Full eight hours talking about it. [ laughter ] the last session is often one of our favorites, and that is a round table discussion where we get all of the speakers up together to talk about some themes, to ask each other questions or ask questions of themselves, and to give you all one last time to pepper one, some or all of the panelists with your own questions. I would ask that when you have a question, if it is for a specific panelist, please name that panelist or if you want to throw it open to some or all. We are going to ask dr. Gunter bishoff to chair this panel discussion. Again id like to thank gunter for coming in and filling in for dr. Stole on such short notice. [ applause ] but before i leave the podium, i would like to introduce for the last time today dr. Gunter pitchoff, dr. Rob satino, and mr. Michael bishop. Ladies and gentlemen, gunter will start it and ill run around with the microphone. Thank you very much. Jeremy. Let me just throw a few general questions out that we could discuss, i thought. The issue came up first with sergi and was raised with rob too, Opening Statements about his growing up in cleveland, and that is what callers have called the yalta myths. Namely keep in mind there was a very good question from the audience, is this sort of the same thing that is selling out of Eastern Europe, the same thing as the selling out of china . That peaked debate in american politics. Keep in mind the context is that the republicans had been out of office since 1932. They had won big in the 46 election. And they wanted to win the white house. And this seemed to be the issue where you could blame the democrats for really doing bad things, meaning selling out china, selling out Eastern Europe at yalta. And thats how it became a bad word in the immediate postwar period. These yaulta myths, i think that as rob told us, echoed all the way into the 1970s in his ohm town, cleveland, being sold down the river. I think thats sort of an important part of the long life of yalta, particularly in american politics. I might also add that charles degall, the french president who was not inskrooited and was smarting under that for a long time, he made yalta a bad word too. And in 1968 after the soviets invaded checkoselovakkia blamed what was going on on yalta. Thats how long it was working inside. So i think the yalta myths are important topic that we out to be talking about. Which is to say that the domestic politics of u. S. Foreign policy. I think rob rightly made a good point. If you recall his conclusion was yalta was the blueprint for allied victory. And he made a good point to remind us that halting of the he willby was an issue that embryos already picked up even though it was discussed. I just might add to that that a very important reason for eisenhower to halt was he was afraid that the nazis were building a fortress down in the alps. So he sent armies down to the south to make sure that alton feston would not come into being. This alpine fortress, they had no time to prepare for such a last stand. But thats what they were afraid of, also because nazi intelligence fed them that, meaning fed it to the oss, that thats happening in the alps. There was another reason to halt would be to get quickly down to the alps. And then the issue that was raised by someone online, we might discuss too, its a very general issue, that person said, yalta, is it so different from previous conferences . Isnt this the game of diplomacy . That whatever you call quid pro quo or tit for tat, is thats whats being done . I think thats a fair question to be discussed too. Thats what id like to throw out there as potential discussion issues. But im sure there is many more. If you dont mind, ill hop on one of those. You talked about the yalta myths, selling out of Eastern Europe, the selling poland down the river or any of the other ethnic groups, east european ethnic groups that lived in cleveland with me. Theres also the roosevelt was sick, and thats why he just wasnt up to it. Theres stalin looking, church shill depressed, and then theres roosevelt. Clearly the man looks on deaths door, as he was. But i love that fact that you sent a graduate student a task of writing a Research Paper on this, looking at word counts and looking at the death and size of roosevelts interventions. I think thats another one we can stand here and write, didnt matter that much. People are still going to ask you, was the fact that roosevelt was sick at yalta, was that issue . Regarding the poles in particular, on the one hand its not a myth that the big three gathered together and decided the future of europe without much consultation with the rest of the world. So thats a reality. And that created a lot of resentment. But where mythology starts really, that the western allies were there in position, really, to get a much better deal, and didnt do that for whatever reason, either fdr was sick or there was spies in the american delegation, or that roosevelt was trying to get to cause with stalin to get the united nations, his Main International project and his legacy going. Thats where the mythology starts. Again, poles are important there because pour poles, yalta was a turning point. Thats where it was agreed that whatever government that they had in london would be replaced. And they were losing territories in the east. The mala tov line was accepted by the western allies, and that was the loss of the city in todays ukraine, which is lieu vive, which was known as lambbard, depending on the controlling power. The western borderers, what they got from germany was not supported. That was at paotsdam. That was a major turning point and disappointment. And yalta was pronounced as yalta, was a word for betrayal even into the 1980s. Maybe one more issue that was also raised throughout the conference and particularly in the paper is german reparations. So stalin demanded 20 billion of german reparations to be evenly divided between the soviet union and the western powers. Thats how evenly he wanted to divide it. He had a point. The soviet union was destroyed very badly, as roosevelt and churchill could see as they traveled to yalta through the crimea. And in order to