence of chinas strategic approach. Does china really have a coherent strategy . My colleague ryan newhart and i have hit a report last month called total competition in which we certainly imply they have a coherent strategy. Even we have questions about how coherent it is. Were trying to look at the facets of what is a very broadbased strategy that is trying to allow china to get its way by all means short of war. Theres no doubt that unfortunately over the last decade or so, china, especially under xi, has been more assertive in the region. I think theres been an absence of significant cost imposition on beijing. A lack of concerted pushback. I think this panel, this report in fact, is an indicator that times are changing. Theres a gathering reaction slowly to chinas assertiveness and one that the chinese cant blame simply on the narrative, the propaganda point that america is trying to contain china and prevent its rise and rightful center stage in the global stage. The reality is theres a lot of concern around the region and world about chinas actions and how china will fit in. Now, of course, china and xi are both on their back foot. Were not wishing the Chinese People ill, especially at a time when they are fighting a shared epidemic in the coronavirus. Theres no doubt the slowing of the economy in china, the mismanagement of information in particular about that spread of the virus is really calling questions about, is china the big power that it even aims to be in the 2020s . Its not starting off the decade on a high point. I do want to say that from a u. S. Policy peck speakrspective Trump Administration deserves credit for a couple of things. The first is simply trying to codify indopacific strategy and bring india and the two oceans as the Prime Minister and india and japan talked about years ago into a more strategic focus. I think this has been a very helpful enlargement of the playing field, including when you bring indopacific i came back from paris and having discussions. As soon as you make indian ocean part of the broader strategic playing field, it allows europe to enter in the discussion in so many ways because europeans see the direct interest. Yes, france has huge equity inside the asia pacific. All of europe can see the glide panel when you think about indopacific about the equities. Thats very important. I think the other thing the Trump Administration did, although they didnt always give the Obama Administration credit, the rebalanced asia which was underresourced but the conce conceptual framework that they have given credit to predecessor on this issue. I think this is an evolution of american thinking in this century about the enlargement of this indopacific and why this is going to matter in the 21st century. I think thats very important. The free and open indopacific, the report that was issued by the pentagon last may, followed up by a state Department Report to show a certain whole of government sort of approach, these are the right principles in that report in my view. Sovereignty is respected no matter a countrys size. We should all rally around that. International law norms are respected and upheld. We should all uphold that norm. Trade is free, fair, open and reciprocal. A little more contentious because you get into what exactly is fair, what exactly is reciprocal. Its the right basic principal around which we can have a discussion. Disputes are resolved peacefully. That fits in with the interest of all the countries represented in this volume, i believe. The heavy on the defense side. It was Randy Schreiber who said america did repeal without replace when it cams to the transpacific partnership. We walked away from the big trade economic package without coming up with a quick substitute for it. We didnt follow up with quick bilateral free trade agreements. We have had trouble building the kind of architecture and finance that we start to see accumulating in terms of the Development Finance corporation. We may that may be about to change. It has taken us three years to fill in that economic basket of engagement in the region. Thats critically important for all of the countries here. The three lines of effort in the report from dod, increasing joint force for power competition, thats something t the United States needs to do to make sure it can deter. But its not mostly what the region wants to hear from us. Officials want to know the United States have the capability. But they want to hear about our Economic Engagement, how we are going to manage the china relationship. Thats why being too successful on that aspect without also marrying it up with some of the economic shows you the strategic aspect. Building emerge with parliamenter parliament er partnership, we need to do that. The third point, encouraging u. S. Allies and partners to cooperate with one another. This panel i think underscores that point. Try to talk about why we do share so many interests. Theres ample room for improvement. I want to just say briefly that three things that u. S. Needs to do better. We need to define our approach to china in a more compelling fashion. By that, more holistic fashion. All of our countries rely on china as part of the global economy. Even though we are at risk of predatory procedures by china. Not constrained by the rules we are constrained by. Strategic competition, yes, the Trump Administration