reconstruct, german reparations were needed. However there was a lesson to be learned from world war i, that if you insist on german reparations on reparations, it might create bad flicks as it did in germany. That was one of the big issues that the nazis picked up. Dr. Plokhy remarked correctly, stalin got his 10 million, even though it was not granted yet at yalta, eventually he got it through various means. First of all, removal of industries from east germany, the same thing you did in man churia, we heard. Removal of industries. And when they realized that was not really such a good deal for them since they often didnt know how to put these industries back together in the soviet union or they became rusty in polish railiards, it is being said to, then they decided to take reparations out of current production in germany. And thats how the soviets got their 10 billion, and i might just remind you they actually took reparations from austria too. And ivesort of found out a remarkable thing. The soviets took about as much reparations out of the eurozone out as into austria. That would almost make you think the u. S. Paid reparations to the soviet union. No such thing as a coincidence. [ laughter ] that figure i thought remarkable. They took reparations the same way from german assets for removal and then reparations out of current production. And that lasted in austria all the way until 1960. Austraya delivered oil to the soviet union all the way up until 1960. But what historian has reminded us recently often, dr. Plokhy briefly mentioned it, we need to keep that in mind too, is the fact that the americans got reparations too from germany, even though they didnt demand any at yalta. How did they get it . In a smart way. They sent teams into germany to take prediction methods, to take patents out of german corporations. And apparently that then saved Companies Like dupont, who took many of these production plants billions of dollars. So it is assumed by historians that this smart way of intellectual reparations actually netted the United States 10 billion or so too. So we say it was turned down at yalta. But in the long run, both sides got what they wanted. I would like to throw in one thing also, gun ther, about this notion of myths. Theyre easiest to sell when theres a kernel of truth. I dont believe in the big lie. You just invent some crazy thing and say it enough times. Let me talk about poland. Weve taught under gradwats. I love them. They often bring certain wisdom to the table. I was in a University Class for years. A student said wasnt. Crazy this war was fought after poland . That ironic nature of what happened to the polish state after the war, feeling that it had come from one form of tyranny to the other, the germans got liberated, they got to live under the benefits of a democratic way of life at least in western germany. But the poles didnt. Whos brave stand against nazi aggressioned started the war. I know we know why it happened and i think everyone in the room knows why it happened. But you do see, thats something you can make some political what kind of Foreign Policy is that . That when poland winds up under the yokee, i looked at those casualty statistics, and poland is shocking. Not only the first to fall, but probably one of the biggest suffererers percentage wise in terms of the war as well. Im just throwing that out there. Maybe i am still channelling my youth reading those angry letters about the yalta conference. But its still there for me. Of course it was Winston Churchill who was very aware of the fact that Great Britain went to war over poland. And thats why at yalta he kept insisting that he was going to bat for poland and that polish government and declaration of liberated europe, as it was called, guaranteeing freelyelected governments in ev Eastern Europe which didnt work out, because he was mindful of the fact we went to war for poland. Churchill is the mastermind between the growth of the myth. He sat across the cabinet table in 10 downing street from michael collins, the great issuer irish revolutionary, who when he signed the anglo irish treaty said i have signed my own death warrant. That proved to be the case. He was killed the following year during the irish civil war. I think when we look back, we have to say that ultimately the decision on his part and his fellow gauche yairlgnegotiators was inevitable. They didnt have any choice. The british wouldnt have accepted the notion of an irish republic at that time. And the british war machine was primed and ready to assault ireland even more viciously than it already had. Thats a very longwinded and round about way of saying, is it the conference itself that were talking about . Or is the yalta conference simply a symbol of or a ratification of these inevitable facts on the ground and forces . Or could it conceivably have gone another way on the coast of crimea . Yeah. Well, i would like to return to lend this question in line of argument to the question that gunter posed earlier about whether yalta is just another place where its a lot of horse trading has taken place. Or there is something particular about yalta. And i would say that its not much different from the conferences that were happening before that in the World International history, with one exception. And that exception was the quite a this liberal view of president roosevelt, who of course was following in the footsteps of president wilson. This idea of liberal order and international organization. And when fdr comes back and aggresses the joint session of congress and senate and says that the old world of this spheres disappeared, we are in a completely different, different world where there is no any more secret agrievance done. So its he announced in u. N. And diplomatic relations. Then things start popping up, there is a secret agreement on the soviet participation in the war with japan. And by the way, there are problems in Eastern Europe with poland. And thats where the reality of the old sphere of influence world and the vision of the new liberal world come and clash. And from that point of view, the expectation interests yalta become much, much more higher than for any other