gets that right. Thats a priority because the United States woke up after a decade of sleeping on this on the job and we were cooperating as john lee says in his report while they were competing. Thats exactly right. There was a natural backlash that the Trump Administration pursued here in terms of needing to put a priority on strategic competition. Strategic competition is not the whole of the u. S. china relationship. We know that from the trade deal. We know that from ongoing talks with china. We need to be a little more surgical about what were talking about when we are talking about competition with china. We are talking about competition at the same time we have a cooperative relationship. They both coexist. They will continue to both coexist. Thats part of the bound competition. Same thing with decoupling. As soon as people want to say were going to decouple with china, what are we talking about . If we talking about 5g, artificial intelligence, hightech sectors in the strategy of the 2015 tenyear strategy, yes, we do need to disentangle from that and make sure we are protecting our National Security in the digital age. At the same time, we are not divorcing our economies wholly the way that some want to jump to that conclusion. First point is to make sure the u. S. Going forward better differentiates what were trying to achieve with china and what were not trying to achieve. That will make for a more compelling strategy to rally others around. Thats what we share. We share not total decoupling. We share protecting our National Security and our sovereignty and the rules. While trying to figure out a way to cooperate with china. We need to bring to the table more trade and Investment Development as i talked about. I think were seeing movement here with the development, the private sector, allies coordinating. We will talk more about that. Third point is we need a better answer to where Southeast Asia fits in or korea fits in. I think there are good answers to this. Were about to hear from richard, who is one of the best analysts from Southeast Asia. We were so successful in growing the india relationship i see a dialogue which is one of the dialogues now has kind of theres an article on this last week. It maps the dialogue about how we went from trilateral cooperation quadrilateral cooperation. These are smaller countries that fear big powers fighting over them or fighting in their area. If the strategic relationship is too successful, it may jeopardize the sovereignty, autonomy of Southeast Asian countries. Thats the concern. It doesnt have to. Most southeast all maritime Southeast Asian country leaders, except for one, right now, wants more u. S. Engagement. We will talk about which one that is. Im hopeful. Although the president doesnt love americans, we love filipinos. Filipinos love americans. We have a lot of a lot in common. I think the likeminded countries bring a certain not only capacity, not to mention values, but also in a speed and pace at which Southeast Asias institutions, as central as they remain, asean cannot move quickly when you have a lowest common denominator preacapproac. Secretly sign a deal to allow china action says to the sea of thailand, thats not cooperation we are talking about here to keep a favorable balance of power. With india and europe and australia, japan, the United States and others, we can do a lot to support Southeast Asias strategic autonomy and growth and prosperity. I will leave it there. I want to now thank this great panel. My last thought is that our shared aim should be not to contain china. Thats beijings propaganda point. A lot of chinese believe it now because they have been selling themselves on this point. We are not trying to contain china. That shouldnt be our aim. We are trying to deny any single power exclusive control over the South China Sea, indopacific. China has a shared interest in that. They wont see it now. But eventually, maybe they will. Without further ado, i want to intere introduce richard, who is a resident analyst at gma network in the philippines. He is the author of many things. Richard, i know he has pow powerpoint slides. Thank you very much. Its a pleasure to be here again. Thank you very much for arranging this and the publication. I would like to also add that we filipinos love the United States. We also love our president. Thats where the problem is. Right . I have ten countries and more than ten people to cover within ten minutes. I will try my best. Let me make it clear that asean is not necessarily Southeast Asia. If you talk about it as an organization, its a small or Medium Enterprise with no human rights. Its different from countries i will try to focus on. Hopefully we will have more people in asean. I left my clicker. You got me excited too much, patrick. Today, im going to talk about asean and china relations. Of course, when we talk about china, were talking about certain policies of the ruling regime in china, not the great Chinese People. We hope the best for them amid the occcurrent epidemic. If you want to understand how specific countries in Southeast Asia are dealing with china, the cycle is important. Ironically, it seems countries outside the asean are more in the acceptance stage, the challenge from china and the necessity to respond accordingly. When we talk about Southeast Asia countries, we fall within bargaining in t