conference, partially because the participants themselves and fdr in particular put them on that level. And one more comment on the internal politics of Eastern Europe and whether it was sold down or not, is that churchill comes back from yalta to a revolt in his own conservative party. So there are attacks on the government policy and the concessions yalta in the parliament. Because again for a lot of people in britain, britain went to far for poland. Its a major issue. And exactly as you said, what britain was getting as a result of that or the world, what was getting as a result of that . With fdr, the polish he was talking about, it seems to me, 3 to 4 million polish voters in the United States. And again, im not sure about the number. But thats what he was talking about in tehran, and he was saying, im not against in change of the polish borders, but i cant commit to that publicly before the president ial elections. Because the poles whose letters you read before that, they were the staunchest supporters of the Democratic Party that ever existed in the world. And my guess, they didnt stay so dedicated. Thats my guess as well. To after that ended. I think the secrecy of the agreement was an important point that historians have paid attention to, that it sort of trickled out what happened at yalta. You know, in the course of the spring. And i think the secret agreement on what the u. S. Had to give for the soviet union to get involved in the war in the far east, you talked about it, rob, that i think came out in february 46, if you will, a year after yalta. It was that secrecy that of course gave them the republicans the means to create the yalta myths that Eastern Europe sold down the river, which became bigger and bigger into the later 1940s. Im glad that dr. Plokhy went a bit into the history. This is how yalta was being discussed throughout the 1950s. I think it was very early, like ten years after yalta, like 1955, that Foreign Relations volumes was published, which is one of our principle source on the american side of what actually came to pass. Uhhuh. It was 55. 55. Usually takes 30 years before it is published on any given event. I dont think youre on, jeremy. Two questions. One for any or all of you, and then one very specific. The general question is that everyones used language like, u. S. Gave, or churchill gave, and so on and so forth. Specifically about Eastern Europe, can you tell me one thing that was quote given away that stalin had not already earned through military means . Thats my first question, more generally. The second is very specific to mr. Bishop. And im not sure whether you were defending churchill or setting up sort of theory about why he thought this and so on. But it seems to me theres an inhernt contradiction between your later interpretation of his being appalled at whats happening in the Eastern Europe and the fact that he wrote on the napkin. In other words, his famous napkin as i understand it was initiated by him. So either youre arguing that there was some sort of epiphany after yalta or perhaps he had guilt feelings or something. But its certainly tue that he contributed mightily to what happened after the war by his acwiessence in moscow. Get that one first. Sure. Well come to the other one. Thats a tough crowd. Yeah, it is. You make a very good point. I mentioned it only because i didnt want to present churchill as being somehow unrealistically above all of the sordid compromises involved in diplomacy and with yalta in particular. But i mean, all i can say is, he wasnt ceding complete control to stalin even on that paper, there was that symbolic 10 say for the west in romainia. I dont think that he wished for or forsaw what was going to happen later. I just think it was an example of his commitment to empire and his vision for what the world should look like in the future becoming dominant, because he was there alone with stalin, and fdr wasnt there at the time. And the irony of course is that things changed in greece so very quickly. I mean, here he forged an agreement with stalin, which ironically enough stalin kept, obviously for his own reasons, and of course britain intervenes in the civil war, but they cant main taib this commitment as i mentioned earlier, and they stepped back, and the americans step in. It wasnt churchills finest movement. Lets put it that way. And he himself said it was a naughty document and he felt somewhat uncomfortable about it. Churchill lived to be 90. He had a sevendecade almost political career. Some of his views shifted over time. Although i think hes a lot more consistent that most people give him credit for. But the fact remains even though he was horrified by the yalta settlement he also was alert to any sign there might be an opportunity for a breakthrough in relations with the soviets. And i quoted some of the things he wrote and said about the aftermath of the death of stalin and how he saw that as an opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement to the cold war. Before we get to the other question, isnt it possible to have to hold both those positions, to hand you a spheres of influence agreement and later rail on it against communism . Because he was an imperialist and under stood, and he was a bedrock anticommunism. I guess as ive gone through life ive realized were complex and one of our obsessions comes to the foreand later its replaced. I can posit a churchill who goes one way then the other. If of if churchill is your hero it could be uncomfortable to read that he vastly preferred stevenson say in the president ial election of 1952. That he was disappointed at eisenhower and eisenhowers comment was the same horror in a different dress. To be off putting and he couldnt abide, the american secretary of state who he said was the only man the only bull he knew who carried his own china shop with him. So you read some of the stuff and it makes you wonder. The fact is having been so adam ant and sincere and consistent throughout his career regarding his hatred of communism. He was horrified by the idea that the world might consume itself in nuclear war and wanted to avert that. So he was capable of change. Maintained and the consistent prin